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Abstract 
This dissertation sets the Christology of Athanasius of Alexandria in the context of 
its sources, and evaluates its reception up to the Council of Chalcedon. His well-
known emphasis upon the Son’s divinity is shown to be underpinned and 
counterpointed by a theological integration of creatio ex nihilo into his Christology. 
Recognizing the lack of continuity between the soul and divine being, Athanasius 
insisted upon the need for an ontological understanding of mediation, a project 
opposed by Arius. This dissertation demonstrates that the influence of Contra 
Gentes / De Incarnatione’s dynamic emphasis upon the Logos’s divine identity, is 
evident in both miahypostatic and dyohypostatic Christological trajectories, and 
that different aspects of the Athanasian corpus are responsible for multi-
dimensional Christological developments. The impact of Athanasius is shown by a 
re-evaluation of Apollinarius, and in an exploration of the development of 
Christological language in Antiochene and Alexandrian Christologies of the fifth 
century. The motif of ontological mediation and relation of both natures in the God-
Man in these diverse contexts demonstrates that Athanasius’s resolution was 
pivotal in subsequent Christian theology.  
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 Here have I seen things rare and profitable; 
 Things pleasant, dreadful; things to make me stable 
 In what I have began to take in hand: 
 Then let me think on them and understand 
 Wherefore they shewed me was, and let me be  
 Thankful, O good interpreter, to thee. 
 
John Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress, Part 1 (1976:44). 
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INTRODUCTION 
a. The subject of this study and its context 
 
Williams (2005) observes that historiography is never neutral. He suggests that 
the next phase of patristic study will be marked by an acute awareness of the 
distortions of historians of thought, and will be required to pursue scholars’ 
constructions critically, with an eye to the impact of social and personal 
prejudices of scholarship. This dissertation is located in the area of the history 
and development of theological ideas. Whilst it would be improperly narcissistic 
to offer an analysis of my own socio-economic, theological and personal 
prejudices, it is appropriate to outline explicitly the ways in which this study took 
shape and so offer a narrative as to how the research area developed into a 
specific study of divine mediation in and through the God-Man.  
 
An interest in the notion of divine mediation was the genesis of this research in 
1998. Athanasius of Alexandria’s well-known aphoristic climax to his De 
Incarnatione (hereafter DI), AÙtÕj g¦r ™nhnqrèphsen, †na ¹me‹j qeopoihqîmen 
(DI 54:3, Kannengiesser, 1973:458) as described in Young (1983) had fascinated 
me since encountering it as an undergraduate. It provoked a desire to explore 
the place and dynamic of the conception of salvation in Christian descriptions of 
mediation. In particular, this became focused upon how and why talk of 
“divinisation” was connected with networks of descriptions of Christology, 
creation, and humanity.  
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R. P. C. Hanson’s work, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, revealed 
the complexity and diversity of the struggle to find a language with the greatest 
capacity to speak of the Christian God during the fourth century “Arian” crises. An 
interest in assessing the roles of Athanasius and Arius in this controversy 
expanded into a desire to explore the impact each had in subsequent 
Christological debate. Arius’s initial role in focusing the question, however, soon 
gave way to a general rejection of his theology. No-one, no matter how critical 
their theology of Nicaea and ÐmooÚsioj, sought to be cast as a “new Arius”, 
whereas in the playing-out of later Christological controversies, the part of the 
“new Athanasius” was a desired role. The research thus expanded to desire to 
assess the impact of Athanasius’s thought. This is reflected in the form of this 
dissertation. Athanasius occupies central place, but the significance of his 
contribution requires an examination of the issues in figures before Athanasius, 
and an evaluation of his contribution requires an assessment of his impact in 
succeeding Christological debate. The research area thus began to explore how 
the divine and the created were construed Christocentrically in Athanasius, and 
how (and why) this achievement eventually becomes paradigmatic. 
 
Further significant factors gave dynamism and direction to the research 
represented in this thesis. My supervisor, Professor Frances Young, suggested 
that a distinctive aspect of this dissertation might be achieved by approaching 
Athanasius archaeologically rather than chronologically – that is, observing from 
primary texts after Athanasius how he was evaluated as a Christological authority 
and working backwards to Athanasius and his context. The advantages of this 
method in the research stage of this dissertation were significant. It revealed the 
 14
enormity of the contrast between the canonization of Athanasius as a measure of 
Orthodoxy (especially in Cyril of Alexandria) with the difficult reception of his 
Christological construction in the fourth century. This methodology highlighted 
the inharmonious clashes in the process of Christological development. By the 
time of Theodoret – which was my starting point – it was clear that there had 
been a cultural reconstruction of Christological arguments, which themselves 
played out (as it were) themes from earlier debates. The “reverse methodology” 
thus highlighted that the hagiographical viewpoints around Chalcedon had 
emerged from a starting point that was more bleak and complex than later 
assessments allowed. 
 
Working backwards revealed the drama of Christological development in the 
fourth and fifth centuries – highlighting many ironies at the assumptions and 
reconstructions in the process of constructing doctrine. But a problem with this 
method emerged, namely that working from identified later perspectives led to a 
tendency to find what later generations said was there in earlier texts, leading to 
an anachronistic reading of the whole. When this became apparent (especially in 
important cases, for example, of ÐmooÚsioj and prÒswpon) it was increasingly 
difficult to write with clarity. Because of the difficulty of establishing a “voice” with 
which to analyse and evaluate the complex processes of development in reverse, 
a chronological method was re-adopted, so that debates around significant 
developments might be discussed with less scope for confusion.  
 
Other secondary material which motivated the centrality of Athanasius and the 
appropriateness of focusing upon the theme of mediation and its implications for 
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descriptions of divine and human being included the inaugural lecture of F. L. 
Cross, given on 1st December, 1944 in Oxford, in the dark days of the Second 
World War, conveying a passion to evaluate Athanasius by scholars of all nations 
after international conflict had ceased. T. F. Torrance’s unusual study The 
Trinitarian Faith (1997) likewise conveyed an energy in these ancient textual 
disputes to witness to the peculiarities and nuances of Christian conceptions of 
mediation and salvation. Alongside Hanson’s magisterial Search (1988) – though 
very different in genre - both communicate the magnitude of the significance of 
Athanasius’s provocation to conventional Christological assumptions, set as they 
were in a hierarchical Platonism of late Antiquity. 
 
Another major reading of Athanasius, Anatolios’s Athanasius: the coherence of 
his thought (1998) located Athanasius in the worlds of Middle Platonism (sic), 
Judaism and especially the Biblical approach of Irenaeus of Lyons.  This work 
provided both an approach to test and an agenda, using mediation to focus the 
genesis and impact of Athanasius’s Christological discussion. Anatolios’s reading 
achieves a convincing description of Athanasius’s thought, an exploration of 
mediation might evaluate the influence of the Patriarch’s Christological 
achievements.  This thesis therefore tests Anatolios’s argument, particularly that 
the Patriarch hones his native Alexandrian theological tradition through his 
engagement with the Biblical theology of Irenaeus of Lyons. The first Chapter of 
this thesis explores some Christological norms Athanasius inherited, leading to 
an evaluation of his transformation of them. 
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Frances Young’s challenging 1997 study Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of 
Christian Culture has had an important impact on the form of patristic endeavour 
– especially in locating exegetical discussions of the Arian conflicts and the 
Christological Controversies in the context of the creation of cultural readings of 
the period. Athanasius’s Christology becomes identified centrally with the 
struggle to establish a Nicene Trinitarian culture as his legacy. The task of testing 
these emerging evaluations, and of resisting a reduction of them into a singular 
sweep (as I believe is a tendency in recent important readings relevant to this 
assessment by Ayres, 2004, and Wessel, 2004), is also an objective of this 
dissertation. The complexity of the issues is lost in such overviews, and because 
of this, the dissertation is pitched upon key primary texts to prevent a collapse of 
a multi-dimensional picture into an improperly “linear” reading. Moreover, the 
chief aim of the thesis is to establish, through this analysis, the degree of 
Athanasius’s contribution to the development of Christology and the dynamic 
which mediation contributes to this.  
b. The selection of texts in this study 
 
With these objectives in mind, it is clear that a discursive and creatively 
connected style was required, both in terms of selecting appropriate texts, and in 
their use (see c, below). In part one, which explores some models of 
Christological construction before Athanasius, the discussion pivots on three 
characters: Justin Martyr, Irenaeus of Lyons, and Origen. In this section, texts 
are used to compose a theological ouverture highlighting key Christological 
questions and method. In the case of Justin, the two arenas of engagement with 
host and mother cultures are determining contexts for his method of 
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Christological explication in his Apologies and Dialogue. Additionally, because 
Justin marks the beginning of this study, this section is inevitably lengthy as 
issues and ideas are introduced for the first time. Irenaeus is explored primarily 
through his Epideixis (in translation) – because this is explicitly a brief Rule of 
Christian Faith and therefore more focused and positive, though reference is also 
made to his heresiological work (AH). Origen is explored through the Peri Archon 
and selections from other works in his corpus. But these explorations are 
restricted because of their place in the thesis to be more thematic in nature than 
sustained readings of texts. 
 
A central section explores Athanasius’ early dual tractate Contra Gentes / De 
Incarnatione (henceforth CG-DI) first, because this is recognized to have been an 
early work, and – as will emerge in the thesis – is a basis for a host of “Nicene” 
arrangements of doctrine – including that of Apollinarius. The second chapter in 
the Athanasian section explores the conflict with Arius as Athanasius reads it, 
and here may be observed a considerable degree of modification and 
clarification of terms, which are used more loosely in CG-DI. The anti-Arian 
literature is thus the prime material for chapter 3. It is here that a reading of 
Arius’s Christology – as a contemporary Alexandrian theologian with Athanasius 
– is analysed. 
 
In order to test the reception of Athanasius, Apollinarius has been selected as the 
writer to represent a reading of Athanasian Christology that will come to be 
rejected as heretical. This chapter will, however, attempt to show continuities 
between Apollinarius and Athanasius. Other examples of what has been coined 
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miahypostatic Christology – especially that of Marcellus – are more distant from 
the early Athanasius, being (in the case of Marcellus) at once more creative and 
more primitive – transforming an earlier Logos Christology, conceiving the Logos 
to be projected from God and ultimately re-assimilated. Apollinarius’ Kata Meros 
Pistis (KMP), however, provides an example of post-Athanasian Christology – a 
reading from which Athanasius reluctantly distances himself. 
 
The part of this thesis that took most editing and revision was the chapter 
analysing Cyril and Nestorius. It was difficult to break free from the fascinating 
and dark narrative of the period in order to look at each Patriarch’s theologies. 
The correspondence between the characters remains a prime focus for this 
discussion, but there is a real need for an exploration of Nestorius’s theology as 
being rooted in a reading of Athanasius. In seeking to show the influence of 
Athanasius on both parties, different dimensions of Athanasian thought are 
drawn out of Nestorius’ argument. A recent important collection of essays edited 
by Thomas Weinandy and Daniel Keating, St Cyril of Alexandria: a Critical 
Appreciation offers a more nuanced and focused evaluation of Cyril’s thought; 
this chapter attempts, in response to that example, a reading of Nestorius’s 
Christology preserved in the Book (or Bazaar) of Heracleides (in French and 
English translation from the Syriac). The point of this chapter remains to evaluate 
the impact of Athanasius upon an emerging Christological location of mediation. 
Susan Wessel’s 2004 study attempts to show that Cyril claimed Athanasius by 
rhetorical tropes, but the chapter in this dissertation urges that theological 
continuity with his predecessor marks the core of what Cyril is attempting to do, 
even if his methodological Realpolitik is multidimensional in its approach, using 
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rhetorical, political and ideological strategies. So, in depicting his rival as the new 
Arius, Cyril claimed to be the continuation of the heretic’s nemesis, Athanasius – 
even though a key notion was grounded not upon an Athanasian but an 
Apollinarian text. 
 
The final chapter evaluates the significance of Athanasius to the later Antiochene 
theological tradition by analysing the place of Athanasius in the text and theology 
of Theodoret of Cyrus. Both the text and citations (in the florilegia) of Theodoret’s 
Eranistes are used to evaluate how Athanasius was claimed by the theological 
tradition most hostile to the later Alexandrian attempts to monopolize Athanasius. 
Theodoret is significant because, although Nestorius claims Athanasius for his 
Christological arguments, Theodoret does so in a measured, and referenced way 
– even if some of his citations are from texts now established to be deutero-
Athanasian (as was the case with Cyril). This does not matter in this context 
because there is no suggestion that Theodoret manufactured this attribution. 
Attribution at this point is evidence enough of the reputation of Athanasius in the 
discussion. 
 
This thesis therefore attempts to establish, by a focused exploration of the 
Christological worlds of significant figures before and after him, that Athanasius 
begets and drives Christological controversy uniquely in the fourth and fifth 
centuries. His early articulations in the CG-DI require further explication in the 
Contra Arianos where he makes sophisticated Christological accommodation for 
a shift in the hierarchical schematization of mediation.  
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By focusing upon Athanasius’s impact and reception, this dissertation describes 
a shift in an understanding of divine mediation which necessitated an 
accommodation by traditional (mostly Logos-) Christologies. Late Antiquity’s 
underlying assumption that despite different orders of being there was an 
overlapping hierarchy enabling formal participation under strict conditions is 
rendered inappropriate by the acceptance of creatio ex nihilo. At the outset of the 
fourth century, there is an unbreachable gulf between the divine and the created, 
a description most explicitly articulated in the Christology of Arius. Athanasius’s 
acceptance of this gulf is as radical as his solution – salvation and mediation are 
only properly construed as the coming together of creatureliness and divinity in 
the Christ – the God-Man. 
c. Mode and genre of this dissertation 
The selection of key texts, and the thematic connection of these throughout this 
study, places this dissertation in the realm of the history of theological ideas, 
rather than history proper, or the establishment of a key text with critical 
apparatus, or detailed exegesis of texts. A reconstructive methodology is 
required to identify continuities and to establish differences not just between 
texts, but between the worlds of these texts. Consequently exegetical analysis 
gives way to a tentative exploration of the environment of each text. This requires 
a methodology which is reconstructive and possibly, at times, conjectural. There 
remain difficulties – it cannot be assumed, for example, by the mere existence of 
these texts, that there is any formal connection or causality in the realm of ideas. 
Neither can this difficulty be resolved by detailed exegesis, nor a more general 
“opencast-mining” model of establishing a generalized overview. An analogy 
appropriate to this dissertation’s style is one employed in a conversation with the 
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late Professor J. Neville Birdsall: that of sinking mineshafts into the theological 
topography to identify where the strata are at given points in time. This method 
allows some evaluation of the layers and development of Christologies. This 
accounts for the sense of an overarching or theological evaluation of the texts in 
this dissertation. It is acknowledged that the cost of this approach is that it 
sacrifices close exegesis for a broader, thematic analysis, using the evidence to 
build up a systematic picture rather than to engage in specific textual arguments. 
The justification for this is that this essay is primarily concerned with observing 
the history of religious ideas, and Athanasius’s place in the emergent models of 
speaking of God’s connection with creation. Clearly these descriptions are 
grounded in the texts selected, but Athanasius remains the lens through which 
these are read. 
d. The particular contributions of this study 
An evaluation of Athanasius, whose reputation was formed by the conflict with 
Arius and who embodied this conflict in his long episcopate and exiles, is best 
achieved when set in a longer-term context – from second-century attempts to 
articulate Christology, until the preservation of the tensions inherent in 
Christological description at Chalcedon.  
 
The bringing together of these texts and the worlds they represent establish the 
centrality of Athanasius in the emergence and honing of Nicene Christological 
description. The thesis highlights in particular his contribution in establishing a 
place for creatio ex nihilo in Christology in opposition to Arius’s pattern based 
upon the assertion that “there was when the Logos was not”. Athanasius uses 
the themes of created nature and eternal being in a counterpoint. This is re-
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presented with many variations in succeeding Christologies of the fourth and fifth 
centuries, but all depend upon Athanasius’s attainment. In particular, it is argued 
that Athanasius’s language in CG-DI begat Apollinarian theology, as well as 
providing the archetype to which Cyril appeals in his arguments with Nestorius, 
while also being a foundation for Nestorius’s position, and an authority to the 
Antiochene tradition of Theodoret in a more nuanced way. Athanasius’s centrality 
in the process, and the reception and manipulation of the patterns in CG-DI 
throughout the period provides a different approach and perspective to Ayres’s 
2004 Nicaea and its Legacy. He writes  
 
Major texts by authors are not extensively considered where their 
influence is hard to trace. Thus the reader will look in vain for any 
extended treatment of Athanasius’ On the Incarnation: but the same 
reader will also look in vain for any substantive evidence that this treatise 
had any effect on the later fourth-century readers I discuss. (2004:5). 
 
It is hoped that the reader may find satisfactory evidence of this influence in this 
dissertation.  
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PART ONE 
CHRISTOLOGICAL CASTINGS IN A PLATONIC 
MOULD 
THE RELATION BETWEEN DIVINE BEING AND CREATED 
NATURE IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY BEFORE ATHANASIUS OF 
ALEXANDRIA 
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CHAPTER ONE: A CONSTRUCT AND ITS ORIGINS:  
THE CONTOURS AND DYNAMICS OF CHRISTOLOGY BEFORE 
ATHANASIUS. 
 
The greater one’s ability to place theologies within the traditions that 
nurtured them, the better one understands their dynamic (Ayres, 
2004:20). 
 
1:1 Introduction: The backcloths of pre-Nicene Christology 
 
Christology attempts to depict the work and person of Jesus Christ in terms 
accessible to the concepts of the intellectual and religious worlds in which it is 
constructed. After introducing some key texts which were powerful in forging the 
cosmological and theological emphases of late Antique Christianity, this chapter 
focuses upon the work of three figures in order to show how fundamental 
theological questions – and different patterns of responses to them – emerged 
around the issue of the relation or mediation of God to creation, and, in particular, 
the Christological location of that connection. The purpose of such an enterprise 
is to set questions Athanasius addresses directly in contexts which illustrate the 
significance of his construction of a coherency in the struggles after Nicaea. 
Conversely, they will also illustrate the cost of his achievement in terms of the 
statement of Christian faith less in terms of engaging or transforming narrative 
and more in terms of processed interrelated ideas.  
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 Part one is, therefore, not a systematic description of the second and third 
century contexts of Athanasius but, rather, sketches other attempts to move from 
part-processed theological narrative into a language of more systematic scope 
(Williams, 2001). 
 
This dissertation explores critically the role of these questions in the Arian or 
Nicene battles of the fourth century, and their continuation in the so-called 
Christological controversies up until the Council of Chalcedon.  Exploring the 
evolution and development of ideas in their relation one to another, the purpose 
of Part 1 is to identify key theological trajectories cohering around Christology, 
often discussing or reflecting upon assumptions about, divine mediation in the 
Son.  
 
To avoid a generalised depiction of intellectual, theological and social milieux, 
providing at best a pastiche of imagery, connecting figures have been selected to 
focus this background. The Christian appropriation and application of cultural 
philosophical assumptions in theological texts is particularly evident in the 
discussion of attempts to account for the relation of Father and Son before 
Athanasius. The aim of this explication of themes is to demonstrate the 
distinctiveness (in terms of theological articulation and content) expressed in the 
CG-DI. After resistance and competing interpretations of the Christology of this 
central figure, Athanasius eventually becomes appropriated by all sides as the 
archetype of orthodox Christology in the mid fifth century – even if what he is 
saying is still a matter of heated debate as late as Theodoret.  
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 Three figures from the history of early Christianity through whom assumptions 
and explicit theological arguments may be more readily identified, are selected to 
expose something of the models of Christological method before Athanasius. 
They are Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, and Origen of Alexandria.  
 
Before commencing an exploration of these theologies, it is appropriate to justify 
their choice as representatives of Christian thought before Nicaea by elucidating 
some significant connections between these figures. 
 
Each experienced cultural fluidity, negotiating degrees of dislocation in their life 
and theology: Justin’s origins, though Roman in culture, were Samaritan in terms 
of his formative years; Irenaeus, originally from Asia minor became bishop of the 
Church at Lyons after persecution (which may itself have been rooted in cultural 
suspicion); Origen’s difficulties with the patriarch of Alexandria accounted for his 
migration from his home to Caesarea. The theologies of each of these figures, 
then, were worked-out in relation to a hostile state and the pressing needs of 
their communities.  Each knew persecution first hand, and ministered among 
communities experiencing martyrdom. They shared a fundamental response: 
each articulated their concern to reject Gnostic theodicies. Though it will be 
observed that they differ in their descriptions of creation, they exhibit a common 
refusal to respond to persecution with any concomitant rejection of creation as 
merely entropic. 
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There are also, of course, significant differences, which are valuable to register a 
diversity of theological perspective in the period. Their contexts were contrasting: 
Justin taught in Rome in the early second century, Irenaeus wrote in the late 
second-century as bishop of Lyons, whereas Origen’s massive theological 
outpourings have both Alexandrian and Palestinian settings in the first half of the 
third century. The use of these three figures therefore provides enough diversity 
to allow an evaluation of the chronological and topographical differences in early 
Christian understanding of mediation.  
 
Moreover in terms of justifying their presence in a thesis focused primarily upon 
Athanasius, there is a yet more significant reason to explore the context through 
them. In all probability, there is connection between all three figures and 
Athanasius, which is important in an exploration of his expression of mediation as 
a central theological and Christological concept. Athanasius knew Justin 
probably mediated through Irenaeus (Behr, 1997:11-14). Droge (2006:238) 
argues that Celsus may well have responded to Justin – making Justin a more 
significant and provocative figure than has often been allowed, and providing a 
link with Origen.1 Athanasius read Irenaeus with a characteristically Alexandrian 
interpretation. Irenaeus’ Adversus Haereses (AH) was a valuable tool in forming 
the shape of Alexandrian Christianity (Anatolios, 2004:2), whose work was 
sought in that province “not long after the ink was dry on the author’s manuscript” 
(Roberts, 1979:54 in Anatolios, 2004:243). Yet Irenaeus was received by 
Athanasius through the spectacles of a specifically Origenian hermeneutic 
                                                 
1 The possibility that Celsus was responding to Justin, suggested more than a century ago by 
Elysée Pélagaud, was argued at considerable length by Carl Andresen in his magisterial Logos 
und Nomos of 1955 (fn.: Especially pp.345-372). Andresen has convincingly shown that Celsus 
employed the same strategy as Justin, although with completely opposite results. Droge, 
2006:238-239. 
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(Anatolios, 2001:463, 465, 469). A critical examination of their assumptions about 
mediation, evident in their Christological constructs, illuminates the significance 
of Athanasius’ contribution in CG-DI, and thereafter – with some self-conscious 
and urgent explication – in the Contra Arianos (CA). If Athanasius did not 
manage a synthesis of Irenaean biblical theology with the Alexandrian 
philosophical tradition (which was, after all, no-where his stated intention), he 
does at least provide a model of Christology working within certain set 
boundaries, a model which works by reference and movement within those 
margins rather than as a linear or monolithic dogmatic system. The fact that he 
further refines his model after weaknesses in his manner of describing the 
person of the Son in CG-DI were exposed in the fourth century conflicts, as well 
as extending this discussion to include the Spirit in his later writings, bears 
witness to one working by referential connection (like Irenaeus and Origen). 
Before turning to explore the texts of these figures in a sustained manner, it will 
prove useful to set their agendas in the broader room of late-antique philosophy. 
 
1:2 Platonic moulds for the casting of ideas of Mediation in Christian 
Theology before Nicaea 
Christological speculations are traceable in the New Testament, but it is not until 
Platonism begins to organize these that it is appropriate to speak of a conceptual 
model. Crucial for the development of that model are particular strands in the 
early material. Dunn (1996) draws attention to one strand, perceived as 
provocative to contemporary monotheistic mind-sets, and which has an impact in 
the “two powers in heaven” controversy of the Rabbinic period as well as 
Christological development. Whether this was a form of bi-theism as caricatured 
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by the authors of the Rabbinic writings, or a form of dualism which finds most 
extensive description in Gnostic material (Dunn, 1996:80f, after Segal, 1977) is 
less significant than its witness to a concern to “protect” the divinity of God and 
the creatureliness of humanity and yet allow authentic mediation and 
participation.  
 
One significant force in the development of attempts to allow such mediation is 
an extension of conventional Wisdom language from periphrastic or reverential 
speech, (which sought to protect the transcendence of God) into a more 
ontologically hypostasised sense. This elevation of wisdom, personified as 
Sophia, can be seen in Sapientia (The Wisdom of Solomon, probably an 
Alexandrian work of around 50BCE (Wright, 1992: 510)). Here, Sophia is very 
near to God, perhaps even the sole aspect of God intelligible to humanity: 
 
For in wisdom there is a spirit intelligent [noerÒn] and holy, unique 
[monogenšj] in its kind, yet made up of many parts, subtle, free-moving, 
lucid, spotless, clear, invulnerable (or, working no harm), loving what is 
good, eager, unhindered, beneficent, kindly towards men, steadfast, 
unerring… For wisdom moves more easily than motion itself, she 
pervades and permeates all things because she is so pure. Like a fine 
mist she rises from the power of God, a pure effluence from the glory of 
the Almighty [¢pÒrroia tÁj toà pantokr£toroj dÒxhj e„likrin»j].2 
 
                                                 
2 Wisdom of Solomon 7:22b-25a, LXX. 
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The quasi-materialistic description of the spiritual nature of Sophia, here, as 
interesting as it is (perhaps as a means of subordination to the absolute divine 
being), is of less significance than the assertion that Sophia is an emanation or 
spiritual manifestation of God:  
 
Right from the book of Job, Sophia had been radically related to 
God. Now her connection is expressed in a manner that even goes 
beyond “begetting” (Prov. 8:22) or “coming forth from God’s mouth” 
(Sir. 24:3). As R. E. Murphy says, in a sort of effusion, radiation, or 
emanation from the divinity, she emerges as a “reflection” or “mirror 
image” of God (O’Collins, 1999:28).3  
 
This provocative picture opens the possibility for new spiritualities and theologies, 
which counterbalance absolute monotheism, or mediate the awesome 
transcendence of God – such a model of projection and ultimate divine 
recapitulation motivate creative Logos theologies like those of Marcellus. The 
cosmological consequences of such a picture of the mediation of God’s purposes 
through Sophia remain normative in patterns of salvation and cosmology 
grouped as ‘gnostic’. Influenced by a powerful mixture of despair and 
hopelessness about the human condition, energized by notions of transcendence 
and an adoption of the near-universal belittling of the material creation to the 
superior, “spiritual” realm, Sophia emerges as the first cause of the moulder of 
matter, the Demiurge. But this model also accounts for why neither Arius nor 
Athanasius in their contested readings of Prov. 8:22, for example, think to note 
                                                 
3 O’Collins cites R E Murphy, The Tree of Life, here, p.144, but gives no further reference for this 
citation. 
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that Scripture speaks of Sophia not the Logos, as their conceptual currency – in 
contrast to some Gnostic models – requires an identification of the two. This, 
indeed, was to a great extent and in different ways the achievement of Justin, 
Irenaeus and Origen.  
 
Varied forms of Gnostic mythology in the NHC demonstrate that amid great 
diversity, common theological concerns are presented: (i) the connection 
between cosmology and theology, (ii) consequently, a clear relation of the person 
of the Mediator to that of the Creator and Redeemer is articulated, (iii) the nature 
of that mediation must be explicated - located in the codices in the gnostics’ life. 
As a whole, the texts are evidence that the engagement with “Gnostic” forms of 
early Christian doctrinal explication4 prompted Justin Martyr,5 Irenaeus,6 and 
Origen (among others) to clarify the relation of Old to New Covenant, committing 
themselves to a Christian cosmology, and to a recapitulative understanding of 
creation and redemption, sensitive enough to the dynamics of a living tradition, 
rich in texture, but consonant with the Judaeo-Christian tradition’s ambiguity 
towards the material creation. Gnostic texts evidence that Irenaeus, for example, 
formulated recapitulation as a response to the soteriologically-focused (if 
alienated) re-workings of the Genesis material in the NH accounts. This is seen 
                                                 
4 Walter Bauer provocatively asserted Gnostic thought to be the most widespread and earliest 
forms of Egyptian Christianity. W Bauer, Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity, (translated 
& edited R A Kraft, et al, Philadelphia, 1977: 44-53. Bauer’s view is called into question by Colin 
H Roberts, Manuscript, Society and Belief in Early Christianity (The Schweich Lectures of the 
British Academy for 1977), London, 1979, urging that the earliest papyrus evidence is third 
century. See the review of viewpoints in Birger A Pearson, “Earliest Christianity in Egypt: Some 
Observations”, chapter 8 of Birger A Pearson & James E Goehring, eds, The Roots of Egyptian 
Christianity: Studies in Antiquity & Christianity, Philadelphia, 1986 (pb1992) 
5 Eve-Mary parallelism is explored in Justin Martyr, Dial.100, below. 
6 Eg AH III.30.1, 32.1, 21.10, 22.4, V.19.1, and Demonstration of the Apostolic Teaching, 32-4 
cited below. 
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in an example from Irenaeus which, in contrast to the complex mythology, and 
tainted view of matter, asks: 
 
But whence, then, was the substance of the first-formed? From the 
will and wisdom of God, and from virgin earth - “For God had not 
caused it to rain,” says Scripture before man was made, “and there 
was no man to till the ground.” (Gen.2:5). So, from this [earth], 
while it was still virgin, God “took mud from the earth and fashioned 
man” (Gen.2:7), the beginning (¢rc») of mankind. Thus, the Lord, 
recapitulating this man, received the same arrangement 
(o„konom…a) of embodiment (s£rkwsij) as this one, being born 
from the Virgin by the will and wisdom of God; that he might also 
demonstrate the likeness of embodiment (s£rkwsij) to Adam, and 
might become the man, written in the beginning “according to the 
image and likeness of God” (Gen 1:26) (Epideixis 32, Behr, 
1997:61). 
 
Like Irenaeus, Arius’s self-understanding may have been that of one who sought 
to maintain the Church’s regula fidei against what he saw as Sabellian 
speculation. But Arius seeks to emphasize the goodness of creation, willed by 
God the Father, with a cosmological role for the created mediator. The Logos, 
created in the beginning of God’s works, is the means of creation and salvation, 
offering both the loving purposes of God, and an ethical pattern of creaturely 
obedience. This provokes Athanasius’s lengthy response in the CA – not least to 
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clarify his own position – seeking to establish a proper, core mediatorial role for 
the Logos in creation.  
 
NHL contains a diverse variety of forms of Gnostic mythology, both in terms of 
literary genre and ideological framework, evidence that there were patterns of 
description of the relationship between God and the world that differ radically 
from the emergent Christian tradition. However, their survival into the fourth 
century as part of a Pachomian monastic tradition, is evidence that there is a 
significant hang-over into the time of Arius and Athanasius, and that the Gnostic 
conflict was not merely a past controversy. Both theologians engage critically 
with it and it gives substance to the urgency of their attempts to apply creatio ex 
nihilo to Christology albeit in very different ways. The library reveals why Justin 
Martyr, Irenaeus  and Origen – among others – in different styles strove to clarify 
the relation of Old and New Covenants, and committed themselves to 
cosmologies which did not pitch Creator against Redeemer. Though the results 
are significantly different, a recapitulative understanding of creation and 
redemption proves an important motif in Athanasius’s approach to the relation of 
God to creation in Christ. 
 
Meanwhile – Tertullian notwithstanding – Platonism provided a more satisfactory 
conceptual model. The text which was to become a dominant hermeneutical lens 
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through which Plato was read in late antiquity, was the Timaeus7. Timaeus’s 
attraction, particularly to Christian reflections upon creation, is striking: 
The splendid vision of a mathematically ordered world modelled after 
the eternal, paradigmatic Forms – a work of art conceived and 
executed by a supremely wise and good deity – was received as the 
fitting climax of Plato’s transcendental philosophy and commended 
itself to generations of theologians of the early Christian era as 
philosophical corroboration of their own creation theologies (Zeyl, 
2000:xiv). 
However, the picture of divinity and its relation to the cosmos offered in the 
Timaeus is also problematic for Christian theology. Leaving aside a readjustment 
in the dating of the Timaeus in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so that it 
may no longer be assumed to represent the chronological climax of Plato’s 
theological cosmology,8 there is a real controversy concerning the nature and 
perspective of apparently theistic language in the Timaeus: in particular, whether 
the language is literal (imagining an objectively real divine being), or analogical or 
metaphorical, where theistic language is merely used as a communicative 
teaching stratagem (Zeyl, 2000: xx-xxv). 
 
In the Late Antique context, Zeyl argues for a predominantly analogical reading of 
the creation story among academicians: 
                                                 
7 Zeyl’s text (2000) is used here. The conventional numeration for references, is followed by page 
numbers from this edition. Zeyl comments “From late antiquity onward… the Timaeus enjoyed a 
position of preeminence among Plato’s works… it was virtually the only work of Plato’s that had 
been translated into Latin” by Cicero (106-43BCE), and subsequently.” Ibid., xiv.  
8 For a thorough review see Zeyl, 2000:xvi-xx.  
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The Neoplatonist Proclus (412-85 C.E.) reports that Xenocrates’ 
student and successor Crantor perpetuated the metaphorical view, 
which appears to have been the dominant one among subsequent 
generations of Platonists down to the time of Plotinus (204/5-70 
C.E.), though the literal view was also maintained by at least two 
eminent Platonists of the first and second centuries C.E., Plutarch 
and Atticus. (Zeyl, 2000:xxi). 
A Christianized reading of the Timaeus – such as Justin’s – may have tapped into 
the literal, more theistic comprehension of creation, or, indeed, have contributed to 
it, and thus reflected real philosophical debate. It may be the case, also, that the 
popularity of a literalist reading of the Timaeus exploited in Christian apologetic, 
confirmed the Academics’ metaphorical preference as a cultured despising of 
theistic readings, in a manner not dissimilar to the Christian utilization of the 
Septuagint led to its abandonment by the Jewish community. 
 
Moreover, Timaeus is far from unambiguous concerning the precise ontology of 
the Demiurge. Timaeus 27d5 – 47e2 (Zeyl, 2000:13-36) establishes, firstly, that 
the most fundamental distinction is not between spiritual or material existence, but 
between being and becoming.  
We must begin by making the following distinction: What is that 
which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which 
becomes but never is? (27d. Zeyl, 2000:13). 
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In Timaeus, time is a function of creation, and has a beginning: it marks, in the 
created dimension, another parameter to locate and determine existent things. The 
world of time is inferior to the changeless perfection of eternity, but is a good copy 
of it: creation, for all its subordination to the eternal, is very good: 
[W]henever the craftsman [dhmiourgÒj] looks at what is always 
changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces 
its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is 
beautiful. (28a. Zeyl, 2000:14). 
The Demiurge’s nature and motives ensure that the created world is good: a 
continuum of benevolence and goodness pervades the cosmos. Gnostic thought 
introduces a breach by ascribing malicious intent to the Demiurge. For Plato, 
however, there is no place for such a neurotic perception of creation. He asks 
rhetorically: 
Now why did he who framed this whole universe of becoming frame 
it? … He was good, and one who is good can never become jealous 
of anything. And so, being free of jealousy, he wanted everything to 
become as much like himself as was possible… so he took over all 
that was visible – not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion 
– and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order. (29e-30a; 
Zeyl, 2000:15). 
In Timaeus, this fundamental goodness is essential in Plato’s attempt to 
harmonize the layers of subordination to the real eternal vision (the eternal divine 
Being, or the truly divine forms, which the Demiurge copies). A non-literalist 
 37
interpretation might read the copying of eternal forms as analogical: but the drama 
of the story depends upon an actual sense of dislocation and beyondness. Divine 
perfection is viewed with longing from a distance as that which the Demiurge is 
not. The unchangeableness of the eternal is conveyed by this sense of distance, 
and combined with the good motives and capacity of the Demiurge, a means of 
connecting the universe intelligibly is offered: 
Now surely it’s clear to all that it was the eternal model he looked at, 
for, of all the things that have come to be, our world is the most 
beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most excellent. This, 
then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that 
which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by 
wisdom. (29a. Zeyl, 2000:14). 
Plato’s hermeneutic, then, is that creation is intelligible, and so, by extension, are 
the Demiurge and the transcendental eternal truths comprehensible. Plato’s 
method in philosophy – a method Justin will apply to theological hermeneutics – is 
through an intellectual appropriation of eternal truths from the order of creation,9 
thus establishing fundamental accessibility or overlap between created and 
creator, the temporal and the eternal. 
This method is clearly dependent upon a vision of a universe with a graduated 
system of connections, a Monist cosmology which can contain in its hierarchical 
order the Cosmos, gods and humanity in communion. The mathematical order of 
the created world applies to the intellectual and the spiritual. Divinity is equally 
distributed throughout the universe in its World-Soul (Dillon, 2005). So as well as 
                                                 
9 Note the role of this argument in Cicero, De Natura Deorum, II:129-130. 
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being conducive to Christian self-expression, this cosmological-theological model 
is problematic. The hierarchy of being, as well as the means for the pedagogical 
improvement of matter by order, and creatures so that they may be more like the 
Creator – a sort of moral or developmental apotheosis – has a gulf which it would 
appear that even the Demiurge may not bridge apart from his capacity to 
contemplate the still distinct eternal forms. This gulf is bridged only by an 
underlying assumption that there is an ontological kinship consisting of a dispersed 
“divinity” copied into the realm of becoming – this is a different form of 
transcendence from the Biblical tradition (articulated in Young, 1991). This 
communion or kinship is characterised by a noetic or intellectual participation 
(Dillon, 2005; Bremmer, 2005). Above the gulf is Mystery and absence of change. 
Despite the conflict with the Judaeo-Christian tradition, it does have sufficient 
parallels to contribute to subsequent complex descriptions and debates of the 
relation of the ineffable Father to the creating and redeeming Son, as well as 
questions of the nature of the soul’s origin.  
Even in the context of a Platonic hierarchy of existence, conceptually there 
remains space between the Being beyond all participation and a dispersed divine 
nature in which all things participate. The Demiurge might be said to occupy this 
space and, whilst standing distinct from absolute and immanent divine natures, is a 
mediator who has copied his true vision into the capacities of matter by his 
handiwork. His power and supremacy is limited, however, to the ordered cosmos, 
and even then governed by and subject to the transcendent: 
The creation of the world takes place on the basis of this principle of 
necessary unity, and it is for this reason that the creator does not 
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simply choose to but must make the world spherical, since the 
spherical shape is that of unity, and thus of perfection. (Zizioulas, 
1997: 29 [fn 4]). 
This imprecision and fluidity enables the possibilities in Late Antiquity of either 
equating the Demiurge with Being or God in toto, or seeing the Demiurge as a 
deÚteroj qeÒj, or the summation of all the dispersed divinity in the cosmos, the 
basilikÒj LÒgoj.10 Dillon (1977:265-303) argues that in late Antiquity despite the 
decline of Stoic materialism, the emergence of a personal or theistic religious view 
is anachronistic. Though there was an increasing tendency towards transcendence 
(for example in Albinus), who described the ideas as God’s own thoughts, true 
divinity, is QeÒj, or Ð prîtoj noàj, clearly distinct from the Demiurge, and described 
in apophatic terms as ¥rrhtoj, indescribable so certainly never subject to human 
definition.11 This imprecise location of the Demiurge’s nature gives rise to the 
possibility of describing true Being as the beyond-Being God (in contrast to the 
Demiurge who is responsible for the realm of becoming). Plato’s emphasis, as we 
have seen, is, however, on the beyond-Becoming Divine Being. Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
10 Jean Daniélou [1973:109] comments on Timaeus 28c: “It is undoubtedly the popularity of this 
text in Middle Platonism which explains the constant quotation of it by Christian writers, but they 
are also indebted to the same source for their exegesis. In Plato himself the words refer to the 
Demiurge, who is distinct from the Good; but in Middle Platonism the two are identified – the 
Creator is also the supreme God. This much is clear even from the variant forms of the quotation: 
in place of the pat¾r kaˆ poiht»j of Plato, Albinus writes tÕ timiètaton ¥gaqon, and Apuleius qeÒj. 
Numenius alone distinguishes the Father, who is the first God, from the Demiurge, who is the 
second (Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XI, 18, 1-2).” Andresen, 1952-3:157, evaluates Justin as having 
a dependency upon Middle Platonism’s tendency towards a religious reading of Plato and the 
concomitant “unmaterializing” of Stoicism, rather than his contribution to a recasting in a 
personally “literal” theistic sense. Ragnar Holte indicates that Christianity may have been 
despised by philosophers because it was seen to be a part of the process of popularizing Plato in 
a personal, theistic religious sense. (Holte, R., 1958:109-168.) On the genre of the apologists’ 
work, cf. Edwards, M., Goodman, M., & Price, S., (in association with C. Rowland) (eds.): 1999. 
11 Albinus, Didaskalios, 10 (edition of C. F. Hermann, Platonis Dialogi VI (1853)) in May 1994;4 
fn. 15. 
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gulf, which Gnostic theology exploited,12 and to which Justin alludes, is something 
Origen also addresses creatively as he offers a resolution in the eternal generation 
of the Logos. In Timaeus, however 
That the supreme god of Plato’s cosmos should wear the mask of a 
manual worker is a triumph of the philosophical imagination over 
ingrained social prejudice… this divine mechanic is not a drudge. He 
is an artist or, more precisely, what an artist would have to be in 
Plato’s conception of art: not the inventor of new form, but the 
imposer of pre-existing form on as yet formless material. (Vlastos, 
1975:26-27). 
Although god of the Cosmos, the Demiurge takes his place in a hierarchy which 
might be depicted thus: 
                                                 
12 The psychological investment of fury at the Demiurge in Gnostic texts is striking, suggestive of 
a sense of betrayal by the creator, (so Grant, 27ff) and described as a “madness” by C. Saldanha 
1984:37: “Gnosticism… epitomized the decadence and corruption of that same philosophy. 
Gnosticism was, in fact, a form of paganism – Greek ideas had gone mad and masquerading in 
the disguise of borrowed doctrines.” This reading of Gnosis is not dissimilar from the method of 
heresiologists in deriving it from the antithesis of revelation, and is far from a more nuanced 
appreciation of its Jewish-Christian roots. Grant’s perspective remains convincing in that only the 
dramatic conversion of those who once viewed the Demiurge as good and loving really accounts 
for the bitterness of their position and reading of Scripture. 
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 The realm of Divine Being: The Demiurge may contemplate this but does not appear to 
participate ontologically in the Divine vision 
═════════════════════ 
cwrismÒj  or Gulf bridged only intellectually, by the Demiurge’s longing contemplative 
vision or  frÒnhsij 
═════════════════════ 
↑ 
The Demiurge, who (or which) has the capacity both to contemplate Being and to order 
matter making  
↕ 
the Universe, and the world of becoming, including time as one of the ordered boundaries, 
with the divine World-Soul evenly distributed throughout it;  as part of this oikoumene are 
↕ 
the gods who come after the creation of matter into spherical imitations of perfection, but 
to whom delegated responsibilities of the creation and education of humanity are given; 
who synergistically participate in the creation of  
↨ 
humanity and 
↕ 
   all creation 
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In this schema, the symbol between each level beneath the Demiurge, ↕, is taken 
to represent constant, mathematically-measurable connection, indicating that the 
controlling concept of the Timaeus is that of the wholeness of all things. This 
mathematical precision, however, falls at the hurdle of unlikeness when it meets 
the realm of Being. Plato neither says that the Demiurge participates in it or does 
not do so, but the Demiurge remains subordinate to it, hence our attempt to depict 
a gulf with the symbol ══════, and the relation only of contemplative participation 
by ↑. This interrupts the gradation of the cosmology depicted by the darkening text. 
Still participation is a core motif of this world-view, and the apparent contradictions 
of this schema are accepted as normative cosmological assumptions by Arius in 
his drawing of an explicit line of division between the Father and the Logos. Both 
the hierarchy and the communion of the divine throughout the whole are vital to 
Plato’s system: 
Plato believes the soul and God are invisible, and he also stresses 
that God cannot be spacially located; to say that God is beyond 
heaven is not to set him in a particularly remote place, but to say that 
he cannot be thought of in terms of time and space which have 
themselves come into being. In light of this, it is surprising how 
physically located higher religious realities are: the higher one goes 
physically, the nearer (it would seem) one is to God. (Scott, 
1991:13). 
But in Timaeus, the Demiurge is not a Created Creator – any activity on the part of 
Being would imply change, and thus degrade it into becoming; and nothing is said 
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of the Demiurge’s origin or relation to the realm of Being.13 This is a silence many 
words in the Christological controversies will strive to explicate.  
For the Platonic tradition, then, in which the early Christian communities found self-
expression, the Demiurge’s activity authentically reflects the will of Divine Being, 
because he is neither defective in his envisioning of Divine Being, nor without the 
capacity to create. The Divine Being’s nature is revealed, or, better, alluded-to, by 
the fact that the essentially inadequate, non-being-ness of chaotic matter should 
be brought into a pattern of order by a mere vision of Ideas. Antiquity’s reading of 
Plato is a cosmology which Justin wishes – among others – to affirm and develop. 
There is also, of course, a tendency in this cosmology towards a profound – but 
not antagonistic – dualism. The Creator is understood to imprint his will upon 
matter. However, matter is not the creation of a good God: because matter is not 
perfect, but chaotic, and the perfect God would be lacking either potency or 
goodness had he have created matter thus. Gnostic theology identifies evil with 
matter, but the non-being of the material upon which the Demiurge imposes order 
is not depicted in such terms in Timaeus. Here, matter becomes morally good by 
progression. Evil, rather, describes that intent or process in reverse. While this 
view of evil adds dynamic to Athanasius’s depiction of the decay of the world out of 
communion with its creator in CG-DI, in Plato, matter receives the imprint of the 
divine gladly, without resistance. Divine nature is thus majestic, and characterised 
by its being utterly consistent, and unchanging, because, unlike the creature, it 
need not change to become better, indeed, it may not change, for it would then 
cease to be perfect, and thus be evil in the cosmological moralism outlined 
                                                 
13 Though this point is obscured in a theistic interpretation of the Demiurge, because a divine 
Demiurge, partaking of being, would not require protological comment.  
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above.14 Plato’s argument refuses to concede that Divine Being’s freedom to 
change is prior to his being: the all-Wise will not commit folly, God will not change 
himself, and is subject to eternal, transcendent necessity – the Eternal Ideas.15 
Anthropomorphism is conspicuously absent from Platonic descriptions of Divine 
Being; despite the generic use of “father” of the Demiurge in the Timaeus,16 this 
remains a cosmological description, rather than an ontological one. The Demiurge 
is the father of the Cosmos, which is his monogen»j.17 This use of Father as 
explicative of the Creator’s nature, with monogen»j describing that the creation 
illuminates Arius’s use of the term applied to the Logos as a proto-creature. Thus 
we may already see that Nicene application of ÐmooÚsioj ontologically to the 
Logos will need strong justification against this Platonic tide. Athanasius will 
therefore argue that he is taking Scripture’s priority over philosophy, and that his 
opponent is conformed to worldly philosophy, even though Athanasius’ word is 
non-Scriptural and has philosophical roots. Arius will argue that he is being 
Scriptural – and the debate will rage around key texts (Prov. 8:22 etc.). But both 
construct models with common philosophical and Scriptural connections arranged 
to reflect different theological proirities. Central to the argument will be the way in 
which God is creator and Father, whether the monogen»j is ontologically part of 
the divine or created, and what is the distinction between the metaphorical use of 
Father vis-à-vis creation, and the linguistic propriety in describing the Father’s 
relation to the Son. 
                                                 
14 Republic 381c, in Shorey, P., 1953: 190-193. 
15 The significance of this issue will emerge in the controversies around the ontological dynamics 
of the incarnation: and is a bug-bear on all sides of the argument. A measure of the sway of this 
Platonic commonplace among Christian writers is seen in Justin, Origen, Arius,  Nestorius, 
Theodoret who have a desire in common with Apollinarius and Marcellus to construe the 
incarnation in such a way so as not to endanger God’s ultimate unchangeableness. Cyril 
expounds Athanasius proudly proclaiming the divine paradox of “the swaddling bands of God.”  
16 Father appears to be a synonym for creator, and is strongly analogical, e.g., Timaeus 37c-38a. 
17 E.g. Timaeus 92c, cf. 31c, 34c. 
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For Justin Martyr, the notion that the Cosmos’s order and goodness reveal the 
divine will, and that a harmonic fellowship borne of a common origin and end is the 
ideal manner of mutual participation within the universe is a useful apologetic 
tool.18 The opposite of this harmony and koinwn…a is chaos, which has no being 
– as it is that from which the Craftsman made the living universe. It is indicative o
Being’s goodness that the Demiurge is allowed to contemplate Divine Being, in 
order to impress this vision faithfully upon chaotic matter. Both the divine nature 
and the Demiurge are good, the latter is generously willing to share his perception 
of Being’s perfection so that matter may receive the image of eternity.  
f 
                                                
This is why the thing that is to receive in itself all the [elemental] 
kinds must be totally devoid of any characteristics. (Timaeus 50e; 
Zeyl, 2000:40).   
The Creator must make an impression of his vision of true Being upon the 
material: but matter is never able to make such an impression upon the eternal. 
The categories of “physical” and “spiritual”, therefore, possess a kinship: they are 
together the truly living aspect of the created Cosmos which animate matter and 
take it out of chaotic alienation from the Divine by the imposition of order.19 
Elsewhere in the Platonic corpus, there is depicted the soul experiencing a fall 
from the perfection of immaterial Being. Just as there is possible a hopeful reading 
of Plato’s Timaeus, his tone in describing la condition humaine can be dark 
indeed.20 There is a psychological sense of a fall in Plato, then, construed 
 
18 Gorgias 507d-508a, in Hamilton & Cairns (eds.) 1999:290. 
19 Timaeus 37c-38a, in Zeyl, 2000:40. 
20 E.g., “We live in a hollow of the earth and think that we are on the top of it, and we call the air 
sky, and suppose that the stars move through this sky. But the truth is the same as before. From 
feebleness and want of enterprise we are not able to pass through to the confines of the air. For if 
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ontologically, not in terms of a breach in relation with God, nor an ethical 
disjunction, but a sense of ontological humiliation coterminous with material 
existence. This perception of material existence as fall is taken up de rigueur in the 
NH texts, and it is unsurprising therefore that a passage of Plato is among the 
documents found in that collection.21 But Plato also depicts the loving will of the 
Creator in his ordaining of the noàj as Helmsman, or kubern»thj. Mind is the 
intermediary help or shepherd in stewarding creation,22 which is redemptive in its 
refusal to witness a shipwrecked race fail to find refuge. The role of an 
intermediary in leading home the broken is an important connection – the mediator 
effects salvation.23 The scattered Logos orientates life towards the good. In the 
(Stoicized) Platonism of late Antiquity, the Logos Spermatikos, whether the 
scattered or scattering Logos, can persist in this function because it participates 
ontologically with the eternal ideas (Holte, 1958). But this is not clear in Plato 
himself, where the analogies are more pragmatic. In ethics, for example, the duty 
                                                                                                                                                 
anyone did pass through to them or got wings and flew there, like the fish who emerge and see 
our world so would he emerge and see the world of the upper air, and if his nature was strong 
enough to endure the spectacle when he saw it, he would learn that that was the sky in the true 
sense, and the true light, and what we call the true earth. This earth down here and the rocks, 
and the whole region are corrupted and eaten away, like things in the sea are by the salt water. 
Nothing of any value grows in the sea, and nothing comes to perfection so to say, but where 
there is earth, it consists of caves and sand and limitless mud and mire, of no account whatever 
compared with the beauties of our surroundings.” Phaedo 110A, in Fox (1957:57).  
21 NHC VI.5, = Republic 588B-589B, NHL p.290-1. 
22 Statesman 273a-e, in Hamilton & Cairns (eds.), 1999:1038-1039. 
23 “Wherefore at that point God who had endued it with order, seeing it in dire straits and 
solicitous that it should not be wrecked by its confusion and break up and sink into a sea where 
nothing could be defined or identified, again took charge of the helm, reversed what was out of 
gear or missing in the world’s former drifting course, restored it to order, and setting it to rights 
made it not subject to decay or death.” Statesman 273e, Fox, 1957:49. Cf. Justin Martyr 1 Apol. 
60; Irenaeus AH V.xviii.2: “in hoc mundo existens, et secundum invisibilitatem continet quæ facta 
sunt omnia, et in universa conditione infixus [Armenian “and in all this world in-crucified” (sic)], 
quoniam Verbum Dei gubernans [=kubern»thj] et disponens omnia”; Epideixis 34: the visible Son 
works the Father’s will as focus of his presence “and steers across the breadth of north and 
south; summoning all that are scattered in every quarter to the knowledge of the Father.” 
Robinson 1920:101. Athanasius, DI 6-7: humanity is steered out of danger by the Logos taking a 
mortal body and, (DI 9), making his flesh an offering for our souls. E. P. Meijering, 1991:313-326, 
connects the Platonic role of nous with God’s offering of this saving steering, through human 
nous (CG 2, 30), in the cosmos (CG 35) and in Scripture (CG 45-6), cited by K. Anatolios, 
2001:466. 
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of the leader is proper influence or governance in the steering of people to the 
truth,24 yet even here it is the presence of this governing principle and the great 
thoughts that it engenders which confers the dignity of cooperating with divine law, 
that illustrates kinship with the divine.25 Indeed, the intellectual presence of noàj is 
the most authentic locus of a divine image in humanity for Plato. Humanity 
abounds when people imitate the divine, their true identity.26 This divine element, 
located in the noàj, is the constituent part which differentiates humanity from mere 
matter and chaos. It is the goal and end of life to return to the fullness (pl»rwma) of 
Being, to return home27 through death: such an anthropology assumes pre-
existence. Participation in that glory will be unencumbered by any remnant of 
chaotic matter.28 Virtuous living will have trained the soul to soar by hard toil,29 this 
alone will establish the qualitative distinction between the incontinent and the 
spiritual - sound and leaky vessels.30 Plato reinforces an ontological-moral 
connection: the noàj must direct the soul, as kubern»thj, otherwise both body and 
soul will be lost, and spiritual death, a return to the primordial chaos, will ensue: 
[W]hat we must understand is the reason why the soul’s wings fall 
from it and are lost. It is on this wise. The natural property of a wing 
is to raise that which is heavy and carry it aloft to the region where 
the gods dwell, and more than any other bodily part it shares in the 
divine nature, which is fair, wise, and good, and possessed of all 
other such excellences. Now by these excellences especially is the 
                                                 
24 Cleitophon 408b, in Fox, 1957:118. 
25 Critias 120e-121c, in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (eds.), 1999:1224. 
26 Republic 500e-501b, in Fox, 1957:107-9. Fox notes “James Adam’s comment on the end of 
this passage is worth recalling …: ‘Plato means to suggest that Man is most manlike when he 
most resembles God.’” 
27 Phaedrus 247E, in Fox, 1957:60. 
28 Phaedrus 250b-c, in Hamilton & Cairns (eds.), 1999:496-7. 
29 Laws Book IV, 718d-719a, in Hamilton & Cairns (eds.), 1999:1309. 
30 Gorgias 493D-494A, in Fox, 1957:167. 
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soul’s plumage nourished and fostered, while by their opposites, 
even by ugliness and evil, it is wasted and destroyed. 31  
The soul is the locus of human nature, because it is eternal and nearer the 
divine,32 participation in divine life is by the soul’s contemplation of the Divine 
Being and its governance of matter after the example of the Demiurge. Divinity is 
the ultimate goal of human being, yet happiness before liberation from the body 
may be achieved. The   
 
true moral ideal, whether self-control or integrity or courage, [which] 
is really a kind of purgation from all the emotions, and wisdom itself 
is a sort of purification… he who arrives there purified and 
enlightened shall dwell among the gods.33  
 
Death is described as a midwife to the soul’s eternal destiny, to be welcomed 
with courage and vivid interest, as Socrates demonstrated in the context of 
impending death: looking, “oxen-eyed”, upon the experience of death as 
edifying.34 
 
                                                 
31 Phaedrus 246d-e, in Hamilton & Cairns (eds.), 1999:493-4.This theme will be a recurrent one in 
this dissertation. It is taken up in Irenaeus’s Epideixis, which appears to be the basis of 
Eusebius’s Theophania. It may be right to construe CG-DI as Athanasius’s Contra Eusebium. It 
was believed that Theophania was a work of the 330s [so, for example, Young, 1983:69; 
Kannengiesser, 1970:383-428]. Anatolios, 1998:29, however, argues for a date before the Trier 
exile (between 328 & 335) as a revision of “the imperialist triumphalism of Eusebius of Caesarea 
by making sure that the triumph of Constantine is strictly attributed to Christ, to the point of not 
even mentioning the emperor”, before his personal exile would have taken the shine off his 
triumphalist tone, ‘it is impossible to see how any contemporary reader would have failed to see 
an absurd irony in an exiled bishop, attacked from within the Church itself, proclaiming the 
Church to be the manifestation of the victorious glory of Christ, and contending that “those 
brought up in Christ do not war against themselves.”’ 
32 Laws Book X, 896c-d, Hamilton & Cairns (eds) 1999:1452. 
33 Phaedo 69c, Hamilton & Cairns 1999:52. 
34 Republic 330d-331b, Apology 30c-e, 32c-d, 40c-41d, 42a, cf. Fox, 1957:79-84. 
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Before death, however, the steering guidance of the noàj as kubern»thj mediates 
and unveils the Creator’s copy of the divine in creation. Each soul has this 
immanent “blueprint” implanted by the Demiurge’s creativity, which might properly 
be described as a mediatorial source of connection to the divine a kubern»thj, able 
to 
convey and transport to the divine the things of man and to man the 
things of god, prayers and sacrifices being the things of men, and 
directions and answers to prayer the things of god. The supernatural, 
being a mean between the two, supplements both and combines 
them into a self-contained whole… God has no direct contact with 
man, but all commerce and conversation between gods and men, 
whether they wake or sleep, is by supernatural means. The 
supernatural beings are many and various, and Love is one of 
them.35 
The divine in humanity enables Plato’s anthropology to be one where humanity is 
part of the self-articulating mind of the Cosmos, having, in its properly-steered 
spiritual reality, something of a mediating role for the universe. This saving self-
knowledge is a different calibre of knowledge than the craft-worker’s skill. The 
Delphic oracle’s inscription so key to Gnostic theology and anthropology, gnîqi 
seautÒn, is for Plato a cosmological-theological junction located in humanity. We 
will observe that Irenaeus’s biblical opposition to Gnostic thought is maintained by 
an apparent paradox: a scriptural emphasis upon transcendence (which is more 
ontologically radical than Plato and Platonic thought (Young, 1991:139-151)) is 
                                                 
35 Symposium 202D-203A, Fox, 1957:45. 
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juxtaposed with an assertion that this same God is active in history with a 
continuity attested by the fulfilment of history and prophecy in the Christian 
dispensation. 
Plotinus continued to promote a pro-cosmic spirituality, steering hard against 
Gnostic readings of Plato and against the Judaeo-Christian tradition where the 
transcendence of God is so rigorous that it threatens those hermeneutical 
connections of Platonic thought which link the world of becoming through a 
discernible order, and make it comprehensible. The world in all its imperfection is 
the end result of divine purposes, and is to be beautiful beyond compare.36 
Humanity’s destiny is to be conceived of with some confidence [beba…wj] because 
of the hierarchy of being which pervades the Cosmos, “to this extent [is 
humanity]… a complete vessel as it is granted to him to be perfected.”37 The 
hierarchy, with its descending gradation, ensures for Plotinus that there is no 
reason to loath the earthly and material: rather, the unity of the whole provides the 
possibility of a method in theology and cosmology. 
We now turn to scrutinise examples of Christian exploration in Christocentric 
cosmology that clearly bear the hallmarks of being influenced by this Platonic 
milieu. This review has revealed some of the problems that Christian articulation 
will necessarily have to face and attempt to resolve. High among these is how 
monotheism may be reconciled with Middle Platonism’s dualistic distinction of “first 
degree” Divine Being (as it were) over a universe itself endued with the promise of 
divine nature because of the work of an intermediary, the Demiurge.  
                                                 
36 Enneads III, 2.3. 
37 Enneads III, 2, 12, cf. Rudolph, 1983:61.  
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1:3 Christianity as Philosophia: Justin Martyr [c.100 – c.165]  
Justin Martyr is a competent example38 among early apologists of the desire to 
communicate and translate Christian theology into a philosophical linguistic 
medium.39 Jewish claims, Gnostic “deviations” and their impact upon the 
Church’s credibility before a persecuting state, underscore this motivation to 
articulate a Christian philosophia.40 In contrast to the rhetoric (rather than the 
                                                 
38 May, 1994:120: “Justin Martyr is a theologian who must not be undervalued… Justin considers 
himself to be a philosopher. Christianity is for him the true philosophy, resting on the age old 
wisdom of the prophets. The classical philosophy of the Greeks also stands in a tradition 
connected with that of the prophets, but in the course of history it has increasingly distanced itself 
from the one ancient truth, so that it now possesses the latter only in an obscure and broken 
form.” Cf. Stead, 1994:81: “Justin… rather unusually for a Christian, was a teacher of philosophy 
at Rome in the second century. Justin was a sensible man who did good service in formulating 
the primitive Christian tradition. There is not the slightest reason to think him inferior to his 
professional rivals among the Roman pagans; indeed his attachment to Christianity was in many 
ways an advantage, as setting him new problems outside the traditional agenda of the Platonic 
schools.” Stead draws attention (1994:93-4) to Henry Chadwick’s positive evaluation of Justin 
[1966:20]: “he is easy to underestimate… Justin is a plain man, but he is not stupid; he can be 
shown to be as competent an expounder of Platonism as his contemporaries… What is central in 
his thought is the way in which the Biblical doctrine of God and his relation to the world provides 
him with a criterion of judgment, in the light of which he evaluates the great names in the history 
of Greek philosophy. Justin does not merely use Greek philosophy. He passes judgement upon 
it.” Contrast Norris, 1966:33-56, especially 53: “He uses philosophical ideas, not systematically or 
speculatively, but pragmatically. That is, he employs them as and when they seem to him to 
coincide with the teaching of the Scriptures… [I]t is just this policy which accounts for the puzzles 
in Justin’s thought: the inconsistencies and superficialities that dog the steps of his expositions. 
Neither his use nor his revision of philosophical ideas is governed by the scientific impulse to 
present a coherent view of the world”; Goodenough’s judgment is that Justin is in no sense a 
philosopher, but primarily a traditionalist, viewing Christianity as an escape from metaphysical 
speculation, and instead offering a revelation which solves the diverse problems of philosophy. 
“But if he added anything to Christianity at all, it was not by transplanting foreign conceptions into 
Christianity, but by going deeper than ordinary Christians into a body of thought which was 
recognized as a legitimate source for Christian metaphysics” Goodenough, 1968:293. Zizioulas, 
1985:72-78 evaluates Justin negatively on the contrary grounds that Justin sacrifices authentic 
Christology to Hellenic Cosmology. 
39 On the issue of texts of the ancient world being “performed” out loud as the context for genre 
discussion, see Dihle, 1994:256. It is irrelevant for this study whether the Apologies [1Apol., 
2Apol.] are separate or are a single text, or whether 1Apol. and 2Apol. were actual appeals for 
justice. The unity of the Apology is accepted by Schmidt, 1975:253-281; so Grant, 1988:55, who 
argues strongly that Polycarp’s martyrdom must have been Justin’s immediate context and 
prompt, and whilst this point is well-made, there are significant problems with a reading of 1Apol. 
as an actual appeal of any use given the fact that chapters 30-60 are lengthy and turgid 
examinations of Old Testament prophecy. Reference to the texts as 1Apol. and 2Apol. is so 
widespread, and the alternative numeration of chapters so problematic, that conventional 
referencing is retained. 
40 The contention that self-definition was primarily a concern vis-à-vis Judaism is strongly 
countered by Young, 1999:81-104, where she explores the Apologies in relation to their 
contribution to Christian identity and patterns of appropriation and distinctiveness with regard to 
classical texts. 
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practice) of Tertullian,41 Justin thus seems to recognize that civilization was 
based – from paide…a through civic life – upon the reading, exegesis and 
reception of classical texts (probably through florilegia or text-book selections 
rather than complete works), and unlike Tertullian, does not find the view that 
philosophical truths are a reflection of the truth of Christian revelation repellent. 
 
Writing in the mid-second century,42 Justin is thus a significant starting point to 
evaluate a Christian response to the assumptions and norms of contemporary 
philosophy and cosmology. His two-part Apology43 (hereafter 1 Apol., 2 Apol.), and 
a debate in the form of a constructed dialogue between himself and the Jew, the 
Dialogue with Trypho.44 The prime provocation for these works was an urgent 
need to undergird the life of the Church by articulation of the Christian filosof…a.  
                                                 
41 Tertullian De Praescriptione Haereticorum VII.9 (Refoulé, 1957). Tertullian’s well-known “Quid 
ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiae et ecclesiae? Quid haereticis et christianis?” goes 
further than merely equating heresy with false philosophy. He asserts that pagan philosophy is 
the parent of heresy. That he may be being ‘deliberately extremist’ [Armstrong, 1980:88] does not 
prevent this also being his viewpoint. 
42 1Apol. 46.1 dates the Apology around 156ce – roughly corresponding to the mention of Felix as 
prefect of Egypt in 1A 29.2-3 (Grant, 1988:53 – citing papyri evidence that Munatius Felix was 
prefect as late as 11 November, 148, but not in office on 29 August, 154).  
43 The critical text of Marcovich, 1994 is used here for the Apologies, though the text of. J. 
Goodspeed, 1914:90ff is also viewed.   
44 The Greek text cited is primarily that of Marcovitch, 1997, and, for Trypho 1-9, van Winden, 
1971. Goodenough, 1968:87, evaluates Trypho “as … so astonishingly dull”, and reads Trypho as 
Justin’s attempt to recapitulate Jewish-Christian theological discussion by a literary construction 
to guide Christians in encounter with Jews. Barnard, 1978, is something of a lone voice in his 
arguing not only that Justin’s knowledge of Judaism is less stylized than Goodenough urges, but 
also that Trypho reflects historical fact. He argues that Trypho’s “character is only too human… 
These personal touches preclude, [Barnard]… believe[s], the view that the figure of Trypho is an 
ideal construction which Justin has created to embody the best of both schools of Judaism” 
(Barnard, 1978:108). Instead “Trypho was a Hellenistic Jewish layman who combined the culture 
and enquiring spirit of the Hellenistic world with a knowledge of traditional Jewish exegesis and 
haggadah” (1978:110).   The introduction to the Trypho assumes that Jews and Christians are 
alike concerned with interpreting revealed truth, and give the strongest clue to its intended 
readership, i.e., Christians concerned to equip themselves to answer either Jewish claims to 
authentic Scriptural interpretation, or (more likely) Imperial anti-Christian arguments that 
Christians were not even Jews, so did not share the protection of the law to practice their religion, 
or both. Rajak 1999:80 outlines arguments for its intended readership, connecting the “battle of 
the books, and also a battle for souls” (ibid. p.80). Whilst there is possibly more corroborative 
evidence that there is some authentic understanding of patterns of Judaism in the details of the 
Trypho’s argument than Goodenough allowed, the obsession to locate the Trypho as 
historiography misses the text’s point. 
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For Justin this was nothing other than the Christian discipline of faith.45 This 
clothing of Christianity in a philosopher’s cloak by Justin is an attempt to expose 
the nakedness of the Empire’s philosophical clothing apart from the Logos, whom 
it is persecuting. In a similar way, Justin’s claim upon the truth of the Old 
Testament seeks to strip Jews (whom Trypho represents) of their claims to be 
faithful recipients and disciples of the truth of revelation. Justin, significantly, 
appears to have recognized that he had to account for the truthfulness and beauty 
of philosophy, and attempt a hermeneutical connection between the Logos and 
created things which made the universe a concern of Christian theology. Justin’s 
Platonic personal history was, no doubt, a factor which urged him to try to portray 
Christian theology as intelligible with a uniting structural hermeneutic if it was not to 
be caricatured as simply ridiculous by its cultured despisers. This was a much 
more demanding task than the relatively simple statement of the Christian case in 
terms of morality or in racial taxonomies (such as offered by Aristides). It was a 
procedure in which Justin had to exhibit pioneering theological boldness, using 
language with a Sitz-im-Leben outside revelation in order to express more clearly 
the significance of Christian belief.46  
                                                 
45 Grant (1988:53) argues that the actual occasion of the Apology [i.e., IA & 2A] was the 
martyrdom of Polycarp in 155/156, as the sort of defense Polycarp might have offered had he not 
been prevented from so doing. In particular references to the fires of eternal punishment (rather 
than the 1000 years of Plato [Phaedrus 249A; Republic 615A] =1 Apol. 8. 4), reflect, Grant 
believes, the fate of Polycarp, the Christian Socrates: “what motivated him must have been the 
knowledge of the fiery martyrdom at Smyrna.” For a review of the history of the perception of 
“sources” for Justin’s philosophical theology see Holte, 1958:109-116. Holte argues that the use 
of logos spermatikos by Justin is primarily a device of asserting the Christian-ness of any 
philosophical glimpses of the truth. Goodenough, 1968 connects Justin’s texts with other 
literature contemporary to them, assigning ideas to their sources with the unsustainable 
confidence of an early twentieth-century historico-critical method applied to the currency of ideas. 
46 This daring practice of expressing the significance of Christian faith in a thought-world alien to it 
is imperative in mission, something to which Arius will object in connection with the non-biblical 
pedigree of ÐmooÚsioj, but a method which Justin displays in order to describe Christian faith 
more fully.  
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Descriptions of the philosophical world in which Justin framed his theology have, 
since Carl Andresen’s study of 1952-3:157ff, accepted as foundational that a 
religious interpretation of Platonic texts, together with a discernable movement 
away from Stoic materialism, was the essence of the eclectic hybrid, Middle 
Platonism. Dillon, 1977, attentively described this, although this taxonomy has 
been challenged by Edwards, 2002. Consequently, there has been a tendency to 
describe Justin’s affinity with much philosophical vocabulary as determined by 
these “external” factors, rather than evaluating Justin’s work as an informed 
theological venture.47 
The problem with such an interpretation of the period has two aspects: namely, 
(a) as already noted, that there appears to have been a sustained wrestling for 
literal or analogical interpretations of Plato among philosophers, a debate into 
which Justin, and Christian mission, reached in order to posit distinctive, 
personal, theistic understandings of “divinity”; and (b) that Justin is not simply 
trying to interpret Christianity to the philosophical world: his apologetic intent is 
missionary, seeking to set distorted philosophical assumptions aright, at least as 
much as “explaining” Christian faith in philosophical terms. 
 
As has been explored above, the notion of a demiurge creating from the ideal 
prototype is a commonplace. Dillon (1977) argues that in “Middle Platonic” 
constructs, the Logos is this Demiurge, evidenced in, for example, as a 
consequence less of Philo, (whom, he argues, had precious little impact on other 
                                                 
47 E.g., Saldanha, 1984:37: “Philosophy in the second century A.D. was inseparable from religion. 
It should hardly surprise us, then, to find Justin and Clement going to the extent of interpreting 
Christianity as a philosophy, for when we stop to consider with what the Greeks could compare 
the Christian religion, we find that there was in Greek thought nothing but philosophy 
corresponding to it.” 
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“Middle Platonists”) than a prevailing Stoic influence in the Platonism of late 
Antiquity. Thus the cosmos is governed and made by the mediating noàj or LÒgoj 
basilikÒj, with the capacity to connect Being with Becoming, and knowledge of two 
kinds (the intelligible and the sensible). The connection, making philosophical 
hermeneutics possible, thus elevates the notion of mediation to a pivotal place, 
because creation and divine connection is located in this figure rather than in an 
evenly dispersed divinity. This is a very different theological cosmology from the 
Monist perspective where the Universe has an immanent ontological connection 
with divinity which was observed in Platonic texts, above (1:2). A hypostasized 
mediator works in late Antique thought because it (he) either is part of a dispersed 
divinity throughout creation (in Stoic conceptuality), or because it (he) belongs 
properly to neither realm (being ontologically located in neither). The Logos in 
Christian expression will facilitate comprehension of both divine being and created 
existence by participation in both, and by its imposition of order (“creation”) – as an 
image of true Being – upon the world of becoming.48 These late Antique trends 
might be described as towards abstraction as towards transcendence, and such a 
description might prevent language about the divine being automatically (and 
perhaps incorrectly) construed theistically. Nonetheless, interpretations of both 
noàj and LÒgoj hypostasized in almost personal terms are present in “Middle 
Platonic” (sic) writers beyond Philo (Dillon, 1977). 
Justin lifts Aristotle’s epithet of ¢gšnnhtoj49 to describe the Father whom the Son 
reveals, but uses it consistently in a personal way. ’Agšnnhtoj is used to contrast 
the purity of the divine with humanity’s licentiousness before its being shepherded 
                                                 
48 Here we anticipate an aspect core to Arius’s understanding of the Logos, see chapter 2, below. 
49 Aristotle, Metaphysics III.3.999.b.l.7ff, used to denote the eternity and causelessness of 
divinity, “not brought into being from anything outside itself”. Tredennick, 1947: 116-121. 
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back to God by the Son.50 It is, also, used to describe the One to whom Christians 
have dedicated themselves in contrast to the shameful deeds of those commonly, 
but falsely so-called gods, now exposed by Jesus Christ as being far from the 
¢gšnnhtoj and impassible (¢paqe‹j) true God.51 Elsewhere also, there are very 
definite moral overtones in Justin’s use of ¢gšnnhtoj: Christians, unlike the Jews, 
responded to the coming of Christ (thus fulfilling Scriptural prophecy),52 casting 
away their idolatry to be filled with joy and faith, and so equipped to dedicate 
themselves to the Unbegotten God through Christ.53  
Elsewhere, Justin uses ¢gšnnhtoj in another sense – to highlight the paradox upon 
which Christians are staking their salvation. Christians are convinced, through the 
prophecies pointing to Jesus Christ written long before his coming,54 that this 
crucified man is indeed the first-born (prwtÒtokoj) of the unbegotten God.55 Justin 
links together the non-biblical term ¢gšnnhtoj with the biblical prwtÒtokoj56 and this 
                                                 
501 Apol., 14.1: qeù de mÒnJ tù ¢genn»tJ di¦ toà uƒoà ˜pÒmeqa. In context, the unbegotten-ness 
of God carries a rhetoric in the text, contrasting the impurity and lawlessness of the lifestyle of 
many Christians to which Justin confesses before they were brought to the Good and Unbegotten 
God (¢gaqù kaˆ ¢genn»tJ qeù), 1 Apol. 2, through the Son. 
51 1 Apol., 25.2. 
52 I.e. Isa. 65:11 and 5:20 in this case. The import of the fulfillment of prophecy in general and of 
Isaiah in particular is noteworthy. Fulfillment of prophecy was a legitimate philosophical interest 
(cf. De Natura Deorum II.73-162), and Isaiah’s place in Justin is very evident in the Apologies 
(see Marcovitch, 1994:171-2), and in the Trypho, upon which Rajak [1999:80] expounds. 
53 1 Apol., 49.5: tù ¢genn»tJ qeù di¦ toà Cristoà. 
54 1 Apol., 53.2: e„ m¾ martÚria prˆn À ™lqe‹n aÙtÕn ¥nqrwpon genÒmenon kekhrugmšna perˆ 
aÙtoà.  
55 1 Apol., 53.2: prwtÒtokoj tù ¢genn»tJ qeù. 
56 The most relevant parallel to this usage of  prwtÒtokoj is Col. 1:15, referring to “the first-born of 
all creation.” Arius will connect its significance more to Ro. 8:29, prwtÒtokoj of many brethren (cf. 
Gregg & Groh 1981:43-76), thus interpreting the resurrection in a soteriologically-orientated (i.e., 
an ecclesial rather than a cosmological) sense. Justin’s application of the term is located in the 
relation of the Logos to God (the Father), and there is little substantive difference from Jn. 1:18, 
where the Evangelist articulates that the Logos is the Father’s complete self-articulation. On the 
relation of Justin to the Fourth Gospel see Braun, 1959:136f; Davey, 1965:117-122. It should be 
registered that this marks a change in the conceptual connections, by pushing the image 
ontologically further than is explicit in the New Testament. PrwtÒtokoj in the context of being the 
first-born of the ¢gšnnhtoj God introduces the paradox of the relation of procession within the 
mystery of divine being without articulating it. This will prove to be a fertile and contentious 
trajectory in Christology and Trinitarian theology which we shall accompany in the main body of 
this dissertation. 
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is both creative and allusive – Justin does not explicate the mysterious relation of 
Father to Son, or Unbegotten to First-born, but its fertility is nurtured by Origen into 
a pattern of describing divine interpersonal relations in the eternal begetting of the 
Son. We should note, however, Justin’s contribution to that process of Trinitarian 
description by this creative selection and juxtaposition of relation and procession. 
In Justin’s own language, however, “God” proper is restricted to the Father, as the 
first “rank” of divinity,57 yet this mystery is fully revealed and taught by Jesus 
Christ58 who is described as “next to” God.59 This language reflects a Platonic 
conceptuality of a hierarchy of connection in order to permit intelligibility. But close 
analysis of the relation of the (incarnate or otherwise) Logos to the transcendent 
Father again is not forthcoming in Justin60 - indeed it would be naïf and 
anachronistic to expect it. Justin’s theology depends upon a Christocentric 
subordinationism,61 which protects monotheistic language and yet juxtaposes this 
                                                 
57 E.g., 1 Apol. 13.1-2. 
58 1 Apol. 13.1-2, did£skaloj. Cf. Marcovitch, 1994:186.  
59 2 Apol. 13: tÕn g¦r ¢pÕ ¢genn»tou kaˆ ¢rr»tou qeoà LÒgon met¦ tÕn qeÕn proskunoàmen kaˆ 
¢gapîmen. 
60 If Justin did know Philo, as is sometimes claimed, he studiously avoids not only the term 
deÚteroj qeÕj, but also avoids equating the Logos with the Demiurge. Shotwell, 1965:97ff, 
compiles an exhaustive compilation of alleged textual correspondences, cf. Goodenough, 
1968:52: “It is this obligation to preserve the unity of the divine nature even while going so far as 
to affirm the separate personalities of the Divine Beings which mark the Christian metaphysics of 
Justin and his successors as having its roots primarily in Hellenistic Judaism rather than in 
Hellenism itself”; and 93: Trypho has “no implacable prejudices against believing in an 
intermediary and secondary Deity, whose complete divine character is yet insisted upon 
(Dialogue 60.3, 63.1). Trypho only parts from Justin on the possibility of the incarnation of the 
Second Deity, and especially of that incarnation’s actually having taken place in Jesus.” However, 
this need not preclude Palestinian influences, so Segal, 1977. Justin prefers the description 
kt…sthj, to Demiurge, and always refers it to God (by which he means Father, not Son). The 
Logos cannot be described as exercising in Justin the sort of intermediary role Goodenough 
describes as Philonic, i.e., neither created nor uncreated, but a kind of “hostage”, guaranteeing to 
God that humanity will not rebel, and to humanity that God will be faithful (1968:50). Barnard, 
1978:118 insists that Justin was unfamiliar with Philo asserting instead that Justin had “a good 
working knowledge of post-biblical Judaism… [The Trypho] is proof that… there was a close 
intercourse between Christians and Jews even after the promulgation of the Birkhath-ha-minim” 
(ibid.). 
61 This stylistic and theological method recalls that of the Fourth Gospel’s emphasis, so Barrett, 
1982:12:. “Here I may mention again the apparent clash between such statements as ‘I and the 
Father are one’ and ‘The Father is greater than I’. John finds himself obliged to make these two 
sets of statements about the same person, because he must make it clear that God in his 
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with descriptions of the Logos which far exceed that of a cosmic did£skaloj, relying 
instead upon an understanding of the incarnation as an epiphany of love.  
In describing the nature of the love which the Christian ascribes to God as ¢paq»j, 
Justin cites the consistent, obedient love of the Son for the Father, to evoke a love 
of the same order from Christians for the Father first, and then for Jesus Christ.62 
Justin has thus managed to introduce the notion of inter-personal love as 
explicative of divine nature in contrast to the stories of the gods of Greek religion: 
these are, he contends, lesser and often malicious divinities.63 The power of the 
term ¢paq»j is employed by Justin to counter paganism and suggest the pure love 
of the Christian God. 
A similar setting is the context for Justin’s meaning when he writes of the 
“ineffable glory and form” of the true God.64 The carving of idols and their worship 
as divinities is not only senseless (¥logon) but hybris against God’s ¥rrhton 
dÒxan kaˆ morf»n. It would make no sense to speak of God as “formless” – as 
this is a description of matter before it receives order from the Creator. The love 
of God, in its pure glory, is manifest in the reciprocal love of the Son for the 
Father and this is the mysterious and glorious form of the divine. Justin uses this 
analogy without threatening the divine unity, and the Father, Logos and Spirit 
represent a model of the harmony of pure love in communion. In this sense the 
“persons” of Father and Son are paramount. Justin refers to Father and Son, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
revelation is truly God; that Jesus reveals not a secondary deity but the Most High God. Yet he is 
Deus revelatus; not the whole abyss of Godhead, but God known.” Cf. also on ‘The Father is 
greater than I’ (ibid., p.35): “The new quest calls for a new Christology, or, better perhaps, a new 
thinking-through of the raw materials of all Christology. It may be that the next generation will find 
the right formulas, reminded by a better understanding of the historical Jesus that the New 
Testament, and not least the Fourth Gospel, is in the end about God.” 
62 2 Apol. 13.4. 
63 Cf. 1 Apol. 5, & 54. 
64 1 Apol. 9.3. 
 59
personal terms,65 but does not appear to hold a distinct doctrine of the 
hypostasis of the Spirit.  
                                                
 
By this strategy in terms of a second-century context, Justin adequately manages 
neither to compromise the unity of God, nor to imply that the Son and the Spirit are 
each begotten by the Father by the vagueness of the divine procession which he 
describes, even if it is couched in terms of Platonic hierarchy, and achieved by 
such an indistinct doctrine of the Spirit that later theologians will have to redress it. 
Justin’s silence is significant: the Spirit is not the divine ousia which constitutes the 
Trinity’s divinity, nor is the Spirit a “necessary” idea which in any way constrains 
the freedom of God’s presence to creation. 
That God’s being is love is a significant key to comprehending Justin, particularly 
evident in the context of the Trypho (perhaps against perceived Jewish and 
Marcionite theologies).66 Justin begins his discussion with Trypho on common 
ground. Unlike the philosophical, non-theistic tradition, Justin and Trypho have 
much in common, enabling Trypho to cut to what he believes to be the centre of 
philosophy: its true purpose is to investigate the divine. Justin then clarifies the 
problem further, that is, that most philosophers do not so comprehend philosophy, 
because the divine is not construed theistically. In such cases, Justin claims that 
philosophy descends into self-contradiction if the divine is restricted to generalities, 
as a nurturing principle or self-governing necessity, but not apprehended 
 
65 1 Apol. 36.2. 
66 Perhaps the identification of the nature of God with love has always been a part of the arsenal 
of supersessionist arguments (cf. Wilson, 1996, ch. 9 and Rajak, 1999). The latter’s reading of  
the Trypho  sees little ‘love’ in her description of it as a vituperative “defence (by attack) against 
Judaism” (ibid., p61). With some degree of irony, Rajak acknowledges that Justin’s endeavours 
are still “path-breaking work” (ibid.) in terms, no-doubt, of demolition and disconnection! Certainly 
it is a distinguishing feature that Marcion, (and Justin’s probable protégé Tatian) emphasize to 
contrast the Christian dispensation with the Jewish.  
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personally or regarding the particularities of individual existence.67 This concisely 
exposes a fundamental difference between biblical and Hellenistic conceptualities 
of divinity. Justin rejects as intolerably labyrinthine the philosophical quest when it 
leads along musical, astronomical or geometric courses of study.68 Truth, for the 
philosophical tradition, is primarily cosmological. It is arrived at, or uncovered, 
though the pursuit of the truth of all things since Plato urged upon the academy  a 
hermeneutic dependent upon the equal distribution of divinity throughout the 
cosmos in the World-Soul.69 
Justin will attempt to re-cast philosophy in a Christocentric monotheistic manner, 
attempting to connect God’s presence to creation in the Logos even if such a 
construct would fail later tests of Trinitarian orthodoxy.  
Evidence for this includes an interesting textual question around Trypho 3.5, which 
regardless of its resolution, is a useful indicator of the connection in Justin’s mind 
between God and Being. The old man, though really leading the conversation in 
the vignette, appears to have asked a clarifying question in their introductory 
conversation about philosophy: “What do you call Being (tÕ Ôn)?”70 Justin replies 
that that which is unchanging and the first cause of all things is God.71 The old 
man focuses upon the foundational assumption of Platonism that there is an 
                                                 
67 Trypho 1.4. 
68 Trypho 2.4. 
69 See above, 1:2. 
70 Trypho 2:6. The majority MS tradition has QeÒn. Goodspeed, 1914, follows the MS Parisinus 
gr. 450, (c.1363/4) exaratus, fol. 193r  - 241r - = ‘A’), van Winden restores tÕ Ôn on the grounds 
that both paleographically and verbally the two are easily confused: a scribe may have mistaken 
the regular Greek abbreviation for God [QN] rather than ON. If the text were dictated, tÕ Ôn and 
QeÒn would be undistinguishable to the hearer. The context is one of a discussion about Being. 
It may be, of course, that Justin so equates the two that he deliberately switches to theistic 
language. Either way our argument that Justin wishes to redress philosophical concepts of Being 
by rooting them in theology is supported by this drift of vocabulary in the text. Bobichon, 2003:190 
has QeÒn without comment. 
71 Trypho 3.5.  
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ontological connection in the form of a divine kinship, which allows philosophy to 
be revelatory. Undermining this destroys Justin’s confidence in the ability of 
rationality or noàj to behold God without the instruction of the Holy Spirit.72 It would 
appear then, that without being the defining essence of divinity, the Holy Spirit 
alone is capable of communicating the totality of God’s being and the truth 
necessary to perfection. 
This achievement of what is an ‘impersonal’ theology of the Holy Spirit will be a 
convention which persists until Athanasius, who draws upon the same subject, that 
is, the salutary action of the Spirit, this time to prove the Spirit’s personal divinity.73 
Justin’s concern is to avoid implying that there is a higher God than the creator.74 
The true God is not composite,75 and thus the theophanies are not of God the 
Father but Logophanies.76 Despite the problems of such a description which 
Origen will attempt to address, it is clear that Justin avoids a radically cosmological 
answer: the Deus revelatus is the Logos, but the Logos does not have the role of 
Plato’s demiurge: the Father is the supreme God in splendour, having made the 
cosmos. His likeness, however, is focused and fully revealed in the Logos the Son 
(rather than to the Demiurge), and present to creation in the Spirit. Together these 
are paradigmatic for later Trinitarian descriptions. To Justin’s picture of the divine 
relation to the cosmos we now turn.   
                                                 
72 Trypho 4.1 À tÕn qeÕn ¢nqrèpou noàj Ôyeta… pote m¾ ¡g…J pneÚmati kekosmhmšnoj; 
73 Grounds for this argument were expounded at a paper read at the thirteenth International 
Conference on Patristic Studies by Dominique Gonnet entitled ‘New approaches to Athanasius’s 
Epistles to Serapion according to the manuscript tradition’ which became the 2001 article ‘The 
Salutary Action of the Holy Spirit as Proof of his Divinity in Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion.’ 
Gonnet’s careful observations are stimulating – here again the notions of participation in God’s 
grace convey a unity not only of divine will but identity. 
74 Contra the Gnostic tradition, but for his own theological grounds: cf Trypho 11.1; 60.2; 80.4; 
and 1 Apol 16.6. 
75 Trypho 114.3. 
76 Or Christophanies, see section 1:iv, below. Justin omits to indicate what was the nature of the 
form the Logos had before the incarnation, or the relation of this “body” to the one brought to birth 
through the Virgin Mary. 
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Justin’s very different view of the theological significance of the cosmos from his 
philosophical peers will find explication in his use of the motif of Logos 
Spermatikos, but this is not an expression interchangeable with contemporary 
thought about divine immanence: Justin does not imply that God is equated with 
the normal life of the cosmos, providing an automatic or ‘natural’ connection with 
the divine. The universe is enlivened by the Holy Spirit’s creative act of hovering 
above the chaotic waters:77 ‘order’ is not its animating principle, but it is, rather, the 
presence of God to creation in the Spirit. Angels are one means whereby Justin 
discusses this: they are active agents of God, bringing messages to humanity and 
acting as guardians to protect people.78 This all fits very harmoniously with Justin’s 
objection to philosophy’s rejection of the personal care and attention that God 
lavishes upon humanity. To Justin, God the creator is attentive and personal love, 
and the duty of human beings is to return this love in worship and service. Angels 
do not fit into a philosophical cosmology, and Justin makes no attempt to de-
mythologize them into (for example) ministering natural laws or principles, which 
enable the universe to be. Angels are not the ideas which the Creator copies, but 
God’s servants, sources of divine inspiration and guidance, thus far from being 
“natural fragments” or “seeds” of divinity or divine reason. For Justin, angels are 
not creative powers which make the universe. His reverence of angels has echoes 
with that criticised in Col. 2:18, but it is far from the idea of the creation of the 
universe through angels as in some forms of early Gnosis.79 Angels are made to 
                                                 
77 1 Apol. 59.2-5, 60.15, another alleged case of Plato’s plagiarism of Moses according to Justin, 
and 64.3-4 – a case of demonic copying. 
78 2 Apol. 5.2 
79 Cf. May 1994:51f. 
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be like the Son,80 and thus are important evidence that charges against Justin 
exhibiting a basic Hellenism in cosmology are inaccurate. 
However, there is one imperative issue where Justin appears to be very close to 
Platonic conceptions of matter and the cosmos: God does not create the cosmos 
ex nihilo, but orders pre-existent amorphic matter: 
Kaˆ p£nta t¾n ¢rc»n, ¢gaqÕn Ônta, dhmiourgÁsai aÙtÕn ™x 
¢mÒrfou Ûlhj di' ¢nqrèpouj dedid£gmeqa...81  
May argues that emergence of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in Jewish and 
Christian theology:  
not only represents an attempt to draw a line against the 
philosophical doctrine of the origin of the world, but is also an 
interpretation of the biblical idea of creation in philosophical terms… 
creatio ex nihilo was developed not only out of contradiction of the 
creation notions of gnosticism, but just as much in direct debate with 
the philosophical model of world-formation. (May, 1994:24).  
Yet even if May were correct, a hesitation is required in the interpretation of 1 Apol. 
10.2. Although Justin exercises himself to demonstrate a theistic philosophy, his 
failure to demonstrate that he holds a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, merely locates 
him in his day – and reflects a sense of Genesis 1, even though there seems little 
textual correspondence with the LXX. Moreover, that Justin wrestled for a 
profound shift in cosmological understanding has already been observed. Despite 
                                                 
80 1 Apol. 6.2.  
81 1 Apol. 10.2 
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the issue of creatio ex nihilo Justin’s personal, monotheistic cosmology is 
otherwise dissonant from Middle Platonic cosmology.  
Justin insists however that God made the universe as it is out of his goodness for 
the sake of humanity, which consequently bears an order reflecting his purpose 
and will.82 Justin appears to have believed the creation story of Genesis 1 (which 
he argues was copied by Plato in the Timaeus83) to have taught that God created 
by the Spirit moving over the watery chaos.84 Justin reads the biblical concept of 
creation to be about ordering, naming and blessing, reflected in the notion of God 
bringing forth good things by separating or dividing chaos: 
The act of creation is understood as a transformation, as a changing 
of chaos or nothingness, however these are understood, into the 
world as it now is, that is, into the world which is destined for people 
to live in. This way of speaking about transformation prevents the 
world and its existence from being taken for granted; the world and 
                                                 
82 Though not his nature, the image of that is reserved for humanity (for whom, according to 
Justin, the whole was made). The influence of Gen. 1:10b, 12b, 18b, 21b, 25b & 31 find echoes in 
Justin’s words in 1 Apol. 10.2. 
83 1 Apol. 59.1-5. 
84 Gen. 1.2a. von Rad (1972:49) argues that the Hebrew for “created” in v.1, arB (LXX: 
™po…hsen), “contains the idea both of complete effortlessness and creatio ex nihilo, since it is 
never connected with any statement of the material. The hidden grandeur of this statement is that 
God is Lord of the world. But not only in the sense that he subjected a pre-existing chaos to his 
ordering will!… Here the subject is not a primeval mystery of procreation from which the divinity 
arose, nor of a “creative” struggle of mythically personified powers from which the cosmos arose, 
but rather the one who is neither warrior nor procreator, who alone is worthy of the predicate, 
Creator”. Von Rad does little to help a connection of this assertion with the description of the 
formless void of the watery darkness,  Vhbv Vht  (LXX: ¢Òratoj kaˆ ¢kataskeÚastoj), and primeval 
storm of v.2, even if it is to be regarded as a heading to the Priestly creation hymn. Claus 
Westermann (1984:100) rejects the assertion that arB implies creatio ex nihilo in the Old 
Testament at all: it “is quite inappropriate to ask if P’s description of creation has anything to do 
with creatio ex nihilo. This is a complete distortion of the intention of P; he wants to guard with 
reverence the mystery of creation not to explain it.” (ibid., p.174). Of course, Justin read from the 
LXX, and came to the text with the categories of Platonic cosmology very familiar to him: but 1 
Apol. 10.2 need not be read as a grotesque Platonic distortion of Genesis at all. On the contrary, 
observing the philosophical difficulty of speaking about “before creation”, Westermann notes “If 
Gen 1:1-2 intended to describe creatio ex nihilo, then that would be a met£basij e„j ¥llo gšnoj, 
something that simply cannot be reported. One can teach creatio ex nihilo; but one cannot narrate 
it” (ibid., p. 46). 
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its contingency is traced back to an event which transcends it, 
namely the act by which the creator brought about change. 
(Westermann, 1984:44). 
Plato did not understand the pre-existent chaos or “non Being” which the 
Demiurge orders in creation to have been evil in nature, though even when it is 
ordered into a world of becoming, exhibiting a reflected order and beauty of the 
divine, it remains in some ways antithetical to perfect Being. This is another 
weighty reason why Justin did not jettison a common assumption about creation. 
Gnostics may have construed matter as opposed to the will and purpose of the 
true God revealed in Jesus Christ, so that salvation is construed as escape: Justin 
did not. The most philosophically-orientated aspect of Justin’s theology of creation 
proves to be the idea that the whole cosmos was created for humanity. This is 
radically transformed by Justin out of any Stoic cosmology by his personalist 
theism which relates this concept “specifically to the history of salvation” (May, 
1994:128). Creation is, for Justin, indicative of God’s redemptive love. The 
manifestation of the Son far exceeds Plato’s assertion that the Demiurge out of his 
goodness desires to endue matter with divine order. In Justin’s theology, the Holy 
Spirit, despite being described indistinctly and subordinately, is the means by 
which God and the Logos are made present to this creation in person, as it were. 
In other words, the Spirit is a manifestation to the cosmos of the present dimension 
of that love which is God’s being. If Justin’s lack of use of creatio ex nihilo 
threatens to land him in trouble to later orthodoxy – even though it would have 
been demonstrably innovative for Justin to have sustained a theology of creatio ex 
nihilo in the mid second century – his doctrine of God makes for a compelling 
foretaste of Trinitarian theology in its unity, differentiation and drama. 
 66
Justin’s Christocentric methodology in cosmology marks also a new direction in 
theological anthropology. The human being, as a microcosm of the World-Soul, 
may be described as a focus of the cosmos in a Middle Platonic thought. This is 
one consequence of the assumption that the highest element of humanity, the 
mind or reasoning intellect, was ontologically related to divinity. If reason, or 
intellect, was the thing which made human beings human, it was because it was 
the means whereby a reconnection with divine nature was possible. Albinus 
approaches mystical expression in his description of an abstract divinity attained 
through asceticism: 
The aspiration for wisdom, or the loosing and wrenching of the soul 
away from the body, [comes] when we turn ourselves to the 
intelligible and the true Existence (Goodenough, 1923:30).85 
In the Middle Platonic milieu, it is the body that is transcended in order to liberate 
the true self, which is present all along. This unchangeability of the divine thus 
meant that humanity, also, in its truest identity, may not change, but may know 
itself ever more truly.86 This focus upon the generic identity of the human being 
finds little appreciation in Justin. We have observed that Justin despises the 
inconsistency of philosophical insistence that God cares for the generic but not 
the personal.87 The reason for this is his conviction that each soul is not naturally 
a hypostasization of the divine. Justin strikingly asserts that the cosmos came 
into being for humanity,88 so that human beings may be recipients of divine love 
                                                 
85 citing Albinus, Freudenthal, 1879:152. 
86 It is not entirely adequate, therefore, to speak of a static-ness of identity, movement and 
development characterize Greek paide…a. For a broad discussion of notions of static-ness and 
development in understanding patristic thought, see Young, 1993:265-283. 
87 Trypho 1.4. 
88 1 Apol. 10.2; 2 Apol. 4.2; 5.2; Trypho 41.1. 
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and receive what they are not. Humanity can (and should) develop and change, 
in wisdom and in piety, salvation, and Christian discipleship sustained by the will 
and the Spirit result in humanity becoming what it was not.89 Christian salvation 
is offered to the sinner and the righteous person alike, and all are free and 
obliged by that freedom to choose the good. Souls that do this come to eternal 
life.90 A deliberate choice of that which is wrong is the sin in which demons urge 
human participation, so joining their rebellion against the good God.91 Purity of 
life is a pre-requisite for salvation, because it indicates whether or not one is 
participating in the governance of the good God or participating in active rebellion 
against him.  
hin 
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Whilst there is significant overlap between the meaning of noàj and the LÒgoj 
spšrmatikoj, both being implanted rational seeds common to the human race,92 
implantation alone is inadequate for the salvation of souls. Human beings have 
not followed the promptings of the noàj but sinned: they have not participated in 
the Logos himself, nor remained in him, even though the seeds of reason wit
humanity leave no person guiltless. Freedom, Justin emphasizes, is core to 
being a created person.93 Whilst Origen will so emphasise freedom th
becomes constitutive of human being, Justin presents, from within a 
philosophical framework, a radical challenge to late Antique philosophy. This is 
clear in his celebration of baptism94 as an effective ontological (as well as mo
 
89 1 Apol. 60.11, 2 Apol. 10.8. 
90 1 Apol. 8.4, 18.2. 
91 1 Apol. 44.1-8; on participation cf. 2 Apol. 13.6, below. 
92 2 Apol. 8.3. 
93 Cf. Gregg and Groh (1981) who argue that this trajectory is significant in understanding the 
psychological power of Arius’ insistence upon a created Logos. 
94 Justin does not use the term b£ptisma in the Apologies though he describes the rite with clarity 
in 1 Apol. 61 with the terms ¢nagšnnhsij / ¢nagenn£omai. Justin uses baptism explicitly in Trypho 
14. 
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new beginning. The restoration of a participatory relationship with the divine 
through the power of the Holy Spirit at baptism connects Christians to the Logos 
completely.95 Baptism enlivens each soul with the life of Christ;96 Christ being 
complete Logos incarnate
the 
. Their presence and worship is thus the 
ason for the world’s preservation.98  
 
ood 
 as 
 
y 
 
terms of intellectual contemplation, and certainly not in terms of Mithraic104 or 
                                                
97 who makes Christians thus become the effective 
lÒgoi spšrmatikoi for the whole creation
re
Redeemed humanity’s salvation and life depend upon the action of God in creation 
and redemption,99 in general and in particular. This activity is historical, revealed in 
the Law of Moses, which had people obeyed, would have brought salvation. Justin 
intimates, though, that there was an inherent hardness in people’s hearts. The 
revealed Law is thus powerless to redeem, even if, like natural reason, it is a g
guide. The redeeming Shepherd, fulfilling both prophecy and seminal reason, 
incarnate of the Virgin Mary condemns death in the flesh and brings divine life
gift.100 This divine life sustains Christians in communion with the divine at the
Eucharist,101 which is the life-giving sacrifice, sustaining the whole world,102 
celebrated in obedience to Christ’s command.103 This Eucharistic emphasis is 
strong evidence that Justin viewed the basis of the relationship between humanit
and the divine to be Christ’s sacrifice as the only ground of participation, less in
 
95 1 Apol. 61.2. 
96 1 Apol. 61.2. 
97 2 Apol. 10. 
98 2 Apol. 7. 
99 Trypho 45.4. 
100 Trypho 45. 
101 Trypho 41.1-3; 70.3-4. 
102 Trypho 117.1-3. 
103 Trypho 117.3. 
104 1 Apol. 65-6. 
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Dionysiac105 theophagy or sacrifice.106 Justin describes Christian life in terms of 
participation in the whole Christ, extending, as it were, the incarnation. Christians 
suffer persecution and martyrdom because of their association with the name of 
Christ.107 For Justin, despite the rhetorical display of the Jews’ hardness of heart, 
of the pagans’ sins manifesting the disconnection between people and the divine, 
and the emphasis we have observed on judgement according to works, any 
ontological mediation remains Christocentric and, in particular, is Eucharistically-
envisaged,108 not primarily moralistic.  Justin then, for all his perceived 
anthropocentric cosmology, derives this from a superabundant vision of the cosmic 
Christ in whom he participates eucharistically. This evaluation of Justin Martyr will 
conclude with a reading of his Christology. 
In Justin, the Spirit of God (who is also the Spirit of Christ) is the means whereby 
the Father and Son engender a connection between the worshipper and the 
Logos,109 Jesus Christ. Participation in the redemptive Christ is Justin’s way of 
                                                 
105 1 Apol 21.2 (body), 54.6 (wine & dismemberment before ascension). 
106 Justin uses qus…a to describe only the worship of false Gods, but never describes the 
Eucharist with this term in the Apologies. 
107 1 Apol 4: Justin does not explicitly follow the argument of 1 Clement 45, which develops the 
thought of Col 1:24, that Christians actualize the sacrifice of Christ, though Origen will – see 
section 2:iii of this chapter.  
108 1 Apol 66.2. Cf. Cuming, 1980:80-82, and Young, 1979:239-284, where she applies a honed 
interpretation to the nature of sacrifice, exploring Justin in terms of Communion-Sacrifice (ibid., 
pp.250-251) and Thank-offering (pp.256-260, 263-4). 
109 There is some reluctance on the part of NT writers to adopt as foundational contemporary 
trajectories of the wisdom tradition, a reluctance which Justin shares in as much as he avoids the 
elevation of personified Sophia [LXX] - contrast, however, philosophia’s universal revelatory role 
in Justin. In contrast to the Torah, Sophia is accessible to all people and nations, and therefore it 
is superficially curious that it does not appear more centrally as a weapon in the Apologist’s or 
Evangelist’s arsenal for the propaganda fidei. (Cf. Prov 1:1f.) There is a universal dimension to 
Wisdom, which balances antithetically the specificity and particularity of the mediatorial role of 
Torah in forging the people of Israel. Obedience to Torah was construed as enabling Israel to be 
the mediating, priestly people for all the nations. Patterns of the personification of Wisdom, (which 
Gnostic mythology freely draws upon), describe a woman worthy of being pursued with all that 
one has. (e.g., Prov 1-9, cf., Mt.13:45). Wisdom is of divine origin, a great blessing to humankind, 
but in much canonical literature of the genre, not a divine being, or generally even an aspect of 
the divine, (O’Collins, 1999:24: “Within a monotheistic faith, Wisdom takes on functions and 
attributes of hvhy, and within a strongly patriarchal religion, Wisdom emerges in a feminine way”) 
but is, rather, the created means or pattern of all creation, and the proclaiming mediator within all 
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reconnecting anthropology and cosmology soteriologically in the Son, whom he 
has described as being “next to” God.110 We have observed that this reconnection 
became necessary in Justin’s philosophical theology once an ontological 
connection between the cosmos or the soul with the divine was removed. Although 
Justin did not employ the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to establish this, substantially 
his cutting of ontological connections requires of him to find another means of 
epistemology, and he does this by making it a function of Christology, and 
construing cosmology in terms always dependent upon God’s act of creation.   
Further Christological exploration will enable a closer description of the nature of 
mediation envisaged by Justin, and will show that Justin had already articulated 
many of the theological puzzlements which Irenaeus and Origen continue to 
struggle to resolve, and which Athanasius approaches afresh in his refutation of 
Arius.  
The perhaps intentional vagueness in Justin, particularly the interchangeability of 
LÒgoj and Son in his works, allows for secondary nuances to co-exist without in a , 
where scattered reason (as in the Stoic doctrine of the anima mundi) is a basis of 
epistemology appropriate in his Platonic context.111 This application of Logos to 
                                                                                                                                                 
creation of God’s bounty, not unlike the place of logos spermatikos in Justin. Cf. especially Prov. 
6-8. Sir.24:8-11, LXX: “Before the ages, in the beginning, he created me [™ktisšn me].”  We will 
return to this tradition at length in part two of this thesis to explore how Arius develops this 
Christologically. But note that it is Logos not Sophia in Justin that is personified. No doubt this is 
attributable most of all to the fact of the incarnation in the male Jesus makes more conventional 
hypostatic sense to choose Logos rather than the feminine Sophia. Note the central Soteriological 
place of the Spirit in Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril, below. 
110 2 Apol. 13.4. 
111 The Logos, in a Christological conception of LÒgoj basilikÒj, identified and incarnate in Jesus 
Christ, and a derived, localized and scattered common reason within the universe is a more 
straightforward reading of the text of Justin than attempts to identify closely the relation in terms 
of contemporary (or near-contemporary) philosophical traditions. Cf., e.g., Pfättisch, 1910, who 
interprets the difference thus: the Logos proper, is the Platonic “form”, in fact: the distinct divine 
form of the Logos is Christ in his absolute transcendent identity. Justin’s use of the spšrma toà 
lÒgou represents the life-giving participation of the Logos in the soul. Cf. the discussion of Meyer, 
1914, sets in terms of the Stoic doctrine of the anima mundi. Cf. Holte, 1958:109-117. This 
 71
Christ exploits both Biblical references to the creative Word of God (in the Old 
Testament and the Johannine tradition), and philosophical conceptual vocabulary. 
The Logos is thus the source of delightful112 doctrines which are true, both in terms 
of the undergirding reason which makes the universe intelligible, and, more 
significantly, in terms of his authoritative teaching of the nature of God.  
But as there is a double aspect to the Logos, (the Logos in himself, and his reign in 
the world of creation). Justin makes it explicit that all participation in rationality - 
kat¦ LÒgou mšroj - without knowledge of the whole Christ is partial and 
fragmentary.113 Before the incarnation it was impossible to know the whole Logos. 
So contradictory opinions114 abounded, which find resolution only in that which is 
greater than human teaching, Christian doctrine, the superlative nature of which 
stems from the complete incarnation of Christ. 
Two consequences of Justin’s argument are particularly worthy of explication. 
Firstly, a missiological dimension is present in Justin’s insistence that human 
contradiction and schism reflect the fact that the whole truth is not fully grasped: 
this drives Justin’s ecclesiology. It is imperative, this being the case, that the 
Church is not obsessed by opinions that are rooted in the world of lower reasons, 
or polluted by notions contrary to these seeds of the Word. The Church’s unity 
                                                                                                                                                 
important distinction of Justin’s makes no ultimate claims for language - or human reason - about 
God. This not only is a conventional necessary modesty in an apophatic climate, but also a 
serious theological awareness rare in the height of rhetoric or conflict. Justin identifies a means of 
allowing religious discourse not to be self-defining but transfiguring, potentially something that 
urges towards self-transcendence, a language of “maximal scope” as in Williams’s discussion of 
Arius (2001). 
112 Cf. The Martyrdom of the Holy Martyrs Justin, Chariton, Charites, Paeon, and Liberanus, who 
suffered at Rome, in ANF 1, pp.305-6. In chapter 1 Rusticus sits in judgment of Justin, who 
recounts pleasing doctrines of Jesus Christ. The sense of aesthetically-pleasing doctrines 
corresponds with Justin’s desire to describe the intelligibility of the universe being sustained by 
the singular Logos of the Father present to creation in the Spirit, and confirms the philosophical 
mind-set of Justin. 
113 2 Apol . 10.2. 
114 2 Apol. 10.1-2. 
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signifies that the graceful and complete reign of the Logos has found authentic 
expression within it.115 Secondly, the significant dynamic in his argument is 
Christocentric. Truth is located in Christ, not in secondary reason, and therefore in 
the realm beyond the control of human noàj. The incompetence of scattered 
reason (in contrast to the excelling strength and capacity of the Logos in himself) is 
central to Justin’s rhetoric. He exalts the essential Logos at the expense less of the 
economic Logos than human beings’ lack of obedience to the seed of the Word. 
Without the whole Logos, humanity lacked the strength to comprehend or actualize 
the fullness promised by reason and philosophy. The Prophetic Spirit alone makes 
sense of this “lack”: it was to be remedied only by the incarnation to which it bore 
witness by prophecy. In predicting the coming of the whole Christ,116 Justin again 
reveals that his concern is less with morality than with an ontological means of re-
establishing authentic epistemology. Though it appears on one level notionally 
possible that souls may follow the promptings of reason embedded in the structure 
of creation and thus do the good, and be rewarded for it,117 Justin’s point is that 
the total structure needs setting aright from within by the whole Logos, enfleshed – 
tÕ Ólon tÕn fanšnta di' ¹m©j CristÕn gegonšnai, kaˆ sîma kaˆ logÕn kaˆ yuc»n.118
Justin concerns himself not primarily with morality, then, but with Christ:   
 
                                                 
115 This both accounts for Justin’s desire to expose and expel heresy, and illustrates a – perhaps 
unexpected – latitude in his allowing a spectrum of interpretations on questions he deemed  to be 
legitimate quaestiones disputatae:  “Justin knows and  mentions deviations from what he 
considers to be correct Christian views, but which it is legitimate to express, [=Trypho 47.1-4; 
48.4; 80.2,5; cf. 128.2-4] but he emphatically separates himself from the heresies which falsify 
Christianity and bring it into disrepute.[= 1 Apol 26; Trypho 35; 80.3f.]” May, 1994:120. 
116 2 Apol. 10, 15. 
117 Justin needs to sustain this possibility to maintain the fairness of God in judging and 
condemning the sinner. Justin re-states the Pauline dilemma outlined – again unresolved – in Ro. 
1-11, that God is not unjust in condemning sin, even though the law of conscience, like the Torah, 
can only limit or prescribe sin rather than work positively to remedy it. 
118 2 Apol. 10.1. 
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[What the philosophical schools] lacked – and what the Jews 
forfeited – was a special gift of God, a c£rij, to understand the 
prophetic Scriptures and so to discover in them the face of the Word 
Incarnate.119 
Christ is central in the philosophy and cosmology of Justin: prwtÒtokoj120 of the 
unbegotten121 God (i.e., the Father), or prwtÒgonoj.122 The transcendent God 
has a Son,123 and the Father-Son relation is the prime foundation upon which 
depend both appropriate theological description, and also the structuring reason
which constitutes the rationality of the ordered cosmos. The style of Justin’s 
rhetoric thus reveals the crucial ambiguity of LÒgoj as both the wisdom, and 
expressed mind of God, thus mediating divine being and creation. The nature of 
the Logos-Son, though distinguished from the Father is thus divine: LÒgoj kaˆ 
prwtÒtokoj ín toà qeoà, kaˆ qeÕj Øp£rcei.
 
sion, 
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124 Despite its problematical dimen
Justin’s hierarchical picture of Father-Son-(angels)-Spirit ensures that the nature
of the Logos’s divinity is not one merely endued by the Spirit, or comparable
angelic origins. Adoptionism is not a possibility, and neither is there construed an 
intermediate between the Father and the Logos. The Spirit reveals the 
significance of the Logos before the incarnation, reiterating the pivotal place of 
the Logos both in creation and in divine reality. The Logos holds together both 
philosophical ontological concerns and (carrying for Justin the weight of the LXX 
translation of rbd) makes way for a more linguistic understanding of Logos, as 
God’s spoken word-deed in history, bearing the challenge of the possibility of the 
 
119 Cf. Saldanha, 1984:10-11, citing Trypho 55.3 and 78. 
120 1 Apol. 46.2; 53.2. 
121 1 Apol. 53.2. 
122 1 Apol. 58.3. 
123 1 Apol. 63.15 
124 1 Apol. 63.15 
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radical freedom of God to love creation personally, already noted as a priority for 
Justin.  
 
Justin’s hierarchical subordination of the Trinity, whilst not describing the nature 
of the distinction between Father and Son in terms of divine ontology, seeks to 
retain a concern common to both biblical and philosophical worlds, namely, the 
priority of the Father (and thus monotheism). Justin does not structure his relation 
of Father to Son in the terms of later orthodoxy, so it is distorting to presume that 
Justin conceived there to be a differentiating barrier between the Father and the 
Son (upon which Arius will insist).  1 Apol. 63.15 reflects Justin’s sense that 
although the Son, if really divine, cannot logically be other than the eternal and 
infinite God – he cannot be merely a manifestation or effulgence of the 
undifferentiated totality of God either. 
 
He is different from God the maker of all things, but I speak 
numerically not gnomically.125  
 
This “gnomic identity” indicates not only divine intelligence, judgment, and 
purpose, but also intimates a locus of identity. Justin is paradoxically attributing 
to the Logos both a distinct identity and a shared reality with the Father. The 
Logos is the Father’s Word.  Justin’s Logos–language represents an important 
dynamic in the development of theology and cosmology, focusing the question of 
the nature of the Son as both determined before creation (as the eternal God’s 
Will), yet finding full expression only in creation.  
                                                 
125 Trypho 56.11: ¢r…qmë lšgw ¢ll¦ oÙ gnèmV. 
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 Because Justin exploits the potential of immediacy possible in the language of 
Logos to promote the possibility of God’s temporal and personal presence to 
creation, he is characteristically misconstrued as holding a temporal notion of the 
begetting of the Son.126 But Justin’s Logos theology demonstrates a capacity to 
juxtapose ontological and relational descriptions of divine mediation. Justin does 
not resolve these, but he does lay them bare by this terminology. Together with 
Justin’s subordinationism, the Word is construed as the hypostasized thought of 
the Father, yet distinct in number, so preventing an understanding of the Logos 
as an effulgence from God (a perceived characteristic of Gnostic patterns of 
description). The subordination of the Son is eternal, consequentially, the being 
of the Logos / Son is not contingent upon the creation of the cosmos despite 
being the means of its genesis.127 The Logos is not just an economic “device” for 
the creation of the world, but eternally the expressed will of God. In this regard, 
Justin contributes something profoundly satisfying in the emergence of the 
concept of the Trinity even whilst exploiting images and patterns of relation that 
will prove inimical to later orthodoxies. 
 
In relation to the cosmos, the economic dimensions of Justin’s Logos Christology 
may be described in terms of structure, and also in terms of its fuller, incarnate 
revelation in the life, teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The two 
achieve a sort of dramatic juxtaposition in Justin. Justin was concerned to make 
sense of truth in the cosmos, and found that a theistically-orientated adaptation 
                                                 
126 Goodenough, 1968:153-4, argues that Justin makes no attempt “to soften the temporal 
implications” of the begetting of the Son before and for creation, arguing that whilst the “inference 
is very remote” he “slightly suggests that the Logos was begotten not long before creation” (ibid., 
p.153), citing 2 Apol. 6.3. 
127 This corresponds with Origen’s use of ÐmooÚsioj of the son (Edwards, 1998). 
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of the doctrine of LÒgoj spšrmatikoj fitted these requirements. Rather than Justin 
directly identifying the World-Soul with Christ,128 his use of Logos as also the 
structural presence of reason reinforces the centrality of the Logos because it is 
nothing other than his imprint upon creation, which is derived from him through 
reason.  Truth discerned by philosophers with integrity before the complete 
coming of Christ were discovered “according to the share each had of the divine 
word sown [in creation]”129 which explicates Justin’s use of spšrma toà LÒgou130 
and kat¦ spermatikoà lÒgou mšroj.131 Significantly, these partial descriptions are 
then contrasted by Justin with the superlative picture of Christians having fullness 
of life and knowledge k¦ta t¾n toà pantÕj LÒgou Ó ™sti Cristoà132 and di¦ tÕ  
lÒgikon tÕ Ólon tÕn fanšnta di' ¹m©j CristÕn gegonšnai.133 Justin suggests that 
universal human culture is a means of structured preparedness for the fullness of 
truth revealed in Jesus Christ. It is not just Israel, therefore which has little 
excuse for failing to recognize the divine reality in Jesus Christ.  
 
Justin insists that all humanity shares an intrinsic intelligibility through the spšrma 
toà LÒgou134 which orientates the possibility of openness to Christ, as an 
epistemic preparedness rather than a direct ontological participation in the divine.  
In addition to this structural, philosophical connection between the Logos and the 
cosmos, Justin’s priority for the elevation of the particular above the generic135 is 
evident where he argues that in Logophanies the personal love of the Logos for 
                                                 
128 Cf. Norris, 1966:46. 
129 ¢pÕ mšrouj toà spermatikoà qe…ou lÒgou, 2 Apol. 13.3. 
130 2 Apol. 8.1. 
131 2 Apol. 8.3. 
132 2 Apol. 8.3. 
133 2 Apol. 10.1. 
134 2 Apol. 8.1. 
135 Trypho 1.4. 
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the plight of the Israelites may be seen. So it is Christ who conversed with Moses 
from the flame of the burning bush,136 his will to rescue Israel demonstrates the 
nature and identity of the Logos before the incarnation. Whilst this is temporally 
before the incarnation yet, Justin says in perhaps simply untechnical and 
conventional language, that it was Christ who appeared. Logos would have fitted 
more neatly if one were to describe Old Testament theophanies as Logophanies 
– here it is a Christophany.137  
 
Highly significant also in Justin’s description of the incarnate life of Jesus, are the 
miracles.138 Though they are not sufficient a basis in themselves upon which to 
base as great a Christological claim as Christians do in asserting the divinity of 
the Son, they are epiphanic139 especially because they were foretold by the Spirit 
of Prophecy.140 The sinlessness of the Son witnessed by his conception and birth 
as in his earthly life141 and his teaching in word and deed,142 achieve importance 
because they signify the nature of this incarnate Christ:143 both are vital 
                                                 
136 1 Apol. 62.1-3. 
137 The plain consequence of this is the best – Justin uses Christ and Logos completely 
interchangeably. 
138 1 Apol. 48.1, 30, Trypho 69.4. 
139 Justin believes that without the testimony of the Prophetic Spirit, and without the context of 
Jesus’s virgin birth, life, teaching, death, and resurrection, they might simply indicate that he was 
a magician, a fact he explicitly counters, 1 Apol. 30. 
140 The Spirit in Jewish Scripture foretold many aspects of his coming, which, Justin believes, 
accounts for them being copied by deceptive demons in order to detract from the uniqueness of 
the incarnation when it took place. The motif of copying of Scriptures is obviously one upon which 
Justin relies both in regard to demonic imitation and Plato’s plagiarism. Cf. 1 Apol. 54-56. 
141 Cf. Trypho 17.1; 102.7; 103.2; 110.6. 
142 described as the power of God, dÚnamij qeoà, 1 Apol. 14.5. 
143 The parallel with Socrates as a type of Christ does not exalt Socrates to the level of the 
incarnate Logos. Socrates managed to follow the truth of reason uncompromisingly, and thus he, 
without the presence and power of the Incarnate Logos, heroically managed to refuse to 
participate in the cultus, thus scandalizing conventional requirements of reverence. Cicero 
perpetuates an approach which connects such a refusal to sacrifice as a crime against the public 
good, and thus rightly leading to resentment. Over these concerns for social cohesion and 
welfare, Socrates sets his mind on the question of truth. Justin appears to read Socrates as 
turning philosophy from the world of social science into that of theology, giving ethics a 
theological dimension. Yet for all its wonder, Socrates’s achievement was far from that achieved 
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dimensions of Justin’s description of what is significant in the manifestation of the 
incarnate life of the Son.144 
 
The climax of the revelation of Jesus Christ in the flesh for Justin, however, is the 
double mystery of the crucifixion and resurrection. Justin makes no attempt to 
collapse the paradox that this glorious Christ was at the same time in his earthly 
economy paqhtÕj kaˆ ¥doxoj kaˆ ¥timoj kaˆ stauroàmenoj.145 
 
Indeed, the humiliation of the Son by crucifixion is, rather than something 
needing explanation, described as the one mystery which the demons could not 
deduce from the witness-beforehand of the Spirit of Prophecy: that the nature of 
love was cross-ward ™p' ¢rcÁj. Whereas demons may not have reckoned upon 
the grounds of mediation and reconciliation between God and humanity being 
anything to do with the crucifixion,146 Plato’s copying of Moses, according to 
Justin, led to his partial comprehension of the cross-focused universe in the 
Timaeus147 where Plato’s world-soul acts as an intersection between the worlds 
of being and becoming in the shape, as it were, of a ‘c’. This crucial intersection 
of the worlds of being and becoming are pivoted as it were, for Justin, in the form 
of the cross, upon which Christ offered his life for the ontologically-inferior life of 
the world out of obedience to the Father’s love for creation. This pivot is echoed 
for Justin mystically in his observance of crosses in the physical world, the sea is 
crossed only beneath this symbol, the earth made fruitful only after being 
                                                                                                                                                 
by Jesus Christ, whose incarnation for Justin enabled the teaching of the ignorant of these and 
more wonderful mysteries still. 
144 Cf. especially Trypho 32-110. 
145 Trypho 110.2. 
146 1 Apol. 35, 55, 60, 65. 
147 1 Apol. 60.1, alluding to Plato, Timaeus 34b and 36b. 
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ploughed with its shape, even the human form is distinct from that of beasts 
because of its cross-shape.148  The soul of the universe, thus, stands in relation 
to the divine only through the pivot of the sacrificial love of God manifest 
supremely in the crucifixion, and vindicated in the resurrection and breathing of 
the Spirit upon Christians. The Spirit conveys divine life to the Christian 
community, so that ecclesiology is a consequence of Justin’s Christology, but not 
its limit. The cosmic dimension is not lost, because in Justin’s thought the 
presence of the Christian community in the world replaces any rôle assigned to a 
“natural” spšrma toà LÒgou in late Antique thought. Justin connects the complete 
mediation of the Cosmic Christ with the residual presence of Christians which 
preserves the world149 by their life in the Spirit and in Christ, and thus are means 
of divine revelation and mediation. Clearly this is not as worked out 
sacramentally as will be found in later writers – for example Cyril, who assigns to 
a sacramental theology the means of appropriating and sustaining divine life for 
Christians in the world. Though Cyril’s theology owes much to Athanasius’s 
presentation of faith in in CG-DI and elsewhere, the notion of Christians 
preserving the world by their presence and divine life is present here. The 
significance of this observation is slanted in an apologetic direction in the context. 
Justin does not elucidate his observation because the thrust of the text’s point is 
that despite (or perhaps because of this) Christians are unjustly persecuted. This 
state of affairs, though demonstrated to be unjust and unwise, does not shock 
Justin, nor should it shock those whom he wrote to strengthen: this is a 
characteristic response from the world - it happened to the good philosophers as 
                                                 
148 1 Apol. 55.3-5. 
149 2 Apol. 7.1. 
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to the Hebrew prophets,150 and to Christ.151 Christians now know the pain of the 
mediation of Christ through their participation in that life of divine love which is 
self-offering.152 In this way, the nature of the Christian Deus revelatus is shared 
by those participate in Christ after his death. 
 
Justin has thus managed a theological connection between the eternal Logos 
and the imprinted seed of the Word in the structure of the whole creation, and an 
ontological link through the Spirit between the incarnate Christ and the baptized. 
The connection remains hierarchical, because at this point there is no alternative 
pattern which allows participation, and Justin is not the systematician to achieve 
this. The Logos participates in the Father because he is begotten by the 
Unbegotten. Creation participates unknowingly in the seminal Logos whenever it 
acts according to reason, but Christians, on the other hand, participate 
ontologically in the personal and complete Christ. Arius will provoke a re-
evaluation of this model, undermining its content by asserting that the Son was 
from nothing, whilst appearing to retain its form as the received tradition of the 
Church. Much of the resistance to Athanasius from so-called “semi-Arian” 
communities will reflect how far this form of theological and cosmological 
description was perceived as normative. However, Justin has sketched a model 
of Christology and soteriology which engages critically with conventions 
contemporary to him, yet is accessible and intelligible to the norms of 
philosophical culture. Subordination plays a vital role in Justin’s theological 
schema, at once keeping the parameters from collapsing and protecting 
monotheism, as best as he can, avoiding Christologies of effulgence.  
                                                 
150 E.g., 2 Apol. 8. 
151 As foretold by the prophets, Justin explicates, e.g., 1 Apol. 49-50. 
152 1 Apol. 56-57. 
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 1:4 The Creating Word: Christ and Cosmology in Irenaeus of Lyons 
(c.130 – c.200) 
The significance of Irenaeus of Lyon to Athanasian studies has become a 
celebrated leitmotif in the recent studies of de Andia (1986) and Anatolios (1998, 
2001). The latter’s treatment is extensive and it is unnecessary to replicate it here 
fully: this section is thus less lengthy than that on Justin and Origen, where it is 
necessary to establish their place in the mindscape of Athanasius. There is at the 
outset, however, one theme which does not find full discussion in Anatolios which 
merits consideration, namely the shunt in Irenaeus from Logos theology to an 
economic Trinitarianism. 
 
Irenaeus’s emphasis upon divine activity and his use of the bodily metaphor of 
hands illustrates this clearly. Calculated to reinforce his juxtaposition of God and 
creation in an anti-Gnostic manner, it is a means of ridiculing Gnostic speculation 
about Aeons emanating from the Logos’s hand like branches from a tree.153 
Hands are Irenaeus’s motif for a person’s self-extension, but this need not be 
construed as effulgence – there is a more acceptable, holistic model,154 which 
culminates in Irenaeus’s contrast of Gnostics’ 99 extensions of divinity with a 
rather more anthropomorphic model of two hands.155  The Creator is not afraid to 
get his hands dirty: encompassing all things material and spiritual,156 they are 
                                                 
153 Irenaeus, AH II.17.6 (Rousseau & Doutreleau, 1982:162-165). 
154 Irenaeus, AH II.24.4 (Rousseau & Doutreleau, 1982:242-245). 
155 Irenaeus, AH II.24.6 (Rousseau & Doutreleau, 1982:248-239). 
156 Irenaeus, AH II.30.1 (Rousseau & Doutreleau, 1982:301). 
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those of an artist or sculptor.157 Indeed, an early Trinitarian model (with echoes 
from Philo) for the mission of the Son and the Spirit finds expression as they are 
described as being the hands of God, together the means of creation and 
redemption. The image is important for all its being well-known: the Son and the 
Spirit are not substantially separate from the divine identity of the Father. 
Irenaeus admits that this is a metaphor: 
 
æj aÙtoà „d…aj m» œcontoj ce‹raj158 
 
but Son and Spirit together make all things and sustain them in their freedom, to 
them does the Father address the words of Gen. 1:26 – and they mould and 
make all creatures perfectly in accordance with the Father’s will: 
 
¢eˆ g¦r sump£restin aÙtù Ð LÒgoj kaˆ ¹ Sof…a, Ð UƒÕj kaˆ tÕ 
Pneàma, di' ín kaˆ ™n oƒj t¦ p£nta ™leuqšrwj kaˆ aÙtexous…wj 
™po…hse.159 
This connection marks a movement from binitarian pattern of Logos-theology to a 
practical Trinitarianism which involves all persons of the Triad in the act of 
creation.  
 
The theological method of Irenaeus of Lyons as witnessed both in Adversus 
Haereses (hereafter AH), and the Epideixis was forged in the pressing pastoral 
context of the confutation of Gnostic cosmogony and theology. Irenaeus is, 
therefore, anxious to provide a thorough alternative to the collection of ‘words 
                                                 
157 Irenaeus, AH II.30.5 (Rousseau & Doutreleau, 1982:308). 
158 Irenaeus, AH IV.20.1 (Rouseau, Hemmerdinger, Doutreleau & Mercier, 1965:627). 
159 Irenaeus, AH IV.20.1 (Rouseau, Hemmerdinger, Doutreleau & Mercier, 1965:627). 
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and sayings at haphazard, … [with]… unnatural and unreal connection’,160 which 
is his analysis of Gnostic exegesis. In contrast, to the NHL, where there are 
copious references to cosmological theories supporting theological disclosure,161 
Irenaeus’s exegetical method above all attempts to preserve the unity of a 
dramatic narrative of creation-fall-salvation. Though often described as 
typological, allegory is also central to his method of countering ensuing 
fragmentation by this separation of creation from redemption. This strategy is, not 
improperly, described as “Scriptural” (Lawson, 1948: 66-82; Simonetti, 1994; 
Young 1997:161-185; Cameron, 1994:65), but Irenaeus’ chief theological 
characteristic is Christocentricity, which holds and governs the interpretation of 
Scriptural texts.  
 
Irenaeus strategy to undermine what he believed to be distortingly ‘disconnected’ 
readings of Scripture was an integrated and inter-connected engagement with 
Scripture, uncovering patterns of prophecy and fulfilment in Christ. He thus 
produced a weave of themes and prophecies from the Old Testament balancing 
them with their resolution in the Christian economy, by focusing them consistently 
upon Christ. This is significant for Irenaeus’s conception of mediation in as much 
as it locates this idea in the open presence of God in creation ab initio. All creation 
points to Christ who is its source and its end. Irenaeus thus does not toil over how 
this may be philosophically possible. 
This is a significant achievement – attained through the somewhat unfocused 
refutations in AH. Irenaeus Christologically re-aligns Jewish Scriptures. Though 
                                                 
160 Irenaeus, AH I.9.3, which the ANF edition renders (p330):“a system which they falsely dream 
into existence, and thus inflict injury upon the Scriptures, while they build up their own 
hypothesis.”  
161 E.g., On the Origin of the World [NHLII. 97, 27-127, 17, in Robinson, 1984:162ff]. 
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there is evidence of ecclesiological concerns, especially as the Church’s unity is an 
essential witness to the cosmic achievement of Christ,162 Christocentric concerns 
are prior. For him, the Church’s continuing ministry of reconciliation has serious 
theological significance as ecclesial life manifests Christ’s cosmic role. Through 
the presence, prayer and mission of Christian communities, Christ will be made 
known in all the world, and all things will come to be reconciled in him by a singular 
Rule of Faith by which the Church lives.163 The Christian community shares the 
singular sonship as the anointed heir in Christ, in contrast to the diversity of the 
sects each having their own founder and competing theologies.164 So, despite a 
significant role for the Church expounded in Irenaeus, this importance is based 
upon and referred back to the centrality of Christ. The Church never usurps an 
ontologically mediatorial role from him.165 
The Christian tradition’s rhetoric of self-distinction from Judaism, from Paul 
onwards, sought to diminish and profoundly relativise the Torah as a mediating 
agent, overwhelmed, claimed Paul and others, by a far greater “splendour” in the 
person of Christ.166 However, in Irenaeus’s battle against a perceived 
abandonment of the plain reading of Scripture by his opponents, the Old 
Testament narrative, though subordinate to his thorough Christocentricity, forms 
Irenaeus’s presentation of Christian identity. In particular, it provides a structure to 
highlight the Christocentric nature of the k»rugma.167 Irenaeus’s claim to fidelity to 
                                                 
162 AH I.10.1. Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1979:155f. 
163 AH I.22.1. Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1979:308f. 
164 AH I.28.1. Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1979:354f. 
165 Witness, for example, the description of baptism in Epideixis 7 which focuses upon the divine 
prerogative and emphasizes the giver of grace rather than the “gift” of salvation as a tertium quid. 
166 E.g. 2 Cor. 3, where ministers of the new covenant proclaim not themselves, but the 
surpassing splendour of the minister of glorification. 
167 Hence Irenaeus’s complaint that Gnostics “collect… words and sayings haphazardly, giving 
them unnatural and unreal connection” AH I.9.3. ANF vol. I (p.330) creates a hybridized 
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the Old Testament finds expression both in his Christological method and his 
assertion that the Christian community’s life in the world will be consistent with a 
plain reading of Scripture’s ethical injunctions.168 
Humanity’s relation with God did not pass through nature but 
through obedience to the will of God, a fact that gave to Christian 
spirituality an ethical character (“doing the truth”) and a strongly 
personalist dimension: it was through personal relationships that 
the human person’s union with God was realized. (Ziziuolas, 
1986:23).169 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
construct, “a system which they falsely dream into existence, and thus inflict injury upon the 
Scriptures, while they build up their own hypothesis” (ibid.).  
168 Ethics and morality have a significant apologetic weight in early Christian argument. Justin 
refutes the divinity of the cosmos or the soul, and the behaviour of Christians is indicative of an 
ontological re-calibration to God by Christ in the Spirit. Origen’s assertion that God is the source 
of all things urges that creation, formed by God’s goodness, is fundamentally good. Paide…a and 
Christian discipleship (askēsis) as vital for the soul’s ascent nevertheless reflects a view of 
salvation fundamentally as self-knowledge. In contrast, approaches towards ethics in NHL reflect 
antagonism towards the cosmos and the Demiurge. Either participation in the material world – 
especially sexually – should be completely eschewed (as contributing to Demiurgic tyranny), or 
his neurotic restrictions should be disobeyed. Ethics, for the Christian community is reckoned, 
even in diversity, as a means of countering causes of hatred and persecution (Workman, 1980: 
43-80; Fox, 1986:336-374; Grant, 1988:65-73); and for an ethical reading of Irenaeus see Meeks, 
1987:160, the Christian tradition “is a story, Irenaeus claims, in which each of us is a character. 
The difficulties we face are explained by that great struggle between God’s will for our redemption 
and the Satan-inspired outworkings of disobedience which provides the dramatic tension of the 
plot; our hope is made possible by our union with the Son, the image of God, who came to 
“recapitulate” that struggle, to overcome it in his victory, and to “restore” our nature; our future is 
resurrection to face his judgment and reward. That is the subtle pattern within which each of our 
actions must be deemed good or bad. As Irenaeus himself summed it up:” ‘This, beloved, is the 
preaching of the truth, and this is the manner of our salvation, and this is the way of life, 
announced by the prophets and ratified by Christ and handed over by the apostles and handed 
down by the Church in the whole world to her children. This must be kept in all security, with good 
will, and by being well-pleasing to God through good works and sound moral character.’ 
(Epideixis 98 – translation of Behr, 1997:100).   
169 Zizioulas, 1986:23. His reading is historically distorting of the diversity of approaches facing 
Christians before Nicaea. One unfortunate effect of this (appropriate) description of Irenaeus is 
that it condemns Clement [of Alexandria] and Origen, as attempting not distinctively Christian 
cosmologies but “Gnostic” by association. 
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Zizioulas’s description might benefit from a more reflexive dimension when applied 
to Irenaeus. The significant theological issue is less that humanity passes through 
history to God, than God is present to the world in history: 
In short, God is conceived here as “towards creation,” and creation is 
conceived as “towards God.” This kind of correlation of God and 
creation is by no means construed by Irenaeus in terms of necessity. 
[fn: Cf. AH II.5, 4] God remains free in the act of granting creation the 
gift of existence and in his continual presence to creation. (Anatolios, 
1998:20). 
This claim of God’s “presence to creation” is central in Irenaeus’s strategy vis-à-vis 
Gnosis. This is clear in both in AH – his uncovering and refutation of falsely so-
called Gnosis170 – and in his exposition of the apostles’ teaching, the Epideixis.171 
Irenaeus intends to expose falsehood by countering misconception with the whole 
                                                 
170 AH IV.33.8: the true gnosis is the doctrine of the apostles, the true Gnostic, therefore, abides 
in this doctrine and teaching. The MSS tradition is complex. Lietzmann, 1961:206 summarizes 
thus: “The Fathers who fought against heretics in the next centuries frequently copied out this 
primary document, and as consequence have preserved numerous passages in the original 
wording. It was then forgotten by the Greek church, with the result that no manuscript containing 
the whole has survived. In the west, the work continued to be prized. At an early date, perhaps 
while the author was still alive, it was translated into Latin; this translation was very frequently 
copied, with the result that more than a dozen manuscripts have survived to our day. Moreover, 
even the Armenians made a translation, and of this we possess the last two books; an Armenian 
translation provides us with a substitute for the lost, original text of Irenaeus’s second writing 
which was still extant in Eusebius’s time [fn: H.E., 5,26] and which bore the title, Record of the 
Apostolic Preaching (Epideixis).” See also Carrington, 1957:307-308), where Epideixis is 
reckoned to be not only “shorter and simpler” but also later. It exhibits, Carrington argues, “an 
almost entire dependence on the Old Testament, which was still in the mind of Irenaeus the real 
Bible of the Church.” (ibid.). Texts referred to here are primarily the ANF translation of A Roberts 
[AH I, II] and W. H. Rambaut, [AH III – V] and Migne [1857, subsequent to Steiren’s German text 
of 1853] with the Corpus Berolinense: Die griechlischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei 
Jahrhunderte, herausg. Von der Kirchenväter-Kommission der Königl. Preußischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, (Liepzig, 1897ff) in Rouët de Journel, 1981: 79-104.  
171 Epideixis in ET from the Armenian in Robinson, 1920, and Behr, 1997. AH suffers from the 
same problem as Origen’s Contra Celsum, namely a lack of sharp structure and rambling 
subjects in an unwealdy format. The most convincing fact about Epideixis being a later 
clarification of AH is its focus and bevity, attempting to redress this. There is internal evidence in 
the concluding chapters of Epideixis (98, Behr, 1997:100), where reference is made to the AH. 
(Contra Behr, 2001:112, who argues, on account of its more primitive use of Scripture, that the 
main body of the text is earlier.) 
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apostolic truth, characterized by continuity with the plain reading of Scripture.172 
Irenaeus cites Justin Martyr with approval twice,173 where Justin exalts Scripture 
and the tradition of the Church (demonstrating the priority of revelation) over 
philosophia.174 For Irenaeus, God is referred to through the witness of creation, but 
perfectly known only by participation in the sacramental life and rhetoric of the 
Church, where Scripture informs human understanding, and where the 
Sacraments and disciplina sacra refine the life of the Christian. Entry into this 
community of truth is by baptism and the interrogative prelude to it after 
catechesis. Irenaeus’s rhetoric witnesses to his belief that a universal authoritative 
articulation of faith is necessary in a Regula Fidei. This is particularly evident in the 
structure of Epideixis, where Irenaeus is at pains to point out continuities. The faith 
held by the Church is that learned by the apostles from Christ – particularly 
concerning the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.175 There follow summary 
demonstrations of the mighty acts of God in Christ (Epideixis 8-42), and then a 
series of demonstrations of the proof of Scripture by connecting prophecy to event 
in the life and ministry of Christ (Epideixis 42 – end). This section of the Epideixis 
can legitimately be seen as a continuation of the emphasis Justin showed in his 
explication of Old Testament passages, which “proved” that both Christ and the 
Scriptures were true, because Christ fulfilled the prophesies and the texts pointed 
                                                 
172 Irenaeus “ne pretend pas être un théologien original. Il expose la doctrine commune. Ses 
sources sont avant tout la tradition catéchétique et les Écritures. Mais il exprime cette doctrine 
avec un profondeur qui en manifeste la richesse spirituelle et qui porte en elle-même comme un 
témoignage d’authenticité divine… Son enseignement est animé par l’Ésprit.” J. Daniélou et H. 
Marrou, 1963:143, in Vallery-Radot, 1999:360. 
173 AH IV.6.2 where Irenaeus cites the lost Against Marcion with relish that Justin would not 
believe the Lord [Jesus] himself had he introduced a God other than the Creator;  and V.26.2, 
where he alludes to Justin explaining Satan’s quietism before the incarnation of Christ and the 
subsequent openness of his teaching. Satan is exposed by the truth plainly set forth, and thus 
sent into furious opposition to Christ and his servants, the seeds of the Word. 
174 We have observed, above, that for Justin, philosophia proper is revelation: the schools are 
human attempts at re-construction of what Plato observes in Moses.  
175 Epideixis 3-7, cf. Behr, 2001:112. 
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to Christ in some detail. There is an obvious a priori taste to Irenaeus’s argument, 
but that circularity is common to both Justin and Irenaeus. What has been 
observed about the Christocentric method of Justin’s biblical theology is directly 
applicable to Irenaeus. The Old Testament shapes “the whole of the Christian 
revelation itself” (Behr, 1997:13), but Christ shapes and inspires the Old 
Testament. Given the probable connection of Epideixis with Athanasius (Anatolios, 
2001), it remains both to review the foundations of that assumption and explore in 
detail the explicitly theological section of Epideixis (3-7, Behr, 1997:42-44). 
Anatolios argues that the writings of Irenaeus directly shaped Athanasius’ 
theology. The former’s insistence, for example, against Platonic conventions, upon 
God’s presence to the world in Creation and in Christ, comes to a climax in the 
‘blending and co-mingling’ (AH IV, 20, 4) of divine and human being in Christ 
(Anatolios, 2001:465). Anatolios urges that this notion governs both structure and 
argument in CG-DI, with a particular emphasis upon that which, though present in 
Irenaeus, reflects a characteristically Alexandrian (Origenian) concern. In 
particular, despite the divine presence to creation, Athanasius maintains that God 
remains ultimately unknowable because human beings are created. This places an 
emphasis upon the divine motivation of love in self-disclosure, which is God’s own 
being.176 Divine nature, then, makes up for any ontological inequality by grace: 
This structural employment of an Irenaean motif, which places the 
dialectic of divine unknowability and accessibility to human 
knowledge within God’s nature itself, stands in strong contrast with 
the Eusebian approach, in which the incommensurability between 
                                                 
176 Anatolios [1999:465] gives the following references in support of his argument: AH II, 13,4; 
II,28,2; III, 24,2; IV,20,1; IV, 20, 5. 
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human nature and divine nature makes knowledge of God 
inaccessible to humanity is resolved by the secondary divine status 
of the Mediator-Logos. (Anatolios, 2001: 465-466, citing Theophany 
I, 5). 
Summarizing Meijering’s structural analysis of CG-DI (1991:313-326), Anatolios 
echoes the rhetorical impact of Athanasius moving from the accessibility of God, 
by his gracious self-disclosure in human being,177 the created world178 and 
Scripture179 less to the Pauline position that human beings are without excuse for 
their breach of communion with God, but to the climax of DI where the depths of 
divine mercy and identity are revealed in the Incarnation (Anatolios, 2001:466). It is 
in reaction to Eusebius’s working of Irenaean theology that the depiction in DI 
displays a more attentive dependence upon Epideixis 14-16, where communion 
with God requires obedience to commandment. Obedience is the means of 
remaining (mene‹n), firstly in communion with God the source of life, and, 
derivitavely, in health and life itself. Anatolios calls this state as remaining within a 
“receptivity”, which constitutes human life in its fullness: ‘Haec enim Gloria 
hominis, perseverare ac permanere in Dei servitute’.180  
Athanasius dramatically extends the consequences of falling from this state by 
depicting the tragedy of a loss of identity, integrity and life. Without participation in 
divine life, humanity falls back into the nothing from which it was made. Here it is 
Irenaeus rather than Origen to whom Athanasius is closer. Origen’s schema of fall 
                                                 
177 CG 2, 30. 
178 CG 35. 
179 CG 45-46. 
180 AH IV, 14, 1. SC 100/2, p.540. In Anatolios, 1999:467. 
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from obedience is cast in Aristotelian terms in Peri Archon:181 in creation souls 
were free and therefore possessed goodness as an accident, not ontologically 
(were they by nature good, then there would have been no virtue in choosing 
good). These arguments, however, are not explored by Athanasius. Human being 
is constituted by the possibility of receptivity, where divine power sustains life. 
Recapitulation above all sets out the fundamental importance of the humanity of 
the Saviour, the “new Adam”, going over the same ground as the old one, humanly 
yet now with divine power, fulfilling God’s intentions rather than disobeying (Minns, 
1994:92-93). This figure has to be human for the notion to work, yet he is also the 
hand of God – as Luke puts it ™n daktÚlJ Qeoà182 - illustrating that already “two 
natures” are anticipated in Irenaeus, establishing another dimension of his being a 
precursor to Athanasius. 
Anatolios links DI 44 with Epideixis 31, arguing for a dependency of the former on 
the latter – the entry of corruption into the very structures of human being 
represents an early example of the identification of interiority with authentic human 
being. Because humanity is corrupted within, no external remedy is sufficient. The 
Logos had to become flesh, so that in the communion of divine and human natures 
in the God-Man, sin might be expelled from the human condition. Anatolios urges 
that this development of the Irenaean tradition is an extension of the ideas of the 
apologists (2001:469), so Meijering: 
Während die Ausführungen zur Überwindung des Todes durch die 
Inkarnation weitgehend in der Tradition eines Irenäus stehen, 
                                                 
181 PA I,2,4; I,5,5. Anatolios, 468, fn 20. 
182 Luke 11:20, though it does not appear that Irenaeus cites this text, see Elliot, 1984:253. 
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bewegt sich die nunmehr folgende Argumentation zur 
Wiederherstellung der Gotteserkenntnis mehr auf den Spuren der 
Apologeten (1989:103). 
Irenaeus describes God the Father primarily as Creator, a means whereby he 
opposes cosmological speculation fundamentally and decisively. God is present to 
humanity in creation, creation is the frame for directly encountering God. These 
themes are reworked by Athanasius ‘through the typically Origenian and 
Alexandrian epistemological framework’ (Anatolios, 2001:469) but retain a 
discernable kinship. 
However, the influence of Irenaeus in Athanasius’s later works – especially the CA 
– is less obvious. Anatolios accounts for this by considering the rhetoric required to 
counter Arian thought was necessarily to be rooted in the texts of the conflict. If 
written after the outbreak of the controversy with Arius and his supporters, CG-DI 
seems to be purposefully aimed at redressing Eusebius’ reading of Irenaeus (in his 
Theophany) along an Origenian epistemology. But a tenet of “Arian” theological 
perspective was the unknowability of God even to the Logos (Anatolios, 2001:470, 
De Synodis 15). The emphasis becomes one of contrast between a created 
mediator and a divine Word – so the emphasis on the mediatory function of 
creation is strategically dropped (Anatolios, 2001:471). It is God who restores the 
relationship between fallen human beings and himself, because the state of 
salvation is not an accident, rather it constitutes direct relationship.  The divine 
Logos is no mediator of a message other than himself: he is the means of 
relationship with God because that is his very nature. Athanasius has thus moved 
from the emphasis in CG-DI, but even here, Anatolios points out, there is an 
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Irenaean connection. Citing a text in the second florilegium of Theodoret’s 
Eranistes,183 Anatolios conclusively drives home his argument for the textual 
dependence of Athanasius upon Irenaeus. Irenaeus describes Christ as the 
mediator between God and humanity in these terms: 
who unites (¼nwswn, aduniuit) the two by his habituation to both, 
brings them into friendship and concord, presents (parastÁsai, 
adsumeret) humanity to God, and makes God known to humanity 
(Anatolios, 2001:472). 
This echoes ideas both of union and presentation with CA 2:70,184 but there 
remains a significant difference between the “soteriological symmetry” of the two. 
Irenaeus’s conviction was that  
unless it was humanity that conquered the devil, the victory would 
not be legitimate; and unless it was God who had given salvation, we 
would not have received it securely (Anatolios, 2001:472). 
Athanasius’ emphasis is that were the Logos a creature then the battle with evil 
would not have been securely won: the divine nature is required in terms of its 
power to establish salvation securely (Anatolios 2001:473). Anatolios exposes that 
Athanasius does not seem to exhibit the clarity which Irenaeus had concerning the 
significance of the Holy Spirit, particularly if CG-DI is the basis for such a 
judgement. The early Athanasius seems to have “regressed”, relegating the Holy 
Spirit to the Apologists’ “Spirit of Prophecy” until the CA. Anatolios concludes that 
the Arian crisis had the effect of intensifying discussion on the relation of the 
                                                 
183 Eranistes II Florilegium, [Fr. Gr. 26] in Ettlinger, 1975:153. 
184 Bright, 1884:140. 
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Father and Son, and that this took time to expand into a larger question of 
procession (cf. Ayres, 2004), but significant to our discussion, too, is his assertion 
that 
Nicene orthodoxy is not primarily the construction of a divine 
metaphysics, but is organically linked to, and is indeed derivative of 
an underlying conception of the structure and the story of God’s 
relation to the world (Anatolios, 2001: 476). 
Indeed, Anatolios’s analysis highlights the role that the nature of creation and 
cosmology plays in the theological debate. 
In distinctive contrast to the varied and detailed cosmologies described in 
Irenaeus’s AH and evidenced in the NHL, his insistence upon the primary 
description of God as creator is a means of resisting cosmological speculation.  
God is present to humanity in creation, creation is thus the context for directly 
encountering God, and this motif of directness is extended into Irenaeus’s 
understanding of the incarnation. 
This is evidenced in the focus of his rule of faith in Epideixis 6 in a surprisingly 
sophisticated Trinitarian manner. The Father is described as “Uncreated, 
uncontainable, invisible, one God, the Creator of all” (Behr, 1999:43). Apophatic 
epithets are appended to a kataphatic assertion about God’s singularity and his 
being the creator and therefore the source of all things. That God is the creator of 
all things will be reiterated in the Christological summation. It is no accident that it 
is emphasised twice, because in contrast to Platonic dualism, Irenaeus retains a 
notion of the Sovereignty of God in creation. In contrast to May (1994), the 
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emergence of creatio ex nihilo as a theological tenet appears in anti-gnostic 
polemic (Young, 1991). 
Irenaeus’s description of the Son avoids the suggestion of an intermediary being. It 
is predicted by the prophets – and known in history – to be: 
according to the nature of the economies of the Father, by whom all 
things were made, and who in the last times, to recapitulate all 
things, became a man amongst men, visible and palpable, in order 
to abolish death, to demonstrate life, and to effect communion 
between God and man (Epideixis 6, Behr, 1997:43-4). 
This depiction, whilst retaining some ambiguity, tends towards a monarchian  
expression whilst also certainly communicating both the pre-existence of the Son 
and explains his mission in terms both of removing the effect of sin, and the 
establishment of relationship between God and humanity. The Son is not 
described as a third ontological entity overlapping or connecting divine and created 
natures, not simply because this is not Irenaeus’s preferred theological style, but 
because for Irenaeus the Son is that communion. Just as Irenaeus opposes an 
intermediate habitation or “place” in terms of cosmology or anthropology – God 
remains present to creation without the need of a Gnostic cosmic revealer – so he 
avoids describing the Son’s mediation in terms of his being an intermediary. 
Indeed, he reserves this as a perjoritative term in AH185 which characterizes 
Gnostic cosmology. As the notion of God’s presence to the world is paramount in 
Irenaeus’ cosmology – it is pivotal also in his Christology, expressed compactly 
                                                 
185 AH I.5.3; 5.4; 6.4; 7.1, 5; 8.3,4; 13; II.16.4; 29.1, 2, 3; 30.2, 5, 7. 
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here. This is another important prelude to a theme in Athanasius, namely, a 
Christological use of creatio ex nihilo. 
Epideixis 6 concludes with a description of the Holy Spirit, exhibiting the familiar 
motif of concern for continuity between Old Testament history and Christian 
experience. The Spirit is the action of God, by  
whom the prophets prophesied and the patriarchs learnt the things of 
God and the righteous were led in the path of righteousness (Behr, 
1997:44). 
But in the end-times, the Spirit has been outpoured upon humanity throughout all 
the o„koumšnh ‘renewing man… to God’ (Behr, 1997:44). 
As if to explicate the means of this renewal, Irenaeus interjects a word on baptism 
(Epideixis 7) – which takes place in the name of this Trinity, and is the work of the 
Spirit, who leads Christians to union with the Son and regenerates (paliggenes…a) 
humanity in him to be presented to the Father, who lavishes the gift of 
incorruptibility upon the baptized person. This is theologically significant, and 
exceeds the sophistication of the early Athanasius in the role accorded to each 
person in the Trinity to salvation. Irenaeus makes explicit the need for all persons 
of the Godhead for salvation to be secure: 
without the Spirit it is not [possible] to see the Word of God, and 
without the Son one is not able to approach the Father; for the 
knowledge of the Father [is] the Son, and knowledge of the Son of 
God is through the Holy Spirit, while the Spirit, according to the 
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good-pleasure of the Father, the Son administers, to whom the 
Father wills as He wills (Epideixis 7). 
This emphasis upon the necessity of baptism and the priority of divine will and 
action in salvation manifests a brake in the extent to which knowledge of God is 
accessible naturally through creation, which we find elsewhere in Epideixis and is 
a characteristic distinction between Athanasius’s CG and his DI.  
Mediation therefore is construed within a framework of divine initiative and 
presence to humanity in creation. The Son embodies this graceful will of God in 
terms consistent with a theology of history. Unlike Origen, there is little here in 
terms of a philosophically-couched discourse around cosmological mediation. 
These two paradigms, soteriological and ontological, co-exist in Athanasius’ 
method through a more explicit use of creatio ex nihilo as the means to hold both 
aspects in view. 
Irenaeus’s centre is one where the re-established relationship between God and 
human beings epitomises salvation. The God-Man embodies this in himself, and 
actualises it in history by retracing the path of the first Adam with divine power and 
humanity– a process described in Scripture. But the covenant is re-sited, not in 
Scripture per se, but in Christ. Christology, rather than Biblical theology as a 
tertium quid, is central. Irenaeus’s project may be described as the Christianizing 
of the Old Testament along the lines of the plain reading of Scripture and the proof 
from prophecy. Although Irenaeus’s prime description of God is creator, the 
Gnostic context against which he writes accounts for this, e.g.: 
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[the Creator] is not a father in the proper sense, nor a god, because 
he has someone who begot (him and) who created him.186 
A characteristic of Irenaeus is his thorough opposition to a speculative 
cosmological framework for theology. His basic presupposition is that God is 
present to humanity in creation. His achievements in maintaining this have been 
initially indicated in examining the connection with Athanasius (above). But 
Irenaeus does not explore how the incarnation can add to this assertion. The 
writings of Irenaeus are not a good place to find answers to this type of 
philosophically-contrued and speculative question. It is to Origen that one must 
look to find a meaningful addressing of questions of this type. But it is important to 
reiterate Irenaeus’s achievement and influence. He persistently refuses the 
possibility (or necessity) of an intermediate habitation (tÒpoj) in terms of 
cosmology or anthropology. Mediation thus conceived – as a tertium quid – is cast 
in perjorative terms in AH I and II.187 Instead, in contrast to such concerns, 
Irenaeus’s style is marked by a balancing of Old Testament data with New 
Testament resolution, and with the possibility of participating and remaining in 
communion with God: 
For to follow the Saviour is to be a partaker of salvation, and to follow 
light is to receive light… for this is proper human glory: to continue 
and remain permanently in God’s service.188 
His combat with Gnostic cosmology produces a robust depiction of the work and 
being of the Logos in terms of recapitulation of the good creative purposes of the 
                                                 
186 NHC I.51.38 – 52.2. Robinson, 1984:55. 
187 AH I.5.3; 5.4; 6.4; 7.1,5; 8.3,4,13; II.16.4; 29.1,2,3; 30.2,5,7. 
188 AH IV.1, SC 100/2, Rousseau, A., Hemmerdinger, B., Doutreleau, L. & Mercier, C., 1965:540: 
“Haec enim Gloria hominis, perseverare ac permanere in Dei servitute”. 
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true God. He refines desciption of the Logos through this onslaught impacting 
upon developing Trinitarian theology and soteriology: the debate must centre 
around the person of the mediator, and the mediator’s relation to God the Father. 
These questions Origen approaches in a manner accessible to Platonic hearers. 
Athanasius and Arius will address the issue more directly. 
 
1:5 Origen (c.185 – c.254) and the Alexandrian Theological Tradition: 
A Christian Philosophy without tainting Pagan paradigms. 
Irenaeus’s use of the Old Testament is central to his portrayal of a unitary picture 
of revelation. New Testament texts were notoriously preferred by such as Marcion 
who wished to establish a contradiction between old and new dispensations and 
theologies.189 The centrality of the Old Testament is striking in the “biblical” pattern 
of cosmology and Christology in Irenaeus of Lyons, who represents a different 
approach from both Origen and Justin. For Justin, we observed that Christians 
were the true Israel, the community where the fullest exegesis of Mosaic 
monotheism found expression. The familiar motif of philosophy as a copy of 
                                                 
189 The earliest commentary on a NT book (or part of one) is Heracleon’s commentary on the 
Fourth Gospel, concentrating upon dividing the God of this world from Jesus Christ. In this 
commentary, the Demiurge is pitched against the supreme God, and humanity is, in a 
symptomatically Gnostic style, divided into different natures by origin and destiny. Cf. M. 
Simonetti, 1994:18f., Ashton, 1991:121-280. Gnostic language appears to be deliberately 
employed in the Fourth Gospel with subversive intent. A Gnostic Christology refuses any 
cosmological dimension to the Messiah’s mediatorial role: Christ offers redemption from history 
and created existence. History is the fall, preventing participation in the divine nature, which is 
also the true, if presently submerged, identity of the Gnostic. Gnostic thought, for all its diversity, 
shares an approach which is a “Revolte gegen Zeit, Geschichte und Welt… Sie ist Negation des 
Vorhandenen und in Geltung Stehenden.” N Brox,1967:265, cited in G Vallée, 1980:183. 
Heracleon’s commentary may be seen as an attempt to redeem the Fourth Gospel for Gnostic 
use, attempting to defuse its powerful anti-Gnostic Christological developments. The Fourth 
Gospel energetically engages with characteristic motifs expicated in Gnostic texts unambiguously 
from Jn.1:1ff. The Logos, rather than Sophia (perhaps because of Gnostic mixed-metaphors vis-
à-vis the fall of Sophia), is implicated not merely in redemption but in the work of creation ¢p' 
¢rcÁj. The Logos represents the sole means of all things coming into being, spiritually or 
physically: “and without him was not anything made that was made.” (Jn.1:2b). 
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revelation, is extended as Christians are philosophers proper, people of the living 
Word, seeds of the Logos, those for whose sake the world is preserved.190 Justin’s 
desire produced a strong statement of case to counteract the accusation that 
Christianity was an intolerant superstition. The monotheistic moralist framework, 
however, led to a particular casting of the relation of the transcendent God with the 
Word in Justin’s Christology. Irenaeus’s exegetical Christocentricity side-stepped 
dimensions of the issue of mediation by asserting God’s presence to the world in 
creation and in Christ.  However, Origen will attempt to resolve the relation of the 
Beyond-Being God with the Son by a hierarchy of being connecting all things in a 
cosmology where subordinationist language functions through an ontologically-
connected cosmos.191 Origen’s interest is an authentically philosophical one: the 
pursuit of Christian gnosis was an urgent task for the Alexandrian Christian 
community – vital to establishing the truth of the Christian faith with rigor in a vivid 
intellectual context.192 The Christian philosopher, the true Gnostic, is the ideal 
Christian for Clement and Origen. Contra Celsum (CC), though in many ways the 
culmination of Christian apologetics, is to be read as part of Origen’s sustained 
attempt to explore truth and to present Christian doctrine as a science against 
Gnostic misunderstandings of creation, and sectarian patterns of Christian identity.  
                                                 
190 Justin Martyr: di¦ tÕ spšrma tîn cristianîn Ó ginèskei ™n tÍ fÚsei Óti a‡t…on ™stin 2 Apol. 7. 
Cf. Holte, 1958:109-168.  
191 Origen’s attempt to approach models of divine being expressed in Plotinus [and possibly 
Basilides] is a conciliatory resolution, hypostasizing the Logos in terms of a Platonic mediator. Cf. 
May, 1994:62-84, Krämer, 1967:336 (fn 531): “He rightly sees the specific feature of Christian 
creation doctrine which distinguishes it from Neo-platonist metaphysics in the single, once for all 
creative act ‘which as the will and free choice of God among endless possibilities (Augustine) is 
the consequence of conceiving God personally’.” Cf. Young, 1991:150 who connects creatio ex 
nihilo to concerns about the nature of God: “…creation out of nothing was not just a doctrine 
about the world. It was doctrine about God.” 
192 ‘“The life of the gnostic is, in my view, no other than works and words which correspond to the 
tradition of the Lord” [Clement of Alexandria, Strom. VII. 104,2]. With his conscious use of the 
concept “gnosis” for the Christian knowledge of truth Clement once again attempted to overcome 
the breach between faith and knowledge in the church and not to remain stuck in a mere denial of 
the claims of the “false” gnosis.’ Rudolph, 1983:16.  
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The diverse and speculative thought of the controversial figure of Origen is often 
constructed from a mixture of Origen’s work with the early explorative work Peri 
Archon193 (or De Principiis, hereafter PA) being privotal. CC,194 coming from the 
end of Origen’s corpus – after 236CE195 – sought to provide patterns of 
constructive and responsive theological explorations as paradigms for approaches 
to apologetic. Sensibly, Crouzel (1989) insists upon the need for an intertextual 
approach to Origen’s works, which is a model employed here.  
In the preface Origen says that he is reluctant to respond directly to a little-known 
anti-Christian text.196 Martyrdom was the widely-celebrated testimony to Christian 
truth far above words,197 with an integrity more consonant to its subject-matter 
than argument against ridicule.  Nonetheless, Origen did submit to his patron’s 
request, producing a text described as “the most important apologetic writing of 
                                                 
193 The text used here is that of Görgemanns & Karpp, [TZF 24] 1976. McGuckin, 2004:36-37 
offers a brief critical introduction, dating the work between 220 and 230. 
194 The text used here is that of Koetschau. For critical notes on MSS traditions, see the critical 
introduction by P. Koetschau, 1899:lvii- xc. A shorter review appears in Chadwick 1980:xxix –
xxxii. Unless otherwise stated, Chadwick’s translation is used in this dissertation. On the genre of 
Contra Celsum as apologetic see Fédou, 1989; M. Frede, 1999:131. 
195 So Eusebius, HE 6.36.1, Origen was over sixty when he began the work, therefore in 
Caesarea, with the intent of strengthening those of weak faith. Cf. McGuckin, 2004:33. 
196 CC Praef. 2, 3:  “Jesus is always being falsely accused, and there is never a time when he is 
not being accused so long as there is evil among men. He is still silent in the face of this and 
does not answer with his voice; but he still makes his defence in the lives of his genuine disciples, 
for their lives cry out the real facts and defeat all charges, refuting and overthrowing the slanders 
and accusations. I would therefore go so far as to say that the defence which you ask me to 
compose will weaken the force of the defence that is in the mere facts, and detract from the 
power of Jesus which is manifest to those who are not quite stupid.” Chadwick, 1980:4. That this 
was not a conventional expression of authorial modesty is urged by Frede, 1999:139f, arguing 
that Origen’s misgivings are rooted in the recognition that the most powerful trial of truth in Christ 
was not met by a systematic forensic forray in conventional rhetoric, but that the truth spoke most 
eloquently in silence. 
197 Contra Celsum III.40, Chadwick, p.156: “That is why Christians forthwith say of images that 
‘they are not gods’ [Acts xix.26], and maintain that created objects such as these are not 
compatible with the Creator, and are worth little beside the supreme God who created, holds 
together and governs the universe.” These images or ornaments (¢g£lmata, Koetschau, 
1899:236) made by creatures should be taken to include all constructs about the divine as well as 
idols: they lack being, because they emerge from the world of existence and becoming, the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo here appears to emerge as the conceptual foundation of Christians’ 
appropriate atheism. This would appear to be a much more powerful Sitz-im-Leben of that 
doctrine than a Gnostic attempt at rapprochement with the Church (contra May, 1994). 
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antiquity” (Crouzel, 1989:47). Written 70 years after Celsus’s198 anti-Christian 
'Alhq¾j LÒgoj,199 Origen no doubt also responded to Celsus’s refutation of 
Christianity because he read the seriousness of the times correctly and sought to 
strengthen Christians for a renewed bout of persecution,200 and also because, in 
demonstrating the necessity of such an enterprise for the life of the Church, Origen 
could defend himself and explorative theology from the accusations of his ‘simple’ 
                                                 
198 Michael Frede argues that Celsus is “without a doubt” a Platonist philosopher writing after 
160CE, [1999:132]; Henry Chadwick urges that Celsus’s “philosophy is that of Middle Platonism, 
and with Epicureanism he betrays no affinities at all”, and that his True Account was written 
around 177-80 [1980: xxv & xxix]. Wilken offers a similar date for Celsus’s Alēthēs Logos at 
around 170CE [1984:94]. Origen believed Celsus to have been a friend of the second-century 
satirist Lucian, and he thus initially assumes Celsus had been an Epicurean. Upon a closer 
engagement with Celsus’s text, Origen admits that he was not (CC 4.54, Chadwick, 1980:228). 
The idea that the Alēthēs Logos is anti-Christian polemic triggered by the arguments of Justin (or 
Aristides) has been seriously considered since Carl Andresen’s argument that it is prompted by 
the text of Justin’s Apols. [Andresen, 1955:308ff], Trigg, 1998:52-3 (after Pichler, 1980:43-50]. 
Eusebius’s Ecclesiastical History (6.36.1-3) dates the Contra Celsum during the reign of Philip the 
Arab (c.244-249CE). Chadwick places a great deal of weight on Contra Celsum 3.15, referring to 
insurrection which he identifies with the troublesome year of 248, “which suggests that Origen is 
writing on the eve of a persecution, the imminence of which is already apparent to those with 
eyes to see” Chadwick 1980:xiv-xv. A gap of at least 64 years is well accounted-for by Michael 
Frede’s argument that Origen’s reluctance to respond at length would at least partly resurrect 
arguments by a more-or-less unknown critic, who drew upon a whole artillery of arguments in this 
“extensive anti-Christian compendium” (Frede, 1999:133). The thrust of Celsus’s Alēthēs Logos is 
that the true reason for the world’s existence, and the most faithful description of its nature, is 
most properly that of the ecumenical vision of an accommodating Pagan culture, which holds 
together the cultures not only of the civilized Graeco-Roman authority but all the world, (Frede, 
1999:133-134; Contra Celsum 1.14, Chadwick 1980:16-17). The interweaving of all religious 
traditions both relativizes exclusive and localized tribal claims upon divinity, yet preserves the 
particularity of the local by including them in the organic whole of paganism. The theological 
effect of this, Celsus argues, contributes to a critical theology where assumptions and 
conventions are challenged by the experience of life in a commonwealth. The assumption that 
God must have many names and manifestations which is fed by this social reality and which 
contributes to its ideological preservation is a strong and serious argument against Christianity’s 
obscurity and exclusivity (CC 1.24, 5.41, 6.49-50, Chadwick, 198:23-4; 296-7; 365-7, Frede, 
1999:133-4) which Origen is urged to address. 
199 Although Chadwick consistently translates this The True Doctrine, a more literal Greek title for 
Celsus’s work is preferred here, as it carries more resonance to the different significances of 
Logos in Christian and philosophical vocabulary (Chadwick, 1980:5). Even if the title is not a 
deliberate rebuttal of Justin (or Aristides, or other Logos apologists), it makes sense to allow the 
ambiguities of the Greek to make its own connections than this title or True Account (Frede’s 
preferred translation, 1999:131ff.) allows. 
200 Cf. Trigg, 1998:53, “The parlous state of the Empire, threatened as never before by inflation, 
internal dissention, and external invasion, induced in some pagan intellectuals an apocalyptic 
mood as Rome celebrated the millennium of its founding in 247. Some blamed Christians, 
favored by the reigning Emperor, Philip the Arab, who tolerated Christians and with whom Origen 
himself had been in correspondence [cf. Eusebius, EH 6.36, not 6.38.1 as in his reference], for 
Rome’s disarray.” 
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detractors.201 Celsus’s choice of title revealed that he was concerned with 
addressing what he saw to be the serious philosophical error underlying Christian 
thought with its potentially lethal social consequences: 
It is clear from the last section of Celsus’ polemic that he is in truth 
deeply concerned about this fanatical new movement that is taking 
people away from the worship of the old gods and is undermining the 
structure and stability of society. Let the Christians return to take 
their stand upon the old paths and abandon this newly invented 
absurdity of worshipping a Jew recently crucified in disgraceful 
circumstances. 202 
Whatever other personal advantages may have been gained for Origen in 
rebutting Celsus’s arguments, the prime theological prompt for Origen was the 
need to address directly the accusation that the Christian notion of God’s 
voluntarist relation to the world led to a fundamental ontological and cosmological 
instability. Celsus pointedly focuses the central theological question: in the 
Christian schema, if God is not to be identified with the cosmos in a graduated 
way, is not Christianity a form of di-theism? Are not Pagans, actually, more 
monotheistic than Christians by recognizing an ontological relation between the 
divine and the cosmos?203 Origen recognises that language explicative of the 
mediation of God in Christ thus needed an ontological resolution, but in similo 
modo to Irenaeus in his context, Origen argues that this resolution must be 
                                                 
201 Trigg, 1998:55: “The opportunity to score points off simpler Christians by refuting Celsus was 
probably a inducement to comply with Ambrosius’s request. Origen’s use of the Contra Celsum to 
defend himself against those (“simple” in his opinion) who objected to his ideas is most evident in 
his response to Celsus’s charges that Christians conceive of God as a celestial cook planning to 
set fire to the world and that they irrationally hope to reanimate their corpses.” 
202 Chadwick, 1980:xxi. 
203 CC VII: 68-9, Chadwick, 1980: 452-3. 
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Christological, urging that a Christology capable of addressing Celsus’s critique 
must relate both sides of the ultimate cosmological distinction implied by creatio ex 
nihilo which Origen (like Irenaeus) uses against the Gnostics. Origen’s attempts to 
do this in a Trinitarian schema, for all the hierarchy and subordination of Son to the 
Father which will draw later condemnation, marks a distinctively new stage in 
Christian articulation even from what has been observed, above. Origen’s triadic 
resolution begins the process of a more profoundly Trinitarian and ontological style 
of resolution, a trajectory which Athanasius will re-work after the questions Arius 
poses at the turn of the fourth century. Origen’s contribution to the development of 
the meeting of Trinitarian description and mediatorial language of Christ is 
foundational to this study. This reading of Origen, in his Alexandrian and 
Caesarean contexts, is of one who took his responsibility for the public 
construction of articulate theological models in a fundamentally explorative, 
adventurous way with the utmost seriousness.204 Origen’s ambiguous evaluation 
by later Christian orthodoxy205 is properly set alongside the context of his 
intellectual ministry in the enormously advanced cultural and intellectual milieu of 
Alexandria (and Caesarea). Origen’s sensitive appreciation and searing critique of 
Jewish scholarship and practice, for example, need not be viewed as being 
                                                 
204 PA is less a single systematic model than outline descriptions of and explorations in the 
foundations of Christian faith. Cf. Lyman, 1993:43-4, ‘ Whether or not Origen may be called 
systematic in the strictest sense, it is clear from On First Principles and the function of his 
theological language generally that he deliberately set out an organized metaphysical scheme 
within which to explore contemporary problems of the relation of God, Christ, and the world”.  
205 Cf. Crouzel’s beautiful description of Origen’s reception under the devise “In signum cui 
contradicetur”. Crouzel, 1989:xi-xii. Cf. Lyman, 1993:39: “Traditionally, Origen has been 
‘suspected of a great orthodoxy’ [Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove (New York, 1939), 
p.37]. His Christian commitment was unquestionable, but his theological conclusions stimulated 
passionate apologetic or repudiation; he was too right to be wrong, or too attractively wrong to be 
ignored”. Trigg (1998:61) poignantly comments that Origen’s survival of torture (albeit in such a 
weakened state that he died within a year or so of being released) prevented his joining the ranks 
of martyrs: “An unequivocal death by martyrdom would have been better for Origen’s posthumous 
reputation”. See also Clark, 1992, for an analysis of the roles Origen is cast in later controversy. 
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restricted merely to his later, Levantine period.206 An awareness of the 
responsibility to articulate Christian doctrine in the context of metropolitan life, with 
all its dangers and social tension, may well have found its mature distillation in the 
product of his Caesarean years in CC, convincing him of the need to prepare 
Christians for the brewing Decian persecutions.  
In CC, Origen had, like Justin before him, to evaluate “the dispensation of 
Paganism”,207 by acknowledging, tacitly or explicitly, that unaided reason has not 
the capacity fully to comprehend truth. Familiar motifs from Philo, Justin and 
Clement of Alexandria reappear: but with more confident handling in Origen, and 
certainly more sophistication and depth. Justin’s theme of Plato plagiarising from 
Moses208 alongside variations of the argument from distorted inspiration from 
daemons fallen from divine grace are to be found.209 We will observe something of 
Origen’s skilfulness in introducing the power of grace in this setting, confirming that 
                                                 
206 Though this is the clear scholarly consensus. Cf. the positive picture Nicholas de Lange paints 
of Origen’s unusual approach to Jews, describing the Contra Celsum as “ a great work of 
apologetic… staunchly defending the Jews from the pagan challenge… [T]he Ancient Israelites 
[had to ]… be defended by the champion of Christianity from the slurs cast on them by the 
enemies of Judaism. The Contra Celsum is unique in Christian apologetic literature for the 
mildness with which it treats the Jews… What we do see from the Contra Celsum is how much 
common ground there could be in the mid-third century between Church and Synagogue, when 
both faced the same attack from outside”. de Lange, 1976:64-5. John Gager is less positive, 
selecting passages of de Lange to temper a positive evaluation of Origen vis-à-vis the Jews even 
in the perceived “friendly”, Caesarean years: “At one level, he merely confirms the existence of an 
important facet in Jewish-Christian relations throughout this period: the existence of a “lively 
debate” between Christians and Jews. We have already noted that Origen complains in several 
places of Judaizing practices among Christians. Thus despite his scholarly discussions with Jews 
in Caesarea and his very considerable knowledge of Judaism, he will explicitly forbid any mutual 
give-and-take between the Church and the Synagogue.” Gager, 1985:165, citing de Lange, 
1976:87. C. Haas, 1997:105-6, cites Wilken 1971:43; de Lange, 1976: 8-9, 23-28; J. A. 
McGuckin, 1992:1-13, et al, to justify a similar conclusion, namely, ‘much of the evidence used to 
establish a “Jewish connection” between Origen and rabbinic teachers is probably attributable to 
the period after he took up residence in Caesarea.’ 
207 A phrase from J. H. Newman’s sermon for Easter Tuesday, 13th April, 1830, preached in the 
University Church of St Mary the Virgin, Oxford, reproduced in McGrath, 2001:26. 
208 E.g., concerning creation, Contra Celsus 7.31 (Chadwick, pp419-20). 
209 Contra Celsum VIII: 4, Chadwick, 1980:456, Origen argues that Plato is inspired by the devil to 
write Phaedrus 246e-247a, 250b 
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reason alone is an interpretative function or a “preconceptual apprehension”210 of 
humanity to receive divine truth and grace, and is not something indicative of a 
kinship with the divine, certainly constituting no prior claim upon God.211  Origen, 
nevertheless, recognized that he had to set about relating this reason to the 
Christian economy, and attempts critical explorations of the relationship between 
them. A thorough examination of Origen’s CC  with a particular eye to mediation 
may enhance an understanding of the subtlety and intricacy of Origen’s depiction 
of the relation of divine will and being interpenetrating with creation’s freedom, and 
though beyond the scope of this thesis would contribute to Origen studies.  
CC displays an extraordinary awareness of the problems of theological 
epistemology, with the relation of God to creation as a central issue. Celsus has 
accused Christians of having an unthinking approach to theology; particularly 
repulsive in its focus upon the resurrection of the flesh, which he asserts is only 
defended by the dubious Christian mantra ‘anything is possible for God’ .212 This is 
a reductio ad absurdum of a Christian emphasis upon the voluntarist and 
personally-construed relation of God to creation. Celsus insists that just as God 
may not do what is shameful, neither does he desire what is contrary to nature or 
his own character: the created cosmos is sustained by reasonable laws, revealing 
that God’s purposes are not arbitrary but good. For Celsus, Christian theology is 
irredeemably anthropomorphic. 
Origen responds by rejecting that such a description fits Christian theology at all: 
Celsus has fictionalised it himself, or derived it from simple and naïve souls, whose 
                                                 
210 Rowan Williams (describing Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology), 2000:18. 
211 So Justin Martyr’s reflections upon LÒgoj spšrmatikoj find fuller, and clearer, explication. 
212 Contra Celsum V:14, Chadwick, 1980:274-5. 
 106
ignorance should not be taken for Christian wisdom.213 Origen characteristically 
criticises the assumption that one can readily know a priori what God is or is not 
like - Origen thus places revelation centrally. Sure enough, Scripture refers to God 
“seeing” and “hearing”, but this should not be read simplistically. An analogical use 
of language is present in Scripture, which is part of its living wisdom, and God is 
incorporeal, as Christian vocabulary about the Spirit indicates. God constantly 
gives a share of his own Spirit to those who are worthy to participate in him214 in a 
non-materialist, and therefore unfragmented, way. Christian theology proper, 
Origen argues, attempts to sustain a personal and sancifying vision of the divine, 
with the Spirit as the e doj215 of the body of Christian believers. God is, indeed, 
immutable, and pagan identifications of the divine with the cosmos in its flux and 
change are dismissed by Origen as grotesque irreverence.216 The resurrection is 
not to be construed as equating divinity with the corruptible at all, but rather the 
latter’s transfiguration by the endowing of divine life upon the creature. It is 
Celsus’s theology which equates divinity with the material cosmos, not the 
Christians’.217 Origen extends the conventional Christian ridicule of idolatry as the 
worship of human work to include the constructs of human thought, so that 
assumptions about the divine – human ideas and a priori conventions – constitute 
no valid prior claim upon the freedom of God.218 Idolatry of this order, namely a 
                                                 
213 Contra Celum VII: 27, Chadwick, 1980:416. 
214 Contra Celsum VI:70;  Chadwick, 1980:384-5. 
215 In this case more a unitary principle than genus, derived from H. Crouzel’s description of 
Origen’s anthropology, 1989:248-257. 
216 Contra Celsum I:21; Chadwick, 1980:21. 
217 Contra Celsum III:40, Chadwick, 1980:155f. 
218 For idolatry as resting in anything other than God cf. Contra Celsum III:40ff, Chadwick, 
1980:155f. This, of course, notoriously, applies for Origen to the literal letter of Scripture, so that 
analogous, symbolic or “allegorical” means of interpretation are required: “He does not mean to 
dispute the historical value of the biblical narratives, which he defends repeatedly in the Contra 
Celsum, but their value as revelation when they are not read in the light of the New Testament: 
the myth is the interpretation of the Jews when they stop at the letter. This meaning is not without 
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denial of relation to God as the foundation for being, will re-emerge with a biblical 
or Irenaean style in Athanasius’ CG-DI, and also in Cappadocian thought.219 
Origen’s epistemology thus carefully distinguishes between theological words and 
the divine Word. God should not be understood to be in any sense restricted by 
theologically pre-determined “necessities” which define him a priori. Rather, Origen 
urges that theological descriptions, if they fail to describe the divine reality, are 
simply untrue. Theological assertion, rather than God sovereign in his freedom, is 
curtailed by Origen’s hermeneutical rigour. Various epithets or ™p…noiai 
describing God, work ecologically in CC in various contexts to depict aspects of 
the divine mystery analogically. Knowledge of God is thus always dependent upon 
divine self-revelation. ”Askhsij alone is insufficient, for God is neither known by 
synthesis, distinction or analogy, and he resists the arrogance of philosophical 
claims to know of themselves the divine.220 Celsus, for one, from the sections 
Origen cites at least, simply does not appear to comprehend that theological 
description has to be radically contingent to divine being. In Origen’s terminology, 
true human knowledge must appropriate a wound of knowing an ontological gulf 
between creation and divinity. Origen demurs from Plato’s optimism because of 
the state of affairs revealed in Scripture and Christian truth. Far from the Timaeus’s 
answer which appears to be little more than a poetic repetition of the 
question: a demiurge, resolving to communicate the beauty of the 
intellectual paradigm to everything, imposed it upon the nature which 
                                                                                                                                                 
analogy with that which contrasts Truth with symbol instead of with falsehood. The symbol does 
not lie, so long as it participates in its model.” Crouzel 1989:108-109. 
219 Cf. von Balthasar 1995:27-8: “[the creation]… is suspended in God, and, in order to be able to 
subsist, it participates in the inexhaustible source of being. But if it turns away from this source 
with a desire to belong to itself, it no longer merits the name of being. This profoundly ontological 
privation of being is sin, which is veritably an annihilation (™xoudšnwsij).” 
220 Contra Celsum VII:44, Chadwick, 1980:431-2. 
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is most devoid of stable and determinable properties, creating the 
best of possible universes as an everlasting image of the Good.221 
Origen insists that, of itself, this nature does not subsist in the fallen creature. The 
Creator’s goodness is not called into question, but the capacity of creation to retain 
ontological stability without communion with God is refuted.222 Christian theology, 
therefore, must correspond to the wounds of Christ the Word, only then 
representing Christ immanently, as it were: 
we might say that after the Word there is marked upon the soul the 
impress of the wounds, and that this is the Christ in each individual, 
derived from Christ the Word.223  
This woundedness as the basis for Christian theology expresses in a mystical style 
an apophatic theological priority.224 
Yet this scandal of wounded particularity, far from being grounds for Christian 
arrogance (Celsus had claimed that Christians assert that God only favours 
                                                 
221 Edwards, 1998a:12. 
222 We will observe the development of this especially in Athanasius’s Contra Gentes / De 
Incarnatione, chapter 3, below. For the influence of the ontological gulf on anthropology and 
soteriological ontology (and the meaning of theopoiesis), cf. Gregory of Nyssa, C. Eunom. 1; II, 
368 C: “It is precisely through its comparison and union with the Creator that it is other than him” 
translation of von Balthasar, 1995:28.  von Balthasar adds, “This abyss that separates the two 
forms of being is the fact of creation, which in and of itself surrounds that which is created with a 
magic circle, which it will never escape. There is no stratagem by which the creature will ever 
understand its own origins [In Cant. 10; I, 980 B]. ” 
223 Contra Celsum VI:9, Chadwick, 1980:323. 
224 “[T]he ‘negative way’ is a guard against our projections becoming idols. In doing this it takes 
up many of the tools of suspicion used by those who understand God as merely a projection, but 
the tools are used in the interests of the logic of overflow. The negative way has endless 
subtleties, intellectually and spiritually. These point to the double truth that discernment here 
requires both sensitivity to a whole ecology and a rigorous self-criticism that is at least as 
searching and comprehensive as the projectionist critique.” Hardy & Ford, 1984:113-4; cf. R. 
Williams, 1979. 
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them),225 is the prompt for Christian mission. Origen insists that the Church’s 
witness is born of a costly desire and obligation to share the longing of God in love 
for creation.226 Origen asserts that Christians, far from belittling the divine to the 
closed and decaying systems of the cosmos, or self-interestedly worshipping a 
vindictive God, full of fury and favourites, rather challenge the assertion of any 
kinship between the created and the divine, yet paradoxically thereby invite 
wholesale participation in the life of God in Christ, whose Spirit makes God fully 
and personally accessible to all. Origen applies the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to 
reiterate the ontological instability of creatures and deny any shared substance 
between humanity and God. Whatever other usefulness Origen makes of his 
insistence upon divine immutability, then, it fits perfectly in CC’s rhetoric against 
pagan theology,227 urging the probability that this is its primary location in Christian 
theology, i.e., as an important strategy of Christian apologetic.228 
Origen’s description of Christian theology certainly lacks the popularist rhetoric of 
Celsus, but demonstrates by its subtlety and intelligence that Christian faith may 
not be dismissed as barbarian ignorance or superstition. The CC has the effect of 
making his opponent’s arguments appear brittle and infantile, as Origen offers a 
sustained and thoughtful critique to the selections of Celsus’s text, exhibiting a 
sophisticated capacity to highlight the epistemological problematic in conventional 
pagan limitations of divine freedom, and a rare understanding that truly theological 
language must have an awareness of the lack of a hermeneutical basis for an 
                                                 
225 “It is foolish of them to suppose that, when God applies the fire (like a cook!), all the rest of 
mankind will be thoroughly roasted and that they alone will survive…”Contra Celsum V:14, 
Chadwick, 1980:274. Cf. the discussion of the issue of worship and sacrifice in this context in F. 
M. Young “‘A time for silence’ Dare we mention prayer?”, in Young, (ed.) 1995. 
226 Contra Celsum IV:6, Chadwick 1980:188. 
227 H. Crouzel emphasizes its place in countering Valentinian gnosis (with ideas of cosmogony as 
divine emanation), Marcionite “division” of Old and New Testament theologies, and Christian 
“literalists” or simpliciores. Crouzel, 1989:153-156. 
228 Contra May, 1994.  
 110
arrogantly confident “natural” theology. Christian theological exploration must be 
marked, for Origen, by a self-critical recognition, or “wound”, that when human 
language is applied to God, triggers a painful awareness that it is over-extending 
its natural capacity. This wound avoids over-simplistic assertion in Origen’s 
theological language. For example, Celsus asks whether or not God is universally 
accessible – rather than merely the tribal divinity of the Christian sect – that is, 
does he not have many names?229 Origen corrects Celsus’s conceptual elision: 
the question about God’s many names is not sequential upon his assertion of 
God’s universality, because names are not accidental, rather they participate in 
coherent social and linguistic systems. The name of God in his particularity 
distinguishes him from the cosmos and establishes the basis of a relation of the 
two in terms other than kinship.230 Universal accessibility need not, indeed Origen 
argues that it may not, depend upon theological multiplicity, as this would be what 
Williams (2000:21) describes as 
settling for a plurality of contingent projects, radically vulnerable to 
the distortions of history, with no inherent critical elements to keep 
them in motion and dialogue.231 
CC offers a profound theological counter to pagan universalism by exposing the 
latter’s inadequacies and incapacity to reckon with the truthfulness of divine 
description in its particularity. Origen’s theology of revelation thus has a pivotal 
                                                 
229 Contra Celsum I:24; Chadwick, 1980:23f.  
230 Contra Celsum I:25; Chadwick, 1980:24. 
231 Williams adds “there gradually develops the fully articulated doctrine of God characteristic of 
patristic and medieval theology: the unconditioned act of self-diffusion and self-sharing upon 
which all things depend – with the important corollary that this act is ‘simple’, it is what it is without 
the admixture of elements or constraints from beyond itself, and so is entirely at one with itself, 
consistent and faithful.” (Ibid.) Origen is a most significant landmark in this articulation, and 
foundational for the shift from a focus of the Christian argument about God from creation to 
Christology. 
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place for the Revealer, the incarnate Logos, less because of a body of knowledge 
which the Logos reveals than his own eternal participation in the Father’s nature – 
with all the necessary hierarchically subordinate caveats as strategies to prevent 
confusion of Father, Son and Spirit (cf. Edwards, 1998). The Logos has a 
foundational role in the creation of the cosmos, and is the mediating meeting point 
of creation with the divine. Creation’s participation in this mediator is the dynamism 
of Christian life, and, Lyman argues, is the motivation for Origen’s use (and 
transformation) of many genres and patterns of description: 
[Origen’s] masterful use of Middle Platonic ontology and Stoic 
psychology, his enquiries into Hellenistic Jewish exegesis, and his 
relentless repudiation of Gnostic election theology were all ordered 
by his optimistic belief in the accommodation of the Logos to the 
mind and life of the individual person. … [His spirituality] consisted in 
the intense, disciplined search for God through the movement of the 
mind as led by the Logos.232 
But this “optimism” comes only when the wound of knowledge which we have 
observed above has been Christologically healed. 
In CC, the Father is never described by the epithet ¢paq»j, perhaps for fear of 
playing into misconceived ideas about transcendence as inactivity or 
disinterestedness with regards to creation: 
Origen underlines the titles of Creator and Father in order to express 
not only divine power and divine transcendence, but divine goodness 
                                                 
232 Lyman, 1993:45. 
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as unhindered, active care, if not love of creation.… God’s desire 
(qšlhma) is the linchpin between his nature and power, so that the 
will (boul») of God operates in no impersonal or abstract way in 
creation or redemption. Origen’s God is never beyond love for the 
individual or intervention; divine will is not merely for the good, but to 
increase the goodness of creation by specific actions.233  
The Father is not explicitly distinguished from the Son (or Spirit) by this term here, 
either. However, Origen unambiguously denies that God should be conceived of 
as acting pathologically or irrationally in his wrath. On the contrary, wrath is 
accounted for theologically and soteriologically: its function is to correct those who 
remain in a state of sin: 
When we speak of God’s wrath, we do not hold that it is an 
emotional reaction (oÙ p£qoj)… That the so-called wrath of God and 
what is called His anger has a corrective purpose, and that this is the 
doctrine of the Bible, is clear from the words of Psalm vi…234 
Origen’s reiteration of wrath not being the abusive fury of God in the same 
chapter235 indicates the style with which Origen uses p£qoj here, namely as a 
                                                 
233 Lyman, 1993:55, 58. 
234 Contra Celsum IV: 72, Chadwick, 1980: 241. On the broader notion of corrective punishment, 
and the implication of this for the eternity of hell, see Crouzel 1989:234-5. In CC  the emphasis is 
clearly and definitively upon the remedial meaning of punishment. Origen does not attempt to 
defend a God who is a terrorist. Rebecca Lyman emphasizes that God is consistently portrayed 
in Origen as setting life before all creatures. “God did not harden Pharaoh’s heart, but… instead 
Pharaoh’s refusal of God’s long-suffering grace hardened his own heart.” Lyman, 1993:57. She 
correctly asserts that “physical existence is not a punishment, but a means whereby creation may 
return to God” (ibid, p.61), properly redressing imbalanced perceptions about the material 
creation as fall and alienation, and reiterating the pedagogical, rather than the punitive purposes 
of God. Crouzel, however, paints a more complex picture of hell and punishment, illustrative of 
Origen’s explorative rather than categorical style. In the Contra Celsum, nonetheless, Origen 
persistently focuses on the redemptive goodness of God as the basis for wrath or corrective 
punishment. 
235 Contra Celsum IV: 72: Óti d' oÙ p£qoj toà qeoà ™stin ¹ Ñrg». 
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theological corrective to excessively projectionist or anthropomorphic perceptions 
of divine motivation and action. 
Origen also seeks to address the surpassing transcendence of the Father even 
from the eternally-begotten Son and the Spirit. The Spirit is constitutive of God in 
himself and in relation to Creation, but not to be confused with the ‘spiritual nature’ 
of humanity: 
the first great Christian philosopher does not agree that man can be 
united in his essence with the Godhead, or can come to know it by 
his own desire. The essences of creatures are eternal and 
consubstantial with the Logos, but the subsistence of these creatures 
as single entities depends on matter (PA I.6.4), and this is neither an 
effluence of the deity nor a coeternal substrate, but a creation out of 
nothing by his will.236 
Edwards has properly removed much of the usual attribution of Hellenization to 
Origen, but not removed the hierarchical frame even though it is more nuanced 
than classically conceived. There remains a hermeneutical hierarchy which 
Athanasius will finally abandon as a result of his engagement with Arius. 
The Spirit is not the ontological connection with creatures by the fact of their 
creation, but by the fact of their restoration in the Son. The baptism of Jesus by (or 
in) the Spirit means that  
                                                 
236 Edwards, 1998a:17. 
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Traces of that Holy Spirit who appeared in the form of a dove are still 
preserved among the Christians.237 
The incarnation is not to be construed as the embodiment of God’s Spirit, however 
the Spirit makes present the ontological communion between created and eternal 
natures in the Son for Christians: 
If Celsus had understood what we say about God’s Spirit, and that 
‘as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God’ 
(Rom. 8:14), he would not have invented a reply for us that God 
thrusts his own Spirit into a body and sent him down here. God is 
always giving a share of His own Spirit to those who are able to 
partake of Him, though He dwells in those who are worthy not by 
being cut into sections and divided up.238 
This sharing of the Spirit as the basis for ontological reconciliation, expressed in 
the Contra Celsum as participation in the Sonship of Christ and his relation to the 
Father, is more expressed in the conclusion to Origen’s Letter to Gregory, where 
he more explicitly explores the theme of participation,239 anticipating later patterns 
in terms of both theology and soteriology – but Origen still belongs to the 
intellectual ancien regime. 
                                                 
237 Contra Celsum I: 46, Chadwick, 1980: 42. In VI:52, Chadwick, 1980:368, Celsus appears to 
have garnered some impressions from a Marcionite or Gnostic theology of contrast between the 
creator and the coming of the Spirit to earth as to strangers. See Chadwick’s footnote 5, ibid. It 
may conceivably be the case that Celsus is attacking the Christian presumption that the relation 
of God to the cosmos is that of ontological alienation, but this is unlikely in the context of the 
whole chapter. 
238 Contra Celsum VI: 70. 
239 ‘If my boldness was good or not, God alone would know, and his Christ, and he who 
participates in the Spirit of God and in the Spirit of Christ. May you be such a participant, and may 
you always grow in such participation, so that you may not only say “We have become 
participants with Christ”’ (Heb. 3:14), but, “We have become participants with God.” Letter to 
Gregory 4, in Trigg, 1998:212-3. This may be an over-interpretation of this text. 
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As the Spirit actualises the mediatorial function of the Son, and leads beyond 
himself to the Father’s being, the discussion of Origen’s relation to Platonic 
descriptions of the divine beyond the realm of Being perhaps finds its proper place 
in his attempt to distinguish the surpassing transcendence of the Father even from 
the Son and Spirit, and the divine life which they share. Conventionally, but 
persistingly, this subordination has been cast as provoking Arius and/or 
Arianism,240 but Origen uses Ð qeÒj particularly of the Father after New 
Testament practice, describing the divinity of the Logos without the definite article
(Crouzel, 1989:181-2).  
 
`O qeÒj indicates God in himself, the generating Father 
who is the basis of divine Being; criticism of Origen conceiving of God primarily as 
creator is thus ill-conceived.241 The Son and Spirit are the divine persons ad
extra,
 
te Son.  
                                                
242 together the means of connecting the Father who is the ground of being 
with the creation and similar in effect to Irenaeus’s description of Son and Spirit as 
the two “hands” of God in the created realm.243 This context is also the setting for 
Origen’s occasional use of creature with regard to the incarna
So in CC, the emphasis upon the transcendence of God the Father undermines 
the attack upon Origen as casting God in terms only of creator: Origen is guilty of 
 
240 ‘Origen… tried to elaborate a theological system starting from Greek philosophy. This 
application of the logos concept in this context led to the crisis of Arianism, which compelled the 
Church to revise the concept radically’ J. D. Zizioulas, 1997: 74. Notwithstanding the question of 
whether Origen was a systematizer, this reveals a somewhat conventional Orthodox prejudice 
against Origen. Zizioulas elsewhere tries to describe Origen generously (ibid., p. 16), but casts 
Origen (with the apologists) as incapable of achieving a ‘synthesis between the idea of truth as 
being and of truth as history’ (ibid., p.78). However, this is no-where Origen’s intended outcome. 
It does not appear that Origen was concerned with establishing such a synthesis categorically, 
but with the task of theological exploration.  
241  Cf. Zizioulas, 1997:75: ‘Despite his doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, Origen connected the idea of 
God so closely with that of creation that he came to speak of eternal creation, arguing that God 
would not be eternally omnipotent with no object on which to exercise his power [De Princ. I: 1,4]. 
God thus becomes eternally a creator, and the link between the logos of God and the logoi of 
creation thus comes to be organic and unbreakable, as in the Greek idea of truth.’ 
242 Crouzel, 1989:201. The Spirit is, therefore, neither a Son nor a Creature like other material 
creatures, but eternal, deriving his existence from the Father and Son. 
243 Lawson, 1948:122-128, “The doctrine of ‘The Two Hands of God ’ represents immediate 
action by the whole Godhead, and consequently equality between the Son and the Spirit.” 
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experiment and exploration, and for all his anti-Gnostic and anti-Marcionite 
arguments, asserts that Christian theology is not naïvely anthropomorphic in its 
perception of the Creator: 
Not one of us says that God participates in shape or colour. Nor 
does He partake of movement… Moreover, God does not even 
participate in being.244  
… we affirm that the God of the universe is mind, or that He 
transcends mind and being (½ ™pškeina noà kaˆ oÙs…aj), and is 
simple and invisible and incorporeal, we would maintain that God is 
not comprehended by any being other than that made in the image 
of that mind.245 
God is eternally creative – just as he is eternally Father: so Origen feels driven to 
construe an eternal creation on Scriptural evidence. He applies creatio ex nihilo to 
material creation, but not to the spiritual reality.246 It will be partly the loss of the 
notion of eternal generation of the soul and eternal “spiritual” creation through the 
application of creatio ex nihilo that characterizes the Arian controversy.  
God’s response even to sin in Origen is creative rather than dualistic: even after 
the fall of souls, God responds consistently with his creative, loving and 
redemptive character,247 but these passages intimate that God is not to be 
                                                 
244 Contra Celsum, VI. 64, Chadwick, 1980:379. For a discussion of the sources of this and the 
following texts, see P. Widdicombe, 2000:36-46. 
245 Contra Celsum VII. 38, Chadwick, 1980:435. Cf. also VII. 46. 
246 Unlike, for example, Evagrius of Pontus’s protology. 
247 Crouzel (1989:190, 215) demonstrates how deeply anti-dualistic this emphasis is, 
contradicting Gnostic dualism and the distinction between the Old and New Testament God after 
Marcion. Cp. Lyman, 1993:52-55, 56, 57. 
 
 117
construed merely or even primarily as Creator, (contra Zizioulas). Widdicombe 
argues explicitly: 
[Origen] has two purposes in the passages: first, a defensive 
intention of ensuring that Christians do not become labelled with 
promoting the notion of a corporeal God…; and second, a positive 
intention of establishing that the knowledge of God revealed through 
the Logos is definitive. In his polemic against Celsus, he is arguing 
that however high a notion of God Greek philosophy puts forward, 
the Christian conception is higher. In effect, he is indulging in a 
species of metaphysical one-upmanship (2000:38). 
We have observed the emphasis in Origen of the necessity not to worship human 
work of hand or brain, and his extension of idolatry to theological constructs. This 
is a rule Origen obeys in his own theology, which makes him such a shibboleth to 
those who seek categorical or systematic method in theology. His refusal to rest or 
remain upon secure theological ground, draws the accusation that the adamantine 
dynamism in Origen’s theology exalts his own intellectual interest over the Regula 
Fidei. Crouzel’s thoroughgoing defence of Origen does much to explain the 
theological basis of his approach: the dynamic, complex understanding of the living 
God is matched by a multi-dimensional understanding of humanity and the 
cosmos. Origen will not exchange the living God for a two-dimensional caricature. 
God is present to creation himself in the Son and the Spirit, and Scripture is a 
means whereby God accommodates himself to deficient human understanding in 
order to transform it and lead it, by its pedagogy, to glory. Scripture is opened up 
by Christ and the Holy Spirit so that it enlightens Christians with ever richer fare: 
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We now ask God to assist us through Christ in the Holy Spirit to 
open up the mystical sense hidden as a treasure in the text…248 
Origen is so convinced of the infinite ascent of the soul to the divine in Christ, that 
he is unwilling to rest in theological constructs, no matter how intellectually 
satisfying. In the PA, he describes the Son and the Spirit leading home the saint by 
continually preparing the soul to receive divine life, and his energies are directed to 
facilitating this divine pedagogy, participating in  
the work of wisdom to instruct and train them, and lead them on to 
perfection, by the strengthening and unceasing sanctification of the 
Holy Spirit, through which alone they can receive God.249 
A reading of Origen’s theology in the CC highlights the wound of a radical 
disjunction of all things from God, demonstrating that Origen constructs an 
environment where an ecology of theological explorations interact with doctrines 
mutually moderating and interpenetrating one another. Origen’s cosmology, 
determined by its systematic ontological disconnection from God, exerts an 
immense influence in the whole picture of his thought. Origen’s theodicy, whilst 
having significant parallels with Gnostic cosmogony (particularly in terms of its 
accounting for the radical instability of created existence by a pre-temporal fall) is 
also a description of salvation related to creation before the Christological 
controversies more clearly focus such discussion in the nature of Christ.. Irenaeus 
constructs divinization as the resolution to the corruption caused by the fall250 in 
the realm of creation.  Origen’s concern is at once more subtle and more complex. 
                                                 
248 Comm. in Joh. I: XV, (89), in Trigg, 1998:120. 
249 Peri Archon I.3.8. Cf.  M. Edwards, 1998a:17. Cf. Trigg, 2001:27-52. 
250 See Lyman, 1993: 61-2. 
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CC demonstrates a wariness of explicitly speaking about creation and the relation 
of the spiritual to the material, most probably because Origen is aware that his 
tentative exploratory style may be read in a literal or categorical sense.  He 
explains his reluctance thus: 
We do not want the truth about the way in which souls became 
bound to a body (though not by reincarnation) to be cast before an 
uneducated audience, nor that holy things should be given to the 
dogs… It is enough to give an account of the doctrines which are 
obscurely set forth under the guise of a story by following the course 
of it, that those who have the ability may work out the meaning of the 
passage for themselves.251 
Two passages are significant indicators of how Scripture alludes to the mystery of 
the creation and the fall, and the nature of intelligible creation to make such a fall 
possible. In a most oblique reference to the plain of Shinar,252 Origen alludes to 
creatures turning from the rising Eastern light and attending to those things alien to 
that primal beatific vision. Shinar, as Philo253 had pointed out before him, 
resembles the Hebrew words for tooth and shake, and is thus reckoned an allusion 
to the story of the confusion of human language at Babel.254 The confusion of 
human languages in the Babel story in Genesis, is, however, far less pressing for 
Origen than the scandal of a project of building a tower to heaven in a vain attempt 
to laying hold of the spiritual with the physical: 
                                                 
251 Contra Celsum V: 30, Chadwick, 1980:287. 
252 Contra Celsum V: 30, Chadwick, 1980:287: Gen. 10:10; 11:2; 14:1. 
253 Chadwick connects the text with Philo, De Conf. Ling. 68, and observes that ‘the derivation is 
based on the Hebrew shēn = tooth, na‘ar = shake’. 
254 Gen. 11. 
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Then they desire to collect material things and to join what cannot 
naturally be joined to heaven, in order that by means of material 
things they may conspire against immaterial things, saying: “Come, 
let us make bricks and burn them with fire” [conspiring to]… reach to 
heaven.255 
The curiosity of this example is constituted by its obliqueness: the reference is less 
to Genesis than an etymological tradition present in Philo. Origen transmits an 
allegorical intimation that humanity lost its focus upon the everlasting light, and so 
was confused and became materialistic, even building a city of brick believing it to 
be heavenly. This exegesis echoes Origen’s view of a rational or spiritual creation 
preceding material existence.256 The Spiritual creation has its roots in eternity and 
is intended to enjoy the sublime vision of God forever, though it still depends 
eternally upon the mysterious will of God the creator. The spiritual, or intelligible 
creation has, as its intended purpose, engagement with the divine,257 but is not 
ÐmooÚsioj with God. Aspects of Origen’s thought which will gain most notoriety 
later – the fall of the logiko… and subordination of the Logos – actually work 
together in his thought to ensure that the spiritual creation is radically distinct from 
God, and contingent in a way that the Logos and Holy Spirit are not. The Logos 
and Spirit are distinguishable, though, in a way that unambiguous use of 
ÐmooÚsioj at this stage would preclude. The rational creatures, endued with 
                                                 
255 Contra Celsum V: 30, Chadwick, 1980:287. 
256 Edwards, 2002:89 “It was not perverse in Henri Crouzel to tax Origen with ‘excessive 
literalism’ [1989:258-9]; Bishop Gore did not fall into paradox when he wrote that Origen’s 
heterodoxies ‘were mainly due to an overscrupulous literalism in the interpretation of Holy 
Scripture’ [Gore, 1907:114]. There is no better illustration of this remark than Origen’s reasoning 
that, since there are two accounts of the creation of humanity in the first two chapters of Genesis, 
humanity must have been created twice.” Though of course the Alexandrian Jewish tradition from 
Philo made sense of the two creation narratives in this style centuries before Origen.  
257 Lyman, 1993: 58. ‘God as good and active, therefore, does not radiate goodness or rationality 
impersonally, but intentionally creates a free world to share divine life’. 
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freedom are always subject to change and instability, otherwise the pre-temporal 
“fall” would not have taken place.258 This breach of communion has profound 
ontological effects, but it is fundamentally different from Gnosis’ tragic degradation. 
The material creation, created out of nothing by God, is not a prison, and rather 
than ensnaring the soul, is, rather, the creative response of God in providing a 
pedagogical means of restoration. The intelligible creation, because it was truly 
loved and known by God, is endued with freedom. The possibility of participation in 
the divine as a created element of intelligible creation develops the apologetic 
motif of LÒgoj spšrmatikoj. The groaning of intelligible creation when embodied in 
the physical universe indicates a yearning to recover its lost place. Human 
experience is one of estrangement, but the material context encourages change 
and the free return to God, a longing fanned into a flame by experiences in 
material existence. Origen’s comments, developed from his reading of the Genesis 
narrative, reveal the significance of physical creation: 
the man who was cast out of the garden with the woman was clothed 
with ‘coats of skins’ (Gen. 3:21), which God made for those who had 
sinned on account of the transgression of mankind, [this] has a 
certain secret and mysterious meaning, superior to the Platonic 
doctrine of the descent of the soul which loses its wings and is 
carried hither ‘until it finds some firm resting place’ (Plato, Phaedrus 
246 b,c).259 
                                                 
258 Cf. Crouzel 1989:181, who rejects conventional accusations that Origen’s prompt and 
perspective here is Platonic rather than “biblical”, arguing that Origen strategically maintains that 
the spiritual creation is radically distinct from God, and contingent in a way that the Logos and 
Holy Spirit are not.  
259 Contra Celsum IV:41, Chadwick, 1980:217. Chadwick refers to the tradition of interpreting the 
clothing with skin as physical embodiment and restriction in Clement of Alexandria Strom. III.95.2, 
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The embodied experience of creatures contributes to the longing for redemption. 
Origen describes this in terms of both connection to and correspondence with true 
Being, beyond the world of becoming, and a life marked by spiritual or intelligible 
characteristics (log…koi), signifying, indeed, unity with the eternal Logos. The fall 
of humanity assumes fundamental significance, compatible to that in Gnostic 
cosmology, yet without the latter’s dualism. Origen’s cosmology attempts to 
account for the ontological gulf in terms of sin. To secure intelligible creation’s 
existence, creatures must remain in communion with the divine nature of the 
creator. Their true being thus transcends themselves, lying beyond their own 
grasp. This construction is not inaccurately described as “Platonic”,260 not least 
because the foundation for this schema is an understanding of creation created ex 
nihilo. Origen is also wrestling with the mystery of intelligible existence’s destiny to 
share the true divine being, because this transcendental ontology is in some way 
the creature’s true identity. Origen focuses on the centrality of creation as the key 
for understanding the goodness and freedom of God, the incarnation is the 
extension of divine mercy into the realm of material creation prompted by divine 
love, something irreconcilable with readings of Origen primarily as “Platonist”,261 
as is the significance of historical and material experience upon the identity of th
spiritual creature: 
e 
                                                                                                                                                
The body, which in Platonism remains at best the luggage of the 
itinerant soul, is for Origen the condition of our historical integrity as 
persons. (Edwards, 2002:76). 
 
Excerpt. ex Theod. 55.1. Methodius asserted that this Gnostic tradition was Origen’s reading (De 
Resurr. I.4.2; I.23.3). 
260 E.g., Edwards, 1998a:1. 
261 Edwards, 1998a:13. 
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Celsus’s Alēthēs Logos in its ridicule of Jews for inconsistency in their theology 
prompted Origen to a defence of Jewish theology of creation. Celsus claimed that 
the Jews “worship the heaven and the angels in it” whilst refusing to acknowledge 
that any of the whole’s parts are divine.262 Origen explores this misrepresentation 
or confusion of Jewish theology with pagan cosmogony,263 arguing that aspects of 
the cosmos are no-where viewed as divine in the Jewish tradition, nor is the true 
God to be construed as the composite whole.264 Divinity is not to be understood in 
terms of origination, but ontology: here is the centre of confusion about divine 
nature and the creation. Origen patiently reiterates that the Jewish-Christian 
cosmology is not pantheist, nor panentheist, but explains that creation as the 
arena where God’s freedom in being personally present to creation is made 
possible, most significantly in the incarnation of the Logos. The Son’s relation to 
the Father is ontologically different from that of creation’s relation to God: no 
hypostatic or ontological continuity is allowed in the case of creation, created, as it 
was, out of nothing. Although Origen generally avoids using ÐmooÚsioj of the 
Son265 in order to emphasise the magnitude of the Father’s transcendence even to 
the Son and the Spirit, it would appear that Origen probably did use the term albeit 
in an analogical, occasional and explorative way266 in order to express that the 
Son, unlike the cosmos, abides in the very substance of divinity. 
                                                 
262 Contra Celsum V:6; Chadwick, 1980:267. 
263 Contra Celsum V:7; Chadwick, 1980:268. 
264 Contra Celsum I:23; Chadwick, 1980:23. 
265 Cf. R. P. C. Hanson, 1983: 53-70; Edwards, 1998:658-670. 
266 Three places in the Rufinus’ Apology preserved in Latin in Rufinus, MPG XVII pp.580-81, 
refined and explored in Edwards 1998:658-670, who restores the text of Pamphilus into Greek, 
and offers this translation: “I think it now sufficiently demonstrated, and indeed obvious, that he 
declares him to be the Son of God, born from [so not part of or co-ordinate with] the substance of 
God – that is, [to use his own word] homoousios, which means [simply] of the same nature as the 
Father, not a creature, not adopted, but by nature his true Son, having come to be from the 
Father himself.” Ibid., 665. 
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Despite accusations of subordinationism, Origen’s Christology is striking for its 
depiction of the eternal and divine aspect: his divine nature is equal to the Father 
(PA 1.2, Görgemanns & Karrp, 1976:122-157), contra Arian chant, there was not a 
time when the Logos was not (Commentary on Hebrews 1.8, Kannengiesser, 
2004a:74). The primary Christological datum appears to be the Logos’s divinity, 
who in the economy takes human nature: 
Primo illud nos scire oportet, quod alia es in Christo deitatis eius 
natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam 
in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit. (PA1.2.1, 
Görgemanns & Karpp, 1976:122).  
Origen’s Christology thus far described however begs the question of how human 
is the Son, what is the status and purpose of the “humana natura” appropriated in 
the Christian dispensation? If the Logos is radically unlike all creation, yet distinct 
from the Father, how is the humanity or creatureliness accounted for? Here it is 
clear that the account of two creations is more than merely a literalist following of 
the Genesis accounts, even if it stems from there. Origen weaves a Christology 
which takes full account of a created nature by postulating that the perfect 
intelligible creature, the soul of Jesus, did not fall but remained in communion and 
loving harmony with God.  
Given that, on account of the faculty of freewill, each of the souls 
was subject to variety and diversity, so that one burned with a fiercer 
love, another with a weaker and more unstable love towards its 
maker, that soul, of which Christ said that ‘no-one takes away my 
soul from me’ [John 10:18], inseperably and indissolubly adhering to 
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him from the beginning of creation (ab initio creaturae) and 
thereafter… was made with him at the outset ‘one spirit’.267 
This perfect soul co-operates with the divine Logos and is united for the economy 
of the incarnation. This eternal unity is dependent upon Origen’s account of two 
creations, but it gives a meaningful role for the created nature of Jesus co-
operating with the Logos ab initio, and accounts for the sinlessness of the Son. In 
that aspect at least, here is a sophisticated insight into two natures participating 
freely in redemption. The human soul is not overwhelmed by the divine Logos, but 
sustained in perfect life. This soul united with the Logos perfectly fulfils divine 
redemptive – the very cooperation being a model of complete salvation respecting 
human freedom: 
Volens igitur filius dei pro salute humani generis apparere hominibus 
et inter homines conversari, suscepit non solum corpus humanum, ut 
quidam putant, sed et animam, nostrarum quidem animarum similem 
per naturam, propositio vero et virtute similem sibi et talem, qualis 
omnes voluntates et dispensations verbi ac sapientiae indeclinabiliter 
posset implere. (PA 4.4.4, Görgemanns & Karrp, 1976:792). 
Christ is Mediator because in himself he is a unity of divine and creature: the 
Logos and the human nature together make Jesus Christ: “anima cum verbo dei 
Christus efficitur” (PA 2.6.4,  Görgemanns & Karrp, 1976:364). 
The context of this achievement is – retrospectively – judged to be a Hellenistic 
insertion into proper explication of the person and work of Christ. But it is, also, 
                                                 
267 PA 2.6.4. Koetschau, 1899:142, Edwards, 2002:94. 
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nearer to aspects of primitive Christianity than Nicene “readings” of Christology 
might allow: 
Everything that primitive Christianity has to say about the pre-
existent saviour is compounded with some reference to his 
humanity, or else the glorification of his humanity and ours. The 
object of John’s prologue is to show that the incarnation of the Word 
is no new tale but the preroration of a speech that commenced in the 
morning when God said ‘Let there be light’…The manhood of the 
Saviour was an indefeasible element of devotion for a Church in 
which the cult of Christ as God had supervened upon the 
acknowledgement of the crucified Jesus as its risen Lord (Edwards, 
2002:71).268 
Moreover, Origen – with typical sophistry – indicates that the humanity of the 
incarnate Christ advances both understanding and salvation. Edwards accounts 
for Origen’s referral to the incarnate Jesus Christ as the fulfilment and epistemic 
guide to Scripture as indicative of Origen’s failure to distinguish clearly “between 
the cosmological Christ and the Christ of Nazareth” (2002:134).269 But he 
observes that  
                                                
In his Homilies on Leviticus… his goal is to discern the Spirit behind 
the veil of sacrifice, it is not the celestial Logos, but the tangible and 
 
268 Cf Kannengiesser, who rightly attributes Origen’s theology to a biblically-informed 
“metaphysical imagination characteristic of a genuinely Alexandrian mind-set”: “From childhood 
Origen knew that divine Wisdom was carrying the whole universe before all times, as in a 
womb… In that mysterious preexistence of God’s creation, a terrible drama had occurred, clearly 
mentioned by sacred writers (Isa.14:12; Luke10:18). Enough for Origen’s inquisitive commitment 
to the Bible… [who] saw in the wake of the massive expulsion of angels from heaven… how the 
tarnished human souls were also doomed to fall.” 2004a:76. 
269 Though Edwards does acknowledge that this failure to distinguish is probably Origen’s choice 
rather than his oversight, 2002:134. 
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audible one, the God-man of the evangelists, furnishes the 
hermeneutic key… (citing Hom Lev 5.2). There can be no doubt that 
the one who is invoked here is the Word who became incarnate, and 
thereby caused his own handiwork, the visible text of Scripture, to 
disclose the latent truth that was concealed from ‘those before us’. 
Origen’s allegorical application of Jesus Christ’s injunction to eat flesh and drink 
blood may not literally be carried out, but should be fulfilled spiritually. Here 
Origen’s emphasis is less on the Eucharist than on digesting the words of 
Scripture,270 which he views as transmitting the reality of Christ to such a degree 
that Dawson (1997) styles it the embodiment of Christ. Scripture has a centrality, 
but it is not “mediatorial” in any affective sense. Scripture’s value lies in its divine 
source and purpose of teaching souls the truth. This is done in history by Christ 
through Scripture. It is a conventional criticism of Origen that his relegation of 
material existence leaves no place for theological “history” (Hanson, 1960:286-
287). His accusations that for Origen history is predicated to spirituality is exposed 
as both inaccurate and anachronistic by Edwards (2002:150-151), who concludes, 
contrariwise, that “[t]he signature of God, in Origen’s thought, is history” (ibid. 152). 
The significance of the Christ event is extended through history beyond the life and 
teaching of Jesus in the flesh by the Spirit, and Scripture (and the assumed 
humanity in the economy) has a central role in divine pedagogy. Indeed, we find a 
different role for creation and history than in Irenaeus, but it is a distortion of the 
subtlety of Origen to depict him as a spiritual, universalist mystic. In his way, 
Christology also has central place, but in an ontologically-oriented perspective. 
                                                 
270 Cf On the Pasch 33:1-2, 18-30; Edwards, 2002:148. 
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 1:6 Conclusions: Arguments, Assumptions and unresolved Conflicts  
 
Unlike the pagan religions – and the Hellenistic mysteries in 
particular – which sought salvation in escape from time and history 
through myths leading to extratemporal experiences, Christian 
spirituality, under the influence of the scriptural mentality, was from 
the beginning focused on history. Unlike the Greek and pagan 
religions of that time, the church’s outlook was not cosmological but 
historical; it was based not on the observance of nature (seasons, 
cyclical movement of stars, etc.) but on events. Creation, far from 
being eternal and “divine,” was an event with a beginning. Its 
existence was contingent and constantly dependent on the will of 
God. Humanity’s relation with God did not pass through nature but 
through obedience to the will of God, a fact that gave to Christian 
spirituality an ethical character (“doing the truth”) and a strongly 
personalist dimension: it was through personal relationships that 
the human person’s union with God was realized (Zizioulas 
1986:23). 
 
This chapter has, however, moderated such a view. The eschatological dynamic 
of primitive Christianity was not accompanied universally by a rigorous view of 
creatio ex nihilo. Zizioulas’ analysis sits uneasily with the common philosophical 
assumptions that are interwoven with Scripture in (despite Irenaeus’s assertions) 
diverse theological constructs. These approaches, represented by Justin, 
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Irenaeus and Origen here, have different emphases and interests, so much so 
that it would be difficult to identify a singular, consistent approach to 
Christological mediation. Though there is a change of gear between speaking 
about Christ as the soteriological mediator of the will and salvation of God (the 
Father), and cosmological Mediation necessary in creation, the fluidity and 
diversity are striking. The Alexandrian crisis around Alexander, Arius and 
Athanasius will require a Christological method that is at once more specific in its 
method, and precluding of this diversity. Athanasius, especially, will explore this 
in a way that impacts upon Trinitarian theology, and closes many of the options 
from Origen’s Alexandrian inheritance.   
 
Wessell (2004) argues that the transposition of former conflicts is a rhetorical 
device by which protagonists sought to cast themselves in the personae of 
established saints – with their opponents as heretics. Whilst this is the case, there 
is, also, the fact that Christological controversy highlights similar issues, and key 
notions are bolstered or threatened in the process. Thus far we have observed 
how the notion of the Logos as mediator had two distinct – if overlapping – 
functions, namely: a soteriological mediator of the will or salvation of God 
(construed primarily in terms consistent with a theology of history, witness 
Irenaeus); and a philosophically-orientated cosmological mediation of the Logos 
(or Sophia) cast in Christian mould in Origen, and more syncretistically in Gnosis. 
The paradigms – soteriological and ontological – emerge from different historical 
contexts as distinct theological approaches.  
This introductory chapter has provided the necessary background to allow an 
evaluation of the influences upon Athanasius’s Christological vision of divine being 
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and created nature being held in Christ in such a way that illustrates the 
possibilities of Christological description in terms of ontological relation and 
differentiation. Athanasius’s Christology does not achieve an easy synthesis of 
Alexandrian concerns and Irenaean method, but it does indicate something of the 
extent of his paradigm shift in Christological method by transforming Arius’s 
clumsy application of creatio ex nihilo to arguments about the Son’s being. In an 
important sense, despite the clear differences, Athanasius seems to have 
identified the applicability of Irenaeus’s anti-Gnostic arguments to his opponents: 
In Contra Arianos 2:70, Athanasius seems to rely on another 
important Irenaean christological text, AH III,18,7, in which Irenaeus 
argues that the denial of the genuine flesh of Christ is inconsistent 
with the logic of redemption. While making no mention of Irenaeus, 
the Alexandrian here does refer to the Valentinians, making the point 
that while the Arian position seems to be quite different from that of 
the Valentinians, it amounts to the same result. While the 
Valentinians denied the genuine flesh, the Arians deny the genuine 
divinity; in ostensibly opposite ways, they are thus equally guilty of 
destroying the immediate unity between God and the flesh which is 
the essential content of redemption (Anatolios, 2001:472). 
This chapter has uncovered theological examples and motivations that are 
helpful in understanding why Athanasius framed Christology in the way he did. 
The remainder of this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that (for good and ill), 
Athanasius’s theology of the incarnate Logos within a Trinitarian framework 
removes Logos theology from the shadow of the theological giant Origen, and 
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establishes a method which, whilst consonant with many elements of NT and 
primitive Christological foundations, has more systematic consistency which 
could not be ignored by fourth-century contemporaries from miahypostatic or 
diaphysite camps (the taxonomy of Lienhard, 1999).  
 
It is to Athanasius as this focusing lens that we may now turn. 
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PART TWO 
THE CHRISTOCENTRIC RELATION OF 
COSMOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY IN 
ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE 
CHRISTOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CHRISTOLOGICAL RELATION OF GOD AND HUMANITY IN 
ATHANASIUS OF ALEXANDRIA’S CONTRA GENTES / DE 
INCARNATIONE 
2:1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the Christology of the early Athanasius by focusing upon 
his depiction of the relation of human and divine natures in the Contra Gentes / 
De Incarnatione (hereafter CG-DI). This provides a starting place to observe 
Athanasius's distinctive usage of the doctrine of creation in the Alexandrian 
theological context. This tradition, for all its implied dualism, emphasised 
elements of continuity between some aspects of the world and God.271 It is not 
the purpose of this chapter to conclude whether it was Athanasius or Arius who 
radically interjected the theme of discontinuity into the commonly held 
assumption of late antique Platonic frameworks. It is clear, nonetheless, that it is 
a vitally significant theological priority that both share – a more fundamental 
agreement than is often acknowledged.272  
 
This exploration of Athanasius’s theological, cosmological and anthropological 
priorities in CG-DI shows that his ontological re-working of the relation between 
God and creation owes much both to Alexandrian and Irenaean traditions. 
                                                 
271 Hamilton, 1977:ii.  
272 On the development of Alexandrian theology in the fourth century see Charles Kannengiesser, 
1991. On the nomenclature of late or middle Platonism, an attempt is made to follow the 
terminology of Armstrong, 1980:85-87, equating with Middle Platonism in Dillon, 1977, and Stead, 
1994:54-75, who correctly emphasises the place of Philo in what is often classed as Middle 
Platonism. This is developed in Edwards, 2002, into a blasting exposé of the (over)use of the 
term. 
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Athanasius shares with Irenaeus a conviction that God is directly present to 
creation. He also develops typically Alexandrian ontological and hermeneutical 
concerns in CG-DI. 
  
Despite scholarly variance in dating the tract 
By common consent the earliest of [Athanasius' works]... must be 
the Contra Gentes et De Incarnatione (Hanson, 1988:417).273 
 
An interpretation of CG-DI as an early work will enable a more chronologically 
nuanced view of the development of Athanasius’s Christology than is allowed for 
example in the systematic readings of Torrance (1988). Taking a probable date 
for the tract in the mid-330s, a Christological analysis at this point will contrast 
with the Contra Arianos and later epistles. It will be possible, then, to make 
tentative conclusions about CG-DI’s place in Athanasius's thought, and this is the 
primary aim of this chapter. 
 
2:2  Integrity, Authorship and date 
From Jerome onwards, the treatise Against the Pagans, the second book of 
which is often called Treatise on the Incarnation of the Word and his 
                                                 
273  Hanson rejects the traditional early date because “very few young men in their twenties wrote 
theological works (any more than they do today), and it would be difficult to explain a silence of 
nearly twenty years between his first work and the next. At one point in the work he says that he 
does not have theological books readily at hand, and at another he remarks that the Roman 
senate decrees ‘that some emperors shall be regarded as gods quite recently, and perhaps even 
up to now.’ (Contra Gentes 9.50)” Hanson is correct in noting that this does not suit a period ruled 
over by a pagan emperor. He notes the dependence of the work on the Theophany of Eusebius 
of Caesarea, giving a terminus post quem of 335. Hanson places the work in the first exile around 
335/6.  
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manifestation in the flesh, has attribution to Athanasius.274 Dräseke (1893:251-
315) challenged Athanasian authorship of CG-DI on the basis of a discernible 
conflated scholarly rhetoric, the influence of Greek philosophy, in stark contrast 
to other “authentic” Athanasian works, and the absence of any reference to 
Arianism or the Nicene faith. Dräseke attributed CG-DI to the Antiochene 
Eusebius of Emesa - whom Camelot (1977:10) calls semi-Arian. Thus CG-DI 
would be a pseudepigraphal work, constructed to give Athanasian weight to an 
Antiochene position. The celebrated Antiochene, Theodoret of Cyrus, indeed 
makes much of CG-DI in the Florilegia of his Eranistes, quoting Athanasius 30 
times, in the most part accurately and always approvingly, wishing to claim 
Athanasius's approval for an Antiochene theological perspective. However, 
though many of these quotations are from CG-DI, Theodoret also cites Ad 
Epictetum, De sententia Dionysii, Sermo maior de fide, Oratio II contra Arianos, 
ad Adelphium, De incarnatione et contra Arianos .275 Though two of these, the 
Sermo maior de fide and De incarnatione et contra Arianos are spurious, to 
assume that just because these texts were used by the Antiochene champion a 
generation later all are suspect is insufficient evidence upon which to distrust 
CG-DI. 276 
 
                                                 
274  Cp. the introduction to the Camelot’s text, 1977:9. 
275  See Ettlinger’s helpful index of patristic citations in Theodoret’s Eranistes,(1975:9-23). 
Theodoret cites the spurious works Sermo maior de fide and De incarnatione contra Arianos as 
Athanasian, as most, if not all of his contemporaries did. 
276 Thomson (1971:277), draws attention in a footnote to the ending of DI as indeed being open to 
Arian interpretation, i.e.: “[all those things which have been prepared] for those who live in virtue 
and love God the Father, in Jesus Christ our Lord, through whom and with whom, to the Father 
with the Son himself, in the Holy Spirit, be honour and glory...”. Thomson translates the kaˆ after 
¢gapîse tÕn QeÕn kaˆ Patšra, but the sense seems more epexegetical, echoing other familiar 
examples of quasi-liturgical phrases (e.g., 2 Cor 13:14), and may be best left untranslated, as a 
liturgical, conventional homiletical conclusion (Cf. De Decretus Nicaenae Synodi 32, ad 
Serapionem iv.7 & 23. See Thomson, 1971:277, Baumstark, 1953:77, and Brightman, 
1900:92,108). 
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Moreover, Dräseke's remains a lone voice in the wilderness, countered in 
fortissimo harmony by, among others, Stülcken (1899:10), Camelot (1977), 
Thomson (1971), et al., including the celebratedly iconoclastic Charles 
Kannengiesser (1973). The almost universal consensus, is that “l’ authenticité 
athanasienne de notre traité ne fait plus de doute.”277 
 
Yet if the authorship is as uncontentious as it now appears to be the case, the 
date (and therefore in many ways the theological significance) of CG-DI remains 
problematic. There seems to be an emerging consensus that the work was 
probably written in the Trier exile of 335-337,278 though it is possible that a later 
date is to be preferred.  
 
Bernard de Montfaucon (1698), basing his text on the Parisian MS Seguerianus 
dated the work around 318.279 Archibald Robinson (1891), in a prolegomena to 
selections of Athanasius in translation follows Montfaucon. Central arguments for 
an early date for CG-DI is the absence of any reference to Arius, and a perceived 
youthfulness of style in the text:  
 
historiennes et ...editeurs de saint Athanase voient dans ce double 
traité une oeuvre de jeunesse de l’auteur. (Camelot, 1977:110.)  
 
                                                 
277  Camelot, 1977:10, citing Roldanus, 1968:374: “L’inauthenticité a été réfutée de manière 
définitive depuis des années dejà”. 
278 Anatolios, 1998:26-9, opts [p.29] for "a date after Athanasius's ascendancy to the episcopacy 
and before his exile to Trier (between 328 and 335)". This corresponds with Petterson, 
1982:1039; and Barnes, 1993:13, preferring 325-328 as an apprentice proof work to establish his 
theological credentials for his new province. 
279  So in the MPG which used Montfaucon’s work, this early date is given, PG 25,1. 
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The chief problem with this dating, before the Arian conflict of 325, is that CG-DI 
was written perhaps only five years after the date of Athanasius' probable boy-
baptism, making the author maybe less than 20 years old.  
 
Paradoxically, whilst a perceived immaturity or brittleness in argumentation is the 
very thing that de Montfaucon and Robinson cite (together with an argumentum e 
silencio regarding the Arians) to urge this early date, the sophistication of the 
tract renders this dating impossible for other scholars. (Hanson, 1988:417, cf. 
Petterson, 1982). The Christology might be seen to be problematic concerning 
the humanity of Christ, and there is little reference to the Spirit. It might seem to 
be advantageous to explain this away by Athanasius's youth, but that seems too 
easy a solution to escape from more difficult implications of his Christology even 
as late as the 330s. The weight of the significance of an argumentum e silencio 
with regard to Arius is also dubious. Neither does Athanasius refer to the Melitian 
schism. Loofs (1889) notes that in his Festal letters, it is not until 335 that 
Athanasius mentions Arius. Kannengiesser (1973) maintains that Athanasius's 
silence on that matter is deliberate, but nonetheless reads DI 24 - on Christ’s 
intention to maintain his Church as a whole - as a critique of Arius: 
 
So neither did he undergo the death of John by being beheaded, 
nor like Isaiah was he sawn asunder, in order that he might keep 
his body intact and whole in death, and that there be no pretext for 
those who wish to divide the Church.  
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By itself this remains a somewhat insubstantial hook upon which to hang his 
thesis. The citation about Christ’s death is a clear contradiction of those who 
would divide the Church, but this is not limited to an Arian context. If anything, it 
makes more sense in the context of the Melitian schism, with its parallel 
priesthood and sacraments, than in the Arian controversy, whose followers 
Athanasius saw not as bruised schismatics having undergone imperial 
persecution, but out-and-out heretics. Nonetheless, Kannengiesser's argument 
that the Trier exile, when Athanasius was without his books, is a more likely 
context for CG-DI, leading him to date it between 335 and 337 (1964:91-100); 
Thomson (1971) accepts a similar chronology.  
 
Stronger evidence for a terminus post quem of the work is an alleged 
demonstrable dependence on Eusebius’s Theophaneia.280  The aged and 
learned Eusebius is unlikely to have been dependent upon the work of a 
precocious Alexandrian deacon, so any established dependency would probably 
secure the date as post Theophaneia. Wallice-Hadrill, however, notes that the 
dating of Theophaneia in the Eusebian canon is itself contentious; it may be the 
case that both texts emerge from Irenaeus of Lyons's Epideixis (Behr, 1997). 
Bienert (1989:402-419) urges that CG-DI is an anti-Eusebeian reading of 
Epideixis against a subordinationist interpretation offered by Eusebius, which 
was open to Arian assent.281 Anatolios (2001:463-4) offers a pleasing synthesis:  
 
I suggest that while the Contra Gentes - De Incarnatione shows 
strong continuity in perspective and clear textual parallels with 
                                                 
280 Cf. the discussion in D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, 1960. 
281 Cf. Mühlenberg, E., 1974:215-230. 
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Irenaeus's Epideixis in particular, it nevertheless tends to play on 
Irenaean themes in the distinctly Alexandrian and Origenian style 
which favours an epistemological approach and which aims to 
construct an intelligible Christian gnosis. Such an epistemological 
perspective was adopted also by Eusebius of Caesarea, within a 
markedly subordinationist theology, and Athanasius's use of 
Irenaeus in this treatise seems to coincide with the project of 
offering a corrective to Eusebius. In his later, explicitly anti-Arian 
writings… this epistemological perspective is largely left behind. 
 
Martin (1996) shows282 that at Alexander’s death there were thirty-five Melitian 
bishops; by 325, though nine were reconciled, there were at least eighteen active 
continuing Melitian bishops and churches. Some remained opponents of 
Athanasius at the Council of Tyre (summer 335), so there is no reason to believe 
that Melitian integrity quickly dissipated.  DI 24 may thus allude to the Melitian 
schism. The Melitian party had a real contender, in the form of John Arcaph, to 
replace the deposed Athanasius as Patriarch of Alexandria, had not Constantine 
also banished him, making way for George. Athanasius’s friendship with Antony 
and Pachomius was ultimately decisive in winning popular support from the 
Melitians.283 
 
On the basis of DI 24 alone, the work could theoretically date from later exiles in 
friendly Egyptian / Coptic monasteries (as late as 357ce) but this does not 
account for significant differences in both method and content in this treatise from 
                                                 
282  Annick Martin, 1996:310f. 
283  Frend, 1984.  
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later works. A Sitz im Leben in the period of George’s supplanting of Athanasius, 
though possible, does not fit the style of the tractate in comparison with 
contemporary Athanasian texts, thus remaining unlikely conjecture. The 
argument that the text is early because it is not rabidly anti-Arian is not 
convincing. Whatever the date of CG-DI, Arius may not be mentioned by name, 
but there is in the content of CG-DI an unmissable theme of the divinity of the 
Logos on almost every page, which repeatedly counters the foundation of Arian 
thought.284 
 
Whilst Athanasius’s dependence upon Eusebius’s Theophaneia (or In Praise of 
Constantine [LC])285, (rather than Eusebius' upon Athanasius) remains likely, this 
does not settle the issues of dates unambiguously. Nordberg’s (1961a:262-266) 
redating,286 places CG-DI in the reign of Julian the Apostate. An early date in this 
period, 361-363, corresponds with the time when Athanasius was exiled from his 
see - prior to 21 February 362 - or in the early part of the fourth exile, 363-3. A 
date between 361 and 362, when George was the “official” metropolitan, might 
give good reason for the serious apologetic work of CG-DI. It is not a work aimed 
merely at promoting Athanasius’s political case, but reasserts what he viewed as 
orthodox Christianity in the time of an apostate administration. Against this 
though is the fact that the content of the tractate remains far too Christologically-
focused contrasting with the theological priorites that had emerged by then. 
                                                 
284 Indeed if it is as early as Montfaucon claimed, the Christology of the piece might be seen to 
have provoked Arius to his Christological reaction. No-one may find within CG-DI the theme ½n 
pote Ðte oÙk ½n. 
285 Cf Hamilton, 1977:72 comparing LC 11:13 with CG 36, notes parallels in terms of concepts, 
vocabulary and rhetorical form, concluding that Athanasius is probably dependent upon 
Eusebius.  
286  Nordberg argues that there was direct influence of Eusebius on CG-DI, not to be accounted 
for by a common inheritence of the Origenist tradition. 
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 Despite the absence of some Trinitarian themes of the later fourth century, CG-
DI displays a Christological precision, presenting both a cogent picture of 
cosmology and anthropology cohering in Christian theology. Athanasius presents 
his argument, re-constructing a by-now archaic Origenistic Alexandrian 
position287 into a new description of the relation of God to creation. Whatever the 
date of composition and the place of Melitian or "Arian" contexts, CG-DI most 
likely emerged after 330 (on the external evidence of Theophania), with a date of 
around 335 being most likely. A date of around 361, during George’s episcopate 
though fitting some allusions in the text, dovetails less well into contemporary 
theology and Christology.288 
 
Even if CG-DI is not the work of Athanasius the teenage proto-theologian, or 
even perhaps his first work, it remains appropriate to consider it at length 
because of its authenticity and subject-matter and its witness in the first half of 
the fourth century to the Christological relation of divine and created natures. CG-
DI directly addresses the issue of the relation of the divine and humanity in terms 
of the theme of creation out of nothing, thus insisting that human kinship with 
God is on the basis of divine gift alone. CG-DI therefore marks a distinctively new 
phase in theology, namely a Christological use of the doctrine of creation, 
accounting for the incarnation as God's re-establishment of stability lost at the 
fall. In contrast to Platonic philosophical understandings, and to Gnostic 
soteriology, there is here no a priori claim of the soul upon the divine in terms of 
                                                 
287  See above, 1.5. 
288  Cf. Beatrice, 1990:159-177. who insists that CG-DI is a mature work, not from Athanasius’s 
adolescence (ie, not 318-325), neither from the Trier exile, but – arguing  through a comparison of 
themes, especially those of anti-pagan and anti-heretical rhetoric –that CG-DI is contemporary 
with Vita Antonii, so between 357 and 362. Martin, 1996, accepts this as the strongest argument. 
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a shared substance. It is to that narrative and Athanasius's Christological 
explication of this theme that we now turn.  
 
2:3 Christology and mediation: Fall, salvation & Human nature in CG-
DI  
Athanasius has a clear schema undergirding CG-DI, which is proper to outline 
here before examining the function and nature of the Logos in this treatise, as 
this context impacts not only upon Athanasius’ s understanding of the Logos, but 
also of salvation as qeopo…hsij, and the ways in which any possible “natural” 
mediation is excluded by the use of creatio ex nihilo. Human yuc» and noàj 
pertain to created existence (so Irenaeus, contra Origen), and have no 
mediatorial function between humanity and divine being:  
 
Athanasius rejects any divine hierarchy. There is nothing between 
God and creation which can be called divine. Those who speak of a 
divine being who is not equal to the Father are guilty of idolatry. 
Therefore he accuses Arians and Greeks of idolatry. There is a 
clear distinction between what is divine and what is human. This 
gulf can only be overcome by God, therefore the Son must be God 
to the same degree as the Father. (Meijering, 1968:130.) 
 
The means whereby Athanasius holds this line is by reference to the Genesis 
narrative and the prime place of creation, making it his own "aetiological 
narrative" (Hamilton, 1977:iv) accounting for the origins of the world. Creation’s 
stability is rooted in divine activity, and human dignity in God's gracious 
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goodness. Moreover this narrative background is the source of a new 
Christological dynamic: for Athanasius, the incarnation fulfils and re-sets the 
stability of creation upon the Creator's explicit will. The relationship between 
Father and Son, and the identity - or nature - of the Son thus move centre stage 
in the argument.  
 
Athanasius's outline of his understanding of creation and the fall and redemption 
thus forms the necessary background for his exposition of the person and work 
of Christ. In CG, Athanasius weaves a thesis that knowledge of God need not be 
taught: humans need no alien or obscure hermeneutic to understand the 
fundamental indebtedness of humanity to the divine. Creatureliness is the basis 
of a natural orientation of humanity to God. In contrast to Gnostic ontology or 
Platonic notions of intellectual correspondence with the divine, Athanasius 
consistently maintains that creation exhibits the marks of a rational and good 
creator (Demiurge); revealing him even in its systematic incompleteness and 
interdependence.289   
 
Athanasius further explores human nature and creation in terms of an adapted 
Genesis paradise narrative, straddling the approach of Irenaeus with the 
concerns of Origen and the Alexandrian tradition. This makes for a distinctive 
psycho-spiritual and individual perspective. Nowhere does Athanasius lengthily 
expound Genesis 1 and 2 in CG-DI, but he alludes to the stories with some 
psychological sophistication as a sort of constant background archetype. His 
                                                 
289  So CG 1, where the arguments follow both from the competitiveness of parts of creation 
(prohibiting pantheism), and the management of each component as revealing the work and 
purpose of the Logos, so CG 29, 39. Note the classic Irenaean themes presented here in a 
different pattern.  
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“figurative” (tropikîj) paradise290 is taken to be an experiential one.291 The human 
soul is created with the capacity, need and freedom to contemplate God, without 
whom it deteriorates. But the soul is vulnerable to distraction by things closer to 
its own created nature than God. Athanasius develops an anthropological-
theological significance of creatio ex nihilo which will require Chrisological 
resolution. The body and its senses become the channel for the abdication of 
humanity’s true calling and nature. Unlike Irenaeus's treatment of this common 
early Christian anti-idolatry motif (where God remains present to creation in its 
physicality), Athanasius pitches corporeality against the contemplation of God. 
The root of human alienation, of sin and idolatry is humanity’s turning “away from 
intelligible reality, and beginning to consider themselves”292 - this self-
contemplation being focused in the physical body. There are clear parallels here 
with Origen, but for Athanasius, self-reference causes a cascade downwards for 
the soul, as the noàj has abandoned its proper shepherding role in the human 
being. Self-interest exposes the soul’s preference for its own good over divine 
truth, and accounts for its subsequent decline and diminution. Humanity's dignity, 
substance, time and energy are wasted because the soul thus becomes 
imprisoned by addictions and pleasures close to hand, leading to defilement and 
the forgetting of God.293 Athanasius's allusions to the creation story throughout, 
using the Genesis narrative as a point of theological reference allow him to hold 
together the goodness of God and his creation, whilst accounting also for the 
dislocation of creation through sin. Athanasius's understanding of Adam and 
                                                 
290  Ð ¤gioj MwãsÁj tropikîj par£deison çnÒmasen CG 2.  
291 For a sophisticated rendering of the psychological dimension of human freedom in Origen's 
thought cf. Lekkas, 2001. 
292  CG 3: Óqen tîn mn nohtîn ¢pest»san ˜autîn tÕn noàn, ˜autoÝj d katanoie‹n ½rxanto.  
293  CG 3. 
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Eve’s shame is that this is an inevitable consequence of their contemplation of 
themselves, relishing their own bodies rather than God.  
 
There is a sense of immediacy and tragedy as Athanasius paints this picture, 
rather than it being merely a stylised motif. Athanasius’s rhetorical skills are 
apparent here as he tells the story of the fall with pathos, grief and freshness. 
Human beings have lost their true nature in their free abandonment of the 
communion with God for which they were created and whose image they bear. 
The fall of humanity, thus understood is a synthetic cluster of notions in 
Athanasius's thought. There is the motif of human fragmentation through having 
a nature and a body now with conflicting desires. This leads to a brittle 
possessive psychology rooted in fear of further diminishment. Associated with 
this, as the background cause is an ultimate fear of death as the return to non-
being, from which humanity came.294 Yet, for all this fear, the soul pursues paths 
of self-gratification in panic, leading to sin in all its forms, from petty injustice to 
murder.  
 
The fall is thus painted as a tumbling of the soul into unreality. Evil is unreality 
invented by the conceits of the fallen human will; it is aimless energy, disordered 
passion.295 Athanasius describes the deathly power of sin296 arguing that in the 
fall, the proper governing principle, the soul under the governance of the mind, 
noàj, is hijacked by members of the body into sin. The natural order of movement 
                                                 
294  Creatio ex nihilo has an important role in the anthropology of Athanasius and is a serious part 
of his theology of creation, differentiating ultimately the Son as an uncreated being, sharing the 
nature of the Father from all other contingent beings. This is powerful, and considered, anti-Arian 
polemic, and is distanced from its place in the Gnostic controversies which May (1994) urges is 
its original source. 
295  CG 4. 
296  CG 5. 
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to communion with God as creation's destiny and purpose is thus reversed. 
Godliness is thus conceived as being directed aright by the noàj to contemplate 
God. Athanasius redeploys Plato’s vivid charioteer image297 to convey a sense of 
waste and danger: 
 
it is as if a charioteer, mounting in the stadium, were to disregard 
the goal to which he was supposed to drive, and turning away from 
it, were simply to drive his horses as hard as he could.298 
 
Paradoxically, evil – though non-being – is nevertheless described as the power 
of driven aimlessness, rooted in human consent to chaos. Part of human being’s 
reality, it may only be tackled from the inside - in the incarnation.299 Athanasius 
sets up an answer to the implied question of why the incarnation was necessary. 
This rhetorical construct demonstrates admirably Athanasius’s apologetic ability, 
but that is not our prime concern here. The significance to this dissertation is that 
Athanasius’s manoeuvre leads him to deny that evil may be conceived of as an 
entity or reality in itself, ™n Øpost£sei kaˆ kaq' ˜aut¾n enai.300 Such a doctrine 
would undermine his insistence on creatio ex nihilo, because either God would 
have had to have created and willed evil301 - which Athanasius will not 
countenance - or evil would have come into existence without his willing it. Then 
God would not be completely the creator of all things. But creation and Creator 
                                                 
297 Plato, e.g., Phaedrus 246f, et al. in Hamilton and Cairns, 1991:493f. 
298  CG 5. 
299  Making virtue a possibility, not only in knowing God, but in such demonstrations of the power 
of Christ in his teaching “persuading his disciples to put aside brutality”, replacing fear, suspicion 
and aggression with trust in the “truth planted in their minds” thus making Christians dwell in 
peace with virginity and celibacy a possible virtue and demonstration of the truth. DI 51.  
300  CG 6. 
301  After the example of, e.g., Isaiah 45.7. 
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remain good; the cosmos is not the work of an evil Demiurge, rather it is ruled 
consistently by God’s providence. If the material world were otherwise, he asks, 
what would be the evidence for God at all?302 The Creator is authentically known 
by his works, and evil is not among those things. Evil is an act of the deluded and 
fallen human will, which insists 
 
like someone who closes his eyes when the sun is shining, and all 
the earth is illuminated by its light, who yet imagines darkness, 
which does not exist, and then wonders about missing his way as if 
he were in the dark.303 
 
This description and account of evil locates it as connected intimately to the 
given freedom which creation enjoys. Athanasius does not explore the issue of 
the necessary possibility of evil in a free creation explicitly, but turns to attack 
idols and idolatry. The gods of the pagan world are evil because they are, 
similarly, nothing. They do not exist in reality. Here Athanasius applies well-
established Jewish-Christian rhetoric against idolatry, dismissing also pagan 
emperors whom others have promoted to divinity, asking who may make gods.304 
As familiar as this motif is, it here has a dynamism established by this locating of 
the argument in the theological significance of God being creator of all things out 
of nothing.  
 
                                                 
302  CG 7. 
303  CG 7. 
304 The ridicule poured upon the idea of "making" a god might possibly be a thinly veiled attack 
upon Christologies where the Son is "made" in the beginning of God's works, though this is an 
argumentum e silencio. Rather the more obvious stupidity of idolatry is heightened as it is 
obviously just a creature who has "made" a divinity. 
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The process of pagan apotheosis is exposed by Athanasius as a mockery to true 
theology, because those who are called gods, and those who proclaim them as 
such, will alike die.305 The gods of pagan mythology are, if the poetry and 
mythology is in any sense true, clearly worse than the basest of human beings: 
 
Others have extended their impiety to the point of deifying and 
worshipping the excuse for their inventions and wickedness - 
pleasure and desire. Such are Eros and Aphrodite of Paphos.306 
 
Pagan divinities’ actions, reflected in popular cultic legends and the poets, prove, 
Athanasius argues, the a-logic of paganism as simply dressing human desire in 
divine clothing, projecting it as divine. He disdainfully rejects the notion that either 
the material handiwork of a creature or the intellectual work of poetry or myth can 
be divine. Both derive from a creature, made out of nothing: and ex nihilo, nihil 
fac.307 There would be more sense, Athanasius argues ad hominem, in deifying 
the inventors of the arts. It is in this dismissive sense that Athanasius introduces 
the deification motif that will reappear and reach its crescendo at DI 54.3. This 
context is an important factor in understanding Athanasius’s description of 
salvation as qeopo…hsij. Attacking the assumption that works or skills deify 
(qeopoioàsi),308 Athanasius explores what true deification might be, so that he 
can re-introduce this theme later in the work. The skill of the human being is 
                                                 
305 This is an Irenaean concern and argument that mortality is the consequence of the fall from 
communion with God, and an abandonment of the sure stability of his will. 
306  CG 9. 
307 The dynamic in Athanasius's argument in CG-DI is clearly applicable to an anti-Arian 
argument: an attack upon a Christology where the Son is said to be "out of nothing". The puzzle 
remains why Athanasius is not explicit in his connection: perhaps by providing a dogmatic 
context, he trusts that Arius’s error will be self-evident. 
308  CG 18. 
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constitutive both of its very creatureliness, and a sign of the divine will that made 
it. Human beings retain the image of the divine and, as creatures, themselves 
signify the Creator's nature and purpose. The human being thus has a pivotal 
place in creation, and through the incarnation will become the locus for 
divinization and the reconciliation of creation to Creator. As the apex of 
creatureliness, humans are depicted as having the potential for participation on 
God’s terms with the divine nature. Athanasius may be seen here to be claiming 
for all human beings the place allotted to the Son in early Arian soteriology.309 
Sin, as a breach of participation, prevents any mediation between creation and 
Creator, but Athanasius does not construe this ontologically for human beings in 
CG-DI. Human beings are not the meeting place of divine and human natures as 
if they had a divine soul, even if they were made in the image of God uniquely 
among creatures. Humanity retains the possibility of participation only if the 
breach is bridged. Though this has been read as if it reflected a hopeful view of 
human nature even after the fall,310 the fact that humanity has a created being 
means that it cannot, of itself, breach the gulf. The scandal of idolatry, thus 
underestimates human destiny, the nub of its error is: 
 
It is wrong to exalt (protim´n) the signs over the signified (t¦ 
shma…nonta toà shmainomšnou).311 
 
To conceive of divine nature in terms of materiality is as abhorrent to Athanasius 
as it is naïve. Organs and a body indicate a nature involved in decay and 
                                                 
309 E.g , contra the reconstruction of by Gregg and Groh, 1981. 
310 Petterson, 1995, 1998. 
311 CG 21. 
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change. In a passage which is as powerful in anti-anthropomorphic invective as it 
is anti-pagan, Athanasius asserts  
 
God is incorporeal (¢sèmatoj), and incorruptible (¥fqartoj), and 
immortal (¢q£natoj), lacking nothing whatsoever.312   
 
Paganism’s diversity is construed as a lack of coherence or harmony of thought: 
powerful evidence against its veracity for Athanasius. It is the product of aimless 
human minds expressing party or national loyalty or plain self-interest, turning 
divine nature into a pretext for war and division, because what pagans call God is 
merely self-projection.313 Athanasius berates the phenomenon of localized 
divinities in the Antique world as examples of anthropological and sociological 
disharmony, asserting that they have nothing directly to do with the question of 
the divine nature.314  
 
Pondering the power of evil, in an argument reminiscent of Gnostic diminutions of 
creation as itself the product of a creature,315 Athanasius maintains that the 
worship of human creatures’ creation causes not only gross immorality,316 but all 
civic ills. Demons are a powerful motif in Athanasius’s Life of Anthony (hereafter 
de Vit. Ant.), but although he refers to them here, in his argument they appear to 
be destructive powerful fantasies which thrive in the falsehood of darkness. 
Young argues that  
                                                 
312  CG 22. 
313  CG 23. 
314  CG 24. 
315  As the abortive creation of Sophia for example in select NH texts. 
316 He rehearses the familiar OT anti-idolatry motifs, especially human sacrifice and male temple 
prostitution as most grotesque among them. 
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 This definition of evil must be interpreted in the light of the 
philosophical tradition of the Platonists, for whom non-Being has 
some  sort of ontological status. There were degrees of being 
depending on a thing’s participation in True Being; Good was 
identified with True Being, so inevitably evil belonged to the 
opposite end of the ontological scale (Young, 1979:198).   
 
Despite a rigorous refutation by Petterson (1990:94-95), Young correctly 
identifies Athanasius’s estimate of evil, particularly in de Vit. Ant, even though the 
polemic and rhetoric of CG-DI, seems more powerful if understood as a non-
thing, merely “a corruption and deterioration of what is created”(Petterson, 
1990:95). In CG, creation is not enslaved by demons, though humanity's 
dislocation from God is accounted for after the Genesis narrative, because of it 
being enslaved to a falsehood of its own making. This is why it is false and evil - 
it cannot have any ontological stability, as the creation of a creature. This 
argument will find expression in Athanasius's anti-Arian literature, where he again 
connects Christology with cosmological stability.  
 
This is not to say that Athanasius neglects to account for evil or demons in his 
view of the world. Indeed, the teachings of Christ “shine more clearly than the 
sun... the power of the cross having filled the whole world.”317  
                                                 
317 This passage may be used to argue for a later date for the tractate - perhaps in the reign of 
Julian, recalling as it does the vision of the late Emperor. This seems rather strained, though, as 
Athanasius certainly did not share the adoration Eusebius displays for Constantine! There is also 
perhaps here a subliminal defence of the scandal of the public crucifixion of the Logos, explicitly 
addressed as an element of divine pedagogy in DI 24; 43-44, as the open display of God’s 
goodness and power. 
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 This discussion of CG celebrates the philosophical achievement of Athanasius, 
but that needs balancing with a fiery, almost superstitious discussion of evil in his 
writing. Athanasius's consideration of the power of the cross in CG is far more 
than shorthand for the universal presence of Christian faith in the world, or even 
a reference to Constantine’s revelation commanding him to conquer in that sign. 
“The power of the Cross” has almost the place of a powerful amulet against evil, 
as it is for the Logos a trophy of his victory over death itself.318 The sign of 
Christ’s death for Athanasius has a power to drive away all the powers of 
demons, proving them dead and impotent. “At the sign of the cross, all magic 
ceases, witchcraft is proven void, and irrational desires cease.”319  
 
"The cross" is thus Athanasius's shorthand for the crucifixion and its significance. 
It was at once a public episode apparently caused by the abuse of human 
freedom, but at the same time within the divine purposes, the means whereby 
the Logos visibly stretched out both arms to embrace both Jew and gentile.320  
By the sign of God's redemptive love in the cross, Greek gods are repulsed and 
exposed.321 Thus whilst Athanasius's emphasis appears less sophisticated here, 
it is rooted in, and relevant to, the soteriological and devotional popular Christian 
experience, perhaps especially poignant in the spirituality of desert monks. It is 
unlikely Athanasius is being deliberately ambiguous or pragmatic – he seems to 
hold both views, despite their surface incompatibility.  
 
                                                 
318  DI 24. 
319  DI 24; cp. DI 55. 
320  DI 25ff. 
321  DI 54. One might expect “by the power of the Spirit...”, but the Spirit is conspicuous by his 
absence in CG-DI. 
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Creation, then, is a constant key witness both against its own divinity and for that 
of its maker through its hierarchy and order. In contrast to the confusion of 
idolatry and evil, Athanasius argues that creation bears the marks of God, as it is 
an inter-connected and inter-dependent whole, pointing, by this organic mutuality 
and integrity to a single creator. It is significant that here Athanasius does not 
contrast God as “creator” with a superior notion of divinity where God is “Father”, 
as can be perceived in the polemical anti-Arian literature and which Torrance 
(1997) characterises as central to Athanasius’s theology. That distinction does 
not work in CG-DI: indeed the argument works in this double tractate because 
there is no distinction between the concepts. So cosmology is pivotal in the 
Christological descriptions here. Clearly, however, God is not to be conceived in 
pantheistic terms: he remains incorporeal, invisible and untouchable,322 there is a 
fundamental ontological distinction between God’s nature and all else: but there 
is no discernable division between God as Father and God as Creator. Rather 
than marking a pre-Arian Sitz im Leben, CG-DI thus marks a different rhetoric 
from the later Athanasius. Conflict and change in the world, with its individually 
incompatible entities of, for example, summer, autumn, winter, and spring prove 
that each or all cannot be God. Holistically construed, however, they can be 
understood as obedient elements in a providential, changing whole. Athanasius 
thus shifts to a more sophisticated estimate of creation. If it bears God’s imprint 
in its organic order, the differentiation and ambiguity of creation is also a strong 
argument against its own divinity. The worship or deification of the created realm 
derives from a distorted knowledge of God and is a deviation from the truth: 
 
                                                 
322  CG 29: e„ gar Ð QeÕj ¢sèmatÒj ™sti, kaˆ ¢Òratoj kaˆ ¥yaustoj tÍ fÚsei. 
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their worship and deification (qeopoi…a) is not the beginning of 
piety (eÙsebe…aj), but of godlessness and impiety...323  
 
True knowledge of God corresponds with human nature so that through the 
Logos of the Father, there is natural access to God and proper worship, leading 
to the subsequent deification of human creatures because only when they are in 
Christ are they rooted in the stability of communion with the divine.324 Human 
nature thus appears to retain a direct access to God, not outside itself but, citing 
Deuteronomy 30:14, from within: “The word of faith is within your heart.”325  
 
It is not necessary to speculate about a late Stoic lÒgoj spšrmatikoj as 
undergirding Athanasius’s thought here. Athanasius’s point is that it is a natural 
dimension of the human creature to rise to contemplate God, even if the fall 
makes that more or less only a theoretical possibility. Athanasius, writing in the 
light of the incarnation, has that “more excellent way” in mind, but there is 
apologetic mileage in his reasoning here. Athanasius’s main point is to 
underscore polemically that the rejection of God for the pleasures of life is the 
cause of great loss, even though within each remains the image of the Logos. 
“Each man’s soul (yuc»n) and the mind within it (kaˆ tÒn ™n aÙtÍ noàn)”326 is a 
path to authentic knowledge of God. Even in the context of trying to make it clear 
that the root of sin lays in human choice, and continuing in sin the result of 
human weakness and stubbornness, Athanasius clearly maintains that the soul 
has access to God. When confronted by the Logos in the words and works of 
                                                 
323  CG 29. 
324  CG 30. 
325  CG 30. 
326  Ibid. 
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Jesus, the soul and mind are unambiguously refreshed and restored. This is not 
automatic, as Bouyer and others have argued,327 but still requires a human 
response (Petterson, 1990:35-73).328 Yet for Athanasius this is primarily a 
powerful work of the Logos: itself a theophany.  
 
Though a creature, the human soul differs in nature from the oÙs…a of other 
creatures. It is rational, and it governs the other senses of the human body, as 
the governing mind or will of an artist plays harmonies on an instrument. The 
body is an Ôrganon of this reasoning faculty, construed as that inner power 
which is not limited to the body and which has been created with a capacity to 
remain in communion with God eternally. Athanasius demonstrates the soul’s 
ontological superiority over the body, in that even when earthbound, the human 
being can contemplate (qewre‹) the heavens. The soul belongs above bodily 
distractions,329 and even despite sin, it has the possibility of turning and rising to 
the divine, a consequence of the soul being made in the imago Dei.330 When 
pure and without distraction, the soul can  
                                                 
327  Through participation in the Church, we participate in Christ argued Bouyer, 1943: “Saint 
Athanase n’a pas à opter entre incarnation “collective” et incarnation “individuelle”, entre un 
Verbe fait humanité et le Verbe fait homme, parce que Jésus est l’humanité, précisons: cette 
humanité nouvelle dont il est le Second Adam, c’est a dire, l’église, n’étant pas deux mais un, 
Athanase les envisage toujours, sans confusion, certes, mais seperation non plus.” Cf. Petterson, 
1990: “Christ has not taken a collective human nature, but an individual one though this does not 
exclude the fact that incarnation has a collective aspect.”  Young (1979:214)  plants Athanasius 
firmly in the earth of middle-Platonism: “Humanity ascended to heaven in Christ, who was no 
mere substitute for men, but the perfect “Platonic” Form of mankind in which men could 
participate and be incorporated through his Spirit. God accepts him, not in place of us, but 
because he sees us in him, and accepts us through him. By being sÚsswmoi with him, we are 
transformed e„j ¥ndra tšleion. The presence of the Logos in tÕ ¢nqrèpinon purified it, sanctified it 
and made it fit to be offered to the Father as a new and perfect creature.”   
328  Petterson (1990) argues than Christ is not properly understood as being to Athanasius a 
conception “of human nature, after the manner of Platonic realism, as a concrete idea or 
universal in which all individual men participate. From this point of view, when the Word assumed 
it and suffused it with his divinity, the divinising force would be communicate to all mankind, and 
the incarnation would in effect be the redemption.” Cf. Kelly, 1968:378.  
329  CG 33. 
330  Gen1.26 as expounded in CG 34. 
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 contemplate (qewre‹) as in a mirror (æj ™n katÒptrù), the Word, 
the image of the Father (t¾n e„kÒna toà PatrÕj tÕn LÒgon).331 
 
Athanasius acknowledges the difficulty of this for the soul through the external 
disturbances caused by a nature not directed aright. The abuse of freedom may 
stand at the beginning of this process, but if it were to be steered aright, if the 
noàj could be restored to its proper place of government, then the soul would 
again contemplate God and recover its true nature. Athanasius thus prepares his 
reader for the incarnation of the Logos, and the subsequent restoration of the 
noàj – or perhaps even the replacement of the noàj by the Logos himself (as 
Apollinarius will notoriously construe the Economy) – which refreshes each 
person’s power so that they may be restored. Here is a development of Origen's 
ontological soteriology within the familiar Alexandrian Christological framework 
with both soteriological and epistemological concerns. Athanasius’s contribution 
here will find more explicit reflection in the Cyrilline – Nestorian conflicts a 
century later. Central to Athanasius's thesis is the soul's saving participation 
again in God as a consequence of the incarnation of the Logos being extended 
to Christians' participation in the divine nature.332  
 
Most significantly, the theme of the meaning of order in creation should not seen 
as Athanasius drawing back from any Christocentric themes, but rather a 
                                                 
331  CG 34 Athanasius uses the image of a clean mirror several times in CG, here, and in 
chapters 8 and 2. Thomson (1971) emphasises the cleanliness of the soul, which whilst being 
part of the image is less significant than Athanasius’s point that the soul can capture the image of 
the Logos. 
332 Contrast Gregg and Groh (1981) on soteriology as Arius’s concern against Athanasius; see 
Keating (2000) for a full discussion of the means of this reconnection in the Alexandrian tradition. 
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Christological application of creatio ex nihilo, which he will explicate more fully 
later in CG-DI. The dynamic of his argument works because he constantly 
interweaves Christology and creation together whilst recognizing their distinctive 
features as a way to depict the paradox of the Incarnation, in a manner which 
might be described as contrapuntal.333  
 
Returning to the witness of creation to the Creator, from CG 29 onwards 
Athanasius argues that the separate elements of creation point to an external 
single will, acting upon them from a powerful transcendent position.334 This will is 
the Divine Purpose, the Logos, who majestically orders opposing forces 
creatively. Creation thus naturally communicates the being of its Creator. It is this 
self-transcending dimension of creation’s nature that makes it more appropriate 
to speak of creation’s pedagogical rather than mediatorial role, revealing to 
humanity the One mediator, who has made and governs all things. The cosmos 
is also the pattern of the body’s proper relationship to the soul. Disorder and 
chaos are indicative of anarchy, but the singular will of the Creator is reflected in 
his works.335 After the paradigm of a harmonious Creation, the human being, 
body and soul 
 
is essentially good. The body is not denigrated, even by implication 
in Contra Gentes where Louth describes Athanasius as ‘the young 
Origenist’.336 
                                                 
333  CG 41, and throughout DI. 
334  CG 29ff. 
335  CG 39. 
336  Petterson, 1990: 9, quoting Louth, 1981:77: “The soul has fallen from the level of the nous to 
the level of the psyche - in straight Origenist fashion - and, as psyche, it is involved in the body. 
The soul can achieve union with God again by means of contemplation. Indeed, in his account of 
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 For Athanasius, the nature of God and the nature of creation are intimately 
connected. Irenaeus maintained a similar picture of God’s presence to his 
creatures through creation, and, ironically, Origen’s concern to depict an 
authentically Christian view of creation motivated him to ontological speculation 
about the nature of the human soul and the degrees of creaturely nature. But in 
Athanasius we begin to see what will become a characteristic mark of post-
Nicene theology, where the unity of God is expressed not in Eusebian 
terminology, but as a depiction of the unity of Father and Son. Yet it is the place 
of creation that drives Athanasius’s Christological dynamic here. In contrast to 
Paganism, he describes the Christian faith as eÙseb¾j qrhske…a,337 the all-holy 
God’s good intent and nature is expressed and exercised by his Logos, the 
“supreme steersman” of creation.338 
 
Athanasius’s use of themes gleaned from the Genesis narratives (creation - fall – 
sustaining providence) as the foundation for his cosmology and anthropology 
clears the ground for the argument to move to his assertion that salvation is 
dependent upon the incarnation of the Logos. Using the currency of Platonic 
language and imagery, to explicate the significance he perceives in these Biblical 
themes, Athanasius engages seriously and critically with contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                 
this, Athanasius is more Origenist than Origen, for the emphasis Origen puts on the soul’s 
reliance on God’s mercy in its return to God is lacking.” If our dating of CG-DI is correct, this 
would make the picture of Athanasius as an Origenist in his youth alone something of an 
oversimplification.    
337  eÙseb¾j p…stij in relation to Arianism. 
338  CG 40. 
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conventional discourse.  Hanson maintains that Athanasius remains faithful to 
the Alexandrian Biblical tradition in this presentation:339 
 
H. J. Sieben observes that for Athanasius the burden or central 
message (skopos) of Scripture is indeed a mystery, but it is not (as 
it is to Origen) a mystery hidden under a veil, requiring de-coding 
by allegory... Athanasius approaches the central theological 
problem of his day from a soteriological, not from a cosmological, 
viewpoint. He removed altogether the problem raised and 
apparently solved by borrowing from Middle Platonism, viz. how 
God or the Supreme Reality can come into contact with the world, 
with transitory, human affairs, at all. He refused to use the pre-
existent Christ as a convenient philosophical device... All created 
things, he stoutly maintains, can bear the direct hand of God; a 
mediator in this sense was unnecessary (Hanson, 1988:422-
423).340    
 
It is true that Athanasius does not connect the Logos with an immanent, seminal 
seed, or anything pertaining the created world – he nowhere calls him Noàj. The 
Logos is, however, 
 
the sole and individual (‡dioj d kaˆ mÒnoj) Word of God the good 
Father.341 
 
                                                 
339 This, too, may be a strong argument for an early provenance of the double tractate. 
340  Quoting Sieben, 1971:195,214. 
341  CG 40. 
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The cosmology of CG is the means whereby Athanasius presents Christology 
“from above”; the Logos sets the earth resting on nothing, yet sustains all by his 
immense will and power. Though Hanson (1988:448) caricatures Athanasius’s 
view of Christ’s assumed body as a “space-suit” Christology, it is more 
appropriate to describe Athanasius’s Christology as cosmological soteriology. 
For Athanasius, history is the paced providence of God in time, seen in the 
narratives of the creation and fall of humanity. This drama consists of creaturely 
interaction with God, whose faithfulness in nurturing fallen humanity at an 
appropriate time (sending law and prophets), overflows when ultimately he 
becomes incarnate. This divine self-expression and interaction with humanity is 
obviously Christocentric rather than text-centred: the divine Word is not 
“composed of syllables (sugke…menoj ™k sullabîn)”,342 but is the express image 
of the Father.343 This divine Word of the Father is for Athanasius the foundation 
for a proper understanding of human nature. The Logos is the sole connection 
between God and creation. There is no remnant of a continuum between divine 
and human natures in the Ôntoj of the human soul in Athanasius’s conceptuality. 
This is clearly evident in his description of the human noàj, both in his 
anthropological and Christological discussion.344 The Logos, the image of the 
Father, the template for humanity, is uncompounded, only-begotten and eternal. 
Humanity, through its fall, has withdrawn from divine stability and descended into 
the instability inherent in its creatureliness. Without being held by a psyche which 
contemplates the Logos, humanity returns to the nothing from which it was made. 
                                                 
342  CG 41. 
343  toà ˜autoà PatrÒj ™stin e„kën  ¢parallaktoj, cf. Col.1.15. 
344 This finds extreme expression in Apollinarius, whose theological explorations is a touchstone 
of miahypostatic heterodoxy in Christological and Trinitarian arguments until and beyond 451. 
However it is evident that Athanasius in CG-DI and Apollinarius share a perceived negative 
estimation of human noàj. 
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Yet the Logos continues to exercise universal authority throughout all creation. 
All principles of creativity and order derive from him as the Wisdom of God 
holding the universe as a musician meaningfully plays a lyre. There is a hint that 
the Logos will yet resolve and redeem the fallen human condition in CG. This is 
possible only because the Logos shares the Father’s own nature; he is no work 
or creature, but a partaker of divine oÙs…a. He remains unmoved with the 
Father, but by his will and intrinsic being moves everything as seems good to the 
Father, the Logos is the unmoved Mover.345 The locus of the Logos’s being and 
his nature is eternity, even when if located in the temporal realm: 
  
by the same command He links and orders everything together 
according to its individual nature,... all at once.346  
 
The Logos shares all attributes of divine being. The modus operandi of his 
governance is from eternity. Athanasius describes this not as a continual 
occupation of the space-time continuum - a LÒgoj spšrmatikoj - but from the 
point of the eternal nature and being of God the Father. This has an effect upon 
Athanasius’s Christology, to the extent that it may appear docetic (or “space-
suit”) at first glance. Certainly, Apollinarius is commonly understood to interpret 
Athanasius’s understanding of the assumed humanity thus in his insistence upon 
the Logos’s real identity or personality with the Father (albeit in divine flesh), so 
that he does not engage in each twist and tussle of history as a temporal 
                                                 
345  CG 42: aÙtÕj mn ¢k…nhtoj mšnwn par¦ tù Patr…, p£nta d kinîn tÍ ˜autoà sust£sei, æj ¨n 
›kaston tù ˜autoà Patrˆ dokÍ. 
346  CG 42. 
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participant, but remains transcendent, impassible, ordering by the power of his 
very nature and will all that is.347  
 
But this is an only part of what is happening in the text: Athanasius draws 
together the first part of CG-DI by weaving his argument back and forth from the 
order of creation pointing to the activity and purpose of God, to the reality of the 
Logos at the centre of the Father’s being and upon whom creation depends, a 
truly divine Logos. The writer therefore connects the Logos’s ontology with 
cosmology, not in terms of a (middle- or neo-) Platonic hierarchy of being – 
requiring mediation and governance – but pivoted upon the Fatherhood of God, 
and the relationship of Father to Son. This is powerful ammunition against Arius 
and his followers. His argument, however, will draw Arian fire because it is 
innovative and distorting of the monotheism of the Scriptural tradition and some 
expressions of the Christian tradition hitherto. Athanasius will have to defend 
(and adapt) his description of the model of relationship between Father and 
Logos in the CA (see chapter 3, below). But he urges that the Logos reveals the 
Mind of God faithfully and completely: he is his Wisdom, being the full self-
disclosure of the Father. This emphasis upon the primacy of relationship between 
Father and Logos may reflect the influence of his direct predecessor, Alexander: 
 
The Son is begotten of God’s nature and is without beginning 
(¥narcoj) like the Father, and without any interval between him and 
the Father. Creatures, on the other hand, are freely brought into 
being from non-being, by the will of God and have an absolute 
                                                 
347 Paradoxically for Apollinarius, the motif of blending must thus remain external, concrete or 
“docetic”, a pragmatic accommodation for the economy – so the criticism that Apollinarius 
ontologically diminishes the divine and human natures does not seem to fit. 
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beginning... The crucial point here is the distinction between the 
generation of the Son by the nature (fÚsei) of God, and the creation 
of the world by the will (boul»sei / qel»sei) of God (Torrance, 
1997:84)348 
 
We have observed that Torrance points out that in CA a recurrent theme is that 
God is primarily described and understood as Father rather than as Creator. 
Through the most part of CG-DI, Athanasius describes God as Creator, with a 
consistent Christological and ontological priority that manages also to focus 
always on the eternal relationship of Father and Logos. So Torrance’s polarised 
description of Athanasius’s theology where “for God, to create is secondary, and 
to beget is primary”349 is too rough-hewn to describe the early Athanasius of CG-
DI, where the emphasis depicts a much closer relationship between creation and 
ontology than Torrance allows. 
 
The Logos and the Father create together, so Athansius’s use of Gen.1.26, 
where God says “let us make” (poi»swmen), here is no mere regal plural, but 
God communicating his will (qel»sei) to his own Sophia, the Logos. Here 
Athanasius, in another powerful anti-Arian argument, outlaws any Christology 
which alienates the Logos from the Father’s identity, or limits any identity to 
participation, or unity of mission or purpose (oÙ kat¦ metoc»n), where common 
task oriention of God and the Logos unites them. A solid ontological foundation in 
Athanasius’s depiction of the relation of Father and Logos undergirds the text, 
and is far more substantial than external similarity or even a shared property 
                                                 
348  Citing the Epistle of Alexander from Theodoret’s Ecclesiastical History 1.3, and Athanasius, 
CA, 3.59-62. 
349  CA 2.2: Torrance, 1997:87. 
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which might still allow the Logos to be a creature of the Father. Athanasius 
defines the Logos as absolute Wisdom in himself – i.e., in God’s self – the Word 
himself is God’s own self: 
 
aÙtosof…a, aÙtÒlogoj, aÙtodÚnamij, „d…a toà PatrÒj ™stin: 
aÙtofîj, aÙtoal»qeia, aÙtodikaiosÚnhn, aÙtokrat», kaˆ m¾n kaˆ 
carakt¾r kaˆ ¢paÚgasma kaˆ e„kîn.350 
 
Athanasius unequivocally unites the Logos’s identity with the nature, will and 
being of the Father: the Logos’s work is indistinguishable from that of the Father 
– he is the Father’s own will. This is the climax of the first part of the double 
tractate, CG seems curtailed in its ending at this point, but DI picks up the 
themes immediately in a similarly bold apologetic, expressing Christian faith in a 
sophisticated dialectical framework,351 which though not biblical in a cultic or 
linguistic sense, is one which Hanson nevertheless describes as being 
 
entirely consonant with Scripture. Athanasius is often wholly astray 
on the details of the Bible; but he has a remarkably firm grip, indeed 
in view of his career one might say the grip of a bull-dog, on its 
main message.352 
 
                                                 
350  “But absolute Wisdom [or Wisdom in himself], absolute word, himself the Father’s own power, 
absolute light, absolute truth, absolute justice, absolute virtue, express image, expression and 
ikon” of the Father. CG 46. 
351  DI 2-32. 
352  Hanson, 1988:424. 
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After a curtailed refutation of Jewish353 and “Hellenic”354 objections to the 
incarnation, Athanasius rejoices at Christianity’s triumph throughout the whole 
world, with the concomitant true deification of humanity in Christ.355 DI is 
therefore comparable to a triumphant, almost symphonic resolution of discordant 
themes portrayed evocatively in CG. Both dimensions are deeply related to each 
other, needing each other not merely for balance but for the achievement of an 
artistic resolution and nuanced contrapuntal Christology pitching divine ontology 
and creation together in a close but creative style. 
 
With such a divine emphasis concerning the Logos’s identity, the question of 
mediation does not need addressing for Athanasius vis-à-vis the Father. 
Athanasius placed any mediating action of the Son not within the Godhead, but 
in his becoming incarnate. What is the human nature and identity of this God-
made-man? It is proper here to ponder how Athanasius in this early tractate 
proposes to resolve the divine identity of the Logos with the assumed human 
nature of the incarnate Christ, not least because succeeding Christological 
debate will claim to be a faithful exposition of Athanasian orthodoxy.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
353  DI 33-40. 
354  DI 41-50. 
355  DI 51-end. 
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2.4: The Incarnate Logos and Mediation: Di¦ t… sÚ QeÕj ín ¥nqrwpoj 
gšgonaj? 
The Logos theology of CG presents Athanasius with a prima facie difficulty in 
articulating the significance of the incarnate nature(s) of the Logos. DI 1-18 
establishes the logic of his understanding of the incarnation: God’s creativity and 
goodness continually prompt him to care for and renew his image in human 
beings. The climax of this love is the incarnation of the Logos, which redeems the 
whole of human existence through his living a real life in a creaturely manner. 
Athanasius describes this as the Logos himself teaching the human soul, 
stopping the power of sin by living a sinless life, and offering that life sacrificially. 
The Logos formed his own body as the instrument with which to make these 
purposes known, offering it as a ransom (¢nt…yucon) for all. Athanasius’s 
defence of the dignity of the Logos incarnate reveals that he really does not 
believe that the Logos is doing something of a lower status than befits the 
Father’s dignity: the Logos is in no way degraded in the process. Any apparent 
degradation (tÍ nomizomšnh ˜autoà eÙtele…v) is in fact all within his control and 
sovereignty. He retains his true nature, incorporeal, appearing through the mercy 
and goodness of the Father in order to teach and save.356 In a notorious but not 
altogether inappropriate simile, to which we have already alluded, Hanson 
describes Athanasius’s understanding as  
 
a ‘Space-suit Christology’. Just as the astronaut, in order to operate 
in a part of the universe where there is no air and where he has to 
experience weightlessness, puts on an elaborate space-suit which 
                                                 
356  Consistent with Contra Arianos 2, 14: The Logos was not trapped or limited by his assumed 
body, instead it was the freeing of all humanity. 
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enables him to act in this new, unfamiliar environment, so the 
Logos put on a body which enabled him to behave as a human 
being among human beings. But his relation to his body is no closer 
than that of an astronaut to his space suit.357 
 
The Logos belongs in the divine being of the Father, in eternity – but Hanson 
here overemphasises the picture, underestimating Athanasius’s closeness to 
Irenaeus in construing the immediate presence of God to creation in a manner 
far less dualistic than Origen’s contrast between spiritual and physical being. The 
cost of this interesting simile is that it misses the function of the doctrine of 
creation’s facilitation of Athanasius’s Christology. The Alexandrian patriarch 
makes it clear that the world is no unfamiliar environment for the Logos in CG-DI. 
Petterson (1990:3) rightly recognizes this, arguing that:  
 
the asomatic God was not alien from his somatic creation; indeed, 
because of the continuous dependency of the creation upon the 
Creator, God could, Athanasius maintained, be seen in and through 
a body. ... ‘the Logos of God, who is God, wills at all times and in all 
places and in all things to work the mystery of his incarnation.’ 358 
 
Yet the assumed physical body remains the arena in which the Logos truly dwelt 
in order to protect and guide the creation he himself made. It is appropriate that 
only the Creator could restore incorruption to the creature, hence his entry into 
                                                 
357  Hanson, 1988:448. 
358  Quoting Maximus the Confessor, in Peacocke, 1979:298.  
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our realm (e„j t¾n ¹metšran cèran) 359 of human flesh. But this is not achieved at 
the price of a false dualism: Athanasius explicitly insists (as in CG) that this does 
not imply that the Logos was previously distant. The incarnation is primarily a 
manifestation (™pif£neia) of the Logos’ constant presence to creation from the 
beginning,360 visibly because of the gravity of the danger facing humanity. 
Perfectly consistently with this positive evaluation of creation, Athanasius 
describes the Logos as then taking a body not alien (oÙk ¢llÒtrion) to our own,361 
forming that body in the Blessed Virgin, as a temple and Ôrganon through which 
he might be known. This has been understood as implying that Athanasius’s 
Christ knew no soul or noàj of its own. Grillmeier however rightly warns that care 
should be taken in fixing later Christological clarifications upon this term, where it 
becomes used as a “soteriological concept which presupposes a prior 
classification of christological anthropology for its full understanding”.362 When 
Athanasius reflects upon the significance of the death of Christ, he gives a 
candid insight into his estimate of Christ’s human being. The Word can not die, 
he is immortal: his taking a body which was mortal, to participate in his divinity, 
suffices death’s claims upon all humanity. The relation between the Word and the 
body is that of the noàj as conceived in CG to the psyche and body. The identity 
of Christ for Athanasius (unlike Origen) is properly the Logos. If there were 
another human identity or psyche in Christ then his schema tumbles – this gives 
us a significant clue to the dynamism of Apollinarius and Cyril’s Christological 
arguments and their claims upon Athanasius. The sacrifice required and offered 
in the ransom of Christ’s death is not an innocent human sacrifice - something 
                                                 
359  DI 7. 
360  Cf. Anatolios [1999] whose reading of CG-DI at this point clearly elucidates the connections 
between Athanasius and Irenaean thought. 
361  DI 8. 
362  Grillmeier, 1975:317ff. 
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Athanasius deplores and reviles in CG - but the powerful Logos “reforming all 
men’s estate by his own power... none other except God the Word incarnate”.363 
For Athanasius, the incarnation is thus a glorious theophany in the flesh of the 
didactic Lord who died to rescue the human condition. The fact that he formed 
his own flesh in Mary is not described in terms of a unique blending of God and 
man. Human nature is conveyed by Mary to the Logos in the incarnation, but, 
united with him, it does not remain a vulnerable humanity. There was no chance 
of Jesus dying in utero or in infancy. The prime notion of the sovereignty and 
immutability of the Logos presents Athanasius with obvious difficulties 
concerning the authentic humanity of the incarnate Christ. Everything is didactic, 
nothing left to chance: the three days in hell,364 and the stretching out of arms on 
the cross,365 are the Logos’s will. He is not enclosed in his body, but manifest 
through it,366 he did not suffer in birth, as he was the one who animated and 
sanctified the body. Though for Athanasius Christ’s body is real, not a fantasy, 
the incarnation is not an abstention from cosmic governance, but the Logos 
taking and animating a real body. Athanasius does not ponder here where the 
locus of the Logos’s identity is, but, consistent with CG-DI, he depicts the Logos 
as remaining in the bosom of the Father and continuing to control the 
universe.367 The Logos assumes the position of the noàj in Christ, controlling the 
body, just as humanity’s own noàj was originally intended and empowered to do
This divine initiative enables humanity to ascend again to the contemplation o
God. His particular, assumed humanity is the tool by which the Logos leads a
the divine. The actions of Christ (especially the casting out of demons and 
. 
f 
ll to 
                                                 
363  DI 10. 
364  DI 26. 
365  DI 25. 
366  DI 17. 
367  Cp. DI 17. 
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healing of the diseased) are epiphanic. All demonstrate that here is the Logos 
fashioning creation afresh. The incarnate nature of the Logos remains the 
enfleshed divinity. The Logos is neither dependent upon creation, nor an 
accidental participant in it. He depicts the Logos’s divinity as being completely 
control in the incarnate Christ, to the exclusion of considering the signifi
the humanity independent of the Logos. In contrast to Origen, there is clear 
correlation with Apollinarius and Cyril here, who will embellish this Athanasian
theme that by itself the obedient pattern of the humanity of Christ is a 
soteriologically insufficient Christology. For Athanasius, the whole – what Cyril 
will call the Union – is most significant. Apollinarius will develop this explicitly i
an insistence upon a blending in Christ, if there is to be a unity of personhood 
and any real humanity other than the fleshly body of the Logos. Such 
argumentation will provoke Antiochene perspectives to insistence upon both thi
heavenly reality and a historical man, expressed in the tradition from a much
despised “two Christs” caricature of Paul of Samosata to sophisticated paradox 
in Theodoret’s Eranistes. Though Cyril will connect such concerns with Arius in 
his rhetoric, this is not merely an Arian concern, but a major theological 
development, which offended much received Christological tradition, promptin
Eusebius (as the Conservative Churchman par excellence) to resist Athanasiu
depiction as innovative. If the Logos did not partake of creation, did Christ truly 
eat, or did he have food of which the disciples knew nothing? In terms of 
mediation there appears to be in CG-DI a one-way flow. “He took of none of the 
body’s attributes, but rather himself sanctified the body.”
in 
cance of 
 
nto 
s 
-
g 
s’s 
                                                
368 The Logos, as the 
true noàj of the body of Jesus, communicates himself to all in communion with 
 
368  DI 43. 
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him: “for we have the mind of Christ.” Humanity’s noàj proved insufficient, an
after the breach of disobedience, proves incapable of steering humanity to 
participate in divine communion. Instead, the Logos’s very self proved victoriou
and is available, through the victory of Christ, to humanity afresh. Humanity is 
given a divine noàj, because of the well-known dialectic described by 
Athanasius’s
d 
s 
 in terms of divinization: 
                                                
  
AÙtÕj g¦r ™nhnqrèphsen, †na ¹me‹j qeopoihqîmen.369 
 
In CG-DI, Athanasius’s concern is to paint enfleshed triumphant divine power 
rather than to discuss the means of mediation. Mediation for him is primarily 
communication of divine purpose through the gift of a divine renewing power, 
evident in the words, healing actions, suffering, death and resurrection of Christ. 
Salvation becomes a higher ontological state for humanity because of the 
Logos’s incarnate involvement than even the paradisaical contemplation of God 
before the Fall. Humanity now has in the divine Logos a stable noàj and guide, 
enabling participation in the divine nature of the Logos in Christ.370 
Kannengiesser argues371 that for Athanasius, before the fall, the ideal Adam had 
no independent soul, as his mind was fixed on God. In Athanasius’s (and the 
Alexandrian tradition’s) schema after Origen, Kannengiesser argues that souls 
became existent only when they turned from the contemplation of God and were 
 
369  DI 54. 
370  Cp Roldanus, 1968:111: “Selon Athanase, dans la recréation il n’est pas donné moins à 
l’homme, mais au contraire plus que dans la création primitive à l’Image. Cela ressort d’un 
passage apologétique de DI, où l’on trouve une comparaison entre la recréation et la première 
création. Athanase commente l’objection selon laquelle, pour le rétablissement de l’homme, il 
n’était pas nécessaire que le Verbe lui-même s’incarnât, puisqu’Il aurait pu accomplir cette 
recréation en donnant un ordre, comme ce fut la cas dans la création primitive.” 
371 Kannengiesser, 1991:108.  
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subject to the passions of the body’s senses. Restored in Christ, Athanasius 
sees the Christian as conformed to the Saviour in knowing no will or mind save 
that of God in Christ: so there is no place for an independent noàj or yuc» in the 
Incarnate Logos in Athanasius’s depiction. Against this, Arius (reflecting Origen’s 
concern before him) insists that salvation consists of the humanity’s participation 
in the divine as humanity, rather than as something transformed or lost to the 
divine. Such a picture of salvation would endanger the divinity of God and the 
unique nature of humanity, so Gregg and Groh’s description of Arius’s thought 
being driven by a contrasting view of salvation to that of Athanasius.372 
 
2.5: Conclusions: Some problematic implications of Athanasius’s 
Christology in CG-DI. 
Although it is an anachronistic distinction in terms of Athanasius, the account of 
the fall in CG-DI is depicted primarily in realistic and psychological terms rather 
than as primarily “historical”.373 Athanasius asserts that it is possible for the 
human soul to return to God.374 Louth’s description of humanity’s lot in CG-DI is 
“a very pessimistic view” where repentance itself would not be strong enough to 
release the ensnared soul. Athanasius does not conceive of salvation as the 
release of an enslaved soul to autonomy, but participation in the divinity of Christ, 
and by this participation, attaining an ontological stability. Petterson urges that in 
CG Athanasius: 
 
                                                 
372 Gregg and Groh’s description (1981) of Arian thought as driven by a contrasting view of 
salvation to Athanasius is consonant with Athanasius’s emphasis here. 
373  So Louth 1974:116. 
374  CG 30-34. 
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stresses the doctrines of creation and revelation, and of mankind’s 
contemplation and appreciation of God... [whereas DI] emphasises 
the doctrines of incarnation and redemption. For Athanasius, there 
is, comparatively speaking, little to separate the doctrines of 
creation and revelation, and of incarnation and salvation, because 
he affirms the ‘noetic’ in man. An individual is contemplative, 
...being a part of being truly human; indeed even the unlettered 
Antony contemplates. Contemplation is seen as a form of 
reconciliation and not the means to reconciliation; so the tendency 
to drive a wedge between nature and grace, and to present the 
Logos incarnate as the antithesis of nature, rather than as nature’s 
completion and meaning is ever to be resisted.375 
 
This chapter has provided a reading of CG-DI which has attempted to be 
chronologically attentive to Athanasius’s nuanced Christology. Too strong a 
contrast between Father and Creator is an inappropriate description of 
Athanasius at this point, for we have seen that he holds the two together, 
consistently refusing an ontological / economic theological division. This 
consistency will be a hallmark of Athanasius’s Christological development (and, 
subsequently, his pneumatology, though that is not the subject of this thesis). 
The cost of Athanasius’s description is perceived by Arius, and subsequently 
many within the dyohypostatic theological tradition, as too high: to that evaluation 
we now turn. 
                                                 
375  Petterson, 1990:17. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARIAN READINGS OF “NICENE” CHRISTOLOGY AND 
ATHANASIUS’S ELUCIDATIONS IN THE CONTRA ARIANOS 
 
The descriptive vocabulary... is forged in a particular context of 
investigation where there is agreement on matters such as what 
constitutes evidence, what are genuine arguments, what counts as a 
fact, ... and while claims may be genuinely referential, this does not 
mean that they escape from this contextuality... [S]peakers use 
words according to established patterns of investigation and 
interest... which are bound by shared assumptions, interests, and 
traditions of interpretation, and share a descriptive vocabulary.376 
3.1 Introduction: the task of this chapter and its location in this study 
The decades of Christian self-definition between the councils of Nicaea and 
Chalcedon are foundational because the overarching grammar and vocabulary of 
Christian theology was being wrestled-over, and emerging from this violent labour 
throughout the empire. This period determined the vernacular conceptuality of the 
Christian community in its life, ethics and liturgy. Credal rehearsals of the Regula 
Fidei became regularly repeated grammatical-liturgical restatements of this 
framework. Nicaea’s centrality though can obviously, and anachronistically, be 
overstated. It was not the case that, when promulgated in 325, every Eucharist 
throughout the whole world imposed the Nicene formulation upon every simple 
                                                 
376 Soskice, 1988:149-150. 
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worshipper.377 However, the struggle to establish what constituted authentic and 
authoritative evidence, and the creation of a universally accepted doctrinal-
linguistic lens, or framework for faith, which determined what were legitimate paths 
of Christian theology and spirituality, was a vital and all-engaging one for Arius378 
and his opponents.  
In this chapter, the theological significance of the mediation of divine nature (or 
divine will) will be used to read the Christological conflict between Athanasius and 
Arius.  This shows that the conflict between them is best understood as their 
mutual attempts to exclude the other’s model of theological thinking and thereby to 
establish their own determinative Christian “totalizing discourse”379 for doctrinal 
language. The conflict, though hung upon Christological exegesis of Scripture, 
reveals that both Arius and Athanasius are concerned to establish an authoritative 
doctrinal framework for Christology. How that theological divergence is most 
appropriately described is addressed in this chapter through an exploration of the 
place of mediation in each system. 
                                                 
377 Lienhard, 1999:33: “The Council of Nicaea did not enjoy any singular authority until several 
decades after it was held. For example, when Athanasius mentioned the Council of Nicaea in Or 
c Arianos I 6, which Sieben dates in 339, the council was not, for Athanasius, an authority in the 
sense of a positive norm for faith. Athanasius first defended the word homoousion in De decretis 
20, composed between 345 and 355. In De Synodis, written in 359, what is authoritative is not a 
fixed formula but the acceptance of a tradition as such, that is, the Fathers together. Only in the 
Epistula ad Iovianum imperatorem (363) is Nicaea correct for Athanasius not only because it is 
apostolic but also because it is the universal, ecumenical faith and hence the divine faith of the 
Church catholic. Writers in the two or three decades after Nicaea make no appeal to its creed as 
uniquely authoritative or to the term homoousion as a touchstone of orthodoxy. Its greatest 
influence was a negative one: more than a few creeds and authors accepted its anathemas as an 
adequate definition of the heresy to be rejected and regularly quote them as an assurance of their 
own orthodoxy.” 
378 Hanson explores early “Arian” theologies 1988:3-123; Anatolios’s chronology to 322 
(1998:134-5) is accepted for the purposes of this dissertation.  
379 Cameron, 1994, uses this phrase with the particular reference to the whole of the Empire’s 
conceptuality, education and language. It is used here less ambitiously to refer to an authorized 
theological envisioning of God and creation.  
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The battles between Arius and his opponents, and between Athanasius and his 
opponents (whom he describes as “Arians”), are explored in order to establish that 
a holistic theological interpretation of the conflict is the most satisfying.380 The 
careful exegetical methodology of Simonetti381 exposes and creatively hones the 
theological priority, properly critically pioneered by Elliger in 1931.382 This method 
takes more seriously the theological motivation and dynamism than political 
readings allow, taking seriously the fact that the protagonists took the theology 
extremely seriously. Attempts to describe the conflict otherwise, be they political383 
or soteriological-ethical384 fail to do this. Williams (2001:6-8) warns against the 
tendency of using theological priority as a veil to construct readings built upon “a 
foundation of complacent bigotry and historical fantasy” in his evaluation of the 
great nineteenth-century Arius scholars, including Newman and Harnack.385 
Newman characterizes Arius’s theology as a religion of protest, rather than a 
faithful quest to assent with integrity. Arius thus has a popularist advantage over 
                                                 
380 For a thorough statement of the status quaestionis see Williams, 1987:1-29 and 2001:247-
267. He demonstrates that Arius and “Arianism” become, even among sophisticated theologians, 
short-hand terms for a radically “other” theological position from that of the speaker [1987:2]. 
Williams’ family tree of Arius scholarship is helpful in describing various thematic slants upon 
Arius, and their influence in succeeding generations of scholarship. 
381 Simonetti, 1971:317-330 disposes of views of Arius which are “Antiochene” or “literalist”. Cf. 
Young, 1997, chapter 2. 
382 Elliger, 1931:244-251 argued that there had been a failure in scholarship to recognize that the 
demonized images of Arius painted by his opponents had been unwittingly transmitted by 
subsequent scholarship. More significantly for our thesis, Elliger recognized that the conflict was 
not merely Christological but theological: being an attempt to clarify the doctrine of God and his 
relation to the world. So Williams, 1987:12-13, 1977; and Stead, 1994:166-168 who reviews 
Arius’s use of oÙs…a in his resistance of ÐmooÚsioj.  
383 For a thorough political reading, see Barnes, 1993. A political perspective is evident in Lyman, 
1993a, 1993b. Brakke, 1998, maps the pragmatism of Athanasius’s ecclesiology and Antony’s 
place in that through Athanasius’s political acumen. 
384 Mönnich, 1950:378-412. Gregg & Groh, 1981:1 “the chronicling of the creaturely limitations of 
their redeemer” was “the pin which swung ... [this] christological door”, developed under the 
header “The Son: One of Many Brothers” ibid. 43-76.  
385 Anatolios, 1998, 229, 93. Despite enormous differences, Harnack exactly follows Newman in 
identifying a blend of undefined Aristotelian syllogisms and Lucian’s transmission of the 
theological emphasis of Paul of Samosata suggesting a synthesis of Antiochene and Origenistic 
concerns in Arius’s theology. 
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Athanasius’s attempt to tool his “grammar of assent”:386 true though this may be, it 
underestimates the serious theological concern of Arius, which a study focused 
upon the notion of mediation in this chapter will attempt to extrapolate. 
This chapter begins with an evaluation of Arius’s theological priorities before 
examining Athanasius’s theological engagement with what he construes to be the 
“Arian” theological model in the CA. We shall see that it is the desire of both Arius 
and Athanasius to establish a single authoritative, language for theology, 
promoting, by its method and system, their specific theological and exegetical 
priorities, simultaneously excluding those of their opponents. Scholarly debate 
about the political or soteriological dimensions of the conflict are discussed in this 
context.387 The impetus to establish an accepted tradition of interpretation is 
uppermost in the exegetical method of Athanasius. Despite the paucity of primary 
texts of Arius (together with the unhappy fact that they are transmitted out of 
context with a deliberate desire to expose the author as heterodox from the 
authentic faith community by his enemies), this theological concern can be also 
                                                 
386  “It is obvious that in every contest, the assailant, as such, has the advantage of the party 
assailed; and that, not merely from the recommendation which novelty gives to his cause in the 
eyes of bystanders, but also from the greater facility in the nature of things, of finding, than of 
solving objections, whatever be the question in dispute. Accordingly, the skill of a disputant 
mainly consists in securing an offensive position, fastening on the weaker points of his 
adversary’s case, and then not relaxing his hold till the latter sinks under his impetuosity, without 
having the opportunity to display the strength of his own cause, and to bring it to bear upon his 
opponent... This was the artifice to which Arianism owed its first successes.” Newman, 1871:26. 
387 Contrast Gregg and Groh’s political interpretation of Athanasius’s claiming of Antony in De 
Vita, with Arian understandings in this schematic form [adapted from Gregg and Groh, 1981:131-
160]: 
“Arian” theology    Athanasius’s theology 
       Antony and the ascetical tradition promotes     
   a Christology rooted in  
• a similarly heroic redeemer   •an understanding of the Saviour’s 
divinized by his virtuous will   immutable divinity 
   where the Church is 
• the locus for the transmission   • a divinely formed body 
of wisdom by a qualified teacher   with a divinely given episcopal authority 
[even better, a Biblical exegete, = Arius]  so that only the episcopally authorized   
      sacramental life can protect the church   
      authentically 
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discerned in Arius’s emphasis upon the theological significance of the created 
nature388 of the Logos. For Arius, “literalism” per se is not central, (be that 
attributed to a “Jewish”,389 “Samosatene Adoptionist”,390 “Antiochene”,391 or  
“Alexandrian”392 context), but a monotheistic, transcendental biblicist method in 
theology is.393 This used sacred texts in an “oracular”, even popularist way, rather 
than in the enterprise of finding appropriate means to express the centrality and 
                                                 
388 This differs from a theological anthropology which is a priority of Antiochene theologians. The 
significance of the proto-creature’s progression is more important in Arius’s schema than the 
“humanity” of Christ, which does not appear to be reflected upon. The issue for Arius, which 
Athanasius engages with extensively, remains a theological-ontological one. Athanasius 
produced CG-DI as a counter-soteriology to such an approach, properly treating anthropology 
[qua created] theologically. 
389 Newman, 1871. Newman is “not at his best here” by Williams (2001:4), but Newman’s concern 
with the development of a Christian rhetoric, though expressed unfortunately, may reflect a 
different methodology - or even exegetical tradition - which interprets the text of Scripture as 
“oracular” - and fragmentary - rather than the authoritative history of revelation which is 
appropriated through a systematic comprehension of the whole by the regula fidei or Creeds. Cf. 
Young, 1997:9-28. 
390 Newman, 1871:37. Newman also allocated much of Arius’s method to Paul of Samosata, 
arguing that the Alexandrian context was alien to Arius’s approach. Cf. Trigg, 1998:63: “In the 
sphere of doctrine, we have already noted the way Origen lays crucial foundations for the 
definition of doctrine of the Trinity and of the person of Christ. He also provided a way to relate 
divine grace to human free will that proved congenial to the Greek theological tradition, a 
congeniality that accounts for the preservation of many of his writings on the subject. … Origen 
distinguished himself from the Platonic tradition by insisting on the necessity of God’s grace if 
human beings are to become like God. Origen just as firmly defended human moral responsibility. 
Refuting philosophers and astrologers who would argue that human actions are pre-determined, 
he made a convincing case that God’s foreknowledge does not predetermine human actions and 
that God’s providence fully respects human free will.” These similarities between Origen’s and 
Arius’s concerns are unseen by Newman. Adolf von Harnack believed Arius’ theological method 
to be the hybrid offspring of the unlikely union of Paul of Samosata and Origen, Williams, 2001: 6-
8. 
391 Lietzmann, 1961:107, is over-simplistic in his summary of this traditional assignation: “Arius 
was not a person of minor importance, but one well-known in the theological world. He was of 
special importance for Alexandria, because he had not been brought up in the indigenous 
tradition, but had come from the school at Antioch, which was diametrically opposed to it. In this 
latter city, a presbyter held in high repute, Lucian by name, had laboured as a teacher until his 
martyrdom in AD 306. A considerable number of students were drawn to him, and these in the 
course of time, occupied the most eminent dioceses in the east; these men felt united in faithful 
fellowship by the memory of their teacher. Arius belonged to this circle, and as he had only given 
expression in accentuated form to Antiochene points of view, he might well reckon on support 
from his fellow students who sat under Lucian. Nor was he mistaken. Eusebius, bishop of 
Nicomedia, which had lately become the royal residence, took his side, and asked the other 
friends to write in support”. 
392 Wiles, 1962:339-347. 
393 A muqologe‹n according to Torrance, 1997:37: “There was another side to Origen’s approach, 
however, which provided this ‘theologising’ (qeologe‹n) with safeguards against a fanciful 
‘mythologising’ (muqologe‹n), and with a normative frame of faith and devotion which could help 
to keep knowledge of God in the centre of the life and living tradition of ‘the Great Church’. 
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significances of the nature of the relation between Jesus Christ and God the 
Father.394  
There is a danger in a primarily theological reading which can follow too closely 
Athanasius’s analysis of the conflict,395 or even, more acutely, in making 
Athanasius’s theology a necessity.396 Gwatkin’s assertion that the essence of the 
conflict was less to do with Christology than about correctly constructing the 
relation between God and the world,397 is not far from our thesis. Any claim, 
though, is limited to a conviction that Athanasius seems to be prompted into a 
theological use of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by the crisis. Embarking upon 
this process of establishing theological method develops into his powerful 
sacramental theology with the incarnation in central place This resolves the 
epistemological and cosmological “gap” - or cwrismÒj - which his theological 
application of creatio ex nihilo imposed upon his opponent’s theology. Athanasius’s 
priority is not explaining the relation of God with the world, but constructing the 
most appropriate model for describing God. If Arius did not make Athanasius 
                                                 
394 “The controversial teaching of Arius, as Alexander, the Patriarch of Alexandria soon realised, 
made it indubitably clear that the decisive issue for saving faith was the nature of the relation 
between Jesus Christ the incarnate Son and God the Father. How, then, must the Church think of 
that relation?... what must be said about the nature of that relation in order to safeguard from 
misunderstanding and distortion all that it stands for in the Gospel? It was in answer to such 
questions that the Nicene fathers formulated their confession of faith: ‘... ÐmooÚsioj …’. 
Moreover they attached to the Creed a canon to the effect that the Catholic Church 
anathematizes ‘those who say “There was when he was not”, and “Before being begotten he was 
not”, and that “He came into existence out of nothing”...’All these statements of the Nicene 
Council were subjected to severe testing in face of prolonged criticism in the fourth century, which 
served to deepen and confirm the convictions of the Church...” (Torrance, 1997:116). Simonetti, 
1971: 317-330 and 1975:80-83, disposes of views of Arius which are “Antiochene” or “literalist”. 
“Literalist” is to be avoided not least because of its pejorative overtones, but Arius’s approach to 
Scripture can be described in part as “oracular.”  
395 CA 1. 
396 Gwatkin, 1900, 1906. 
397 Gwatkin, 1900: 8. 
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“necessary,” he did provoke his distinctive theological contributions to Christian 
theology.398 
A discussion of mediation approaches the edifice of salvation and Christian 
theology holistically (with soteriological, ecclesiastical and ascetical dimensions). 
In Christology it becomes a differentiating cipher, focusing the cluster of fourth-
century conflicts. Analysis of mediation in the competing theological models of 
Arius and Athanasius allows a more attentive description of each system and the 
conflict.  
Conventional descriptions of the fourth-century conflict as “Arian” versus “Nicene” 
is so commonplace that, despite the distortion of these terms, they are difficult to 
avoid, and accordingly appear in this dissertation. They are inadequate not least 
because “Arian” is Athanasius’s coinage, deliberately minted to connect later 
fourth-century theologians whom he was opposing, to this arch-heretic. It is 
generally accepted that Arius’s actual (rather than perceived) role in the fourth-
century conflicts was minor.399 Moreover, “Nicene” is not shorthand for “orthodox” 
even in Athanasius’s writings until the mid 360s. The only occurrence of 
ÐmooÚsioj before De Synodis is CA I.8.1:  Vinzent (1996:377ff) insists that this 
usage derives from CA IV – a work probably by Apollinarius.  Lienhard (1999:33) 
similarly rejects descriptions of the conflict as Alexandrian vs. Antiochene or 
                                                 
398 Athanasius would maintain that there is nothing innovative in his theology. Even the use of 
non-biblical terminology at Nicaea is to preserve the di£noia or whole sense of Scripture and the 
catholic faith. 
399 Lienhard, 1999:33. Athanasius demonstrates the effectiveness of the dictum that what actually 
was the case in history is far less significant that what was believed to be the case. 
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Eusebian vs. Arian, 400 so a description of two competing theological traditions is 
necessary. 
Lienhard (1999) offers the useful taxonomy of dyohypostatic (for the so-called 
“Arian” tradition) and miahypostatic (for the tradition espoused by Athanasius and 
Marcellus). Both theological methods are concerned to preserve the unity of God. 
The dyohypostatic model does so by drawing a line of distinction between God 
proper (“the Father”, or, often in Arius, the “Monad”) and the Logos. The Logos is a 
second God, leaving the “Beyond all being God” sublimely transcendent. The 
miahypostatic model insists on one shared ØpÒstasij or oÙs…a of Father and 
Son, preserving divine unity, and maintaining the priority of the divine nature and 
initiative in salvation. This description reinforces the centrality of Christological 
mediation to each model, and it will be adopted here despite the case that there 
inevitably remains generalization and simplification in describing an emergent 
thought-world which continued to use terms like oÙs…a, ØpÒstasij and fÚsij 
without generally agreed definitions until Chalcedon.  
Lienhard ascribes the Christological significance of mediation primarily to the 
dyohypostatic model. He identifies that for Arius, God can only be described in 
negative terms, (¥narcoj, ¢gšn[n]htoj k.t.l.), so mediation of the Logos is the 
purpose for which he was “made”. But his suggestion that miahypostatic theology 
has no place for mediation is not substantiated. Athanasius reclaims mediation by 
his consistent application of creatio ex nihilo, expelling any residual theological-
cosmological assumption of a ladder or chain of being.401 Mediation is thus the act 
                                                 
400 Though he accepts that the description of the theology attributed by Athanasius to Arius is 
more properly historically described as “Eusebian”, ibid. 34. 
401 “These authors [Arius and the dyohypostatic theological spokespersons] think habitually, or 
pre-reflectively, in terms of the Greek notion of the great chain of being, a way of trying to 
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of bridging this ontological gulf, less than having a sense of ontological overlap in a 
hierarchy of being. Lienhard’s identification of miahypostatic theology’s emphasis 
upon the incarnation and its soteriological significance leads him to argue that 
mediation is therefore less significant in this tradition. Though it is different in a 
model where salvation is construed as the assumption of ¹ ¢nqrwpÒthj into the 
divine nature through Christ, mediation remains central to Athanasius and 
miahypostatic theology. The notion of mediation in dyohypostatic Christology 
emphasizes the mediation of God’s will. In Arius, divine wisdom is taught by the 
created Logos, who sums up and harmoniously projects creation’s diversity back 
to the transcendent Monad. The discussion of mediation within a miahypostatic 
framework allows Athanasius to expound the significance of ontological mediation 
of divine nature in Christ, opening up vistas of meaning for the Christian tradition’s 
texts and linguistic description, pushing that theology along Trinitarian lines.  
Both Arius and Athanasius stress the received nature of their competing 
theological models. Both expound diverse Christologies from common authorized 
texts: dyohypostatic opponents of Athanasius urge that Nicaea’s ÐmooÚsioj is an 
aberration from Scriptural witness; whilst he argues that miahypostatic 
interpretation of the Regula Fidei is necessary to maintain the whole of Christian 
truth. The concept of mediation thus exposes theological exegesis to be vital and 
central. Both Arius and Athanasius, therefore, look to the tradition to unpack the 
meaning of mediation in their systems, and both believe themselves to be 
guarding the deposit of faith. Central to the Arian conflict is this schematization of 
                                                                                                                                                 
understand the whole of reality by situating each existent in a ranked and ordered scale, with God 
himself at the top and brute matter at the bottom. They do not make any clear distinction between 
the uncreated and the created as the two primary or ultimate categories of being.” Lienhard, 
1999:41. 
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Christian faith. This chapter will use mediation in Arius and Athanasius to explore 
the theological nub of the conflict.  
3:2 Arius in reported speech 
The notion of the Logos as mediator is central to the Arian controversy.  Arius’s 
treatment of the subject prompts the development of a sustained response of 
miahypostatic “orthodox” theology and cosmology. But there is a critical issue to be 
established, namely whether any picture of Arius based upon a fragmentary 
selection of his “own words” is not necessarily a distorting one.402 This material 
has been carefully selected to undermine Arius’s argument, hence this section 
critically contextualizes readings of Arius in reported speech. Arius’s writing 
remains available solely because it forms part of Athanasius’s carefully woven an
Arius polemic, or Epiphanius’s theory of heresy.
ti-
gical 
                                                
403 “Pro-Nicene” transmission of 
Arius is intended to convey diminishing connections and significances, which Arius 
would not own. It is, rather, a measure of the astute politics and keen theolo
analyses of Athanasius that he managed to achieve a thorough, specific and 
 
402 Cf. Barnes 1993:14-15, “Can the term ‘Arianism’ legitimately be used at all for historical 
analysis, given its demonstrable origin as a derogatory party label? And if the term ‘Arianism’ is 
used, should it be defined as the distinctive theology of Arius himself, or does anyone count who 
considered that Arius’ views lay within the permissible range of views which the church could 
tolerate, whether or not he himself shared them? No fourth-century thinker who is normally 
regarded as ‘Arian’ or ‘Neo-Arian’ would ever have applied the term to himself. The label was a 
term of abuse: Athanasius and his allies habitually employed a broad definition which turned all 
their enemies into ‘Arians’.”  
403 Epiphanius [c310-402] whilst conveying dissenting traditions, is prone to present distorted 
pictures of those traditions by creating interconnection alien to the described tradition’s self-
understanding. His picture of Arius in Panarion echoes (and is probably dependent upon) 
Athanasius’s works, especially CA I & II. These were probably written c 339 during his second 
exile in Rome, during George’s appointment as patriarch (Anatolios, 1998:87). Athanasian 
authorship of CA III is disputed by Kannengiesser, 1983:405-416; but defended by Stead, 
1985:227. Athanasius’s de Decr. is his most careful promotion of the significance of the Nicene 
Council, whose ÐmooÚsioj was unknown by Hilary, cf. Ayres, 2004a. The Cypriot Epiphanius 
shared his nation’s commitment to Nicaea, for whom Athanasius was a hero: “Cyprus was 
decidedly pro-Nicene, and not the less  so because of its struggle to free itself from the 
jurisdiction of the bishops of Antioch, whose devotion to the Creed of Nicaea, since the downfall 
of Eustathius [=  deposed by Eusebius and others at the Council of Antioch, 341, on charges of 
Sabellianism] had been held to be doubtful.” Amidon, 1990:i. From the manner in which 
Epiphanius’s texts follow Athanasius’s works in “clusters”, it is likely that Epiphanius is dependent 
upon Athanasius’s critique and transmission of texts. 
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targeted refutation of dyohypostatic Christology through the twists of the fourth 
century.404 Stead (1978) notes that if this material cannot be considered as the 
nearest to primary data that we have on Arius – there is nothing more.405 Although 
Stead’s 1978 paper406 offering a metricated version of the Thalia has been 
challenged,407 the fragments from Arius’s Thalia in CA 1.5 (hereafter Thalia A) and 
De Synodis 15 (hereafter Thalia S) are the most reliable quotations of the original 
to be had.408 For comment on Ep. ad Aeg. 12, see Post-script after Bibliography.  
Arius, after failing to correct what he saw to be Alexander’s heresy, responded by 
a campaign of publicity detailing the outrage he felt at being disciplined by his 
bishop for daring to hold the true dyohypostatic faith. Part of that campaign 
appears to have been a tour of the East, initiated, no doubt, by epistles, alerting 
bishops whose “natural” conception of Christian faith was a dyohypostatic model of 
theology. Of these the Epistle to Eusebius of Nicomedia is transmitted by 
Epiphanius, who also transmits a more conciliatory attempt to convince his own 
bishop that he is indeed right. Athanasius’s transmission of parts of the Thalia is 
less a presentation of a banquet than a careful selection of hors d’oeuvres 
representing elements of dyohypostatic theology that he finds most objectionable. 
                                                 
404 It is not unreasonable to infer from Athanasius’s determination in CA (especially II), and from 
Epiphanius’s lengthy textual notes, that both wanted to describe Arius and Arian theologies 
closely.  Athanasius’s determination to wound Arian theology by every means, not least his 
attempt to answer Arian textual arguments not with counter-texts but, rather, by wrestling with 
each text in the light of what he saw to be the whole picture of revelation, shows that he wanted 
to ensure that he conveyed the most detailed refutation in order to be most damaging to his 
opponents. 
405 An understanding of the complexity of the genres of description and counter-description, 
sometimes called “heresiology” is needed to bridge the apparent methodological impasse. 
Descriptions of anti-miahypostatic models of theology must proceed attentively and ethically 
through a selection of primary material where Arius’s theological priorities are “exposed” rather 
than described. It cannot but be influenced by a series of pictures or impressions of Arius highly 
charged in the rhetoric of heresiology. Cf. Lyman, 1993b: 45-64. 
406 Stead, 1978:20-52.  
407 Both the reconstruction and reading has been questioned (particularly vis-á-vis the 
identification of so-called “Sotadean” metre) by West, 1982:99-105. 
408 Williams, 2001:17.  
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Thus Arius’s epistles will be analysed theologically, before a theological account 
given of the fragments of the Thalia. 
 
3:2:1 The Epistle of Arius to Eusebius [Epiphanius Panarion 69.6.1-7] 
Arius appeals in his affliction to his “true co-Lucianist” Eusebius of Nicomedia, 
succinctly relating his theological disagreements with his bishop in this vivid 
statement of case: 
we do not agree with Alexander when he says publicly: always God, 
always Son; the Father together, the Son together; the Son exists 
with God.409 
This objection is against both the content and the publicity of Alexander’s 
pronouncement that the Son is of the same oÙs…a with the Father.410 Arius 
reminds Eusebius that a host of his colleagues411 condemned any theology that 
describes the divine nature in terms of emanation or confusion (i.e., Arius’s 
description of miahypostatic theology), and that God (the Father) does indeed 
precede the Son. The literary-dogmatic effect of Arius’s sustained use of selected 
                                                 
409 Panarion 69.7.3. This communicates Arius’s genius for a vivid popularization and politicization 
of the quest for a determinative model of Christian language which so provoked Athanasius, who 
caricatures this as his opponent’s “flippancy, effeminate in tune and nature” in Sotadean metre. 
Cp CA I. 4,5. 
410 Confirming the possibility that Arius held an exegetical teaching role in the Alexandrian 
Church, as Theodoret indicates. He appears to sees it his duty to correct Alexander’s error and 
excess. The struggle that follows is based upon counter-text and counter-exegesis, which reflects 
the significance of scriptural exegesis in Arius’s method and motivation. 
411 Eusebius of Caesarea, Theodotus of Laodicea, Paulinus of Tyre, Athanasius of Anazarbus, 
Gregory of Beirut, Aetius of Lydda et al. 
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New Testament terms in the defence of a rigid dyohypostatic subordinationism 
echoes a populist biblicism, which differs significantly from Origen’s subtlety.412  
This appeal is interesting in its use of language which consistently says “God” 
when one might suppose the use of “Father,” yet which has close enough affinities 
to the Origenist tradition and to synoptic language to be able to claim to be the 
traditional and authentic theological expression of the catholic church. Arius’s 
epistle betrays the extent to which the author does not conceive of God essentially 
in a trinitarian manner. The possibility - and popularity - of this dyohypostatic 
trajectory reflects the fact that the orthodox trinitarian linguistic which was 
eventually to be established as the only Christian theological description, was 
problematic, representing as it did a means of speaking about God which many felt 
to be innovative and incompatible with the tradition.  
Arius contrasts what he believes to be Alexander’s anti-Biblical heresy, with his 
axioms of faith, namely that: 
[1] the Son is not unbegotten or a part of the Unbegotten in any way 
[as that would be to confuse the persons of Father and Son];  
[2] the Son is not from any substrata of divine nature [which would 
introduce a note of inevitability into the incarnation, so that it may be 
construed as a mechanistically-determined event, rather than an act 
of divine will and grace]; 
                                                 
412 A point not missed by Newman, 1871: 4-5, 7, 27-28, who accounts for it by the influence of 
Paul of Samosata [Eusebius HE, vii, 30]. 
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[3] the Son came into existence by the will and decision of God 
before times and before ages; 
[4] the Son is in “the only-begotten God” only in so far as the 
overarching dyohypostatic theological system allows; 
[5] so, while the Son is permitted to share in the unchangeable 
characteristic of begotten divinity,  
[6] before he was begotten or created the Son was not. 
This is tooled in such a way as to protect God’s [= “the Father’s”] nature, from 
change, diminution, or any “natural” descriptions which imply pre-determinism or 
ontological inevitability. The Son must be the free product of the Father’s will and 
purpose, rather than be the inevitable expression of who God is. The place of 
divine will in the Son’s nature is thus a powerful theme of Arius’s theology, 
because only this can overcome the gulf between created and eternal being. But 
rather than identifying the Son as the Father’s will and purpose, Arius asserts 
instead that the Son must correspond to God’s will and free desire. There is, then, 
a gulf with the Son on the created side, yet Arius does not appear fully to grasp its 
significance. Instead, Arius continues his appeal, outlining that it is because his 
theology is based upon orthodox, universally understood (dyohypostatic) tenets, 
that he is unjustly persecuted. He portrays himself as teaching the traditional truth 
that the Son has a beginning, whilst God is without beginning.413  
The key thrust of this epistle, then, is that Arius and his followers are persecuted 
because they assert that the Son has a temporal beginning, in contradistinction to 
                                                 
413 Panarion 69.6.2-7. 
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the divine which is without beginning. This is, to Arius, plain sense, but produces a 
radical subordinationism and differentiation of Father and Son which offers a one-
sided solution to Christological mediation caused by creatio ex nihilo which he 
identifies.   s
 
3.2.2: The Epistle of Arius to Alexander of Alexandria [Epiphanius 
Panarion 69.7.2-8.5] 
Epiphanius comments that Arius’s “continuous stream of poisonous blasphemies” 
is continued in his superficially conciliatory Epistle to Alexander, where Arius 
defines himself and his teaching over against other heresies. Unlike Valentinus, 
Mani, Sabellius or Hieracas,415 Arius takes his lead from “the law and the prophets 
and the New Testament.”416 From the outset, Arius claims Scripture as the ground 
of his theological authority. Arius’s concern to establish that his framing of the 
authentic way of envisioning faith against alien forms of expression is evident in his 
equation of miahypostatic Christology with Sabellian thought. In contrast to this 
perception, Arius identifies himself with the Law, Prophets and Apostles. If 
Athanasius is perceived to be guilty of transferring “the original historical conflict 
between Arius and Alexander... into a mythic and eternal confrontation of error and 
truth”417 here is that self-same process of connecting “truthful” models of faith over 
against false prophets and heretics. This “location” of method is an important 
                                                 
414 Grillmeier,1975:219. 
415 Panarion 69.7.5. 
416 Panarion 69.7.3. 
417 Lyman, 1993b:54.  
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rhetorical dimension of the conflict,418 attempting to construct a single theological 
language amid uncertainty and confusion.  
Another dimension is also a significant clue to Arius’s concerns. In this slightly 
more conciliatory epistle419 Arius explains in this public œkqesij p…stewj420 to 
Alexander the tenets of his faith slightly differently: 
[1] the one God [= Father] is alone unbegotten, alone eternal, alone 
without beginning, alone true, alone immortal, alone wise and alone 
good, alone master, alone judge... 
[2] this God begot the Son before eternal times to make all things: 
[3] the begetting was authentic [not docetic]; 
[4] the begetting was not an emanation [identified as Valentinian]; 
[5] the begotten was not, therefore, co-essential or a part of the 
Father [a position identified as Manichaean]; 
[6] the begetting of the Son in no manner divided the Monad into a 
Son-Father [how Arius understands the heresy of Sabellius]; 
[7] but the Son was created by God’s will before times and ages. The 
voluntary election of the Father to create the Son as a mediator in 
creation, in order to make all other things, attests to the Father’s 
                                                 
418 Cf. Wessell, 2004. 
419 Young, 1983:59: “The representation of Alexander’s views is rather different from that given in 
his earlier appeal to Eusebius, but this is surely no more than should be expected in the 
circumstances.”  
420 Young, 1983:59, a public letter outlining his position. 
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genuine goodness. The Son is worthy of appropriate exaltation 
magnifying both the Father’s grace and the Son’s honour. 
[8] The three hypostases of Father, Son and Holy Spirit appear to be 
described, but it is noteworthy that there follow descriptions only of 
the Father and the Son421 as [a] God is the cause of all things, alone 
and without beginning; and [b] the Son is begotten by the Father 
outside of time, but was not before his creation; is not eternal, co-
eternal nor co-unbegotten, as this would posit two ingenerate 
principles.422 
Some points here require immediate comment. Firstly, Arius’s theology is (from 
Epiphanius’s point of view) profoundly untrinitarian because of its dyohypostatic 
basis. Yet Arius’s assumptions about divine nature are serious, perhaps even 
necessary provocations to Alexander and Athanasius to provide clearer trinitarian 
description, and to relate a truly trinitarian model to the miahypostatic theological 
tradition.  
Secondly, there is a striking certainty about Arius’s application of attributes directly 
to the Monad – whom he is seeking to protect from physical connection with 
creation. This is not missed by Athanasius, who charges Arius with impious 
arrogance. Indeed, Athanasius exhibits more caution in his theological method, 
attempting as it does to weave creatio ex nihilo into a miahypostatic Christology. 
The confidence present in Athanasius’s method springs from his insistence upon 
                                                 
421  Possibly through Epiphanius’s editing, but more likely because this theological conflict is 
focused as a Christological controversy through mediation and is not construed as a 
pneumatological issue. The conflict at this stage remains focused upon the relation of the Father 
and the Son to each other and to creation.  
422 Panarion 69.8.1-4. 
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the ontological connection of Father and Son in the incarnation, but respects the 
divine mystery. Epiphanius describes as mania Arius’s obsession with protecting 
God from any change,423 but it is Athanasius who notes the irony that Arius’s 
surety ultimately reduces God to an idea.424  
Thirdly, Arius’s theology has Monist tones. Whilst biblicist in its terminology, this 
conveys echoes of the popular philosophical and cosmological environment with 
its concerns about the prime ingenerate principle and its relation to multiform 
creation. Arius is motivated to protect divine transcendence from mutation or 
emanation or the Sabellian error. This has at least as much biblical influence as 
widely held Platonic metaphysical and cosmological assumptions: 
the crisis was brought about by a combination of this cosmological 
doctrine of God with the biblical doctrine of creation.425 
The irony is that whilst it would appear that Arius seeks to maintain a model of 
divine activity where God is freed to will and to draw creatures into his restoring 
grace without the determinism of divine ontology necessarily driving independent 
of divine will, there is a significant element of Arius’s Christology which  
reduced the act of salvation to the reversion of the many to the One. 
Thus history as God’s activity was almost eliminated. Under the 
influence of the biblical concept of history the return of the many was 
perhaps identified as an education on the part of God or as the 
                                                 
423 E.g., Panarion 69.31.1. 
424 Athanasius Decr 18; Ad Episc. Aeg. 4, Cp Anatolios, 1998:96-100. 
425 Grillmeier, 1975:229; cf. May, 1994; Young, 1991:139-151. 
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divine reconstitution of all things. But essentially that return was 
more like a natural process than a constant operation of God.426 
Athanasius’s counter claim is that Arius (in his dyohypostatic model) has in effect 
two Logoi. Arius’s conception of divinity in terms of an absolute transcendental 
Monism does not sufficient soteriological weight to the theme of mediation in a 
created Logos. In contrast, Athanasius’s (miahypostatic) method concretely 
connects the mind, will or purpose of the Father with the Logos. So there follows a 
textual war, with Arius’s pivotal use of Proverbs 8.22 and other texts to posit a 
hypostasized but, more significantly, created Logos whose task of relating the One 
and the many is an ontological impossibility according to Athanasius’s critique. 
 
3.2.3: Thalia A [Athanasius CA I. 5] Please refer to post-script, p. 398. 
Athanasius begins his presentation of Arius’s theology with a peculiar seven-lined 
stanza from Arius’s Thalia [hereafter Thalia A]. It seems to reveal little if anything 
about Arius’s theology, but chosen, no doubt, because it reads as self-obsessed 
self-promotion. Athanasius depicts Arius as an inadequate mediocrity – despite 
this, there is also in these lines an indication of Arius’s self-understanding, 
ecclesiology, and theological priorities. 
The lines, firstly, place Arius in the “faith of the elect (™klektîn) of God.”  Arius is 
anxious to stress that his doctrine and teaching is not innovative, but the consistent 
faith of those whom God declares to be wise, who persist in the careful discipline 
                                                 
426 Studer, 1993:17. 
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of study under the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.427 Arius claims this eclectic 
tradition, the “narrow way” of discipline, demonstrating something of an élitist 
ecclesiology. Arius places himself in the tradition of the faithful and wise, in order to 
identify his teachings in a context more significant than his “own” opinions. This 
contextualizing rapidly becomes an apologia for his notoriety in the second part of 
the stanza. It is because Arius has followed “close on the heels... step by step” of 
the wise preservers of Christian truth that he has become universally known.428 
This notoriety is expressed as Arius’s suffering unjust persecution, and his 
subsequent undeserved infamy. The model of the faithful disciple suffering 
calumny for the sake of truth has parallels in the Psalms and the synoptic 
tradition,429 yet is related by Athanasius to indicate in Arius a smugness and 
whingyness - a naïve, self-obsessed and self-proclaiming personality. 
Athanasius’s sharpness cuts across Arius’s rhetorical intent, where the allusion to 
his notoriety as his suffering stands in oppostition to his faithfulness to the truth. 
There is an effective dramatic imbalance: all the sufferings Arius endures, are as 
nothing compared to the glory of knowing God’s wisdom and knowledge: 
  poll¦ paqën  - di¦ t¾n qeoà dÒxan.430 
The joy of the unfettered wisdom and true knowledge of the faith is the enlivening 
key to this text. But Athanasius conveys the picture of someone, if not contra 
ecclesiam, then neutral to the structural ecclesiatical authorities in comparison with 
his overwhelming truth: Arius has a taste for a martyr’s identity, and a proud desire 
                                                 
427 pa…dwn | ¡g…wn, ÑrqotÒmwn, ¤gion [qeoà] pneàma labÒntwn, Stead, 1978:48. 
428 toÚtwn kat' ‡cnoj Ãlqon ™gë ba…nwn ÐmodÒxwj | Ð periklutÒj, Ð poll¦ paqën di¦ t¾n qeoà 
dÒxan. Stead, 1978:48. 
429 E.g., Mt. 5:10-11 and parallels. 
430 Stead, 1978:48. 
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to pursue his reading of Scripture free from ecclesiatical authority or convention.431 
Athanasius achieves a depiction of Arius as one obsessed by his own self-
importance. Athanasius’s indubitably propagandist purposes here nevertheless 
exploit Arius’s identification of salvation with the correct exegesis of the “message” 
in the divine Oracles. Scripture’s truths, rather than a dogmatic-theological 
overview, are Arius’s priority. In this he probably did share the preferences and 
concerns of many traditional Christians, from his co-Lucianist bishops to faithful 
worshippers in his Baukalis parish in Alexandria. His approach to Scripture would 
appear to be participatory and immediate. If the description of “literalist” is 
distorting, there at least appears to be an approach that views Scripture as 
oracular. We have more material to test this theory, Athanasius’s second citation of 
the Thalia, to which we now turn. 
3.2.4: Thalia S [Athanasius de Synodis 15] 
The portion of Thalia which Athanasius transmits in De Synodis is very different in 
character from the self-obsessed section which he chose to introduce his préçis of 
Arius’s thought in CA I. The similarity between the two is Arius’s convention of 
asking for “Wisdom’s” leading and teaching; applied in Thalia A to himself, but in 
Thalia S to the Logos. This suggests an equality of being between Arius and the 
Logos: as both are creatures, proceding in knowledge of God due alone to the 
Monad’s graceful will revealing his purposes, supremely disclosed in the Logos. 
Theology is dependent upon this grace, but with it theology is possible and will 
have a more kataphatic style. 
                                                 
431 On the relation of Arius to the Melitian schism cf. Leitzmann,1961:106; Martin, 1996. 
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The literary structure of Thalia S appears to consist of a series of verses with an 
internal contrast in each line between the transcendent, eternal God, and how this 
God is revealed through the Logos in time. The effect of a series of parallelisms is 
to heighten a sense of the Monad’s transcendent inaccessibility, and promotes the 
paradoxical centrality of the created Mediator:432 
 God himself is unexpressible, in so far any have begun to   
 describe him;433 
 We declare him Unbegotten, [alone] by him who is begotten by   
 nature; 
 We sing his praises as without beginning, by him who has a   
 beginning; 
 We honour him as eternal, through him who has come to be in   
 time; The One without beginning set the Son to be the beginning of 
 all to be brought forth.434 
This sustained juxtaposition makes theological sense of the subordination of the 
Son, developing a theology of the created Logos. Arius’s method exalts the Father 
- as “God-in-himself” - to the point of alienation from creation. Revelation in Christ 
is limited to a reflexive purpose - the Logos mediates the truth of the ultimate 
inaccessibility of God in himself. Arius thus emphasizes the parity of the Logos 
with all created beings. The connection between all creation and the Logos 
through whom everything came into being is ontological: rooted in a shared 
created nature. Christology and anthropology are deeply connected, but theology 
                                                 
432 Italics refer to a sustained subordinationist Christology to affect a heightened theology of 
God’s essential transcendence. 
433 Clearly this includes Christ, but it is not exclusively a reference to the Logos, hence it is not in 
italics. See Thalia A with reference to Arius as one of the “enlightened ones” of God’s wisdom. 
434 Stead, 1978:48-9, lines 1, 3-6. 
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and anthropology remain ultimately alien from each other. Arius’s Logos mediates 
divine grace and freedom; this communication is as much of God’s will as he 
would have us know. It is possible only because humanity shares creaturely 
existence with the Logos. Arius rejects any vestigia Dei with the Father as the 
foundation for either epistemology or salvation. These verses have the effect of 
communicating an absolutely alien, but free divine grace, maintaining God the 
Father as the eternal subject, the “beyond-our-being-God”. Any basis other than 
an ultimate disparity between God the Uncreate and everything else would 
suggest to Arius an inappropriate “mingling”. There is a rigorous and ultimate 
differentiation between God the Monad, the Father, and all other being. This 
requires the mediation of a majestic proto-creature, endued by the grace of God 
with the task of connecting the many to the Monad: 
For there is a Triad, but the glories are not equal; their substances 
unmingled435 
[O]ne is more glorious than the others - even to the boundlessness 
of infinity:  
The Father is alien by nature from the Son.436 
Arius’s use of “Father” is again interchangeable with “Monad” and “God”, referring 
to the ultimate mystery of God in himself.437 The Monad has always been, but the 
Dyad - the relation of God to his Logos - is necessarily derivative from the Monad 
in himself. The Son has no being in himself, his being, like that of every other 
creature, lies in the infinitely mysterious will of the Father. Trinity and incarnation, 
                                                 
435 ¢nep…miktoi ˜auta‹j [e„sin] aƒ Øpost£seij aÙtîn Stead, 1978:49, line 17. 
436 xšnoj toà uƒoà kat' oÙs…an Ð pat»r Stead, 1978:49, line 19. 
437 So in the Epistle to Alexander, 3.2.2, above. 
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as means of God’s self-disclosure, have no eternal significance or essential 
reference, but function by reinforcing ultimate divine transcendence. Arius cannot 
allow the Logos to be the Reason of God, but the created product of the Wisdom 
of God. Thus Christology has many legitimate trajectories which should not be 
closed down by the imposition of a singular and innovative theological model. He 
insists  
He is certainly to be thought of in a myriad constructs.438 
For Arius, the gravest danger for theology is an unwarranted arrogance of 
anthropocentricism evident especially in Nicaea’s miahypostatic model. Arius 
urges theological modesty, a humility borne of a recognition of the ultimate un-
likeness of created and uncreated Being. His assertion of creatio ex nihilo in 
theological methodology conveys serious dyohypostatic Christological concerns. A 
polemical construction of Arius implies an inaccessible divine Mind beyond the 
enfleshed Logos. Christ has taught what may be known of the Father by his 
creatureliness. Gregg & Groh (1986) and Greer (1975) highlight the soteriological 
dynamic in Arius’s depiction – creaturely hands of a brother’s grasp are pivotal.  
Athanasius must negate this spirituality of subordination to promote miahypostatic 
Christology. Arius allows that none greater than the Logos can be made, even by 
God - though the Father can reveal himself equally truly in other creatures. This 
curious elevation of the Son allows space for other creatures to share his “place” in 
the Father’s affections, without losing their creatureliness. God is not changed by  
                                                 
438 ™pinoe‹tai goàn mur…aij Ósaij ™pino…aij- | pneàma... dÚnamij, sof…a Stead, 1978:49, line 
25 . 
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the incarnation, so humans - as creatures - are not ontologically distorted by 
salvation. The Word does not express the fulness of the Father (as a creature the 
Son does not know his own essence or generation other than that which the 
Father has revealed to him), yet no greater expression by a creature is possible. 
Athanasius transmits this section, no doubt, because he wants to expose what he 
thinks to be a description of the Son diminishing to his honour and revealing an 
unbridgeable chasm in dyohypostatic theology. But to Arius essential theology is 
ultimately impossible. Scriptural exegesis is imperative to grasp that divine 
Wisdom which can be appropriated by the creature. The Son’s perfect creaturely 
relation to the Father is the climax of revelation. God [=the Father] is not to be 
objectified, categorized or subject to predictable human rules of logic or linguistics. 
The Scriptures remain an invitation to an existential engagement with the 
ultimately mysterious transcendent God with, and through, the mediation of the 
Proto-Creature Logos. 
3.3 A picture of Arius  
Arius’s hope of salvation, emphasizes transforming grace in faith, which 
corresponds the believer to Jesus Christ without transmuting creaturely nature into 
a (lesser) divine being. God and creature are alike protected in this understanding 
of salvation. Correspondence to Christ can go no further than to forge a bond of 
identity with him as the pre-eminent creature who restores true freedom of Sonship 
to all who are “in Christ”. It remains impossible for a creature to bear divine nature: 
this would belittle and change divine nature, and is thus alien to Arius’s Christian 
tradition. Christian perfection is correspondence to Jesus Christ, that first willed 
creature of the Father, to share in the Monad’s voluntarist relationship with him.  
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This spirituality emphasises that the path of Christian perfection is to arrive at, and 
remain in, Jesus Christ, contemplating the ultimate mystery of God from his 
superlative – yet always creaturely – perspective. This resonates with aspects of 
Origen’s subordinationism and soteriology, which allowed human nature the 
freedom to turn aside from the vision of God even in heaven:439 the focus remains 
upon the individual created soul rather than a final transformation into divine 
nature. The Arian crisis is a necessary prompt for more attentive trinitarian 
description with regard to soteriological expression: it becomes apparent that for a 
miahypostatic theology to work convincingly, a theology of the persons of God 
needs fuller articulation. 
There remains something attractive in Arius’s refusal to see created and uncreated 
being blend into a third entity which alone “allowed” correspondence to be 
possible. This is too mechanistic for Arius. He maintains, rather, that whatever 
knowledge of God is possible to humans as creatures, is possible only through 
Christ. This Christocentric subordinationism has a dialectically attractive 
Spirituality, which should not be overlooked in accounting for the reception of 
dyohypostatic Christology: 
To whomsoever believes... [w]e all need to discover, through faith, 
that love, in the vulnerability and weakness of our bodies, makes its 
                                                 
439 Cf. Trigg, 1998:63: “In the sphere of doctrine, we have already noted the way Origen…  
provided a way to relate divine grace to human free will that proved congenial to the Greek 
theological tradition… Origen distinguished himself from the Platonic tradition by insisting on the 
necessity of God’s grace if human beings are to become like God. Origen just as firmly defended 
human moral responsibility. Refuting philosophers and astrologers who would argue that human 
actions are pre-determined. He made a convincing case that God’s foreknowledge does not 
predetermine human actions and that God’s providence fully respects human free will.” 
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way into us as presence-of-the-Other who makes us live because we 
can only consent to Him without being able to possess Him.440  
Arius’s reported speech, therefore witnesses to a spirituality of difference, which 
Williams describes as an “unbridgeable gulf between God and all else”.441 The 
lack of ontological connection between God and creation in Arian thought marks i
as clearly delineating an impassable cwrismÒj between God and Creatio
Athanasius’s rigour in applying creatio ex nihilo contrapuntally intends to 
compound a sense of dislocation in Arius’s theology. It is to Alexander and 
Athanasius’s miahypostatic response to Arius’s thought that we now turn. 
t 
n. 
                                                
  
3.4  Evaluations of Arius by his opponents 
3.4.1 Alexander of Alexandria  
Theodoret’s claim that Arius was put in charge of scriptural exegesis442 is probably 
not an anti-Alexandrian slight, because there is evidence to support a view that 
Arius’s priority and expertise was scriptural exegesis. Alexander responds by 
rehearsing counter-texts to familiar dyohypostatic proof-texts,443 whilst 
Athanasius’s strategy is to engage on his enemy’s home ground, countering 
 
440 “A quiconque croit... [n]ous avons tous besoin de découvrir, par la foi, que l’amour, dans la 
fragilité et la faiblesse de notre corps, creuse en nous son lieu, comme présence de l’Autre qui 
nous fait vivre, parce que nous ne pouvons que consentir à lui sans le posséder.” Fuchs, 
1982:214. 
441 Williams, 2001: 177. 
442 Boularand, 1972, chapter 4, cited in Young, 1983:62. 
443 Arian favourites include Prov.8.22f, Philippians 2.9-10; Ps. 45.7,8 etc. Alexander’s response 
as the crisis unfolded, was to respond by the counter-rehearsal of texts, especially from the 
Johannine corpus, see Philarchos [c. 321/2, Williams, 2001:324 (after Opitz)]; Athanasius’s CA, 
on the other hand, dating from the second exile (c 339) is a doctrinal attack against the Arians, 
where something more than a balancing of texts was necessary.  
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traditionally subordinationist texts in context of the “focus”444 or “mind”445 of the 
whole Scriptural canon and Regula Fidei. Athanasius’s arguments often feel 
contrived, battling against the plain reading of the texts, but are serious attempts to 
counter what Athanasius insists is the reductionism of dyohypostatic readings. The 
differing strategies of Alexander and Athanasius will be explored, noting that whilst 
Alexander wishes to provide a counter-balance to what he saw as Arius’s improper 
selectivity of Scripture, Athanasius attempts to combat Arius’s incorrect 
construction of the whole sense of Scripture. 
 
3.4.1.1 Henos Somatos [Epistle Catholic of Alexander]446 
Henos Somatos [Hen. Som.] is generally acknowledged to be a “synodical 
report”447 bearing Alexander’s name (though signed by many more), less out of 
honour to his primacy than because he probably penned the encyclical. Stead 
(1988, 1994:170) has made a case for this being Athanasius’s earliest extant work 
around 318CE, but Kannengiesser (1991:400) follows Opitz’s dating of c.319CE. 
Williams (1987:55-59) argues for a date of around 325CE,448 “increasing the 
probability of this letter’s having been drafted by the hand of Athanasius as 
secretary to Alexander” (1987:51).  
                                                 
444 skopÒj. Torrance, 1997:25. 
445 di£noia Young, 1997:29 - 45. 
446 The opening Greek words of these documents are used to name these Epistles (after the 
practice of Williams and Stead). Hen. Som. refers to the “One Body” of the Church. Philarchos, 
describes “The ambitious and avaricious will of wicked men...” in Theodoret, HE 1.4 (Opitz, 
1935:19-28). Theodoret’s reliability is shown in his close attention to the text in Eranistes’s 
florilegia, although there may be good political sense for a champion of the Antiochene tradition to 
preserve Alexander, there is little reasonable probability of his assigning the material to Alexander 
knowing it to be false.  
447 Kannengiesser, 1991:400.  
448  From the signature of Colluthus as a personal repudiation of Arius, signed in 325 when a 
synod of Alexandrian clergy met with their diocesan, and when Colluthus, demoted from the 
Episcopate but restored as a presbyter to the Alexandrian Church, makes a public show of loyalty 
to Alexander. Kannengiesser is unconvinced, retaining the earlier date of 319 (1991:401).  
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Hen. Som. claims to preserve Christian unity by informing the universal Church, 
contra Eusebius of Nicomedia, of the dangers of dyohypostatic Christology which 
claimed:  
God was not always Father, but there was a time when God was not 
the Father. The Logos of God was not always, but was, rather, made 
from things that are not.449 
Hen. Som. maintains the true God made all temporal things out of nothing, thus 
Arius is depicted as being gravely disrespectful of the Logos when he describing 
him as a created thing, unlike the Father in oÙs…a, alien and separate from him. 
The Logos is mutable, the Father thus remains ineffable even to his Logos. The 
charge is one, not of over-emphasizing the Father’s transcendence, but of 
demeaning the Logos’s nature, status, work and person.450 The encyclical 
exposes  Arius’s (and his followers) dyohypostatic theology as lawfully 
anathematized and duly excommunicated, on the basis of predominantly 
Johannine proof-texts.451 Hen. Som. identifies the chief danger of such Christology
as introducing a breach in the perfect knowledge of the Father by the Son. This 
would render Scripture untrue, and endanger the surety of salvation which, t
Church has always proclaimed, is guaranteed by the Son’s perfect knowledge of, 
and participation in, the Father’s will.
 
he 
                      
452 The Epistle concludes with a sense of 
urgency and haste to expose the undercover evil, adapting, chameleon-like in its 
                           
 18; 14.9; 14.11; 10.30.    
449 Hen. Som. 1. 
450 Hen. Som. 2. 
451 Hen. Som. 3: John 1.1, 14,
452 Hen. Som. 4. 
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nature, but identified by the hallmark of persistence in denying the divinity of 
Christ.453   
454
The motif of ™x oÙk Ôntwn here is used entirely negatively. It is applied in Arius’s 
error, wrongly, to Christ. There is no exploration of the doctrinal appropriateness of  
creatio ex nihilo here: it is simply associated completely with Arius. We shall 
observe that this is also an assumption of Philarch., but that there, the author does 
at least use the term in a different and more positive sense vis à vis creation, yet 
without systematically differentiating its usage, rather, it is used as a shorthand for 
Arius’s error.  However, the encyclical appears to be hastily written, urgently 
focused upon exposing Arius and his colleagues, without entering into a clearly 
worked-out cosmological or Christological alternative to dyohypostatic errors. To 
have done so would indeed have given space for a closer exploration of the 
different models of Christology proffered by Arius and Alexander, but opened up 
unnecessary speculative debate, perhaps in the synod. Hen. Som. hence is a less-
discursive anathematising document. As a synodical document, it would, no doubt, 
ave reflected the contributions of Athanasius (and others) whoever the scribe 
was. 
 
Philarchos, on the other hand, is dated by Opitz (1935) as immediately prior to the 
 
h
 
3.4.1.2: Philarchos [Epistle of Alexander of Alexandria to Alexander of
Constantinople] 
Council of Nicaea (c.324) because it exhibits a more sophisticated explication of
                                                 
453 Hen. Som. 5 & 6. 
454 The lack of such a differentiation here might augur (against Williams) for an earlier dating. 
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what was to become that Council’s victorious argument.455 In complete harmony
with Hen. Som., Philarch. identifies at the outset that the quintessential error of 
Arius is making the Logos the “equal of all.”
 
ith created matter. Of 
prime significance here is Alexander’s initial description: 
m things which are not - 
including in this even the Son of God.458 
 
 a 
 
was known by God to be a safe pair of hands, and proven himself a good soul  
on account of the carefulness of his manners and his practice.460 
                                                
456 The reference is less to a concern 
which emphasized the soteriological significance humanity of Christ,457 than to a 
desire to ensure that the Logos is ontologically identified w
they say that God made all things fro
Alexander’s primary charge against Arius is that he applies the doctrine of creatio
ex nihilo to the divine Son, lumping the Logos with things which have come into 
being and which will pass away.459 Alexander’s first argument is rhetorical: it is
reductio ad absurdum when pondered from the perspective of the redemptive 
economy. Christ is “made” the ultimate and universal Saviour simply because he
Alexander argues against the application of creatio ex nihilo, then, when applied 
directly to the Son: this makes Jesus essentially no different from Peter or Paul or 
 
prompting Eusebius Pamphilus’s denial of the co-existence [sunuparchein] in his letter to 
Alexander. Williams admits that the date does little to change the overall picture of Alexander’s 
theological understanding or its significant antithesis to Arius’s theology.  
455 Williams, 1987:59, sed contra, reconstructs a chronology that best fits the enigma of 
Colluthus, suggesting that Philarch. is an earlier exploration by Alexander dating from 321/2, 
456  Philarch. 1. 
457 This is a later “Antiochene” reading, which attends theologically to the humanity of Christ. 
There are superficial parallels – Christ is the Captain of Salvation, the first of many brethren, etc. 
These motifs, among others, led Gregg and Groh (1981:43-76) to their soteriological analysis of 
Arianism. 
458 Philarch. 1. 
459 Philarch. 2. In chapter 7, Alexander groups humanity and angels together as creatures, with 
the ontological corollary that they make progress, move and change by virtue. Alexander insists 
that it is hybris to assume that the Logos of God likewise comprehends things in a linear manner. 
460 Philarch. 3. 
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any other soul determined to will and do the good. This undermines the model of 
mediation Alexander offers a few chapters on, and exhibits what Newman 
described as the “humanistic” interest of Arian theology.461 It is, Alexander argue
a grotesque irony, as it makes the Creator to be, in fact, a Creature.
s, 
 
 for 
in 
ke one draw back from applying functions of the doctrine of ™x 
oÙk Ôntwn to the Son as if to any other creature. Saying that there was when the 
Logos was not: 
is [he says,] a mark of sheer ignorance…insist[ing] that the one who 
is the cause of every thing is posterior to the origin of that thing.  
e 
rguments 
y a differentiated, apophatic 
                                                
462 Alexander
protests that the reason followers of Arius have been led into such stupor is that 
their failure to recognize the genre and limits of theological language. Alexander 
thinks this is an important issue, underscoring, at the end of Philarch., the need
humility in theology.463 Appealing for an admission of the limits of human reason 
the face of the ultimate mystery of the incarnation,464 he argues that common 
sense would ma
465
So Alexander judges Arius’s argument “impious”: Athanasius uses this self-same 
description about his opponents’ arguments, when he believes that they ar
unable, through being inappropriately undifferentiated, to recognize that a
apply in different ways according to the oÙs…a of the subject.466 Though 
Athanasius attempts a theology of the Son b
 
461 Newman, 1833:20 on what he called the “Syrian School of Theology’s” “Judaizing tendency”, 
cf. judged by Williams, 1987:3-4 as not Newman’s best contribution. Newman’s language and 
conceptuality vis à vis Judaism is unacceptable to twenty-first century minds, but was common 
mid-nineteenth-century parlance. Certainly, Cardinal Newman’s analysis corresponds in large 
part to that of Alexander, and is certainly a leitmotif of later Alexandrian attacks upon Antiochene 
models of Christology. 
462 Philarch. 4.   
463 Philarch. 4, Cp also 12. 
464 Philarch. 5. 
465 Philarch. 6, 9. 
466 Cf. Torrance, 1997:13-46.  
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application of 
to reiterate th
it would be more godly and true to signify God from the Son, and call 
Athanasius’s distinctive application of theology to divine essence requires a 
disciplined identification of the nature of the subject and appropriate humility. This 
familiar theolo
interpretation,
Origen held that through divine inspiration, the human terms found in 
Holy Scripture are governed by the nature (fÚsei) related to them... 
spiritual interpretations of the Holy Scriptures, in accordance with the 
spiritual nature of those realities, must involve a passage in thought 
from a lower level of ‘bodily’ or literal sense to a higher level of 
Arius and his followers were, to Alexander and Athanasius, in the dark. Athanasius 
attempts to reclaim the miahypostatic significance of the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo, reverently applied to the Son so reinforcing the homoousion, but Alexander 
reacts to Arius’s critique of ÐmooÚsioj by asserting that the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo is wholly inappropriate to all but created existence. Athanasius, avoiding the 
term ÐmooÚsioj, (save in CA 1.8.1), launches a direct attack by applying the 
                                                
creatio ex nihilo in CG-DI, such careful theological method leads him 
is concern of Alexander thus: 
him Father, than to name him from his works and call him 
Unoriginate.467 
gical method has a clear Alexandrian pedigree in Origen’s biblical 
 which Torrance (1997:36) describes thus: 
spiritual, mystical meaning where the truth shines in its own self-
evidencing intellectual light.468  
 
467 CA  1.34, translation of Torrance: 1997:76. 
468 Citing Origen De Princ. 1.1.1f; 1.3.3; 2.2.2; 2.4.4; 2.5.2; 2.7.2; 2.11.2ff; 3.5.1; 3.12.4; 4.2.1ff, 
15. Cf. Trigg, 1985.  
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doctrine reflexively so as to reinforce the ontological divide, yet urging that even 
the notion of creatio ex nihilo, though characteristically associated with the Arian 
case, promotes the truth of ÐmooÚsioj. 
e Christians heirs, not to the path of human virtue, but to his 
divine power.470  
 Son, he 
ther,471 could the cross be a glorious scandal and not merely 
a human tragedy.472 
referring to 
n 
                                                
Only if the Son is of the same nature as the Father can the sonship (sic)469 of 
Christians be secured: it is because the Logos is the true Son that the spirit of 
adoption can mak
Alexander’s attack is founded upon his claim that without a grasp of the Logos’s 
divine nature, the scandal of the cross is lost. It is only because Christ incarnate 
was the divine Logos that as the “proper, peculiar, natural and excellent”
was delivered for those who are not so. The paradox is great as are the 
consequences. Only if the Logos is indeed immutable, unchanging, sinless, the 
eternal icon of the Fa
Alexander identifies the impiety of Arius’s creatio ex nihilo Christology, 
it as the cause of the error,473 locating it as the core of the presbyter’s 
Christological calumny. In opting for a description of the Logos as made from 
things which were not, Arius avoids “two unbegottens” or Sabellian modalism, but 
Alexander insists these are not the only alternatives. He argues that Arius’s falsely 
dualistic Christology where creatio ex nihilo is applied undifferentiatedly to the So
 
469 Despite the obvious sexist language, sonship is retained here, after Gals. 4 “And if a Son then 
an heir”: the significant thing about a shared sonship is the shared inheritance of divine 
participation for Athanasius. 
470  Philarch. 7. 
471 Philarch. 7, 9. Alexander’s argues that to admit temporality and change would undermine any 
claim for the Logos to be “the faultless and living mirror of the Divine nature.” 
472 Philarch. 8. 
473 Philarch. 9. 
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is a greater folly than the miahypostatic errors which so offend Arius. Alexan
caricatures Arius as offering simplistic and improper theological description 
undermined by a failure to grasp the magnitude of the contrast between
unbegotten God and the things created ex nihilo: ex nihilo, nihil fac. So 
Athanasius’s reclaiming of the doctrine, and his sophisticated application of it to 
Christology in the CG-DI changes the association of this doctrine from being (in 
Alexander’s shorthand) the centre of the Arian error. In CA Athanasius applies this 
doctrine to undergird an interpretation of the Incarnation consistent with Ð
– but mentioning the term but once. Like Alexander, he arrives at a great 
cosmological-ontological gulf (cwrismÒj) between the eternal divine nature a
creation, Alexander by avoiding th
der 
 the 
mooÚsioj 
nd 
e doctrine, Athanasius by a most careful 
application of it. Alexander writes 
he Middle Place is the only begotten, the 
Logos of Divine nature.474 
ace. 
 
tence” with the Logos holding a traditional “linking” mediatorial 
significance.  
theological method, claiming apostolicity for his own theology in a quasi-credal 
                                                
Between the two, holding t
This “middle Place” is the place of governance of all creation by the Logos 
maintaining all things in harmony: all things exist in as far as they remain in him. 
Such security, Athanasius explicitly argues is possible only when created reality 
rests (mene‹n) in the divinity of the Logos - for Athanasius there is no middle pl
Alexander echoes the conventional cosmologically of a Platonic mind-set of a
“ladder of exis
Philarch. concludes with Alexander offering his version of orthodox faith and 
 
474 Philarch. 11. 
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form.475 The Unbegotten Father begets his only Son, not ex nihilo, but of himself, 
“not by splitting off or by emanation of distinct levels of reality (so Sabellius and 
Valentinus), but “in an unutterable and inexplicable fashion, since his Øpost£sij 
defies investigation by any entity that has come into being.”476 Being a creature is 
insufficient qualification to claim theological authority, argues Alexander, just as an 
ex nihilo Logos could not perfectly know the mystery of the Father’s will and being: 
the form of his divine generation is not to be grasped by the natural 
capacities of rational beings.477 
Alexander reflects with sophistication upon the Son’s eternal dependence upon the 
Father (after Hebrews 1.3: the effulgence of his glory and the express image of the 
Father’s ØpÒstasij) insisting that “eternity” be not confused with “unbegotten”. The 
eternal, divine nature is still that of self-differentiated divinity eternally begotten in 
the primordial Son.478  The appropriate response is humble recognition that human 
reason cannot plumb the depths of divine mystery.479 Appropriate theological 
honour of the Son is founded upon the distinction between created minds and his 
eternal nature, but Alexander’s cognition of the eternal generation insists upon 
distinction between Father and Logos. Alexander expresses this in biblical terms of 
limitation: “in this alone is he inferior to the Father, that he is not unbegotten.”480 
Human reason lacks the ontological qualifications to engage in essential theology, 
but Alexander offers a pneumatological resolution. The Spirit, proceeding from the 
                                                 
475 Philarch. 12. 
476 Philarch. 12, translation Williams, 1987:249. 
477 Philarch. 12. 
478 Philarch 12, Williams’s translation of ¢rca…othta 1987:249f. 
479  “the words of the holy struggling as best they can to make the mystery clear is limited  in so 
far as it is possible to grasp them.” Philarch. 12. 
480 Philarch. 12. 
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divine nature, imparts holy understanding as an inaugurator, motivator and inspirer 
of Old Testament prophets and the teachers of the new Covenant. Williams notes  
the most distinctive feature of this text... is probably its markedly 
apophatic character. The tension between the eikon theology of 
some passages and the insistence elsewhere on God’s abiding 
inaccessibility to reason is no less pronounced for being very 
typically Alexandrian.481 
Whilst reflecting this theological carefulness, Athanasius, nonetheless, is not 
dissuaded from freshly reapplying the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo and applying 
mediation ontologically in the miahypostatic case. Athanasius anoints creatio ex 
nihilo for Christological use in a miahypostatic framework. 
 
3.5 The Orationes contra Arianos of Athanasius  
CA reflects Athanasius’s systematic engagement with the theological implications 
of Arius’s thought. Athanasius shares Alexander’s apophatic method: without a 
divine ontological initiative, where theological language is dependent upon God’s 
self-disclosure in Christ, it is impossible. The starting point for theology is the 
reality of the Incarnation: 
The Incarnation means that God has really given himself and 
communicated himself in his eternal Word to mankind. It is out of that 
Word and in accordance with the way which that Word has taken in 
the Incarnation that genuine theological statements are made. They 
                                                 
481 Williams, Arius, 1987:252. 
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are genuine statements in so far as they derive from that Word and 
refer back to it: that is their essential analogic.482 
Athanasius’s argument is that Arius’s theological method is indistinguishable from 
muqologe‹n kat' ™p…noian in contrast to an authentic qeologe‹n kat¦ di£noian. 
Whilst it is superficially Scriptural, Arius actually subjects the Bible to a priori 
assertions about the nature and unknowability of God. Whilst claiming to be a 
scriptural exegete, Arius is in fact mythologizing Scripture and blending scriptural 
words with commonly held contemporary cosmological assumptions into a hybrid. 
Ironically also whilst Arius seeks to describe a model of divine activity of God’s 
freedom drawing creatures into a restoring relationship with him, not determined by 
divine ontology necessitating this, Athanasius claims that Arius  
reduced the act of salvation to the reversion of the many to the One. 
Thus history as God’s activity was almost eliminated. Under the 
influence of the biblical concept of history the return of the many was 
perhaps identified as an education on the part of God or as the 
divine reconstitution of all things. But essentially that return was 
more like a natural process than a constant operation of God, 
inspired by wrath and love.483 
This section approaches Athanasius’s theological method by exploring his 
understanding of the Logos as mediator. Mediation in dyohypostatic theological 
constructs provoked Christological controversy to (and beyond) Chalcedon. Arius’s 
conservative, apparently biblicist, arguments were a popular, acceptable 
                                                 
482 T. F. Torrance, 1965:36, in A. J. Torrance, 1996, 191.  
483 Studer, 1993:17.  
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representation of traditional pre-Nicene subordinationism, but provocatively 
changed by his insistence upon the Son’s creation out of nothing. Athanasius 
persistently criticises Arius’s formulations because they have moved from the 
continuity in Origen’s theology. Athanasius accepts the breach, but offers a 
contrary theological solution. CA has serious strategic strength. By engaging with 
Arius’s own arguments, focused in exegesis based upon fragments of his own 
words, Athanasius seeks to prevent his opponents from distancing their 
dyohypostatic Christologies from Arius. Passages of Arius’s Thalia are rehearsed 
(and followed by paraphrase in Thalia A), in order to demonstrate Athanasius’s 
argument that Asterius and his contemporaries are connected to Arius and his 
hybris as their fountain-head.484 
3.5.1: CA I  
The starting point for Athanasius’s attack on Arian thought in CA I illustrates his 
prime objective of exposing “Arian” theological language and framework of as 
inadequate. As a heretic, Arius is not connected with the life-giving truth of Christ, 
and as such condemned to the Godless falling back into nothing, which is the end 
of all creatures.485 The attraction of Arius’s arguments, Athanasius admits, are 
                                                 
484 We shall examine CA I and II.  III & IV appear in chapter 4 as Apollinarius’s understanding  of 
mediation in henoprosopic - as distinct from miahypostatic - theological model. The theory of 
Kannengiesser that CA III is Apollinarian is evaluated there. We accept as authentic for the 
purposes of this chapter Athanasian authorship for the first two discourses. Cf. Kannengiesser, 
1982 and Lienhard, 1999:5 “if Athanasius and Marcellus did not meet in Tyre, they certainly met 
in Rome. The year or so that they spent there may have been their most important contact. In any 
case, the known history of Marcellus after 340 is principally the history of the relationship with 
Athanasius. Marcellus may have encouraged Athanasius to take up the pen against the Arians 
[So Tetz, 1979:337-338]. Athanasius probably wrote Orations against the Arians I and II in Rome 
in 339-340, when he and Marcellus were together there. [Theodore Zahn, over a century ago, 
noted that Marcellus influenced Athanasius’s exegesis of Prov 8:22 in Or c Arianos 2, 18-82; 
(Zahn, 1867:118)]”. Young, 1997:30 opts for a date around the 350s. Whilst not unreasonable, 
Lienhard (ibid) and Anatolios, 1998:87 convincingly establish a date of around 339, maintaining 
significant exegetical connections between Athanasius and Marcellus. In defence of Young, there 
is nothing to prevent this influence in applying Prov 8:22 to the incarnation living with Athanasius 
throughout his exiles.  
485 CA 1, 1, MPG 26, 12-13; 55, MPG 26, 125-127. 
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superficially seductive because of a scriptural “flavour” - they are scriptural 
phrases, but woven, as is Satan’s wont, into a deceptive cloak, which is not the 
Christian language of the ancient Catholic faith.486  
Christian theology, in contrast to Arius, takes the witness of Scripture and 
discourses with it freely under the guidance of the whole of Scripture and the 
Spirit.487 This reveals that Arius’s doctrine is alien to the witness of Scripture: 
Scripture does not engender or allow [Arius’s doctrines]: it has been 
shown and shall be shown again that their doctrine is alien to the 
divine testimony [¢llÒtria taàta tîn qe…wn log…wn].488 
Athanasius’s comprehension of scriptural texts is thus informed by a broader rule 
of faith of the Church, and his theological acumen exercised in contrasting the 
eternity of the Son to temporality in Arius’s crass assertions that Óti Ãn pote Óte 
oÙk Ãn [Ð uƒÒj], and oÙk Ãn Ð uƒÕj prˆn gennhqÍ.489 The Son, Athanasius 
argues, is the eternal radiance of light eternal. Stead (1994:171) comments: 
the Son is eternally generated from the Father by a spiritual outflow 
like the sun’s radiance which implies no division or diminution. The 
Son is ‘proper to his substance’, idios tēs ousias, but a distinct 
expression of it; for though existing ‘in the bosom of the Father’ he 
can simultaneously permeate the universe and moreover inhabit the 
human body in which he suffered on the Cross (so DI 17)... The 
                                                 
486 E„ d ¢gnooàntej oÛtw ceim£zontai kaˆ toiaàta Battologoàsi, maqštwsan ¢pÕ tîn Gpafîn, Óti 
kaˆ Ð t¦j aƒršseij ™pino»saj di£boloj di¦ t¾n „d…an tÁj kak…aj duswd…an kicr©tai t¦j lšxeij tîn 
Grafîn... CA 1, 8: MPG 26, 23. 
487 CA 1, 9: MPG 26, 28. 
488 CA 1, 10: MPG 26, 33. 
489 CA 1, 11: MPG 26, 33-35. 
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Father’s whole being and power is communicated to the Son, and 
through him to the world; yet we cannot say that the Son is less than, 
or other than, the Father. Yet they are not interchangeable, still less 
identical as Persons; the Father himself remains the ultimate source 
from which glory flows out and to which thanksgiving is returned. 
The Father and the Son, then, are theological absolutes, whereas Arius makes 
both derivatives of a pre-existent Original Monad.490 Athanasius insists that the 
Father is the ontological origin of the Son, unlike Arius’s attempts to allow a 
created Logos to be called “Son” and “God” by participation (kat¦ metous…an). 
Athanasius demands to know how a created Logos may thus “partake”?491 The 
option is either participation in another “will” external to the transcendent Monad 
(who remains unattainable) - thus the Logos would not be “second” after the 
Father,492 but third after this other hypostasized Will; or participation by oÙs…a in 
the nature or being of the Father - a complete, mutual and eternal participation and 
dwelling, rooted in the Father having begotten the Son. 
Athanasius drives this home soteriologically. Christian life is participation in the life 
of God - in divine nature, so 2 Peter 1.4 and the witness of the tradition of faith.493 
                                                 
490 See Thalia S, above:  “For there is a Triad, but the glories are not equal / Their substances 
unmingled / [O]ne is more glorious than the others - even to the boundlessness of infinity: 
/ The Father is alien by nature from the Son.” 
491 t…noj to…nun ™sti mštocoj; CA I: 15; MPG 26,44. 
492 On the Logos as a “second” God, see Origen CC V. 39: “It must be realized that by a ‘second 
God’ we mean just this: the virtue that includes all virtues, the Logos that includes every kind of 
reason... and we say that this virtue and Logos is uniquely associated and made one with the 
soul of Jesus, since he alone has been perfectly capable of the utmost participation in absolute 
Reason, absolute Wisdom, absolute Righteousness.” 
493 AÙtoà g¦r toà uƒoà metšcontej toà qeoà metšcein legÒmeqa, kaˆ toàto ™stin, Ö œlegen Ð 
Petroj, `/Ina gšnhsqe qe…aj koinwnoˆ fÚsewj. CA 1, 16: MPG 26, 44-45. Cf. Origen CC III.28f: 
“from Jesus began a weaving together of the divine and human nature in order that human 
nature, through fellowship with what is more divine, might become divine, not only in Jesus but 
also in all those who, besides believing in Jesus, take up the life which he taught; the life which 
leads everyone who lives according to the precepts of Jesus to friendship with God and 
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Readers are presented with an enormous contrast: a choice between God, 
sublime in his transcendence, inapproachable and unknowable, between whom 
and the Logos there is an unbreachable gulf; and a thorough and real  participation 
in the Father through the Son for Christians. Athanasius propounds a soteriological 
theology because the Son mediates that in which he participates. For Arius the 
Logos is the summit of creation, for Athanasius, a begotten Son offers the 
opportunity of a theology of divine oÙs…a. Eternal generation is his response to 
Arian accusations of emanation diminishing the divine oÙs…a: 
oÜte Ð uƒÕj ™x ¢po¸·o…aj ™stˆ toà patrÕj.494  
Appropriate trinitarian theology is thus brought centre stage. Trinitarian language 
has to be more than metaphorical or a theologoumenon: it must refer to the eternal 
reality of God as God is: it must be realist, referential language. Only a 
miahypostatic theology, Athanasius argues, rooted in the full divinity of the Son 
properly honours the Father.495 For Athanasius, Christian theology is not the 
description or delineation of God from without, but participation in divine life 
through connection and participation in God’s nature by dwelling in the Son who 
remains in the Father. So Athanasius’s understanding of the place of revelation in 
his trinitarian theology is fundamental. Scriptural description of Father and Son 
renders “Maker / Creator” epithets inadequate to the incarnation as the heart of 
Christian faith. “Creator / creature” language is inadequate because a 
Christological outworking of the implications of creatio ex nihilo reinforces the 
                                                                                                                                                 
fellowship with him.” Friendship and fellowship are less than the ontological transformation 
Athanasius and (later) Cyril require. 
494 CA 1, 21: MPG 26, 56-7. 
495 Contrast his choice of Arius’s Thalia in Thalia S, above: Arius’s couplets are quoted because 
Athanasius believes Arius’s attempts to honour the Father by diminishing the Son are grotesque 
and unacceptable to Christian piety.  
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unbridgeable gulf and the impossibility of non-revealed theology.496 The Logos’s 
role in the creation must be considered: his creaturely activity undermines a 
theology supposedly aware of the theological significance of ontological 
incompatibility. Father-Son language, consistently applied, checks a “background” 
Monist idea of God. 
Athanasius admits that the eternal generation of the Son is not entirely to be 
compared with human begetting,497 but Father-Son language conveys the greater 
theological truth about God, more appropriately linguistically framing Christian truth 
than biblical words promoting a theology based on the work of God in creation, 
whilst remaining external to divine nature. The language of Father-Son relation 
opens that inner-trinitarian, personal oÙs…a dimension only in miahypostatic 
theology. 
So Athanasius expounds the theological significance of miahypostatic terminology 
as relational, essential and indispensible to authentic speech about God. His long 
theological prologomena prevents the collapse of theology into a dyohypostatic 
emphasis upon the sovereign “will” of the Monad, without authentic participation of 
Father and Son, where the Christian is incapable of sharing the divine life (for this 
is not really the Son’s). His foundation takes seriously the humanity and the divinity 
of the Logos in one personality, and emerges with theological weight in CA II’s 
exposition of the incarnation. 
There is, however, a problem associated with Athanasius’s project of addressing 
favourite “Arian” proof-texts of the Logos being a creature. In contrast to divine 
                                                 
496 CA 1, 24: MPG 26, 60-61. 
497 CA 1, 28: MPG 26, 69. 
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impassibility, texts which describe Jesus as weeping or thirsting are accounted for 
by Athanasius admitting that the incarnate Son’s humanity suffered these 
passions, not the divine Logos. Ironically, he thus de facto divides the natures in a 
manner that Cyril, for example, will say is improper. Thus it will be Athanasius to 
whom the Antiochenes will appeal for ammunition against Alexandrian exegetical 
style. In Athanasius this is part of his application of creatio ex nihilo in a 
differentiated manner to the Son: but it will become an uncomfortable factor for 
Cyril who will object against such interpretation on the grounds of communicatio 
idiomatum. 
After this theological setting in context, Athanasius wrestles favourite “Arian” texts 
back into an “orthodox” conceptuality by drawing out the overall movement and 
meaning of Scriptural witness, its di£noia. Athanasius draws texts and episodes 
into a primarily soteriological context: Christ was baptized not for his own need (his 
oÙs…a’s sake), but for the economy of our salvation.498  
Such exegesis weaves together a reading of each specific text’s meaning with the 
broader scriptural sense499 thus criticizing Arius’s theological vocabulary and 
method. For example, to call God “Unoriginate” (¢gšnhton)500 is an unscriptural 
word - just as ÐmooÚsioj is - but, unlike ÐmooÚsioj, “Unoriginate” is alien to the 
sense of Scripture, and to true [miahypostatic] Christian theology, because it 
assumed that access to the divine is through the works of creation rather than the 
fact of ontological relation of Father and Son. A “creaturely spirituality” is 
something Arius holds dear - but Athanasius describes this theological preference 
                                                 
498 Cf. Athanasius’s treatment of Philippians 2.9-10; Ps 45.7,8; Hebrews 1.4; in addition to the 
baptism narratives and other Synoptic episodes, etc. CA 1, 37 -  64: MPG 26, 88-145. 
499 Young’s description of Athanasius’s exegetical method, making much of the di£noia of 
Scripture, relates to the regula fidei of the earlier church in 1994:29-45 & 9-28. 
500 CA 1, 33; MPG 26, 80. 
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as a Greek de-personalization of God.501 Athanasius thus establishes at once a 
Christocentric theology and a theological hermeneutic: Christ mediates a full and 
true theological understanding of the Father because he participates by nature in 
the Father, and dwells in the baptized, effecting a true ontological union between 
divine and created. Texts that refer to the economy, focused on the humanity of 
Christ, are located in a broader context, giving a differentiated sense to his 
theology of the divine Logos perfectly united with the Father and with the humanity 
that he formed for himself. Context is vital for his theological method: 
For had [Arius and his followers]...known the person, the subject, 
and the timing of the apostolic speech [=Scripture], they would not 
have applied to Christ’s divine nature things belonging to his 
humanity, nor committed themselves to such foolishness [leading to] 
such grotesque irreligion.502  
Theodoret of Cyrus develops this – citing Athanasius as exemplar of this 
exegetical tradition – in his “double application” of Scripture, extrapollating the 
theological significance of Christ’s humanity - ¹ ¢nqrwpÒthj. Here, though, 
Athanasius’s main theological point (mutual participation of Father and Son 
through a shared divine Ñus…a) depends entirely upon the divinity of the Logos. 
Though Athanasius does not preclude debate about, for example, a double 
ÐmooÚsioj or a theology of the human nature of Christ, his context is the conflict 
                                                 
501 kaˆ oátoi mn ¢gšnhton lšgontej, mÒnon ™k tîn œrgwn shma…nousin aÙtÒn, kaˆ oÙk ‡sasi 
kaˆ aÙtoˆ tÕn uƒÕn êsper `/Ellhnej, Ð d Patšra lšgwn tÕn qeÕn ™k toà lÒgou shma…nei 
toàton. CA 1, 33: MPG 26, 80. 
502  E„ g¦r ™gnèkeisan tÒ te prÒswpon kaˆ tÕ pr©gma kaˆ tÕn kairÕn toà ¢postolikoà ·htoà, oÙk 
¥n, t¦ ¢nqrèpina e„j t¾n qeÒthta ™klamb£nontej, tosoàton ºseboàn oƒ ¥fronej CA 1, 55: MPG 26, 
124.  
 219
with dyohypostatic theologies which require a sustained and convincing theology 
of Christ’s divinity: to this is the remainder of CA I addressed. 
Athanasius accuses Arius of blending Greek ideas with a theology of revelation 
that is no further advanced than the Old Testament dispensation. The Old 
Covenant, mediated by angels and by Moses (creatures), perfected no-one.503 
Death’s reign brought ontological annihilation to humanity, which since the Fall 
was unable to remain with God. This dislocation was exposed but not resolved by 
the Old Testament, which remained divine revelation, but where the people of God 
remained creatures pondering God from the foot of the mountain, and suffering 
death and diminishment (“dying in death”). The contrast of this with the Christian 
dispensation, Athanasius argues, could not be greater: 
™n dš tù Cristù p£ntej zwopoioÚmeqa.504 
The real significance of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo for Athanasius is that it 
applies to humanity but not to Christ; yet the grace of God is made plain in the 
Logos’s acceptance of the consequences of humanity’s falling back into nothing, 
and exchanges humanity’s destiny for eternal life in himself, and full participation in 
the divine life he shares with the Father. A creaturely spirituality (or soteriology, as 
Arius prefers) is inadequate because it lacks this scope (Arius, of course, would 
have rejected the necessity of this construction). Humanity’s creation out of 
nothing, allows for no ontological vestigia Dei in people. “Natural” ideas, assertions 
and assumptions about the divine cannot but be projection across an ontological 
chasm which does not allow human logic to apply directly. Athanasius insists that 
                                                 
503 Ð nÒmoj d di' ¢ggšlwn ™lal»qh, kaˆ oÙdšna tetele…wke. CA 1, 59: MPG 26, 136. 
504 CA 1, 59: MPG 26, 136. 
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the cwrismÒj or hermeneutical gap, applies to all corrupted human notions of 
transcendence. All theology must have an ana-logic, must be referred to authentic 
revelation of God in the Son. Arius’s improper theological starting point leads to all 
subsequent errors. His application of human language – even words from 
Scripture without an overarching comprehension of the di£noia of Scripture and 
essential miahypostatic theology – is his foundational error. Christ cannot mediate 
that in which he does not participate by nature. 
3.5.2: CA II 
Athanasius opens his second oration with a resumé of arguments in CA I.505 The 
reader is reminded that to understand the di£noia of Scripture, the appropriate 
whole context of the Christian dispensation must be held in mind - otherwise one is 
tossed about on the waves of “irreligious thoughts” and opinions.506  
¹ di£noia tîn gegrammšnwn ™stˆn Ñrq».507 
The mind or purpose of Scripture reveals that the Word became flesh - and the 
central tenets of the Christian faith are the means to understand the fullest 
significance of texts. Specific contexts are much less significant than this 
overarching theological hermeneutic, without which context, one might say, 
individual texts become pretexts to interpretations according to opinion, 
muqologe‹n kat' ™p…noian instead of qeologe‹n kat¦ di£noian. Athanasius 
                                                 
505 I.e., that it is the Regula Fidei as a whole which counterbalances Arius’s opinionated textual 
selectivity in exegetical hermeneutics; and that breach of connection between Father and Son in 
Arius’s theology results in the loss of theological apprehension, CA II, 1 MPG 26, 147-149. 
Athanasius revisits his argument that texts cannot be applied Christologically willy nilly, without an 
eye to the thrust or dianoia of scriptural revelation. Thus they must be applied in a differentiated 
way, to the humanity or divinity of Christ as the overarching context dictates. Athanasius insists 
that any theology based on an assertion that the Son is in fact a work has a self-defeating a-logic. 
CA II, 2. MPG 26, 149-150. 
506 CA II. 5. MPG 26, 156-157. 
507 CA II. 7. MPG 26, 160. 
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understands the Old Testament primarily Christologically, as a fore-shadowing of 
the incarnation. Texts out of this context, then, should not, he argues, be used to 
determine Christological arguments. Alighting upon Old Testament references to 
priesthood, Athanasius argues that they find their fullest meaning in the mediatorial 
priesthood of Christ. The Logos did not “become other than himself in taking the 
flesh”, rather, the flesh is the priestly robe and role that Christ assumed in the 
economy.508 Priesthood and mediation is a very significant dimension of 
Athanasius’s - and thereby miahypostatic theology’s - argument, as a function of 
the economy. The Mystery of the enfleshed Logos epitomises this essential truth 
of his priesthood – it is epiphanic of the essential Mediation central to the 
hypostatic identity of Father and Son: 
the putting on of a created, made body - which he can offer for us is 
the reason [Scripture] refers to his being made.509  
“Being made” and “becoming” High Priest in the flesh and mediation are integrated 
functions in the essential truth of incarnation, intelligible only through the 
perspective of the whole framework of Christian truth. Each works only when there 
is ontological identification of the Son with the divine nature. Incarnation is the sole 
means of ontological mediation, because its whole motivation is Christ’s priestly 
manifestation of divine mercy pro nobis. The Logos has no personal need to take 
flesh in order to come fully into existence - unlike creatures: 
                                                 
508 CA II. 8. MPG 26, 161 – 164. 
509 CA II. 8. MPG 26, 161 - 164. On Marcellus’s contribution to Athanasius’s interpretation of Prov 
8.22 from the perspective of the incarnation see Zahn, 1867:118; Young 1997:37; Stead, 
1994:170. 
 222
human beings are clothed in flesh in order to be and to exist, but the 
Word of God was made man in order to sanctify [all subsisting] 
flesh.510 
Mediation is evident, but construed without dyohypostatic voluntarist emphasis: it 
is here the consequence of real, ontological divine incarnation, which transformed 
creatures’ nature and destiny only because the Logos was not a creature. The 
assumption of human nature to the divine is possible through the Logos’ being 
“made” flesh, being “made” priest and mediator. This revelatory usage of “being 
made” remains for Athanasius within the overall di£noia of the incarnation.511 Thus 
he sets a detailed Sitz im Leben for his reading of Proverbs 8:22. Athanasius’s 
exegesis kicks away any “ladder of existence” from the epistemological 
scaffolding: insisting upon the primacy of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo over a 
hierarchy of Being. God is not simply a craftsman par excellence, not “maker” but 
absolutely Creator.512 God’s Logos calls into being things that were not: he must, 
therefore, share the divine nature. Were the Logos merely “the first among many 
brethren,” he would not be able to create or mediate - indeed logically there would 
be an infinite regress without ultimate resolution: 
if creation could not endure the Logos’s divine hand in creation, then 
the Logos [if he were a creature] could not endure this divine weight 
of glory. Were this the case, if created being could not endure to be 
of God’s own making, there would arise the need for a mediator. The 
Logos – as a created being – would need a medium in his own 
                                                 
510 CA II. 10. MPG 26, 165-168. 
511 CA II. 15. MPG 26, 177. 
512 CA II. 22. MPG 26, 192-193. 
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creation by God... so shall we invent a vast crowd of accumulating 
mediators, so that creation could not ever have come to be!513  
For Athanasius such “protective” creaturely fearfulness, though pretending to be 
honorific to the divine nature, is, in fact, a cosmology alien from the di£noia of 
Scripture. God’s participation with Creation through the Logos is not squeamish - 
Athanasius refers again to the metaphor of the Sun’s radiance as an image of the 
Son’s divine being mediating the essence of the Father - like the warmth and light 
of the Sun’s rays, so the divine Son is the active dimension of divine nature: God’s 
embodied purpose “made” flesh. 
Athanasius thus moves to a sacramental / soteriological dimension. Salvation 
through baptism into the body of Christ is ineffectual if Christ is a creature – hence 
Arian baptism is invalid – as all creatures “naturally” have a created Ñus…a, there 
is no advantage in being united with the “senior” creature – no significant hierarchy 
of created being can compensate for the ultimate differentiation demonstrated 
between created and divine nature.514 Athanasius soteriological emphasis in the 
remainder of CA II offers a “comedy” as the ontological basis of Christian salvation 
thus:515 
[1] The begotten Son [4] might be made to share 
 the divine nature of the 
 begotten Son             
? ? 
[2] is made flesh                           ? so that         ?           [3] created flesh   
                                                 
513 CA II ,26 MPG 26, 201-204. 
514 CA II. 41 MPG 26, 233-236. 
515 CA II. 55-58 MPG 26, 261- 272. 
 224
This would not be possible were the Logos a creature, there would be no 
connection, there could be no repair or mediation. The otherness of the Logos’s 
nature from that of creatures and his essential unity with the Father is, thus, an 
absolute requirement for Christian theology. Implicitly woven into the fabric of 
Athanasius’s argument is his recognition that were the Son a creature, then he 
could not bring new creation to birth. This will find fullest expression in 
Athanasius’s writings on the divinity of the Holy Spirit’s role in salvation. The focus 
here, however, is sustained and clear, if repetitive, there is a central place for 
mediation in Athanasius’s miahypostatic theology - in fact it becomes a way of 
pressing home the importance of the divinity of the Son in a “radiance which 
implies no division or diminution” (Stead, 1994:170). 
  
3.6 Distinctive functions of mediation in conflicting Christological 
models 
Within Arius’s dyohypostatic theology, the mediation of the Logos is traditionally 
subordinationist, but nonetheless has a central cosmological-soteriological 
function. Mediation is of central importance, if worked-out very differently, in 
Athanasius’s miahypostatic theological tradition. Any picture of Arius’s theology 
must admit that any description after the conflicts of the fourth century are tied up 
with the victorious community’s memory. Athanasius intends to preserve and 
promote the understanding of this conflict in miahypostatic terms. 
Critiques of Athanasius as “political” (and thus bad) are as anachronistic as 
prejudicial views of Arius as “Other” (and thus bad). The struggle for miahypostatic 
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Christology required sustained and strong theological and ecclesiological conflict. 
The Christian community’s move from being a persecuted minority required 
sustained theological articulation as part of its responsibility – constructing a 
means of describing God and ecclesial life in changed circumstances.516 
Athanasius’s engagement with Arius was not merely coping strategy but a 
changing strategy.  Athanasius’s contra mundum epithet reflects the degree of his 
commitment to creating a non-negotiable theological hermeneutic, challenging the 
instituition of the empire to its very pinnacle where it resisted him, inevitably 
leading to exile and isolation. But the alternative – accepting ÐmoioÚsioj as 
normative within theology – dyohypostatic in nature – was unacceptible, even if it 
was seen by the majority of Christians as a means of preserving dignity by 
avoiding conflict with an eye to unity.  
Athanasius’s response to dyohypostatic theological models is to project them all 
onto Arius, drawing a methodological connection between this heretic with whom 
no-one wished to be associated and those who were to come after him who 
propounded dyohypostatic theology. This witnesses the degree to which Arius is 
construed as radically other to authentic Christianity (Williams, 2001). Athanasius 
by attempting to establish a miahypostatic theology as the only authoritative 
language for the orthodox community, projects a way of looking at God and the 
world with a mediatorial Christocentricity. In fixing the vocabulary of the Church 
thus, his had to be, like Arius’s, a focussed exegetical enterprise: 
                                                 
516 “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.” Abraham Lincoln, 
Annual Message to US Congress December 1, 1862, cited in Aaron Copland’s second-world war 
composition Lincoln Portrait Boosey & Hawkes. Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra directed by 
Zubin Mehta, Decca, 1968.  
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There is no room for any subjective libertarianism (which is a form of 
bondage) where humanity becomes subject to the dictates of the 
alienated conceptuality and language of its culture, be it past or 
present. Rather, the freedom of the Church exists precisely in its 
responsibility before the liberating freedom of God. Dogmatic 
theology serves to remind the Church of this and, therefore, of the 
need for a propriety … of terminology and conceptuality (A. J. 
Torrance, 1996:48).  
Athanasius’s repeated objection to Arius’s theology is not merely political or 
ecclesiastical rhetoric, but a real objection to a linguistic framework that he judged 
to entrap God in an oracular-biblicist cast, motivated by commonly held 
dyohypostatic presuppositions. Arius’s biblicist hermeneutic is a hybrid, Athanasius 
argues, resting on a priori concepts of divine freedom, making God a function of 
preconceived freedom disrespecting received piety of an overarching Regula Fidei 
or Lex Orandi.  
Athanasius’s theology urges a silent perplexity before the mystery of God in a 
more ontologically-constructed way than Arius’s.517 This is not merely conventional 
piety, but an authentic concern to establish a miahypostatic theological framework 
that coheres around the divine person of God in Christ and makes mediation 
ontologically significant.518  
                                                 
517 CA II 36, MPG 26, 224-225. Bonhoeffer cites Kierkegaard’s “Be silent, for that is the absolute,” 
asserting “Teaching about Christ begins in silence,” in A. J. Torrance, 1996:49: “To acknowledge 
the freedom of God is to be committed to... silence not least at the methodological level”. 
518 Cf. Young, 1997:296: “Maybe Origen’s “playing” with the text became less and less viable. 
Maybe Arius’ problem was that he failed to recognize that the old-style Christian “philosopher”, 
such as Justin and Origen had been, could not survive the institutional consolidation that was 
already happening and would be reinforced by imperial patronage.” 
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Athanasius’s foundation for a systematic miahypostatic doctrinal framework will 
emerge to be a vibrant tradition in subsequent contexts,519 his use of creatio ex 
nihilo effectively highlights the ultimate ontological unanticipatability of God in a 
very different manner from Arius’s insistence on an a priori concept of freedom. In 
Barth’s words, Athanasius’s theology reinforces that “God’s Word is no mere thing; 
it is the living, personal and free God.”520 
Arius’s blend of Platonic assumptions with notions of ultimate transcendence from 
Judaism, refuses miahypostatic Christology (and ÐmooÚsioj in particular) as 
“unbiblical” because it subverts his a priori concept of divine freedom. For 
dyohypostatic Christology, ÐmooÚsioj identifies Father and Son in a manner 
incompatible with Scripture, radically relativizing the priority of the words of 
Scripture to the divine Word of the Father521 not attributing theological significance 
to God’s free initiative and human grace in Christ which Arius accepted as 
normative and traditional. 
Traditional depictions of the Arian schema cast the Logos’s role firmly as Mediator 
rather than Creator, so failing to bridge the Creator / creature gulf,522 so in 
Williams’s judgment (1987:6-7): 
                                                 
519 Cf. the struggle of the German Church under Nazi administration, and Barth’s method untidily 
described as theology “from above,” which was, more accurately, an attempt to guard the 
“inconceivable novum” of Christian dogma in the systematic framework of Church Dogmatics. 
This style of Christian theology is less attractive in contemporary multi-cultural (post-)modernity, 
cf. Kannengiesser’s reflections upon the lack of an Athanasian biography, because of a failure of 
most moderns to identify with his character and personality, in his paper “The task of an 
Athanasian biography” at the XIII International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, 16-21 
August 1999. 
520 Barth, 1975:198, cf. A. J. Torrance 1996: 53. 
521 Mönnich, 1950:378-412; Gregg & Groh, 1981. 
522 Cf. Jenkins, 1974:34: “To be human is the gift of God. If we reflect on what this sentence can 
mean about the origin of being human, the process of being human and the end of being human, 
then we shall find in it a pointer to what Christians mean by salvation... this is what Jesus Christ 
enables us to believe and offers us the chance to practice - that being human has a source, a 
potentiality and a fulfillment which is given by God, offered by God, and secured by God. 
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the Son or Logos is brought in as a mediatorial figure of a 
straightforward Neoplatonic kind. The two disparate elements are 
held together by the idea that the created mediator actually 
advances in status as a result of the incarnation (which thus 
becomes part of a trajectory of glorification, not a radical humiliation); 
but Arius’ scheme is adulterated by a mythological version of 
adoptionism (involving the Logos, not Jesus) that leaves us finally 
with practical polytheism, two objects of worship.523 
Despite this pedigree, it is distorting to caricature Arian theology as being merely 
or even primarily concerned with “Hellenistic” ideas. Neither is it appropriate to 
omit the role of mediator in Athanasius. But the Logos as “Mediator” only makes 
sense for Athanasius within a rigorous miahypostatic system, referring theology 
back to the revealed incarnate Logos who is of one being with the Father:  
if a line of utter distinction is drawn between the being of the 
incarnate Son and the being of the Father, [fn, cf Athanasius, De 
syn., 45] it cannot be held that there is any oneness between what 
the Gospel presents as the revelation of God and God himself... As 
Athanasius expressed it, if the Son were divided from the Father, or 
the Word were not eternally inherent in God, then the being of God 
would be quite irrational (¥logoj)- a light that does not shine (m¾ 
                                                                                                                                                 
Therefore being human is not solely at the mercy of time, circumstances and death. We can be 
saved and fulfilled.” The emphasis upon the gift of grace is possible where there is actual divine 
activity in Jesus Christ, otherwise Mediation is a distraction from what Jenkins identifies as the 
uniting vision of salvation in the Christian religion. This echoes Harnack’s concerns very closely. 
523 Williams, 1987:6-7, citing Harnack 1901:220. 
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fwt…zwn), an infertile desert (œrhmoj), a dry fountain or just an 
empty pit (l£kkoj).524 
Alan Torrance describes Arius’s theology as muqologe‹n, a groundless projection 
“on to the Ineffable and Unknowable at a point when intellectual honesty would 
require an attitude of open agnosticism.”525 To construe the Logos as Mediator 
requires a careful correlation with the whole Christian tradition and the di£noia of 
Scripture - as Athanasius strives to achieve. 
Athanasius’s picture of Arius is one of impiety where a lack of discipline replaces 
reverent theological description with anthropological projection: 
if one takes seriously Arius’s conception of the divine being, it is hard 
to see how anyone could know anything about God at all. By a 
curious irony, on which Athanasius was not slow to remark, Arius 
seemed to possess a good deal of privileged information. But where 
had he got it from? Athanasius was in no doubt about the source: the 
Arians [sic] had fabricated this concept of divine being out of their 
own minds, thus making their own intellects the measure of ultimate 
reality and assigning to Christ, the Word made flesh, the place which 
their minds could make for him.526 
                                                 
524 T. F. Torrance, 1997:133-134, and 1965:36; A. J. Torrance, 1996:191: “in accordance with the 
way which that Word has taken in the incarnation that genuine theological statements are made. 
They are genuine... in so far as they derive from that Word and refer back to it: that is their 
essential ana-logic. Theological thinking is thinking of and on the ground of a given Reality... what 
God is to us in Jesus Christ he really is antecedently and eternally in himself - that is the 
analogical reference.” 
525 A. J. Torrance, 1996:192. 
526 Heron, 1981:70; A. J. Torrance, 1996:193. 
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Though not couched in such contemporary theological language, Athanasius’s 
theology can be accurately described as aiming to preserve God himself – rather 
than an idea of God – as “indissolubly subject.”527  
The theological cost of miahypostatic theology remains the question of theological 
significance of Christ’s humanity. Athanasius’s opposition to a model which failed 
to allow divine (and, for him subsequently human) nature a theological 
significance, perhaps inevitably, bequeaths an ambiguous theological inheritance. 
Although Athanasius’s differentiated application of Scripture to the two natures of 
Christ is compatible with Chalcedon’s double ÐmooÚsioj, Apollinarius and 
Marcellus (as miahypostatic and henoprosopic theologians) claim to be explicating 
Athanasius’s theology, offering further nuanced interpretations of Christ’s 
mediation. In the conflict between Cyril and Nestorius, again the implications of 
divine and human natures are theologically central: Cyril exploring the theological 
significance of humanity primarily through Mariology; whilst Nestorius does so 
Christologically on a prosopic plane. This long Christological trajectory is the 
bequest of the struggle between dyohypostatic and miahypostatic methods and 
Athanasius’s urgent promotion of his “Nicene” model as the sole Christian 
framework (Ayres, 2004).  
A lasting impact of this conflict is the mediatorial role Athanasius assigns to 
Christ’s divinity: a function which can only be present in miahypostatic theology, 
where the divine nature of the Son is “the primordial condition of humanity’s 
participative communion with God” (A. J. Torrance, 1996:194). Explicit in the 
priesthood of the divine word are both natures’ participation in mediation, without 
                                                 
527 Jüngel, 1983:23; A. J. Torrance, 1996:193. 
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the mechanics of that cohesion being speculated over. Despite this, Athanasius’s 
argument requires the human nature for mediation to function. Though Athanasius 
may beget  more henoprosopic Christologies528 - mediation which functions by 
blending cannot hold the “double” ground possible in Athanasius’s thesis. 
Ultimately, the fourth-century conflict focused in the “Arian” literature of Athanasius 
is a Kulturkampf to establish a miahypostatic theological pattern of description as 
solely legitimate to transmit the “interests, and traditions of interpretation, and to 
establish this shared descriptive vocabulary as determinative” (Soskice, 1988:150).  
Athanasius’s insistence upon the whole of tradition, as Regula Fidei or di£noia of 
Scripture, is his sustained response to opponents’ dyohypostatic method, and it 
will prove ultimately convincing: 
the choice and interpretation of the scriptural passages was 
determined by a theological and philosophical premise, a particular 
understanding of monotheism (Grillmeier, 1975:222). 
If Arius witnessed “to the unbridgable gulf between God and all else” (Williams, 
1987:177), Athanasius’s careful descriptions of the nature and role of the Logos 
mould an organic conceptuality of divine transcendence through an absolute 
application of creatio ex nihilo.  God’s sovereignty and unmalleability is not the 
“mere fact of unrelatedness,”529 but God’s own being present to creation in toto in 
Christ.   
                                                 
528 See part 3, below. 
529 Williams, 1987:198; Anatolios, 1998:95. 
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But it was dyohypostatic theological constructs - which Athanasius insisted upon 
connecting with Arius - that provoked the theological revision: 
Arius introduced notions of time and eternity based on classical 
metaphysics into trinitarian thought in order to categorize divine 
generation. Thus the gospel narratives seemed to offer a physical 
and reduced image, in a platonic sense, of the essential inferiority 
and created nature of the Son, compared with the Father. Arius’s 
commentaries on biblical texts are no longer available, but there is 
no doubt that his scholastic use of Scripture reflected a serious need 
for greater theological consistency in the mainstream Origenistic 
tradition at the turn of the fourth century (Kannengiesser, 1999:57). 
Athanasius exposed that Arius’s model is different from Origen’s without his 
understanding how. Arius began to kick away steps in the Middle Platonic ladder 
of existence by insisting upon the ultimate impersonal transcendence of the 
Father. Arius’s methodology is incomplete, failing to comprehend thoroughly the 
significance of such a move for Christology. Athanasius’s response to Arius’s 
description was to claim that dyohypostatic theology created a hybrid method, an 
alienated God, and a marooned mediator. 
This chapter has explored the way in which mediation – as construed in Arius’s 
patterns of belief – prompted Athanasius to tackle biblical hermeneutics and 
doctrine anew, revisiting mediation to claim its miahypostatic significance. The 
conflict of theological systems required the notion of mediation to develop, 
engaging explicitly with dyohypostatic subordinationism. The conflict would result 
in the lasting miahypostatic location of Christology, and the emergence of  
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Trinitarian theology. In this recasting, traditional “mechanistic” concepts of 
mediation failed to attain what they previously achieved. Mediation assumed an 
ontologically participatory significance, which, as well as linking two different 
qualities, performed another ancient but less emphasized meaning, that of 
interjecting and holding two natures protectively apart.530 
It is to other nuanced miahypostatic interpretations of mediation, and Alexandrian 
and Antiochene readings that we now turn. 
                                                 
530 mes…thj, as one set in the midst to umpire, arbitrate and mediate, even to keep apart is 
developed by Cyril of Alexandria to describe the function of the Red Sea, protecting the fleeing 
Israelites from the host of Pharaoh in his Paschal Homilies.  
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PART THREE 
Reception & Resistance: Athanasius’s Construct as a 
Contested Legacy  
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PART THREE 
Part three of this thesis observes the reception and development of Athanasius’s 
miahypostatic Christology, particularly evaluating the way it begat the Trinitarian-
Christological Controversy proper (Ayres, 2004). Themes of mediation and union 
are lenses that focus this, highlighting difficult aspects of Athanasius’s 
achievement. Issues of the relation between Father and Son, of what it means to 
refer to Father, Son and Spirit as persons, and of the place of each person in 
salvation, are answered differently, not only between mia- and dyo-hypostatic 
christological approaches, but also within the former model.  
 
Analysing the emergence of divergent Christologies within Athanasius’s 
theological inheritance based on the Kata Meros Pistis (hereafter KMP) leads to 
an appreciation of the theological vitality of Apollinarius. In Part 2, the 
homoousion doctrinal-linguistic model was styled “miahypostatic” (after Lienhard, 
1999). This chapter, however, shows that this description does not hold through 
the controversies, even when the Son is conceived of as a distinct [and single] 
ØpÒstasij. Apollinarius’s Trinitarian model is such that subsequent theologians 
cannot ignore. Despite almost universal distancing and condemnation, 
Apollinarius contributes to the development of miahypostatic Christology within 
an overarching Trinitarian theology, thereby contributing to a more nuanced 
acceptance of ÐmooÚsioj.  
 
Apollinarius’s theological experimentation is profoundly significant in a manner 
very different from, for example, Marcellus. Marcellus shared miahypostatic 
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assumptions with Apollinarius: Athanasius defensively comments that he was not 
far from error.531 Marcellus’s self-perception is that of an ally of Athanasius and 
the “miahypostatic” Christological tradition; he, like Apollinarius, is easily 
caricatured by Eusebius as representing the wrong-headedness of the whole 
miahypostatic Christological tradition. Hanson argues that at the Council of Rome 
in 341, Marcellus’s theology was vindicated by those present because by 
“oversimplification they were able to see Marcellus as orthodox” (Hanson, 
1993:272). The first canon of the Constantinopolitan Council gives the 
impression of the via media of Christian truth from the beginning, orthodoxy 
avoiding the extreme winds of heresies on either side.532 This chapter explores 
an emerging, organic and responsive series of trajectories within the 
miahypostatic inheritance – analogically compatible to a series of Goldberg 
variations after Athanasius’ initial Christological ex nihilo Aria. Apollinarius 
provides evidence of the development of Christological vocabulary and grammar 
within Christian theology. 
 
The difficulty of describing this complex emergence is evident from the attempts 
of Epiphanius onwards, and remains perplexing, as the aesthetically unattractive 
(and perhaps misleadingly over-precise) descriptions of Leinhard used hitherto 
reflect. However, alternatives (“Nicene,” “Arian,” “orthodox,” etc.,) are more 
distorting. 
                                                 
531 Marcellus retains elements of traditional monotheism with a revised Logos theology, revealing 
that his primary theological consideration – the divine unity – is not far from that of Arius: both 
preserve the Father’s priority in the Trinity. Marcellus’s experimentation is more adventurous than 
Arius’s (or his successors), but nonetheless, shares a rejection of thorough Trinitarianism. 
532 In NPNF 14ii (1995):172. 
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Discussion in chapter four focuses upon Apollinarius’s Christological 
achievements. Marcellus, against whom perhaps KMP was aimed533 is not 
considered in his own right in this thesis.534 Sharp theological debate between 
them emerges as markedly different from that between Athanasius and his 
“Arian” opponents, because both write with shared miahypostatic 
perspectives.535  Epiphanius admits that Apollinarius and Marcellus represent 
spectacular “home goals” for the miahypostatic camp, but accounts for it as 
divine truth drawing the devil’s hostility: determinedly putting “his bitter poison 
into the most wonderful foods”: the honey to which he adds this particular 
bitterness is the miahypostatic Christological description which Epiphanius calls 
rthodoxy”.536  
 
                                                
“o
 
533 Spoerl, 1994:545-568 & 1999: “Apollinarius strives to argue for an understanding of the Son 
and the Spirit’s status within the Christian godhead that is simultaneously directed against the 
errors of Arius of Alexandria and his sympathizers and Marcellus of Ancyra and his defenders. 
Against Arius, Apollinarius argues for the single eternity, glory and divinity of the Trinity’s 
members; in the course of doing so, he expresses full support for the Nicene doctrine of the Son 
and the Spirit’s consubstantiality with the Father. Against Marcellus, then, Apollinarius argues for 
the real and eternal distinction of the Trinity’s members. While it is possible that the Kata Meros 
Pistis may have originally been written to address solely the relationship between the Father and 
the Son, in its present extant state, its arguments seamlessly and organically integrate 
consideration of the Spirit’s status within the godhead with that regarding the Son’s.” Spoerl 
suggests that the text “in its current state”is a revision of an earlier work, was written before 
pneumatology became a significant issue to the “Miahypostatic”cause. She interprets the two 
lengthy florilegia of texts which explicitly address the Spirit in a way which “interrupt[s] the flow of 
argument… [giving] the impression of being inserted into the text after the fact to bolster 
Apollinarius’s points.” Spoerl is probably correct, because this accounts for appearance of many 
sections applying to the Spirit. The document is a Christological one first which then moves along 
a Trinitarian path to a miahypostatic pneumatology. Mediation is effected by the Holy Spirit, this is 
thus an argument for his full divinity as it is for the Son’s, after Athanasius’s location of mediation 
as a divine function. 
534 See note 538, above. For Marcellus studies see the review of literature in Lienhard, 1999:9-
19. 
535 Young (1983:191) describes Epiphanius as writing “very strongly against Apollinarius” but in 
the Panarion Epiphanius almost writes an apology for Apollinarius. He describes him as “the 
venerable old man, always beloved by us, by the blessed Pope Athanasius, and by all the 
orthodox, Apollinarius from Laodicea...” (Panarion 77.2.1 [H/D3.417], Amidon, 1990:339f). 
Apollinarius’s teachings, Epiphanius suspects, were misunderstood by younger hearers 
(Panarion 77.2.3 [H/D3.417], Amidon, ibid.:340). Cf. Schaff 1891: 711: “Epiphanius expresses 
himself concerning the beginning of the controversy in these unusually lenient and respectful 
terms.”  Epiphanius’s approach is evidence that Apollinarius represented an attempt to describe 
the relation of the humanity and divinity of the Son within a model that he shared.  
536 Panarion 77.1.1 [H/D3.416]; Amidon, 1990:339. 
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A Trinitarian Christological reading of KMP will show that far from being guilty of 
the distortions most often attributed to him, Apollinarius attempts a serious 
Christology. The “dual context” of Arian heresy on the one hand and his 
perception of Marcellus’s destructive experiments on the other, provides the Sitz 
im Leben for his emphasis on the “one divine nature of the Incarnate Word” 
which Cyril weaves so centrally into his Systematik.537 Apollinarius offers much 
more than a mathematical resolution.538 Against Marcellus, numerical singularity 
and identification with the divine oÙs…a is the imperative aspect; against the 
dyohypostatic tradition, ontological identification is most important. Apollinarius’s 
struggle to construe Christology correctly within Athanasius’s framework 
demonstrates that he recognized it as the authentic language with which to 
speak of God, Christ, and creation. Theodoret, as will be shown at the end of this 
dissertation, from a very different perspective, also indicates this, because 
Athanasius maintains and shares much of the “Antiochene” concerns about the 
intractability of divine nature.539 
 
A chief Apollinarian concern is balance between the two issues of the 
soteriological-Christological union with and in the Son, and his focus upon the 
person of the Mediator and his view of that mediation as the reconciliation of 
created and divine natures within the Son’s personal unity. In significantly 
different ways, Apollinarius and Marcellus insist upon the divine unity, creatively 
exploring ways of describing this. Consequently they provoked what is 
traditionally termed an “Antiochene” Christological response. Cyril of Alexandria 
                                                 
537 See chapter 5, below. 
538 Aquinas later observes (S Theol I xi, 1) the distinction between a numerical singularity, “one 
which is a principle of number”, and ontological unity “one, which is convertible with being.” 
539 Witness the citations of Athanasius’s work in the Florilegia of texts in Eranistes; chapter 6, 
below. 
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and the emergent monophysite tradition, still found Apollinarius’s arguments 
(whether or not Cyril and the monophysites believed them to be Athanasius’s 
words) indicative of authentic Christology.540 There is probably also a Eucharistic 
context for Apollinarius’s language about Christ’s “divine flesh”, which Cyril 
develops more fully.541  
 
 
 
                                                 
540 Raven op cit accuses Cyril of “dishonestly” applying the famous Apollinarian clause  m…a 
fÚsij toà qeoà lÒgou sesarkwmšnh. Young (1983), urges that Cyril believed both the motto and 
the work to be Athanasius’s. 
541 Cf. Chadwick, 1951:145f. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
APOLLINARIUS OF LAODICEA’S HENOPROSOPIC TRINITARIAN 
CHRISTOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction: the task of this chapter and its location in this study 
This chapter observes the often immensely sophisticated discourse and yet also 
apparently disturbingly crude542 Christological explorations of Apollinarius in his 
KMP. In particular the notion of the “soul” (or personality) of Christ, is shown to 
have a mediatorial function because of its divine identity. Though an agent for 
mediation in some Middle Platonic thinking, the soul in Apollinarius’s terminology 
is particular: noàj refers to an agent’s identity or personality. Apollinarius, though 
located within a miahypostatic Christological tradition, distances himself from 
miahypostatic Trinitarian models which identify one oÙs…a with one ØpÒstasij. 
Presenting a single oÙs…a with three prÒswpa each having their own 
ØpÒstasij,543 Apollinarius describes a thorough Trinitarian theology. In doing so, 
Apollinarius hones ÐmooÚsioj into an anti-Marcellan tool. 
 
Classical interpretations of the Christological explorations of Apollinarius are 
restricted here to footnotes, to allow a revisioning of extant works and fragments 
around the themes of mediation and union. This chapter exposes diverse 
theological motivations and methods within a shared miahypostatic Christological 
approach. The reasons for the ultimate failure of the reception of attempts to 
                                                 
542 Compare, for example, the notorious Fragment 113 for its striking baldness in applying the 
analogy of a mule as blending the oÙs…ai of she-ass and horse in one sub-species unity which 
participates in both species. 
543 In KMP; but in the “Apollinarian” CA III & IV, the tendency is to stress a single divine 
ØpÒstasij. This is in the context of Christological language rather than trinitarian debate. There is 
clearly fluidity in the way each term is employed. 
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describe the mediation of Christ in terms of a noetic synthesis (Apollinarius) or an 
economic modalism (Marcellus) are evaluated, witnessing to the power of 
conservative Christological models over perceived innovative speculation. 
Nazianzen’s chief concern has less to do with protecting the distinct contribution 
of Christ’s humanity to salvation, than with maintaining an Origenist “sacrament 
of intellect” whereby the human noàj of the pre-existent Jesus is re-cast as the 
point of mediation between God and human flesh. Gregory fights shy of 
Apollinarius’s materiality and incarnational-sacramental theology rather than 
pursuing a distinct human personality of Christ. This criticism is not really 
concerned with mediation but with using the human mind as a filter through 
which the divine Mind may be the subject within a human body.  
 
Nonetheless, even if conservative fear hampered Apollinarius’s Trinitarian 
Christology, his failure to win universal support confirms Athanasius’s 
achievement of establishing both the divine personality of Christ and the need to 
maintain mediatorial concerns which relate divine nature to humanity without 
reducing the divine mystery to a mechanistic “system,” but remaining couched in 
personal and relational language. Athanasius’s paradigm, urged upon the 
Christian world afresh at Chalcedon, does not collapse the tension of humanity 
and divinity into a third entity, even for the sake of the unity of the personality of 
Christ. But before that resolution, it is first necessary to explore in detail 
Apollinarius’s Christology. 
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4.2 Trinitarian theology, mononoetic Christology and mediation in 
Apollinarius of Laodicea 
Athanasius forged a Christological descriptive vocabulary in the crucible of 
immense conflict that divided Christendom, so that it was necessary to 
demonstrate, in sometimes plainly bizarre exegesis, that the miahypostatic 
language of Nicaea was the only framework fully consistent with the traditional 
faith. Athanasius thus represents a revolutionary language shift in Christian 
theology. This part of the study explores Apollinarius’s attempted development of 
Christological grammar in the miahypostatic tradition. Apollinarius’s failure should 
not detract from his contribution to the process of establishing “communally 
authoritive rules of discourse, attitude, and action” in this Christological 
tradition.544 
 
The KMP as well as attending to these issues in its content, is, significantly a 
complete work on the subject. Fragments conveyed out of context by 
Apollinarius’s opponents, are thus given a balance by a reading of KMP.  
 
4.3 A Christological reading of KMP545 
Apollinarius opens his systematic exposition of the Faith with an explicit 
indication of the perspective of his work: he is fundamentally anti-dyohypostatic: 
 
                                                 
544 cf. Ford, 1984:277. 
545 Lietzmann, 1904:167-185. The translation of the text is my own; references are to the 
paragraph numerations in Lietzmann. 
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Inimical and alien to the Apostolic Confession [of faith] are those 
who speak of the Son as having come into being “out of nothing,” - 
saying of him that his beginning was his being sent forth from the 
Father - so, also, are those who have in mind the same concerning 
the Holy Spirit.546 
 
The defining prompt of Nicaea remains the prime threat to the Church to 
Apollinarius, even if Arianism is a later socio-rhetorical construction. Apollinarius 
locates his argument in the context of the theological histories of the fourth-
century. Apollinarius defends the miahypostatic language of Nicaea (i.e., 
ÐmooÚsioj), regardless of its possible Marcellan pedigree, as a necessary 
weapon in the fight against the archetypal heresy.547  The adoption of ÐmooÚsioj 
appears to have been a calculated risk on the part of the fathers present: with 
Marcellus indeed a prime mover for the term,548 impressing upon them that 
ÐmooÚsioj was the best strategy to counter Arian danger. Now Arian danger was 
universally recognized, came the time for Apollinarius to cut Marcellan 
                                                 
546 KMP 1 [paragraph markings of Lietzmann]: –Ecqistoi kaˆ ¢llÒtrioi tÁj ¢postolikÁj Ðmolog…aj o† tÕn 
uƒÕn ™x oÙk Ôntwn kaˆ ¢postellomšnhj ¢rcÁj e„nai ™p…kthton lšgontej tù patrˆ kaˆ oƒ perˆ toà ¡g…ou 
pneÚmatoj t¦ aÙt¦ dianooÚmenoi. Lietzmann, 1904:167. I have attempted to translate this in such a way as 
to avoid an impression of emanation in the term ¢postellomšnhj ¢rcÁj, which the “Exoucontians” surely did 
not intend.  
547 Cf. Wiles’s (2001) excellent monograph exploring the attraction of Arianism. 
548 Cf. Barnes, 1998:47-67; especially 52: “The Marcellan claim on Nicaea seems not to have been simply a 
development after the fact, as though Marcellus made a claim on an event which was otherwise 
unconnected to his sphere of theological influence. Recent scholarship comparing the creed of the Council 
of Antioch, early in 325 (which promulgated doctrines favourable to Alexander and condemned Arius), with 
the creed of the Council of Nicaea, late in 325, has suggested that the very wording of the creed of Nicaea 
bears the theological finger-prints of Marcellus.” Citing Logan, 1992:444, Barnes relates that Logan argues 
that the creed of Constantinople “in an attempt to remove any hints of Sabellianism in the creed of Nicaea, 
not only replaced the Nicene wording [of ‘begotten of the Father before all ages’] with the traditional form... 
but equally removed the associated gloss ek tes ousias. The two belong together and imply, at least to 
Marcellus and his party, that there is one hypostasis or ousia in the Godhead.” Cf. S. Parvis, 2002, 
'Marcellus of Ancyra and the Arian Controversy: A Bishop in Context' Unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh; & Siebt, K., 1994, Die Theologie des Markell von Ankyra. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
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connections by defining more precisely Nicaea’s ÐmooÚsion tù patr… with 
explorations of the Son’s eternal generation.549 
  
The end of KMP 1 (Lietzmann, 1904: 167) interjects as if an addition to the text  
the notion of the Holy Spirit’s divinity. In all probability, this belongs to a later 
edition of KMP, attempting to revise earlier Christologically-focused argument to 
apply to the Holy Spirit, thus ensuring his divinity and a thoroughly Trinitarian 
resolution (Spoerl, 1999). Evidence for this includes the swinging back to 
Christological considerations pertinent to the “Arian” controversies after the 
introduction of the theme of the Holy Spirit’s divinity:  
 
most alien are those who apply to the Son [sic] the assertion that 
any divine nature is by gift, according to grace.550  
 
Apollinarius intends to make it unmistakable that he places himself in the 
miahypostatic Christological tradition. Central to that tradition is emphasis upon 
the Godhead’s unity. Apollinarius expounds a way of celebrating this which is not 
an adapted form of second century Logos theology (in the guise of models of 
Arius or Marcellus),551 in a non-voluntarist Trinitarian manner.  
 
                                                 
549 Appendices 1 and 2 of Hanson (1988:876-877) illustrate the changes to Nicaea at 381. 
Constantinople adds (gennhqšnta) prÕ p£ntwn tîn a„ènwn, in its description of the begetting of 
the Son, and deletes Nicaea’s ™k tÁj oÙs…aj toà patrÒj. These are at least as significant as the 
well-known anti-Marcellan addition of oá tÁj basile…aj oÙk ™stai tšloj.  
550 dÒsei kaˆ c£riti. Lietzmann, 1904:167. 
551 Arius’s theological model and Marcellus’s have in common a concern for monotheism, though 
approached in different ways. Arius’s deuteros theos, the Logos, has, as we have seen, the 
emphasis of creation redeemed; Hanson, 1998, describes Marcellus’s opposition of Paulinus of 
Tyre who “called Christ ‘a second God’ and said that he had become God in a more human way”, 
(ibid., 45). Marcellus perceives that there is an inappropriate assertion that there are three ousiai 
in this model of theology. His response is a vigorous miahypostatic argument, caricatured by his 
opponents as Sabellian. 
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In this phase of explication and clarification of the term, Apollinarius and 
Athanasius appear to be working at the same time on the same project.552 
Despite his closeness to (and friendship with) Athanasius, Apollinarius is either 
unaware of the refinements Athanasius had made in CG-DI to the association of 
creatio ex nihilo when applied to the Son, or chooses not to address them in his 
opening rhetoric.  
 
Apollinarius still seems to use the ex nihilo motif as short hand for Arian error, still 
applying it in the manner of anti-Arian works of Alexander of Alexandria. The 
reasons for this may be one (or, more likely, a combination of) the following.  
 
Firstly – and most likely – Apollinarius may simply revert to a caricaturing 
rhetoric, beginning his work with a miahypostatic rousing taunt. “Arius” is a 
construct here for the most significant error in Apollinarius’s view – the 
dyohypostatic Christological tradition. Arius’s insistance upon applying creatio ex 
nihilo to the Son was thus shorthand to describe this Christological tradition. 
 
Secondly, though I am not convinced of this, this may be evidence for 
Apollinarius not knowing CG-DI either because it had not reached Laodicea, or 
that it may not yet have been written. If KMP – or a first draft of it – were written 
in the 350s or 360s, this would necessitate CG-DI being a work of Athanasius’s 
                                                 
552 Barnes, 1998:48: “In the present account of the fourth-century trinitarian debates I will speak in 
terms of three stages in the debate...: first, the condemnation of Arius and Nicaea 325; second, 
the post-Nicaea assault on Marcellus; and third, the invention of Arianism.” The evidence of KMP 
is that there is a cluster of common arguments which impact upon the reclaiming of ÐmooÚsioj 
which overlap “stages” two and three. Although there are common approaches as the debate 
moves through the fourth century, perhaps the implication that there are clearly defined “stages” 
is not what Barnes wishes to convey. Apollinarius’s KMP would appear to reflect a transitional 
period where both second and third “stages” need addressing together. Apollinarius’s success in 
moving from the second to the third is a mark of his capacity and importance as a strong 
theological contributor in the debate. On Athanasius and ÐmooÚsioj, see Ayres, 2004a. 
 246
third exile. But it would seem strange that ÐmooÚsioj was still so studiously 
avoided in CG-DI were that the case, and it seems likely that KMP represents a 
later phase in the development than CG-DI.553 The prime enemies remain those 
who resist the miahypostatic Christological model: but now the project of using 
ÐmooÚsioj as a foundation for Trinitarian theology is underway. 
 
So, thirdly, it seems probable that Athanasius’s attempts at re-instating the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo appropriately to the Son had been successful after 
Nicaea, but now the task required was a refinement of ÐmooÚsioj which 
Athanasius, Apollinarius and others were undertaking. Apollinarius intends to 
rehabilitate ÐmooÚsioj apart from a Marcellan context. Athanasius has hitherto 
fought shy of relying upon this phrase over much, but in the 350s, there is a new 
confidence in reclaiming it. Barnes (1998:49) rehearses possible reasons why 
Athanasius may initially choose to do battle on the ground of creatio ex nihilo in 
CG-DI and CA I, avoiding ÐmooÚsioj almost completely because 
Homoousios had three strikes against it. First, it had a modalist 
history of use, and indeed figured in a third-century conciliar 
condemnation of a modalist theology. Second, and not unrelatedly, 
in its limited use it had had materialist connotations. Third, it was 
no-where to be found in Scripture. The context of the Nicene use of 
homoousios added yet a fourth strike, as it were. 
 
Apollinarius thus explicitly sets out at the beginning of KMP to rehabiliate 
ÐmooÚsioj without Marcellan overtones. Just as Marcellus might have been a 
                                                 
553 Unless KMP represents an innovation in the rehabilitation of ÐmooÚsioj that Athanasius does 
not want to risk at this point. 
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key figure in its introduction at 325, so Apollinarius appears to have been a key 
figure in revisioning it, so attracting the scorn and attacks of the anti-homoousion 
tradition, to such an extent that he (in similar vein to Nestorius the notorious 
victim from the Antiochene tradition years later) has to be jettisoned so that the 
argument can stand aside from the character and be won by the miahypostatic 
camp. Between 340 (the probable date of CA I, where ÐmooÚsioj is cited, 
perhaps after Apollinarius’s CA IV554) and the eventual centrality of Nicaea’s 
ÐmooÚsioj in Athanasius’s theology, a major linguistic-cultural shift takes 
place.555  
 
That Apollinarius does not re-introduce Athanasius’s Christological re-working of 
creatio ex nihilo should not appear overly significant. This would introduce 
something which would compromise the straightforward polemics of his rhetoric 
at this point. KMP represents a phase after Athanasius’s CG-DI as a significant 
part of a more widespread trend in a Trinitarian theological development. 
 
Apollinarius soon moves to refine his raison d’écrire: the anti-dyohypostatic 
Christological tradition is not the limit of Apollinarius’s self-understanding. “No 
less alien,” he argues, are models of theology that collapse the theological 
significance of the persons of the Trinity into triple beings in a Monad, even if 
they appear to be part and parcel of the miahypostatic Christological camp. 
Apollinarius defends the Nicene model from attacks from such as Eusebius who 
wished to tar the whole tradition with a Marcellan brush. `OmooÚsioj properly 
                                                 
554 Vinzent, 1996. 
555 When this was, is problematic. A dating of 350 for de Decretis Nicaenae Synodi would indicate 
a turn in the associations for Athanasius within a decade. The lack of ÐmooÚsioj in CG-DI would 
urge for a date before 350. The “conservative” consensus remains around 335, the Trier exile, 
though dates as late as 363 have been urged. See discussion above, 2:2. 
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construed requires that the Trinity should not be viewed merely as a metaphor or 
pattern of God’s action accommodated to the needs of humanity’s fallenness, nor 
an economy of God’s being, but, rather, an eternal relation of three persons.556 
Any so-called solution to Christological problems that failed to take Trinitarian 
language as realist, and not simply as metaphorical, Apollinarius insists, must be 
strongly resisted. Clearly writing against Marcellus (and/or his supporters), 
Apollinarius offers his own thesis on the Incarnation, which, he claims, is that 
taught for universal salvation by the Church.557 
 
KMP argues that Christology is authentically accessible from contemplating 
salvation-history: yet there is, unsurprisingly, a world of difference between, for 
example, the soteriological method of “Arian” exegesis and KMP.558 
Apollinarius’s emphasis reflects that of Athanasius with regard to the mediatorial 
significance of the Incarnate Logos. His divine identity was brought into 
conjunction with humanity in the flesh (not merely located in the Mind, but in the 
totality of the human nature of Christ from the Blessed Virgin).559 In the union, the 
divine nature assumed the ability to participate in the cosmos in human fashion in 
order to fulfil the mystery of our salvation. This acquisition of real flesh did not 
distort the Logos’s divine identity: 
 
[For the divine identity of the Logos] giving himself to human flesh - 
which was taken to himself from Mary, whilst he retained his own 
                                                 
556 ¢llÒtrioi d oÙk Âtton kaˆ oƒ t¾n tri£da m» kat¦ ¢l»qeian ™k triîn prosèpwn Òmologoàntej. 
Lietzmann, 1904:167.  
557 Ekklhsiastik¾ d Ðmolog…a kaˆ kosmoswt»rioj p…stij Lietzmann, 1904:168. 
558 Cf Gregg and Groh, 1981.  
559 Contrast the Cappadocian critique of Apollinarius, where “Mind is mingled with mind as nearer 
and more closely related, and through it with flesh, being a mediator between God and carnality.” 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad Cledonium, Meredith, 1995:113. 
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identity, and suffered no alteration nor deterioration of his divine 
hypostasis.560 
 
Apollinarius is emphatic that divine identity and initiative has a prime significance. 
He shares later Antiochene theologians’ concerns that the incarnation does not 
“change” the divine nature, that no mutation was consequential upon the 
incarnation. Rather, the incarnation is conceived of as bringing divine nature and 
humanity together in harmonious balance:561 the divine flesh of Christ is united 
with the divine nature by the divine nature’s initiative and capacity to appropriate 
humanity.  
 
Already here is a clue to the context of Apollinarius’s notorious phrase “holy 
flesh.” At this point in KMP it is short-hand for the reality of the mysterious 
consequence that in the incarnation, impassable divinity is not changed, but 
according to (and not contradictory to) its divine capacity, the divine assumes the 
experiences, pains and perspectives of humanity.562 This is a device for referring 
to the divine single subject of the incarnate Son. His use of “holy flesh” has 
traditionally been connected with a crude notion of mediation between the 
physical structure of the body and the “lower soul,” (where s£rx has been 
                                                 
560 dÒntoj mn ˜autÕn ¢nqrwp…nV sark…, ¿n ™k Mar…aj prosel£beto, me…nantoj d ™n 
tautÒthti kaˆ mhdem…an qe…an metak…nhsin mhd ¢llo…wsin Øpostant£toj KMP 2, 
Lietzmann, 1904:168. 
561 sunaireqšntoj d prÕj t¾n kaq' Ðmo…wsin ¢nqrwp…nhn, éste t¾n s£rka prÕj t¾n qeÒthta 
˜nwqÁnai, tÁj qeÒthtoj tÕ paqhtikÕn tÁj sarkÕj ™n tÍ toà musthr…on plhrèsei ¢nVrhku…aj. 
Lietzmann, 1904:168. 
562 tÕ paqhtikÕn tÁj sarkÕj ™n tÍ toà musthr…ou plhrèsei ¢nVrhku…aj. Lietzmann, 1904:108. Cf. 
Apollinarius’s argument with the attack of Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistula 101, Ad Cledonium, 
MPG 37, 181-3: tÕ g¦r ¢prÒslhpton, ¢qer£peuton Ö d ¼nwtai tù Qeù, toàto kaˆ sèzetai. 
Apollinarius’s so-called “impersonal” solution to the Christological problem of an assumed man, (a 
misconstrual of assumed humanity into the Godhead in the unity of Christ’s person), is countered 
in the so-called Athanasian Creed, in a clause traditionally perceived to be anti-Apollinarian: One: 
not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh: but by taking the Manhood into God; One altogether; 
not by confusion of Substance: but by Unity of Person.  
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construed as referring to the enlivened physical totality, but not the spiritual 
personality of Christ). Raven (1923) argues that the context for understanding 
these terms is an applied Middle-Platonic anthropology. Yet that is not consistent 
with Apollinarius’s employment of these terms. The identity of the Logos 
incarnate, is the divine centre of personality for Apollinarius. There can be, for 
Apollinarius in KMP, no quasi-independent noàj implying that an assumed human 
individual: but that identity extends because of the incarnation to the holy totality, 
t¾n s£rka t¾n ¡g…an. No explicit connection is made at this point in KMP to the 
Eucharist, but participation in the divine reality of the incarnate Christ 
sacramentally – a connection Cyril will expand upon – is a more organic and 
natural reading of the text than Raven’s suggested Sitz im Leben.563 
 
The consequence of divine incarnation is the divinization of human flesh so that 
death cannot dissolve it. Athanasius extensively reflects upon this motif from the 
perspective of the Fall and its restoration in CG-DI.564 Here, the human being 
before the soul’s fall is understood to possess an undistorted copy of the Logos. 
In the incarnation, authentic, redeemed humanity is restored and mediated to all 
“flesh” by his “holy flesh”. The Logos’s assuming of all that is distorted and 
moribund in humanity, himself becoming the life of Christians does not require 
                                                 
563 “Mankind is endowed with three elements in its nature. The lowest is the body or sîma, the 
material structure through which the invisible is revealed and expressed: to this term flesh (s£rx) 
is often applied, though s£rx is freely personified and used to denote both body and lower soul. 
Higher than the body but still an earthly element comes this lower soul (yuc»); and the term when 
strictly employed is always used for that which man shares with the animal creation: but where 
s£rx is used of the living body, it is natural that yuc» should be contrasted with it, and should 
signify the whole non-material part of personality – this being of course its popular meaning.” 
Raven, 1923:198. He continues, erroneously, to accuse Apollinarius of substituting nous for what 
Raven (after Paul) thinks should be the peculiarly  “Christian” element of pneuma:  “Highest of all 
comes the heavenly element, which St Paul calls the spirit (pneàma), but which Apollinarius 
regularly identifies with the mind (noàj), and which in consequence he regards not as the special 
prerogative of the saints, but as belonging to all men by “nature,” and as constituting the centre of 
personality.” Raven, 1923:198-9.  
564 One might go so far as to say that it is the principal thesis of CG-DI - see above, chapter 3. 
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separate theological significance for an assumed human component. Salvation is 
understood as an organic and Christocentric totality. There is dramatic balance 
between divine nature and the humanity in the incarnation, but, above all, a real 
unity achieved because of divine nature’s capacity to receive flesh divinely, i.e., 
with a constant divine identity. S£rkwsij results in the reality of the divine nature 
being borne by the flesh, restored in Christ into a single incarnate nature so that 
death cannot destroy it. In Christ - and in Christians - this gift of immortality is 
“holy flesh.” Apollinarius reflects Athanasius’s thesis in CG-DI (with regard to 
Christ), and in de Vita (with regard to Christians). For Apollinarius, humanity’s 
original glory has not simply been restored. The outcome of the incarnation is the 
greater exaltation of humanity by incorporation of Christians into the divine 
nature. Salvation is rigorously understood in an ontological manner: 
transformation, transfiguration and the glorification that is deification. The person 
of Christ, in his full divinity, makes this an ontological reality for humanity, and the 
Spirit conveys this life and sanctification for Christians.565 Apollinarius 
distinguishes between the ontological reality of Christ’s divinity in the Holy Trinity 
and the “divinity” of saints, the holy people of Christ: the latter are utterly 
dependent upon the former. The Son is not to be construed as a “Spirit-filled 
man” or one promoted to divinity, nor a second heavenly power subordinate to 
“God,” rather God is to be known as Trinity. 
 
For it is the case that either we have in mind in its natural glory and 
truth the perfect Trinity, or we will be forced to speak of a Monad 
                                                 
565 EŒj oân Ð pat¾r Ð qeÒj, eŒj uƒÕj Ð lÒgoj, ›n pneàma zw», ¹ ¡giwsÚnh tîn Ólwn. Lietzmann, 
1904:169. 
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and not Trinity - or... impiously become as those who worship the 
creature.566   
 
Apollinarius’ rigorous trinitarianism is explicated in his Christology and 
soteriology, countering both Modalism and Arianism by identifying both as a 
monotheistic conceptuality, untouched by a realist (™n fusikÍ dÒxV kaˆ ¢lhqinÍ 
t¾n Ólhn tri£da) Trinitarianism.567 The divine Spirit mediates Christ’s saving work 
and nature by being himself divine, for it is a mark of the divine nature’s freedom 
to be able to be “present to” creation (Anatolios, 1998). Participation in the Spirit 
is the pragmatic means of reckoning (nohtšon) Trinitarian mystery. Apollinarius 
holds together the real divinity of the persons, the Spirit in this case, with the 
derived capacities to participate in the Trinity’s nature that are endued upon the 
creature in the sacraments of Baptism and Epiclesis,568 and worship. The 
divinely-driven incarnation results in the pouring out of the divine Spirit to remain 
on all flesh. The Holy Spirit’s role in this undergirds the Church’s sacramental life. 
The “holy flesh” of the Body of Christians receives the Body of Christ at the 
Eucharist, participating in the Son’s divine flesh. Perfect divine nature is not 
changed, but fully revealed, as it is endowed upon the creature. The 
distinctiveness of Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not depicted as three differing 
divine beings, because the shared divine nature distinguishes the persons of the 
Trinity from all else. The Son, in this regard, is unlike the Saints, who by the 
                                                 
566 À g¦r ™n fusikÍ dÒxV kaˆ ¢lhqinÍ t¾n Ólhn tri£da nohtšon, À mon£da kaˆ oÙkšti tri£da lšgein 
¢nagkasqhsÒmeqa... ¢sebîj t¦ kt…smata sšbousin:  KMP 9, Lietzmann, 1904:170. 
567 KMP 9, Lietzmann, 1904:170. 
568 ¹ ™p…klhsij in the context, here, of the use of the Holy Trinity to sanctify the creature, is 
ambiguous. It refers, of course, to the invocation of the name of the Holy Trinity in Christian piety, 
but resonates, too, with liturgical Epiclesis: the Eucharistic transfiguration of created things into 
the divine body and blood of Christ (and the people of Christ by the epiclesis of the Holy Spirit in 
the so-called “second” Eucharistic epiclesis), in Apollinarius’  phrase ¢ll' ™p' ÑnÒmati tÁj ¡g…aj 
tri£doj tÕ b£ptisma kaˆ ¹ ™p…klhsij kaˆ ¹ latre…a, KMP 9, Lietzmann, 1904:170. 
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mediation of his divine nature through the Spirit, receive eternal nature though 
they are ex nihilo. Asserting that the basic choice in theological models is 
between a thorough trinitarianism or Monism - either modalistic or Arian in 
expression - Apollinarius offers soteriological justification for the necessity of 
Trinitarian theology. The miahypostatic theological tradition is refined: already it 
is the case that ÐmooÚsioj has been constructed differently from the modalistic 
implications of Marcellus’s miahypostatic model. Apollinarius’s distinctive 
Trinitarian theology of the persons with its emphasis upon mediation of authentic 
divine life counters Marcellus’s temporal – and hence temporary – model of the 
divine Monad’s accommodated self-differentiation for humanity’s salvation. He 
recognizes that this reduces Christology to a penultimate concern because the 
divine unity is preserved at the cost of a Godhead who changes to meet the 
needs of the hour. So Apollinarius reiterates the impassability and 
unchangeability of divine nature in anti-Marcellan argument, urging a Trinitarian 
resolution.  
 
Apollinarius continues to expound this context for the incarnation in a Trinitarian 
soteriology.569 Re-visiting earlier discussion of the incarnation from this 
Trinitarian perspective, Apollinarus more fully delineates the parameters of 
change in the economy. The incarnation did not mutate divine nature. Its 
workings, properly hidden in the mind of God, remain Mystery, but its purpose is 
clear. Divine nature is not changed; rather human nature is rescued from its 
temporal hurtling to decay and diminishment. Human oÙs…a, mutated from
God’s purpose in creation into the nothing from which it was created, is 
 
                                                 
569 Lietzmann,1904:171. 
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connected with the divine nature after the pattern of the flesh of Christ. The
of the Father, in the incarnation of the divine Son, temporally represented by the
Holy Spirit, cannot be construed as the divine nature changing. The Holy Trinity, 
in the person of the Son and the life of the Spirit, engages with the consequenc
of human sin in such a way as is completely consistent with God’s purposes from
eternity. Each divine Person willingly participates in the incarnation, to renew
perfect huma
 love 
 
es 
 
 and 
nity.570 
                                                
 
The Incarnate Logos neither limits the Logos’s cosmological and theological 
functions, nor has, in addition to the divine subject, an assumed “fallen” 
humanity, which is fully divinized on a prosopic plane,571 but is, rather, the Logos, 
the divine Son, properly located in the new, holy humanity of Christ’s “divine 
flesh.” 
 
Therefore we believe that, without any change to the divine nature, 
the incarnation of the Word happened for the renewal of human 
nature... The enfleshed divinity, having become a citizen on earth 
(according to the Humanity)... yet filled all things [according to his 
own divine nature] in the [holy] flesh, completely harmonized 
[sugkekramšnoj = brought together, blended, composite].572 
 
 
570 prÕj ¢naka…nwsin tÁj ¢nqrwpÒthtoj, KMP 11, Lietzmann, 1904:171. 
571 See, chapter 5, below. 
572 [Kef£laion d tÁj swthr…aj ¹mîn ¹ toà lÒgou s£rkwsij.] PisteÚomen oân ¢nalloiètou menoÚshj 
tÁj qeÒthtoj t¾n s£rkwsin toà lÒgou gegenÁsqai prÕj ¢naka…nwsin tÁj ¢nqrwpÒthtoj... kaˆ kat¦ 
tÕ ¢nqrèpinon ™pˆ gÁj politeus£menoj Ð toà qeoà lÒgoj t¾n qeik¾n ™pˆ p£nta parous…an 
Ðmo…wj diefÚlaxen, p£nta peplhrwkëj „d…wj te tÍ sarkˆ sugkekramšnoj, kaˆ tîn perˆ s£rka paqîn 
ginomšnwn t¾n ¢p£qeian ¹ dÚnamij ecen t¾n ˜autÁj. Lietzmann, 1904:170-1. 
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Sugkekramšnoj is to be understood as Apollinarius’s attempt to safeguard the 
singular personality of Christ in the holy ›nwsij, so that pathos need not be 
attributed directly to divine nature, because the humanity and holy flesh of the 
Son is subsumed itself as a function of divine mediation. Perhaps in this “Spirit”-
revision of KMP, Apollinarius extends the soteriological and ontological use of 
divine mediation to the Holy Spirit, the medium of divine, saving nature endowed 
upon Christians, as an argument of the Spirit’s divinity. In both Christological and 
Pneumatological senses, mediation is, as it were, conceived of as “from above”, 
fully consistent with Athanasian priorities of CG-DI: Apollinarius argues for the 
necessity of transforming, divine nature revealed and given by God, to be 
received by all humanity. But Apollinarius presses this Christologically: clearly 
Jesus Christ is an exception to this: because his identity and ontology is divine, 
he obviously does not “need” to receive derived divine life as gift. The mediator 
attains in his own body the particularity of human life without mutating or 
changing divine nature. Apollinarius excludes any perception of the incarnation 
as the eternal divine Logos co-existing with an “ordinary,” or, more significantly, 
fallen man. The divine Logos is the noàj of Christ: he is therefore the only real 
Man, the first Adam more-than-renewed: the Last Adam, humanity’s destiny, 
disclosed. The consequential description of “blending” will be resisted in 
subsequent Christology because of connections with distortion into a tertium quid 
associated with it. However, even in the notorious fragment about mules and 
she-asses, much quoted and now devoid of its context, the aim of Apollinarius 
(however successful or inappropriate the image) in the context of KMP, appears 
to be that of maintaining both the distinct properties and divine reality and unity in 
the Incarnate Word. His theology is compatible with later articulations of Nicene 
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Christology, e.g., “Neither confounding the Persons: nor dividing the 
Substance”,573 but Apollinarius’s absolute conviction remains that it is the 
humanity of the first Adam, and the last, with which the Logos is completely 
united henoprosopically. Apollinarius maintains, by the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo, that the Incarnate Word is, (again in the poetic double Christological 
application in the Athanasian Creed)  “Equal to the Father, as touching his 
Godhead; and inferior to the Father, as touching his manhood.”574 Even that 
humanity which is far superior to our own fallen nature (which is hurtling back into 
the nothing which is its “own place,”) is created out of nothing, yet secured by the 
divine union, that which in Adam decayed is safe, remaining575 and held eternally 
in him for humanity’s salvation, an inheritance that nothing can spoil or mutate or 
wither.576 
 
Apollinarius then turns to a specific anti-Sabellian polemic. With Marcellus in his 
sights, he considers the soteriological and Christological implications of the Holy 
Trinity.577 He reasserts the necessity for a real Trinity of three substantial578 
persons: 
 
But there are some who attend to the subject of the Holy Trinity 
dreadfully, arrogantly insisting that there are not three persons, 
instead introducing the notion of a person without hypostasis.579 
                                                 
573 Quicunque vult, BCP, 1969:65. 
574 Quicunque vult, BCP, 1969:65. 
575 On mene‹n in Athanasius see above, chapter 2. 
576 Cf. 1 Pe.1:4. 
577 §§13-18, 24-26; 33-35, Lietzmann, 1904;171-173, 175-176, 180-181. 
578 I.e., not ¢nupÒstaton. 
579 ...oƒ tr…a prÒswpa oÙk enai diiscurizÒmenoi, ésper ¢nupÒstaton e„s£gontej prÒswpon 
KMP 13, Lietzmann, 1904:171. 
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 Apollinarius’s use of anhypostatic, here illustrates his understanding of 
ÐmooÚsioj: it is a term which means more than oÙs…a because it connects the 
oÙs…a with the persons of the Trinity.580 Here Apollinarius represents a 
conceptual refinement preparing for the abandonment of the use of Ûpost£sij to 
refer to the divine oÙs…a of the Trinity: the miahypostatic tradition is undergoing 
phenomenal transformation. The argument for the single ØpÒstasij of Christ is 
clearly differentiated from the fluidity of usage between oÙs…a and ØpÒstasij in 
Trinitarian description. God the Holy Trinity cannot strictly be referred to as a 
single hypostasis (though the divine nature is summed up in such terms in CA III 
& IV). Apollinarius concludes his differentiation of his position from that of a 
Marcellan depiction of a single oÙs…a shared by Father and Son. He has shown 
that ÐmooÚsioj does not impose a theological model of modalistic monism: 
ØpÒstasij is the means whereby Apollinarius refutes Nicaea’s detractors by 
condemning the neo-Sabellianism traditionally associated with Marcellus’s view 
of a Monad who, adopting to the sinful and helpless state of humanity, mutates, 
as it were, economically, into a Trinity, until the end, when the Son and Spirit 
present all things, including themselves, back to the Father. Apollinarius labours 
the point somewhat, but his thrust is unambiguous, three divine persons are truly 
divine - there is a single divine oÙs…a - hence Father, Son and Spirit are beyond 
passion, uneffected and undisturbed by change. Change is a characteristic of the 
created world, so the persons of the Trinity, are not bound by limitations of 
created existence or temporality. The rationale of the incarnation, then, is to 
                                                 
580 Lietzmann, 1904:159, suggests that Quod unus sit Christus was written by Apollinarius, where 
he argues in similar vein that it is wrong to say that there are two hypostaseis in Christ rather than 
one, as that would introduce a fourth hypostasis into the Godhead. Mühlenberg, 1978, denies 
Apollinarius’s authorship, so Spoerl, 1999, where she says that this is “the closest any 
Apollinarian comes to saying that there are three Øpost£seij in the Trinity.”  
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change created nature, but in no way does this diminish divine reality. 
Apollinarius builds upon Athanasius’s argument from creatio ex nihilo to maintain 
not only the divinity of the persons of the trinity, but their unity: they have a 
common, uncreated nature, divine reality, which preserved eternally the divine 
ØpÒstaseij in three prÒswpa. Hence it is inadequate to refer to any one 
prÒswpon as if the other persons are the same: their distinctiveness is 
theologically significant. In contrast to Arian arguments that to acknowledge the 
divinity of the Son diminishes the Father, Apollinarius asserts that to speak of the 
divinity of the persons of the Son and the Spirit, is also to acknowledge the 
peculiar quality („diÒthta toà patrÒj) of the Father:581 
 
For if one speaks of any single prosopon just as if [it were] a single 
divinity, it is not the case that the two are in the unity [™n tù ˜n…] 
as one [æj ›n].582 
 
Apollinarius asserts that there is no justification for such fluidity in theological 
language which connects the persons of the Holy Trinity interchangeably for the 
sake of a mechanistic mediation. Each person of the Trinity is in complete divine 
union with the other, Son and Spirit participate in the fulness of the Father’s 
divinity in complete communion, but this does not confuse the discrete activities 
of each. A theology of full communion between real, differentiated persons of the 
Holy Trinity is paramount for Apollinarius, who strives to solve the puzzle of 
distinct persons of the Trinity whilst maintaining the personal unity of the 
mediating Son through locating the Logos of the Father in the Incarnate Christ, 
                                                 
581 KMP 15, Lietzmann, 1904:172. 
582 e„ d kaˆ prÒswpon ›n lšgei tij ésper kaˆ t¾n qeÒthta m…an, Ñuk œstin æj ›n t¦ dÚo ™n tù 
˜n… KMP 15, Lietzmann, 1904:172. 
 259
whilst not restricting the influence of the Logos to his own body with which he is 
united uniquely: he reigns, as it were, over all creation, even from the agony of 
the Cross. Apollinarius’s emphasis upon a singularity of subject in the Son 
communicates that he has the divine properties of the Father, as they are alike 
divine, whilst having different identities. The ØpÒstasij of “Father” must never, 
therefore, be short-hand for “God”: even if the fullness of divine nature is 
begotten of the Father (in the case of the Son) or procedes from him (in the case 
of the Spirit). Divine nature must not be withheld from the Son in Christological 
expression, neither through dyohypostatic Christological tradition, nor – in this 
context – by Marcellus whose theology robs the Son of any hypostatic divine 
being, so really restricting true divine nature to the Father: 
 
And calling the Son God in the manner specific for the Father... let 
the hypostasis of the Father stand as the description of God, not 
withholding the Son from that, because his being is from God.583  
 
Apollinarius insists upon a tri-hypostatic Trinity again. He also insists that the 
union of natures in the divine person of the Son, is permanent both in terms of 
his divinity and in terms of his humanity, this is possible only because of the 
divine personality of the Son fixing the humanity as “heavenly flesh.” Humanity’s 
salvation is thus secured. The Logos is the sole enlivening agent, because he, 
(with the Father and the Spirit) is truly divine. His humanity contrasts to the 
                                                 
583 kaˆ qeÕn mn tÕn uƒÕn tù „dièmati toà patrÕj kaloàntej...éste gnwrizšsqw mn ¹ ØpÒstasij 
toà patrÕj tÍ toà qeoà proshgor…v, m¾ diatetm»sqw d taÚthj Ð uƒÕj æj ín ™k qeoà KMP 17, 
Lietzmann, 1904:173. Spoerl, 1999:fn64: “So let the ØpÒstasij of the Father be acknowledged by 
the title of ‘God,’ but do not let the Son be cut off from this title since He is from God.” 
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moribund identity of undivinized men and women.584 There is thus a 
soteriological need for a single divine ØpÒstasij of the Son’s divine humanity. 
The assumption of an “external” humanity would urge towards a “quarternity” of 
beings, one of which would be creatio ex nihilo in the godhead.585 Apollinarius 
resists models of an assumed man, or even an assumed “fallen” humanity is part 
of his Trinitarian description. His argument, to sum up, pivots upon Christological 
issues of mediation and participation and the henoprosopic divine personal 
identity of the Son in the Trinity. 
 
Apollinarius moves to apply this refusal to confuse language about the persons of 
the Trinity to the person of the Holy Spirit.  The Trinity’s divine unity is not 
achieved by the synthesis (sÚnqesij) of the three persons: such a model would 
                                                 
584 Cf. the possibly Apollinarian De Incarnatione Verbi Dei, where Apollinarius’s “holy flesh” or 
“divine flesh” finds more acceptable expression in his reflections of resurrection life: “Dead men 
cannot take effective action; their power of influence on others lasts only until the grave. Deeds 
and actions that energize others belong only to the living. Well, then, look at the facts in this case. 
The Saviour is working mightily among us, every day he is invisibly persuading numbers of 
people all over the world, both within and beyond the Greek-speaking world, to accept his faith 
and be obedient to his teaching. Can anyone, in the face of this, still doubt that he is risen and 
that he lives, or rather that he himself is the Life? Does a dead man prick the consciences of 
people, so that they throw all the traditions of their fathers to the winds and bow down before the 
teaching of Christ? If he is no longer active in the world, as he must needs be if he is dead, how is 
it that he makes the living to cease from their activities: the adulterer from his adultery, the 
murderer from murdering, the unjust from avarice, while the profance and godless man becomes 
religious? If he did not rise, but is still dead, how is it that he routs and persecutes and overthrows 
the false gods, whom unbelievers think to be alive, and the evil spirits whom they worship? For 
where Christ is named, idolatry is destroyed and the fraud of evil spirits is exposed; indeed, no 
such spirit can endure that Name, but takes to flight on sound of it. This is not the work of one 
who lives, not of one dead; and, more than that, it is the work of God.” The divine personality as 
the Life of humanity fits KMP.  Cf. Norris, 1996:43, citing Newman’s edition of Athanasius’s Select 
Treatises, 1869-81, of Christ’s resurrection: [he] ‘“was raised again and justified by the Spirit; and 
what was wrought in him is repeated in us who are his brethren, and the complement and 
ratification of his work... The divine life which raised him, flowed over and availed unto our rising 
again from sin and condemnation. It wrought a change in his sacred manhood, which became 
spiritual, without his ceasing to be man, and was in a wonderful way imparted to us as a new-
creating, transforming power in our hearts.”’ 
585 Apollinarius accepts the reception of humanity’s created being into the Godhead in the Son 
soteriologically, but resists it as an appropriate Christological explanation of the incarnation: an 
assumption misses the point ontologically. The reality of the Trinity for Apollinarius is threatened 
by this – for it would merely be an economic modification of monotheism à la Marcellus. 
Apollinarius Insists upon hypostatic distinction within the Godhead in three real but completely 
divine prÒswpa. 
 261
be partative and imperfect (mšroj g¦r ¤pan ¥telej).586  Apollinarius observes divine 
order in the Trinity, the Father is styled ¢rc» of the Son, and not his brother, and 
the Spirit is the Spirit of God, but this mysterious procession and relationship 
does not undermine the divine reality of the three prÒswpa. The persons of the 
Trinity have both a koinwn…a and a unity: there are not three Gods, nor three 
Lords, nor three divine oÙs…ai, but one divine nature.587 The Father’s unique, 
distinct and eternal prÒswpon shares a single, divine oÙs…a, with the Son and 
the Spirit. Divinity assumes flesh accordingly, not assuming a particular soul or 
person. Christ’s Logos is his own Logos, his own noàj.  The oÙs…a of the Holy 
Trinity does not subsist in created things, without enduing a divine reality. 
Redeemed life consists of sanctification to complete communion, koinwn…a, with 
the divine Trinity, where humanity is glorified and transfigured by the divine 
splendour.  
 
In KMP 18 (Lietzmann, 1904:173) Apollinarius offers a creedal summation of his 
argument, which gives a more textured context to understand the meaning of the 
“holy flesh” of the Incarnate Word. He echoes Athanasius’s fundamental 
distinction between the Holy Trinity and everything else, a distinction both 
temporal and eternal because God is constant (Marcellus’s adapting monotheism 
is again condemned). By the Holy Union and the mediating work of the Holy 
Spirit – perceived primarily in terms of sanctifying, continuing, then the work of 
the Son – anything in being has relation and communion with the Holy Trinity. 
                                                 
586 KMP 18, Lietzmann, 1904:173. 
587 ¢n£tirrhtwj koinwn…an kaˆ ˜nÒthta œconta, kaq' ¿n oÜ te qeÒthtej tre‹j oÜte kuriÒthtej oÜte 
¡giÒthtej, ¢ll' ¢lhqîj,  tîn triîn prosèpwn menÒtwn beba…wj, tîn triîn t¾n ›nwsin Ðmologhtšon. 
Lietzmann, 1904:175. Cp the “Athanasian Creed”: “Alia est enim persona Patris, alia Filii; alia 
Spiritus Sancti. Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est divinitas: æqualis gloria, coæterna 
majestas” Cf. BCP, 1965:65. 
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Created by the Father’s will through the Logos, redeemed in accordance with 
these eternal purposes by the Incarnate Word, and sanctified and preserved by 
the divine presence – the work of the divine Spirit – the creature is sanctified. 
The Son’s taking human flesh and reality from the Blessed Virgin in the union, 
remains imperative: it is not lost or laid aside after the Ascension. So, 
Apollinarius argues, Christians worship the whole Logos incarnate, the heavenly 
flesh of whom is united with the divine nature in the single prÒswpon of the Son 
never to be disentangled, not even at the eschatological re-presentation of all 
things to the Father.588 Not only shall the Son’s kingdom have no end, his 
prÒswpon and ØpÒstasij is eternal. This divinized humanity that is worshipped 
as part of the mystery: there is a “Singularity of worship” of the Son. Cyril will 
make more explicit some of the consequences of the lack of a fully divine 
understanding of the person of Christ at the Eucharistic consumption of the flesh 
and blood of Christ: it would not be possible to worship a created centre of 
existence, that would be idolatry; and the Eucharist cannibalism.589  
 
Another soteriologically-driven argument appears to have been added in this 
section.590 Just as the true divine nature of the Son was mediated by the Holy 
Spirit upon the Blessed Virgin Mary, so, if the salvation and sanctification of 
Christians is to be secure, then the Holy Spirit must be fully divine. Otherwise, 
there is no assurance of God’s abiding presence among things which, created 
out of nothing and returning to nothing, need to be united to, and in communion 
                                                 
588 Lietzmann, 1904:176-7. Cf. the Constantinopolitan addition to the Creed of Nicaea: oá tÁj 
basile…aj oÙk œstai tšloj - the Son’s kingdom, like the Son’s Øpost£sij, “will know no end”. 
589 See below, chapter 5. 
590 Interrupting the course of Christologically-focused Trinitarian theology here, Lietzmann, 
1914:167. 
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with, divine life if they are to remain. Apollinarius applies this particular 
soteriological concern to the question of the full divinity of the Spirit. 
 
The only alternatives Apollinarius offers other than his own Trinitarian theology, is 
his construct of “Arianism” or a Marcellan model. Apollinarius is committed to 
Trinitarianism so that there cannot be two active loci of personality in the Son: 
that would distort divine nature’s immutability. Salvation is cast solely in terms of 
fallen humanity being assumed and divinized by the humiliation of the Logos in 
the incarnation and passion, and by his glorious resurrection with its overflowing 
consequences. Apollinarius construes this salvation ontologically. This 
soteriological motivation is a very different model than that urged by Gregg and 
Groh (1981) to describe Arius’s motivation. Apollinarius does not refer to 
salvation on the creature’s terms, rather its assumption and divinization after the 
manner of the holy union. Apollinarius’s soteriological emphasis proceeds from 
his argument that as the divine Word put on the garment of our flesh in the 
Mystery, so we must put on the divine nature, the resurrection life, given to us by 
him to enter the marriage banquet of the lamb.591 The Son mediates only in as 
much as he endows his prevailing divine nature upon all flesh in the manner of 
his incarnation. The Spirit continues this mediation: the most significant fact of 
Christian salvation is that the Union works for the renewal of all humanity.592 
 
Passion and Crucifixion have a theological significance only because of the 
union: it is redeemed from being another meaningless tragedy in the world of 
                                                 
591 The danger here is that it can be miscontrued to imply that the Son put on humanity as if it 
were a costume. But Apollinarius is at pains to argue for the hypostatic union through the real 
humanity of the Son from Mary. 
592 prÕj ¢naka…nwsin tÁj ¢nqrwpÒthtoj. Cp KMP 36, Lietzmann, 1904:181. 
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created existence, because the divinized humanity of the Incarnate Word, 
enables the faithful to   
 
confess the suffering of the Lord, according to the flesh.593 
 
Christ’s heavenly flesh thus has a mediating function as it is the means whereby 
human suffering is known by the divine Son, and the means whereby, through 
enduring suffering, powerless matter, created ex nihilo, is endowed with divine 
power. Apollinarius attempts to hold together essential theology with the drama 
of salvation at every point. He explicitly attempts to subvert other models of faith 
which emphasize a human linked with God, an ¥nqrwpon qeù sunafqšnta.594 
Rather than a model of conjunction or juxtaposition of two natures with 
(according to Apollinarius) two centres of personality, the nature of the s£rkwsij is 
the Trinity’s effecting divinisation of all flesh without mutuation. The Incarnate 
Word has a unity of purpose and personality, not two discrete identities or 
personalities. The centre of the Incarnate Logos’s identity, the noàj, acts and 
directs the body divinely. The Incarnate God retains his own energy, oÙs…a, and 
unconquerable noàj, to lead home the people of God without diminution or fear of 
loss: 
 
For God, incarnate in humanity’s flesh, retains his own energy, [his] 
mind unconquerable by fleshly natures and passions, so capable of 
                                                 
593 KMP 29, Lietzmann, 1904:178. 
594 Lietzmann, 1904:178. 
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leading the flesh and the promptings of the flesh divinely and 
sinlessly.595 
 
Apollinarius’s leitmotif makes sense of his refusal of a human noàj: the 
untransfigured, undivinized humanity (qua created and fallen humanity) has no 
place ™n tÍ qe…v doxolog…v. The centre of the Christian truth for Apollinarius is 
salvation construed as the sanctification of human life by its being endowed with 
the divine nature of the Son and the energy: 
 
the Word of God was made man for our salvation in order that we 
might receive the likeness of the Heavenly [One]; and be made 
divine after the likeness of him who is truly Son of God by nature 
(kat¦ fÚsin).596 
 
Apollinarius insists upon ontological distinction of the divinity of the Son and the 
endowed, graceful divinity (by his passion and through the Spirit) upon those who 
are in Christ. Apollinarius does not expound how there are “grades” as it were of 
divine nature, but the distinction is present in KMP. The absolute, real and 
unmutated divine nature of the Incarnate Logos, by the power of that hypostatic 
union, extends to all flesh, and remains in perfect communion with humanity in 
Christ.597 
                                                 
595 noàj ¢»tthtoj ên tîn fucikîn kaˆ sarkikîn paqhm£twn KMP 30, Lietzmann, 1904:178. 
596 ¹me‹j g£r famen ¥nqrwpon gegenÁsqai tÕn toà qeoà lÒgon prÕj swthr…an ¹mîn, †na t¾n 
Ðmo…wsin toà ™pouran…ou l£bwmen kaˆ qeopoihqîmen prÕj ÐmoiÒthta toà kat¦ fÚsin 
¢lhqinoà uƒoà toà qeoà, kat¦ s£rka d uƒoà ¢nqrèpou kur…ou ¹mîn 'Ihsoà Cristoà. KMP 31, 
Lietzmann, 1904:179. 
597 Cf. Wolfson’s strained argument (1956:440), determined to demonstrate the logical 
inadequacies of Apollinarius’s Christology: “while the body and the Logos in Jesus form one 
nature by reason of the lack of a rational soul in the body... the body with its irrational soul is still 
something distinct from the Logos, inasmuch as in its union with the Logos it is not completely 
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 Apollinarius provides another résumé at paragraph 32 in Lietzmann’s text,598 
before advancing his theological theme. The Son and Spirit are both self-
subsistent, existing co-eternally in divine communion with the Father,599 neither 
are created by an external will of the Father:600 the Logos is the noàj of the 
Father, and the Spirit his life. The incarnation of the Son enables a theology of 
double ÐmooÚsioj to emerge.601 Here, however, is not the point for Apollinarius 
to interrupt his discourse by a lengthy exploration of double ÐmooÚsioj: there is 
more dynamic to be described in his particular treatment of Trinitarian 
soteriology. The unity and the eternal tri-personality of the persons of the Trinity 
are not simply that of appearance (an Anti-Marcellan thrust), nor merely a 
hermeneutical device, nor something achieved by the human Son’s participation 
with the divine (perhaps an attack upon a semi-Arian Christological construction) 
but the ontological foundation of Christian salvation.  `OmooÚsioj  is fundamental 
in Apollinarius’s Trinitarian model, because, as we have observed in Athanasius, 
the fundamental cosmological-theological differentiation is between divine and 
created life, and the fullest significance of salvation is the transformation of 
human beings into the life of God in Christ. Only the notion of ÐmooÚsioj can 
                                                                                                                                                 
destroyed... or completely changed into the Logos.” Wolfson ignores the essential-soteriological 
nuances of Apollinarius in his application of a Philonic-Origenistic critique of Apollinarius’s 
fragments. Cf. Hanson, 1993:60, on his suggestion that Arius’s thought was fed by Philo 
(because Philo taught two Logoi, and that one was created ex nihilo): “But then, Wolfson was 
obsessed to an excessive degree with the influence of Philo on the Fathers; Philo’s Logos-
doctrine is confused and obscure; he does not make the same division between the Logos and 
God as did the Arians.” So Lorentz, 1980:103-106.    
598 KMP 32, Lietzmann, 1904:179f. 
599 zînta kaˆ Øfestîta kaˆ ™nergon, ¢eˆ sunÒnta tù patr… KMP 32, Lietzmann, 1904:180. 
600 oÙ poi»sei tÍ ™k boul»sewj, Lietzmann, 1904:180. 
601 Meredith, 1995:103: “On the whole it can be said that the central aim of all parties was to steer 
some sort of middle course between the position of Arius on the one hand and Marcellus of 
Ancyra on the other. This means that though all agreed that Arius had been wrong, if he meant 
that the Son was not co-eternal with the Father, Marcellus was no less wrong in denying any real 
and eternal distinction between the Father and the Son. Cappadocian theology is an attempt to 
interpret the central term homoousios in such a way as to insist on the full deity of the Son and of 
his eternal distinction from the Father.” 
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permit the soteriological gates to burst open.602 Salvation is the giving of divine 
life.603 This divine life, when appropriated by the creature,604 is transmitted by 
mediation of Son and Spirit.  Their ontologically divine ØpÒstaseij remain the 
means by which this divine nature is lavished upon the creature. Humanity’s 
share in divine life is by grace, through the Son’s divinity, in a Christocentric-
Pneumaticocentric manner.  
 
Apollinarius’s approach is bold, but the fact that he needs to rehabilitate 
ÐmooÚsioj confirms a Marcellan environment for this term in its anti-Arius use.605 
The Son made his home in the world606 in the incarnation by the Holy Spirit, 
resulting in sanctification. The Son’s incarnation and the Holy Spirit’s coming are 
                                                 
602 Lietzmann, 1904:177. The sanctifying role of the Holy Spirit conveys the nature of the Trinity to 
the creature that it may “remain”. Apollinarius fixes all this upon the reality and differentiation of 
the divine persons. 
603 Cyril further develops this in Trinitarian style: the Son gives his divine life for the life of the 
world, the Spirit enables the creature to appropriate this divine life. Keating, 2000, urges that 
construing “a narrative of redemption” in Cyril solely in the light of the Eucharist is distortive. 
(contra Chadwick, 1951). Such a construction, he argues, limits the concept of participation to the 
sacramental union of Christian to Christ in the Eucharist, whereas this is not the primary means of 
indwelling in Cyrilline texts - either numerically or functionally. Rather, pneumatic indwelling is 
central to Cyril. 
604 Keating, 2000:4 fn.10:  “The verb, ‘to appropriate’, can mean ‘to make over to any as his own’, 
or ‘to take for one’s own’ (The Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, vol I. Oxford: Clarendon, 1973, 
p. 94). The title of this study intentionally plays off an equivocal use of ‘appropriate’ in order to 
indicate Christ’s active gift of divine life to us, and the active reception of this divine life by us. The 
term should not be understood, however, in a technical philosophical sense, according to which 
our ‘appropriation’ of divine life would imply that the divine life becomes ‘proper’ to our human 
nature. For Cyril, our share in the divine life is always ‘by grace’, and not ‘by nature’.” On the 
meaning of theosis/theopoiesis, see Russell, 1988, who examines the use and significance of this 
as markedly “Alexandrian” in Clement, Origen, Athanasius, Apollinarius & Didymus the Blind 
(1988:221-360). 
605 This does not resolve the largest puzzle: which we have explored above, namely, if Arius was 
to be suppressed, why did the Nicaean Fathers adopt a device which could be (and appears to 
have been) so easily rejected as Sabellian, and which even Athanasius did not use until its 
rehabilitation by such theological foundations as those of Apollinarius? Hanson, 1988: 272, 
argues (concerning the Council of Rome): “The Western bishops made no serious attempt to 
analyse the complexity of the situation which faced them [ie, at the Council of Rome, 341]; they 
had hitherto remained on the periphery of the controversy; their traditional Monarchianism could 
square well enough with the little they knew of the Council of Nicaea; by an oversimplification 
they were able to see Marcellus as orthodox. This intervention gave those in the East who wished 
to change the Creed of Nicaea an opportunity; the West’s vindication of the manifestly heterodox 
Marcellus increased the disquiet which N[icaea’s Creed, henceforth N] had already created, for N 
appeared to favour the near-Sabellianism of Marcellus.” 
606 uƒÕj  ™ped»mhse kÒsmJ ™k parqšnou labèn, ¿n ™pl»rwsen ¡g…ou pneÚmatoj e„j tÕn 
p£ntwn ¹mîn ¡giasmÒn KMP 35, Lietzmann 1904:181. 
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together reckoned to be salvific: the incarnation is connected to Christians by the 
Holy Spirit so that the Son’s life conveyed by the Holy Spirit, may deliver 
 
death to death and destroy[…] death by the resurrection, which 
raises us all.607 
 
The sustained, close inter-relation between the persons of Son and Spirit, as 
central to salvation in KMP is explicit here. Christian salvation is the life of the 
divine Son mediated by the Spirit. Apollinarius weaves together ontological and 
soteriological significances of Son and Spirit in a masterly parallelism here at 
what is the climax of his thesis: in the incarnation, the divine Son takes to himself 
our human nature (neither being transmuted in the process - made to be a 
partaker in fallen, sinful humanity – nor assuming a man): in the resurrection his 
holy flesh is endowed upon all who are in him. The Son is tightly bound in his 
divinity to our humanity, and thus makes his home in the world. Apollinarius 
continues608 (of the Son): 
 
The One Son, both before and after the Incarnation is the same -  
God and [a Hu]man [being] - both as One. And God the Logos and 
the Man Jesus are not [to be conceived of] as separate persons 
[prÒswpon], but the preëxistent Son was himself made one with 
                                                 
607 uƒÕj  ™ped»mhse kÒsmJ s£rka ™k parqšnou labèn, ¿n ™pl»rwsen ¡g…ou pneÚmatoj e„j 
tÕn p£ntwn ¹mîn ¡giasmÒn,] qan£tJ d paradoÝj t¾n s£rka tÕn q£naton œluse di¦ tÁj 
¢nast£sewj e„j t¾n p£ntwn ¹mîn ¢n£stasin... KMP 35, Lietzmann, 1904:181. This delivering of the 
flesh of death refers less in this context to Christ’s own assumed body – this would make the 
resurrection a work of the Holy Spirit, but fits best in the context of the applied divine life to the 
Christian. Cyril will make this explicit in his reflections on divine indwelling as the Spirit’s activity 
(cf. Keating, 2000). 
608 KMP paragraph 36, Lietzmann, 1904:181. 
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flesh through [™k] Mary, in order to bring into himself into complete 
and holy and sinless human unity, the economy [of which results in] 
the renewal of humanity and the salvation of the whole universe.609   
 
Apollinarius has hitherto alluded to the paradox of the Son’s humiliation. Whilst 
fully divine, the Son was bound with our human nature without becoming a hybrid 
in the process, neither being two subjects nor centres of identity.610 The Union is 
prior, and the economy of salvation depends upon it. This is the context for this 
text:  
 
The One Son, both before and after the Incarnation is the same -  
God and [a Hu]man [being] - both as One.611 
 
Apollinarius is not referring to a preëxistent, heavenly “divine-flesh” as his 
opponents caricature him. He has established that the flesh is a temporal 
attribute, taken of the Blessed Virgin at the Incarnation. Rather, the unity referred 
to here is the identity, the single subject of the Incarnate, which is consistent from 
eternity, neither mutating nor changing. 
 
Mediation of divine life is thus linked with the means of facilitating its 
appropriation. His Christology proclaims the personal unity of the incarnate 
                                                 
609 eŒj uƒÒj, kaˆ prÕ tÁj sarkèsewj kaˆ met¦ t¾n s£rkwsin Ð aÙtÒj, ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ qeÒj, ˜k£teron 
æj ›n. Kaˆ oÙc ›teron mn prÒswpon Ð qeÕj lÒgoj, ›teron d ¥nqrwpoj  'Ihsoàj. ¢ll' aÙtÕj Ð 
proãp£rcwn uƒÕj ˜nwqeˆj sarkˆ ™k Mar…aj katšsth, tšleion kaˆ ¤gion kaˆ ¢nam£rthton ¥nqrwpon 
sunist¦j ˜autÕn kaˆ o„konomîn e„j ¢nanšwsin ¢nqrwpÒthtoj kaˆ kÒsmou pantÕj swt»rion. KMP 36, 
Lietzmann, 1904:181. 
610 In stark contrast to a literal reading of the notorious Fragment 113, which counters this 
argument, see a paraphrased translation at the end of this chapter. 
611 eŒj uƒÒj, kaˆ prÕ tÁj sarkèsewj kaˆ met¦ t¾n s£rkwsin Ð aÙtÒj, ¥nqrwpoj kaˆ qeÒj, ˜k£teron 
æj ›n. KMP 35, Lietzmann, 1904:181. 
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Logos, developing Athanasius’s ontological counterpoint: creatures may also be 
recipients of divine life – to which they have no a priori ontological right – through 
the activity of the Holy Spirit. Apollinarius stresses the collaborative mediation of 
Son and Holy Spirit:  
 
The Son is one Lord, even as also (is) the Spirit, who transmits 
[diapšmpon] the Lordship of the Son to the sanctified creature.612  
 
He delivered death to death and destroyed death by the 
resurrection, which raises us all.613  
 
Resurrection appears as a term indicative of the substantive nature of divinized 
human life – the ontologically real aspect of the economy of salvation. The active 
mediator of this divine life is the Spirit, who realizes who Christ is, and what he 
has done, for the Christian.614  
 
Perfect also is the Holy Spirit of God, who through the Son, 
furnishing abundantly those adopted children of God, is living and 
life-imparting, Holy, and sanctifying those participating in him, not at 
all in the manner of an unsubstantial human breath being breathed. 
                                                 
612 kÚrioj eŒj Ð uƒÒj, æsaÚtwj d kaˆ tÕ pneàma, t¾n toà uƒoà kuriÒthta diapšmpon e„j t¾n 
¡giazomšnhn kt…sin. KMP 35, Lietzmann, 1904:180-1. 
613 qan£tJ d paradoÝj t¾n s£rka tÕn q£naton œluse di¦ tÁj ¢nast£sewj e„j t¾n p£ntwn ¹mîn 
¢n£stasin. KMP 35, Lietzmann, 1904:181. 
614 The meaning of the Virgin being “filled with the Holy Spirit for the sanctification of all.” KMP 35, 
Lietzmann, 1904:181. Two aspects features of Apollinarius’s argument are significant: [1] the 
Holy Spirit has a necessary divinity to convey divinity to the Blessed Virgin;  [2] accordingly, he 
must be fully divine in order to convey this life to Christians. Apollinarius continues Athanasius’s 
nuanced application of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to Christology. The argument is ontological 
in the case of the incarnation of the Son, but soteriologically-focused in the case of the 
sanctification of Christians. In both aspects, Apollinarius connects salvation’s dependence upon 
the authentic divinity of both Son and Spirit. 
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So it is that the Trinity is indeed to be worshipped, glorified and 
honoured and reverenced: the Father, who is apprehended 
[nooumšnou] in the Son because the Son is from him, that Son who 
is glorified in the Father, because he is of the Father, manifested in 
the Holy Spirit to those who are sanctified.615 
 
The significance of a single noetic subject to Apollinarius is given clear 
exposition: the single nature of the divine Son in his humanity is the means of 
sensible apprehension of the Father, Christians are made participators in his 
unique knowledge of the Father by the Spirit. A divine noàj protects the integrity 
of the persons of the Trinity and soteriology in his schema. We shall note that 
Cyril and the subsequent non-Chalcedonian [monophysite] tradition further 
develop these Christological priorities.  
 
The Christological current in KMP then flows back to pneumatological concerns, 
concluding with a florilegium of Biblical texts which Apollinarius places as an 
appendix as the grounds for his Trinitarian Pneumatology.616 
 
Apollinarius’s consistent approach to the singularity of subject of Christ, and his 
justification of this is clear in terms of essential theology and soteriological 
                                                 
615 Tšleion d kaˆ tÕ pneàma tÕ ¤gion ™k qeoà di' uƒoà corhgoÚmenon e„j toÝj 
uƒoqetoumšnouj, zîn kaˆ zwopoiÒn, ¤gion kaˆ ¡giastikÕn tîn metalambanÒntwn aÙtoà, oÙc æj 
ØpÕ ¢nqrèpou pno¾n ™mpneusqe‹san ¢nupÒstaton, ¢ll' ™k qeoà zîsan, di' Óper ¹ tri¦j 
proskunht¾ <kaˆ> doxast¾ kaˆ tim…a kaˆ seb£smioj, patrÕj mn ™n uƒù nooumšnou, kaqÒti 
uƒÕj ™x aÙtoà, uƒoà d ™n patrˆ doxazomšnou, kaqÒ ™stin ™k patrÒj, faneroumšnou ™n 
pneÚmati ¡g…J to‹j ¡giazomšnoij. KMP, Lietzmann, 1904:181-2.  
616 See footnotes in Lietzmann, 1904:182-194. Apollinarius cites [in this order] 2 Cor. 13.13; 2 
Cor. 1.21,22; 2 Cor. 3.15-18; 2 Cor. 4.4-5; 2 Cor. 6.6,4; 2 Cor. 6.6-7; 1 Cor. 3.16-17; 1 Cor. 6.11; 
1 Cor. 6.19; 1 Cor. 7.40; 1 Cor. 10.4; 1 Cor. 12.3-13; [strongly alludes to Gal. 1.8-9]; Hebr. 2.3-4; 
and Hebr. 3.7-11.  These cited texts establish, for Apollinarius, the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and if 
the text as Lietzmann transmits it is a 2nd [“Spirit”] edition of KMP, this selection most certainly 
belongs to that edition.  
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motives. His use of ÐmooÚsioj non-modalistically witnesses antipathy against 
attempted moderations of economic Trinitarianism accommodating essentially 
Monadic conceptions. His emphatic rehabilitation of this term effectively 
distances from it from Marcellus. Apollinarius develops Athanasius’s application 
of creatio ex nihilo with ÐmooÚsioj reinforcing the Alexandrian’s emphasis upon 
the cosmological dualism between created things and eternal divine nature. He, 
additionally, applies ÐmooÚsioj to the Holy Spirit, who mediates the divine nature 
of the Son. In De Unione Apollinarius attends carefully to the significance of the 
humanity of the incarnate Son, again applying ÐmooÚsioj theologically to both 
the divine nature and to the Son’s ÐmooÚsioj with humanity. It remains to 
evaluate whether this miahypostatic concern is consistent with other works by 
Apollinarius, de Unione and other fragments. The chapter will conclude with an 
attempted reading of the notorious fragment in the light of this context.  
 
4.4: Apollinarius’s De Unione and Fragments through the lens of KMP  
 
Apollinarius’s De Unione is, if anything more explicit about the soteriological 
significance of ÐmooÚsioj than KMP. Here Apollinarius introduces the double 
homoousion to establish that the ultimate cosmological differentiation of created 
and non-created being, the cwrismÒj between divine and human nature 
characteristic of Athanasius’s thought, is only resolved in the incarnation.617  
 
Thus he is both coessential with God in the invisible Spirit (the flesh 
being comprehended in the title because it has been united to that 
                                                 
617 Lietzmann, 1904:189. 
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which is coessential with God), and again coessential with men (the 
Godhead being comprehended with the body because it has been 
united to what is coessential with us). And the nature of the flesh is 
not altered by its union with what is coessential with God and by its 
participation in the title of homoousios, even as the nature of the 
Godhead is not changed by its participation of a human body and 
by bearing the name of a flesh coessential with us.618 
 
As in KMP neither nature is distorted, but humanity is, rather, endowed with its 
ultimate destiny: the nature of the Son. The oft-quoted accusation that 
Apollinarius used a model of blending which reduced each oÙs…a to a third 
entity in the Holy Union is clearly far from this text also, and misconstrues the 
central thesis of both texts. This requires a critical evaluation of the provenance 
and context of the scandalous texts: if they are his, an evaluation of the purpose 
of those particular similes is required. De Unione confirms the methodological 
importance of taking KMP as the hermeneutical key to a reading of Apollinarius. 
 
4.5: Towards Trinitarianism: the place of mediation and the refinement of 
“miahypostatic” theology 
In this chapter we have observed how the issue of mediation is handled by 
Apollinarius against Marcellus. Athanasius’s thought is developed in Apollinarius 
against what is a creative and provocative model of adapted Logos theology in a 
miahypostatic mould in Marcellus. Apollinarius thus offers a constant critique of 
Marcellan theology, and hones the miahypostatic Christological tradition, into a 
                                                 
618 Lietzmann, 1904:188; Translation of Norris, 1980:105.  
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thoroughly Trinitarian model, clarifying the use of ØpÒstasij in a way that 
subsequent Councils will use as normative. A reading of Apollinarius’s theology 
which takes the complete text of KMP as the primary source, illustrates his 
substantive agreement with later exponents of the Alexandrian tradition, 
especially Cyril. Moreover, Apollinarius’s theology is compatible with a radical 
reading of CG-DI as outlined above: because there the divine identity of the 
incarnate Son is so theologically significant that Athanasius has to refine it in his 
anti-Arian tractates. 
 
Apollinarius’s connection of the unity of the Son’s personality with soteriology is a 
development of Athanasius’s insistence upon soteriological remaining in the Son, 
replacing a Platonic Middle Place in the cosmologies of traditionalists like 
Eusebius. Apollinarius roots Trinitarian thinking in the incarnation, and 
miahypostatic Christology in the context of tri-hypostatic, homoousian theology. 
His promotion of the notion of Athanasius’s construction of mediation reflects his 
awareness of the weakness in miahypostatic neglect of the theological 
significance of Christ’s humanity. Apollinarius shares the Christological approach 
of DI: the Logos replaces the image of the Logos. A particular reading of 
transformative mediation is a significant dynamic in both.  
 
Furthermore, Apollinarius recognizes some of the difficulties for conventional 
anthropology and soteriology which Athanasius’s emphasis upon the Incarnation 
reinforces. Infinitus fit finitus, et finitum fit infinitum. But the Infinitus is not 
distorted in the becoming finitus; and the finitum is made infinitum in a way which 
always preserves Athanasius’s absolute ontological distinction of eternal Son and 
 275
created sons who, by grace, receive divinity through the Spirit. Athanasius’s 
theology which wrestled ontologically with the Christological assumption of 
humanity into divine reality leads Apollinarius to a Trinitarian theology emphatic 
of the full divinity of the Holy Spirit: 
 
the Church is the Spirit-bearing body of Christ, [and] ... the Holy 
Ghost really dwells in the Church and maintains its life... [T]o say 
that the Holy Ghost is the life or the soul of the Church is, if one is 
doing anything more than employing a picturesque metaphor, to 
say that God is really communicating himself to men, that the 
Church consists of deified humanity. For the Holy Ghost is God 
himself... the Church is the Spirit-bearing body [which is]... another 
way of saying that the principle of unity of the Holy Trinity and the 
principle of the Church’s unity are identical, for the [reality]... of both 
is the Holy Ghost (Mascall, 1965:9). 
 
In Apollinarius, Athanasius’s concern for a communion-creating mediation 
located in the Son, is extended to the Spirit. The motive is soteriological, the 
method ontological. The Spirit’s mediation conveys divine nature upon humanity 
in a manner far exceeding humanity’s aboriginal state. The divine Spirit conveys 
and mediates his divine life to those in Christ. Mediation is the task of the third 
person of the Trinity, who communicates Christ’s achievement in the Church. 
Christology is perhaps for the first time set in a thoroughly Trinitarian context in 
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KMP. Apollinarius argues that this leaves no place for a counter Logos,619 a 
persisting assumed human noàj, in Christ. His full humanity consists in his being 
the Logos of God: anthropology is thus significantly expanded as Cyril will 
explicate. Apollinarius is unconcerned about the assumption of a (singular, 
actual) man in order that one particular nature can be restored in the union. 
Rather, he emphasizes the Holy Trinity’s divinizing of all human life. To construe 
this as “impersonal” is to miss his soteriological / ontological emphasis. 
Apollinarius breaks free from Origen’s model in an authentically Trinitarian 
manner, insisting that a human noàj other than the Logos of God in the incarnate 
Christ would confuse his person, and diminish his humanity. It is not fully human 
to be one fallen human. Full humanity consists of communion with God – it is the 
possession only of the first Adam before the Fall, and the gift of the last Adam in 
the incarnation. Apollinarius’s Christ offers a proleptic new humanity which more 
than merely restoring the fallen, transforms it into his divine life. The drama of DI 
54’s aÙtÕj g¦r ™nhnqrèphsen, †na ¹me‹j qeopoihqîmen is given full explication in 
Apollinarius. The Spirit’s role is fully integrated as the agent of this qeopo…hsij 
establishing his full divinity. 
                                                 
619 I am using this in a “plain sense”, i.e., not in a technical manner like Bonhoeffer, 1974:29, who 
uses Anti-Logos as a Christological foundation. His methodology begins with humanity’s 
perception of its own Logos and counters this with Christ the true Logos: “Man’s ultimate 
presupposition lies in his human Logos ... What if somewhere the claim is raised that this human 
Logos is superceded, judged, dead? What happens if a counter-Logos appears which reuses to 
be classified? A Logos which annihilates the first? What if the proclamation goes out that the old 
order has been dissolved, that it is out of date? First of all the human Logos repeats its old 
question. How is such a claim possible?... It forestalls the claim by negating itself and at the same 
time asserting that this negation is a necessary development of its own being. This is the ultimate 
deceit and the ultimate power of the Logos. This is what Hegel did in his philosophy. The reaction 
of the Logos under the attack of the Anti-Logos is no narrow-minded repudiation of the other 
Logos, as in the Enlightenment, but the great insight into its power of self-negation. Self-negation, 
however, means self-affirmation... But what if the Anti-Logos ... no longer appears in history as an 
idea, but as the Word incarnate, there is no longer any possibility of incorporating him into the 
order of man’s own Logos.” Bonhoeffer’s case here is not far from Apollinarius’s. The incarnation 
is about the divine Logos encountering, entering in the flesh the human Logos, but not to be 
juxtaposed with it, but rather, by the holy union, to redeem it. This transcendent new Adam thus 
becomes the new centre of human existence. 
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 In addition to these particular developments, Apollinarius’s use of ØpÒstasij and 
prÒswpon in his Christological explorations represent a quantum shift in 
theology, and positive and negative reactions emerge against them. 
Apollinarius’s Christological exploration of mediation set boundaries for later 
theology; his Christological use of oÙs…a, ØpÒstasij, prÒswpon and fÚsij 
contributed significantly to their future roles in Christological discourse, and 
application of these epithets pushed a more general re-definition of these terms 
which were previously much looser, often interchangeable, descriptions.620  
 
Apollinarius’s contribution to the grammar and content of Christian dogmatics is 
significant. KMP defends miahypostatic Christology against dyohypostatic 
readings, and redefines ÐmooÚsioj against what he perceives to be Marcellus’s 
deficient usage. Marcellus was the bête noire of conservatives like Eusebius and 
dyohypostatic theologians – an example of why miahypostatic Christology 
inevitably led to Sabellianism. His labours in KMP refute Marcellus, and thereby 
those who would use him to dismiss Nicaea’s ÐmooÚsioj. Marcellus’s attempt to 
marry miahypostatic Christology with Logos theologies of the second century 
cannot resist becoming quasi-Arian or Modalistic Monism. The contribution of 
Apollinarius as a developer of Athanasius’s thought in CG-DI has evaded proper 
recognition.  
 
In subsequent chapters of this thesis, Apollinarius’s significance is unavoidable. 
Developing Athanasius’s insistence upon the proper recognition of humanity’s 
                                                 
620 See chapter 5, below, for a discussion of the change of meaning in Christological terms in 
Cyril and Nestorius. 
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creatio ex nihilo, he urges an ontological resolution of soteriology which cannot 
be ignored, and which must be set in Trinitarian context.621 
  
                                                 
621 Raven (1923) acknowledges there is but a hair’s breadth between Apollinarius and 
Athanasius, but thereby misses the significance of the developments in Apollinarius’s theology 
from a common miahypostatic source. McGuckin’s 1994 robust defence of Cyril of Alexandria 
comes close to a participatory exegesis of Apollinarius, yet, in his desire to promote Cyril, under-
emphasises the parallels. Wolfson offers precise philosophical definitions of “union” (1956:385), 
after Dräseke, 1892, but relies too much upon out-of-context fragments representing Apollinarian 
- rather than Apollinarius’s - thought. Despite Wolfson’s stated aim to do for the Church Fathers 
what he had tried to do in his work on Philo (“to build up, out of suggestions, a systematic 
structure of his thought and also to piece together, out of allusions and implications, the story of 
its growth” 1956:iii), his attempt with Apollinarius stretches his material too far. Wolfson wishes to 
demonstrate how “the relation of certain teachings of Greek philosophy to the revealed truths of 
both the Jewish and Christian Scripture resulted similarly in a recasting of Christian beliefs in the 
form of a philosophy and thereby also producing a Christian version of Greek philosophy.” [ibid.: 
vi]. The result, although helpful in general delineation of an emergent Christian Philosophical 
tradition is unhelpful in its analysis of Apollinarius’s contribution [1956:433-451]. He misses the 
significance of the mystery of the union distinctively participating in the fullness of divine nature, 
fitting humanity to bear that glory by the persistence of the “divine flesh.” Instead, in the manner 
of Apollinarius’s contemporary critics, he uses both aspects against him: “From these nine 
passages it may be gathered that, while the body and the Logos in Jesus form one nature by 
reason of the lack of a rational soul in the body [citing De Fide et incarnatione, 7, Lietzmann,  
1904:199; De Unione, 5, Lietzmann, 1904:187; Fragment 107, Lietzmann, 1904:232;], the body 
with its irrational soul is distinct from the Logos, inasmuch as in its union with the Logos it is not 
completely destroyed (sic) [citing Fragments 127, 128, Lietzmann, 1904:238; Fragment 129, 
Lietzmann, 1904:239; Fragment 134, Lietzmann, 1904:239-240] or completely changed into the 
Logos [de Fide et Incarnatione, 7, Lietzmann, 1904:199].” Wolfson misses the functions of, for 
example, the promise of the reality of union with divine life whilst distinguishing between the 
esential divinity of the Son and the endued divinity to those in the Son. His argument appears to 
be based fragments from Apollinarius which do not reflect the subtleties or nuances of his 
arguments. Cf. Bethune-Baker (1954:240-241) cites the works of Apollinarius, commenting: 
“None of these writings, however, shew any of the peculiar theories known as Apollinarian.” He 
responds to the publication of Lietzmann [ibid, 433f] thus: “It appears to be questionable whether 
Apollinarius really conceived of the Logos as the archetype of all human souls”. Apollinarius did 
conceive of the single divine nature of the incarnate Word as restoring and divinizing fallen 
humanity. Schaff, 1891: 709-711 acknowledges that Apollinarius “was the first to apply the results 
of the Trinitarian discussions of the Nicene age to Christology, and to introduce the long 
Christological controversies. He was the first to call the attention of the Church to the physical 
and pneumatic side of the humnaity of Christ, and by contradiction brought out the doctrine of a 
reasonable human soul in him more clearly and definitely than it had before been conceived.” His 
error, accounted for by the best intentions, was  “zeal for the true deity of Christ, and his fear of a 
double personality, he fell into the error of denying his integral humanity” making “Christ a middle 
being between God and man, in whom, as it were, one part divine and two parts human were 
fused in the unity of a new nature.” This is not Apollinarius’s intent. The holy union of real 
humanity (the nous of the Logos) and complete human existence (sarx and soma) should not be 
contrued thus. The humanity is real for him because it is not fallen and decaying. The model of 
divine Logos sustaining that which is created ex nihilo has soteriological priority. J. G. Davies’s 
[1966:266] judgement has characteristic brevity, though he misses the Anti-Marcellan prompt: 
“Apollinare, che divenne vescovo di Laodicea nel 361 nel pervenire alla sua posizione fu 
influenzato da tre fattori: il suo antiarianismo, la sua opposizione alla christologia antiochena di 
Diodoro di Tarso, e la sua interpretazione «traducianista» dell’origine dell’anima individuale.” 
Humanity for Apollinarius, irrespective of the soul’s origin, was fallen: sin was a part of humanity’s 
psychological / ontological reality. Otherwise, Athanasius’s theological foundation for the 
incarnation would be irrelevant.  
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Cappadocian critiques of Apollinarius assert that noàj still has a mediating 
function, re-presenting in a refined form Origen’s argument for the sacrament of 
intellect: 
 
Mind is mingled with mind as nearer and more closely related, and 
through it with flesh, being a mediator between God and 
carnality.622 
 
Gregory is less concerned with re-instating human mediation here than insisting 
that a human noàj has the specific function of protecting the divine nature from 
carnal existence - less a mediatorial concern than protecting divinity from 
degradation.There is a sincere soteriological aspect to the Cappadocians’ 
concern, because in their Origenistic anthropology, humanity is located in the 
noàj, for that is where Gregory (like Origen before him and contemporary 
Cappadocians) locate the human subject. But it is not sufficient to caricature 
Apollinarius’s estimate of “human nature by definition depraved” [my italics] as, 
for example, Frend maintains.623 
                                                 
622 Gregory of Nazianzus, Ad Cledonium, transl. in Meredith, 1995. He connects Gregory of 
Nazianzus’s critique of Apollinarius with Origen’s belief that the human mind is the “point of 
juncture between God and the body” [Peri Archon, 2.6.3]. The Cappadocian objection may better 
be understood as an objection to Apollinarius’s perceived materiality in the “divine flesh.” 
623 Frend, 1984:634. Frend’s close analysis is built upon the fragments, so underestimates that 
the most salient issue is that the life of humanity is restored by the union in the incarnate Logos. 
Frend recognizes the “veuve” and brilliance of Apollinarius, yet rejects his Christology on 
soteriological grounds: “To assert belief in a Christ who lacked an essential part of human nature, 
namely the human mind, destroyed community between Savior and saved.” Frend’s description 
of humanity in Apollinarius as “depraved ” inappropriately suggests puritanicalism in Apollinarius’s 
thought. Cyril of Alexandria will later strive to expound in his defence of “the one incarnate nature 
of the Word” and in his biblical exegesis (especially of the baptism narratives) a theme 
harmonious with Apollinarius, who is concerned with the single subject of the Incarnate Word, 
and his offering of his whole self to the Father. Fallen humanity with its moribundity has been, as 
it were, nailed to the feet of Christ. The mystery of the union is that in the death of our humanity is 
the means of divine life by that sacrifice. This is participated in at the Eucharist. The in-dwelling of 
the Holy Spirit, humanity assumed by the Logos is exchanged for the Life-giving real unfallen, 
divine Humanity of the Son: “divine flesh”. Frend’s accusation of the collapse of koinonia between 
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 Raven’s exploration of Apollinarius had a significant impact, in popular reviews at 
least, upon assessments of the subject of this chapter. This study has shown 
through a textual reassessment of Apollinarius via the complete KMP as a 
hermeneutic, that far from being trapped by a “concrete” Greek conceiving of 
humanity in terms of oÙs…a, (Raven’s transmission of Nazianzen’s critique of 
“chemical and physical metaphors”) Apollinarius addresses the issue of Christian 
salvation in a characteristically Alexandrian framework of qeopo…hsij, but, more 
significantly, in a thorough Trinitarian conceptuality.624 This is indeed the locus of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christ and his people is the very opposite of Apollinarius’s emphasis. Frend arrives at this critique 
through Epiphanius, [Panarion, 77.24]. But (as Frend acknowledges, 1984:649 fn.102) this 
accuastion attacks the views of Vitalis, “the Apollinarian bishop of Antioch.” It is both an 
infringment against natural justice to impute someone on the grounds of his disciple’s 
development if it cannot be demonstrated that this is a necessary consequence of the teacher’s 
method. It is improper to envisage Apollinarius intending such a picture.  
624 On human ousia in chemical or concrete terms, see Raven, 1923:273ff. Wickham 1983:203 
identifies what may be the source of Raven’s judgment upon Apollinarius noting (in the context of 
Cyril of Alexandria) “The Platonic universal was not concrete, (that was Hegel’s notion)”. On the 
nineteenth century background to the nature of humanity in Christ (focused on Harnack) see 
Keating, 2000:46-53. Cf. the helpful, if lengthy, footnote on “Union” in von Balthasar, 1989:58f fn. 
1, re-emphasizing the peculiarly “Christian” function of mediation in the debate: ‘Before 
approaching a Christian solution of the question [of the relation of our being aware of oneness 
with God and difference in essence and the possibility of - and nature of - ontological change], 
one could perhaps precede it with a pre-Christian, general consideration of human nature, which 
the Greek Fathers have repeatedly used in order to cast a little light on the trinitarian and 
Christological-ecclesial mystery. How, then, can we posit the unity of human nature, since this 
nature always only exists in various persons? The unity is perfect; each man is 100 per cent 
human, including the mentally ill and the amputee. Every man has the exact same bodily 
structure, which is the obvious prerequisite for a human medicine. In addition, each has basically 
the same structure of soul, which permits a valid general psychology; nevertheless, men are 
individually and for one another opposed entities. This so struck a Greek like Gregory of Nyssa 
that he believed he could take the human unity of nature and diversity of persons as a valid 
image of the Trinity. This was taken amiss by theologians because the unity of human nature 
would be one “abstracted” from individuals, while in God it would necessarily have to be 
understood “concretely”, since we would otherwise posit three opposing Gods. This is, of course, 
correct, but it does not apply to Gregory’s concept of nature or to that of other Greek Fathers for 
whom Christ’s Incarnation as such affects all human nature (sanctifying and “divinizing” it). In 
speaking of human nature, Gregory of Nyssa likes to use the image of the “dough” (phyrama) that 
as a whole is “thoroughly leavened” by Christ; or that of a river that, from Adam and Eve as its 
origin, flows on by a gereative fruitfulness through all generations, not in a mere “conceptual” 
continuity but in a real or physical one. Here it is not so much a matter of conveying Platonic 
thoughts (“ideal unity”) as those of the Stoics, according to which the Logos is spiritual as well as 
material. When we read in Is. 58.7, “Clothe the naked, and do not despise your flesh”, we 
understand the Greek Fathers’ view better. By this they do not deny that the personal spirit of 
each one comes from God. We can by all means understand this natural aspect of the 
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Raven’s assessment of Apollinarius’s “scholar’s passion for truth and the Saint’s 
confidence in righteousness... [a] noble... product of Greek Christendom” (Raven, 
1923:151) and the arena in which Apollinarius’s lucidity “opened up and surveyed 
new tracts of country” (Raven, 1923:150). 
 
In conclusion to this Athanasian reading of Apollinarius, a paraphrase of his 
notorious Fragment 113 is offered as an attempt to establish him as a serious 
exegete of Athanasius, moderating the starkness of that attributed him by Justinian 
in Contra Monophysita. Out-of-context as this fragment is, if it is really from the 
hand of Apollinarius, it would seem dissonant from KMP, were its aim not to be 
more than an attempt to employ an analogy of organic unity which somehow fully 
and actively participates in divine and human life.  
Mediators bring together things of likeness and of difference in one 
bonded-together unity. Just as in a mule there is the likeness both of 
an ass and of a horse; as in grey skin there is - in its own way - white 
and black; and as in spring is, as it were, a mist where there is 
working - in their own ways - things of winter and things of summer. 
A mediator has neither half of each nature in which it participates, 
nor discretely both, but the furthest points, out of which it is, are 
evenly distributed, married together into a unity. In such way is the 
mediation [mesÒthj] of God and man in Christ; certainly, to be sure, 
                                                                                                                                                 
relationship between substance and person as an initial and indispensible foreshadowing of that 
which - throughout all the consideration of the trinitarian and Christological mystery - will lead to 
understanding of the mystical body of Christ and to the many mysterious aspects of the 
“communion of saints”. Without this Christian theological mediation, the thought would indeed 
remain pre-Christian, insofar as emphasis on the physical unity of human nature hinders full 
understanding for the uniqueness and dignity of man, as becomes evident from the pagan and 
nontrinitarian monotheistic religions and again from post-Jewish and post-Christian atheistic 
communism and analogous (“Western”) human ideologies.’ 
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neither simply and entirely a whole man, neither God alone, but a 
mingling [m…xij] (Lietzmann, 1904:234). 
 
The dramatic climax of the Christological controversy will further illustrate the 
process of Christological clarification, illustrating the failure of proponents of a 
once-distinctive and shared (what might then have been termed) “mia-hypostatic” 
theology to agree upon an appropriate Christological vocabulary, and it is to that 
embittered and personal clash between Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius, half a 
century later, which we now turn.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF FIFTH-CENTURY CHRISTOLOGICAL 
CONTROVERSIES IN FOURTH-CENTURY TERMS. 
 
In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, St. Cyril (Patriarch of Alexandria, 
AD 412-444) is most closely related to St. Athanasius (Patriarch of 
Alexandria, AD 328-373)…. St. Athanasius is the “canon” (St. Basil) 
and St. Cyril the “seal” (St. Anastasios Sinaites) of Christian 
Orthodoxy. The reason for this is that both together have worked 
decisively for the defense of basic and fundamental truths of 
Orthodox Christianity. St. Athanasius fought for the doctrine of the 
divinity of Christ, which was questioned by heretics on account of 
the incarnation. St. Cyril built on the Athanasian foundation and 
clarified the doctrine of the Incarnation and especially the humanity 
of Christ. [Dragas, 2004:ix]. 
5.1: Introduction 
Dragas’s connection of Athanasius and Cyril, despite being couched in 
hagiographical Orthodox convention, is confirmed by recent scholarship of a very 
different style. Wessel’s 2004 study of Cyril’s rhetoric in his conflicts with 
Nestorius urges that his victory largely depended upon his self-identification with 
Athanasius (and his enemy with Arius) rather than political nous or theological 
erudition:  
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By the seventh century, Cyril was considered to be one of the 
greatest church fathers of Eastern Christianity, while Nestorius 
emerged as second only to Arius, the quintessential heretic of the 
Eastern Church…. Athanasius’s interpretative method has been to 
imagine the broader intent and scope (skopÒj)625 of Christian faith 
as providing the context for correct interpretation. When Cyril 
borrowed this method, he thus understood it to mean that difficult 
words and phrases should be interpreted according to the truth of 
the Christian message that the creed of Nicaea preserved and that 
the creedal formulations of his early episcopacy contained, and not 
according to the literal words of the scriptural text (Wessel, 
2004:11; 299). 
 
This chapter explores the place of Athanasius of Alexandria in the Christological 
controversies between Alexandria and Antioch building up to the Council of 
Chalcedon. This “triangulates” an understanding of his significance – assessing 
him in both miahypostatic and dyohypostatic Christological models in the fifth 
century. The study will explore material after the polemical correspondence 
which led to Nestorius’s condemnation, 626 especially focusing upon Cyril’s 
Christological Dialogues,627 Against those who are Unwilling to Confess that the 
Holy Virgin is Theotokos (hereafter, AUCT)628 and the Nestorian Heracleides.629  
An examination of Cyril’s construction of conventional dialogues and the rhetoric 
                                                 
625 So Torrance, 1997; contra Young, 1997 who shows that Athanasius’s predominant notion is 
the dianoia or mind of Scripture. 
626 Wickham, 1983. 
627 de Durand, 1964. 
628 Dragas, 2004. 
629 Nau, 1910; Driver & Hodgson, 1925. 
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developed between writer and reader in Heracleides leads to an identification of 
an explicit theological continuity between both fifth-century antagonists and 
Athanasius (contra Wessel, 2004), and illustrates the role of Christ’s humanity to 
both parties. It also elucidates a significant difference in style between Cyril and 
Nestorius with regard to citations of Athanasius and others in their argument. 
Where Cyril asserts continuity, and demonstrates many parallels and allusions, 
Nestorius quotes and cites Athanasius to demonstrate his claim for Christological 
authenticity.  
 
The impact of Athanasius of Alexandria upon both is clear, though perhaps 
surprising in terms of their mutual antipathy. Briefly stated, we shall observe that 
Cyril often follows textual clusters that Athanasius has used and imports 
significant theological vocabulary from, for example Contra Arianos II.67,630 
whereas Nestorius’s style is to cite a specific text and turn it in his argument. In 
Cyril’s discussion of redemption as recapitulation in a way that cannot reasonably 
be accounted for merely by fidelity to Pauline texts alone, an Athanasian 
influence has been identified: 
 
Car notre Rédemption est essentiallement pour S Cyrille une 
«récapitulation». Il fait de ce dernier terme un emploi sans 
commune mesure avec les us de son prédécesseur et maître, S. 
Athanase (De Durand, 1964:90). 
 
                                                 
630 PG 26.289 B. 
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The connections between Athanasius of Alexandria and Cyril extend far beyond 
their holding, in different centuries, the same patriarchal see. Russell (2000:4-5) 
and Wessel (2004:64-65, 128-129) detail the familial relationship between 
Athanasius and Cyril’s uncle and mother, and evidence their common approach 
to conflict resolution. In the Christological controversies with Nestorius, Cyril acts 
with the confidence of one accustomed to holding the authorized Athanasian 
tradition as a right, most especially in his attack upon Nestorius, this new Arius.  
McGuckin (1994:15-16, 2004a) describes the later Cyrilline Dialogues as a re-
presentation of Athanasius’ Contra Arianos. Daley observes that, for this reason, 
 
Cyril’s reflections on the Trinity, despite their length and intricacy, 
seem to most modern scholars derivative and uninteresting, even 
doctrinally anti-climatic, because they show a closer kinship with 
the theology of his Alexandrian predecessors Athanasius and 
Didymus than with the now-classic formulations of the 
Cappadocians and Constantinople I. (2003:113f). 
 
Lebon also draws attention to Athanasius being claimed and read in different 
theological ways by the Antiochene tradition: 
 
C’est un fait reconnu par tous que les Antiochiens et les 
Alexandrins (du temps du Cyrille) pouvaient se réclamer dans une 
certaine mesure des doctrines peu systematisées et unifiées et des 
formules peu étudiées de la christologie du grand alexandrin 
[=Athanase] (1935:746).  
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 Lebon specifically argues that the notion of the appropriation of humanity, and 
divine dwelling with us, a strict unity of person in the flesh and the distinction of 
idiomatic expression rather than double attribution of Scripture represent a 
common “concuremment chez Athanase” (de Durand, 1964:16fn).  
 
In exploring the complex relationship between Cyril and his predecessor 
Athanasius, it is also necessary to indulge Nestorian texts with as much “critical 
appreciation” as that lavished upon his Alexandrian nemesis in recent 
scholarship.631 In the collection of Nestorian texts prior to the discovery of the 
Book of Heracleides, Athanasius does not appear to be cited nor mentioned in 
the Nestorian corpus – though the reasons for this must be critically evaluated. 
Substantive claims upon Athanasius, however, are made by the author of 
Heracleides. Whether Nestorius had time to reflect upon the political sense of 
claiming Athanasius in his exile – thus weaving him into the Liber Heracleides – 
or whether Athanasian allusions undergirded Nestorian thought all along, with 
references “cut” by antagonistic collectors of Nestorian texts in orthodox 
propaganda, there is one unavoidable conclusion. A claim upon Athanasius was 
a highly desirable strategy in the fifth-century confict, but was by no means 
restricted to the Alexandrian tradition (contra Wessel, 2004). Indeed, Nestorius’s 
“use” of Athanasius applies not only to claims of doctrinal continuity with him but 
extends to identification with his treatment in the world. Both hold not only the 
same faith but shared the same fate of calumny and exile (Driver & Hodgson, 
1925:130; 377). 
                                                 
631 See below, note especially the influence of McGuckin (1994, 2004); Wickham’s introduction to 
Cyril in his 1983 introduction to selected correspondence, and Weinandy & Keating (2003). 
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 This chapter traces Athanasius’s influence, weighing how the adoption of an 
Athanasian pedigree for each perspective might apply to both protagonists. But 
at the outset, the most significant point is evident: Athanasius is recognized as a 
“seal” of Orthodox Christology to both parties. 
 
5.2: Readings of the conflict and literary review 
 
Both [Cyril and Nestorius] have their admirers, who usually 
assume, with the championship of one of the two, an intense dislike 
for the other. (Anastos, 1962:119). 
 
McGuckin’s detailed picture of Ephesus I (1994:1-125) disperses idealistic 
notions about the emergence of orthodoxy.632 His study is marked by a refusal to 
pander to contemporary assumptions that Christian truth emerges through 
anachronistic expectations of “liberal ecumenism” (1994:9).  
 
McGuckin’s attentive introduction and translation of key Cyrilline texts is marked 
by a tendency to be his advocate at every turn; consequently, prosecuting 
Nestorius’ motives and work in a manner that stretches the evidence 
unevenly.633 McGuckin rejects judgements of Cyril that caricature him as having 
                                                 
632 The bias towards Cyril is at least explicit and uncontested by McGuckin, but it does not do 
equal justice, nor show a equal latitude in approaching Nestorius so as to demonstrate parity to 
the Constantinopolitan’s corpus. See Young’s review (1983: 213-229) for balance, which distils 
the minutiae of detail and intricacies of events into an overall analysis of the period and its 
literature.  
633 McGuckin, (2003:205-236) continues this style in his contribution to a selection of critical – if 
revisionist - essays all of which appear remarkably positive towards Cyril. 
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a Christology of lÒgoj - s£rx as betraying a “sclerosis of the imagination” 
(2003:205).  Party to recent scholarly revision in assessing Cyril is Louth’s (2004) 
argument that Cyril’s negative reputation in Victorian England lay with Charles 
Kingsley’s 1853 novel about the murder of Hypatia by a mob at his instigation 
(also Russell, 2000:63). Louth argues that this accounts for Cyril’s transformation 
from a great articulating Father of the Church into “a sinister figure, cruel and
unscrupulous” (Louth, 2004:353). Russell (2000, 2003) argues that the dis
of Nestorius’s apologia at the beginning of the twentieth century also contrib
to a pro-Nestorian revision of opinion, citing (among others) the sympathetic 
scholarship of Bethune Baker (1908), Loofs (1914), Prestige (1954) and Anastos
(1962). In addition, it must be admitted that scholarly trends of the twentiet
century focusing on the historical Jesus make Antiochene theological method
more popular. Recent interpreters have described the character of the argum
between Cyril and Nestorius diversely. McGuckin’s 1994 study – like much of 
Weinandy and Keating’s 2003 collection – gives primacy to theological 
provocation of Cyril by Nestorius. Others admit that politics had an enormous, 
possibly paramount role to play in the controversies (witness Bethune-Baker 
(1908), Scipioni (1956), Anastos (1962), and – partly – Russell (2000)); or politics 
fuelled by, among other things, a real theological concern (Young (1983)
 
covery 
uted 
 
h 
s 
ent 
                                                
634, 
Wickham (1983)), whilst, as observed above, Wessel (2004) provides a rhetorical 
hermeneutic.  
 
Any residual twentieth-century indulgent empathy towards Nestorius is attacked 
in Weinandy and Keating’s (2003) collection of essays. Presenting a rigorous 
 
634 Young 2003:55-74 moves towards a more exegetically-focused reading – where concerns to 
demonstrate the continuities of redemption – fall – restoration drive theological axioms which find 
expression around the term qeotÒkoj.   
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defence of Cyril, the collection fails to be as indulgent towards Nestorian texts.635 
Weinandy’s essay in the collection claims that any reading of Chalcedon other 
than a Cyrilline one is to misunderstand it (2003:43). Weinandy ignores 
substantive agreement of that Council with Nestorian Christological axioms. 
Chalcedon’s synthetic weaving of Christological emphases preserved the 
tensions made explicit in the debates, but was esteemed by his Alexandrian 
successors – not entirely unreasonably – as a betrayal and refutation of Cyril’s 
theological emphases.636 The shift to a more nuanced appreciation of Cyril’s 
perspectives is underpinned in a close textual manner by Young’s essay in the 
collection (2003: 55-74) focusing upon Cyril’s exegesis before the Christological 
controversies, where she shows that Cyril exhibits a typological regenerative 
understanding of salvation. This, she argues, sheds light upon his passion for 
qeotÒkoj in the controversy and accounts for the energy with which he focuses 
his theological commitment to the “union”. Boulnois, (1994; 2003:75-111) 
connects qeotÒkoj arguments with a rigorous Trinitarian schema that Cyril 
defends as part of the Alexandrian inheritence in a study that also confirms the 
need for a continual reappraisal of Marcellus.637 Nonetheless, if caricatures of 
Cyril distorted an appreciation of his Christological significance, so there is a 
prima facie case that a similar style of review of Nestorius’ theological 
perspective with critical appreciation is required. This chapter, as far as feasible 
within an assessment of the Christological controversy in terms of Athanasius’s 
                                                 
635 Weinandy, 2003:23-54, claims that his defence of Cyril is less a defence of a figure than that 
of the incarnation itself (ibid.,54). 
636 Russell, 2000:223: “The popular verdict [upon Chalcedon]… was that it had exonerated 
Nestorius”. 
637 Cf Lienhard, 2001:108: ‘Once the authenticity of the Fourth Oration is denied (as it now 
universally is), then evidence that Athanasius rejected Marcellus evanesces. Not only that, but 
other evidence can then be reinterpreted: evidence that Athanasius remained in communion with 
Marcellus, and also in theological sympathy with him.’ Cf. Lienhard, 1987:415-437. 
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influence, will attempt to model such an approach. Cyril’s cherishing of 
Athanasius’ role is primarily conveyed through an “Apollinarian” reading of 
Athanasius summed as Øpost£sei mi´ tÍ toà lÒgou sesarkwmšnÍ638 which Cyril 
believes to be Athanasian. Nestorius’s citations, however, highlight the significant 
differences between divine nature and creaturely existence in the incarnation. 
Their common reaching to Athanasius helps to clarify patterns of reading the 
period, particularly around notions of mediation, divine and human nature, and 
soteriology. 
 
5.3: The Context of the Christological Controversy 
The theological method of Theodore, Nestorius, and Theodoret emphasises the 
impassibility of God and insists upon a precise language which allows an 
anthropology paradoxically capable of maintaining the possibility of qeolog…a.639 
This was very different from Cyril, who emphasized that God grasped the whole 
of human being and nature in Christ in order to transform it. 
 
For Cyril this is the marvellous truth of the Incarnation, God from all 
eternity may have known, within his divine knowledge, what it is like 
for human beings to suffer and die, and he may have known this 
perfectly and comprehensively. But until the Son of God actually 
became man and existed as a man, the Son of God, who is 
                                                 
638 Wickham 1983:24; 62 fn3; McGuckin, 1994:85, 207-8. 
639 Grillmeier, 1975, is cautious to assume that one can easily speak of an Antiochene School. 
Greer, 1967:415-422, 1975:356, prefers to avoid excessive claims for Antiochene exegetical 
methodology. He shows that there is much in common between Antiochene and Alexandrian 
exegetical methods, but claims that the direction of each is driven by the theological 
preoccupations of each tradition. Greer prefers to speak of an Antiochene theological tradition 
rather than a school. 
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impassible in himself as God, never experienced and know 
suffering and death as man in a human manner. In an unqualified 
manner one can say that, as man, the Son of God had experiences 
he never had before because he never existed as man before – not 
the least of which are suffering and death. This is what, for Cyril, a 
proper understanding of the Incarnation requires and affirms, and 
this is what the communication of idioms so remarkably, clearly and 
even scandalously safeguards, advocates, and confesses. The 
eternal, almighty, all perfect, unchangeable, and impassible divine 
Son… actually experienced, as a weak human being, the full reality 
of human suffering and death. What was an infamy to the 
Docetists, to Arius and to Nestorius was for Cyril and the 
subsequent Christian tradition the glory and grandeur of the Gospel 
(Weinandy, 2003:53). 
 
Cyril is cast here as the sole authentic exponent of the incarnation. He certainly 
distrusted human nature’s “natural” capacity to plumb the theological depths, and 
the capacity of the divine nature without the union to reach, know and remedy 
humanity’s wound. But the conflict may be read as an attempt, from very different 
starting points, to address the same fundamental issues in their actual 
Christologies, namely: 
 
The two thinkers were completely at cross-purposes. Their tragic 
misunderstandings blinded each to the deep value of the facts 
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which  the opposite school was primarily eager to secure and 
enforce. (Prestige, 1954:143).  
 
The personal antagonism between the two finds expression in intrusions in the 
other’s see. Nestorius heard nothing but Apollinarius’s error in Cyril’s use of 
language and imagery; Cyril could not or would not fail to see a double 
personality in Nestorius’ Christ.640 In the stand–off at Ephesus I, the Emperor 
Theodosius interpreted events politically. Confining both parties in the heat of 
summer, and confirming both parties’ mutual anathemas and excommunications, 
indicates not only his desire for a speedy resolution, but exasperation with the 
conflict and the characters.641  
 
The picture of Cyril as a stubbornly politicized man,642 with whom it was unwise 
to express an opinion about religion or politics, adept at bankrolling the court to 
achieve influence (Louth, 2004:353-357), emerges: even Wickham, who deems 
sympathy for Nestorius a waste of energy, admits: 
 
It will always have been unwise, and sometimes even physically 
dangerous to meet Cyril as an opponent (1983:xvii).  
 
Nestorius’s objections in Heracleides are not mere whining (contra McGuckin, 
2004a): they express justified outrage at Cyril’s distortion of his argument, 
                                                 
640 McGuckin, 1994:173: “This was certainly Cyril’s consistent and sustained reaction to 
everything he read in Nestorius.” 
641 For details, see McGuckin, 1994:69-103. 
642 Witness, for example, To Acacius of Melitene, in Wickham, 1983:60-61. “If a letter allegedly 
written by me be brought by anybody implying that I have changed my mind about what we did at 
Ephesus, this, too, should be treated with derision; for we are, through our Saviour’s grace, sound 
in mind and have not wondered away from true reasoning.” 
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ignoring central Christological texts and unethical behaviour. It will be shown 
below that Nestorius produces textual evidence from Athanasius to show that this 
is the case.  
 
It was the use of the term qeÒtokoj which forms the majority of evidence cited 
against Nestorius in his synodical deposition.643 It was perhaps Nestorius’s most 
profound political misjudgement to underestimate the power of popular piety 
surrounding this term (McGuckin, 1994:128), and this is exploited in his 
condemnation. Cyril mocked Nestorius’s theological precision as pedantic, prissy 
and ultimately heretical with the syllogism: 
 
  If Mary is not, strictly speaking, Theotokos 
  then her Son is not, strictly speaking Theos. (McGuckin, 1994:28).  
 
Through effective rhetoric, Cyril convinced the Council at Ephesus - as he 
himself probably believed - that Christ was, in Nestorius’s schema, in the end 
simply an inspired man.644 
 
Yet despite the unedifying context, of each representing to the other all that is 
wrong with the Church, and brutally fighting it out in public come what may, the 
subtlety, and beauty, of the theological and Christological insights on both sides 
towers above the antagonism of their authors, and to an examination of this we 
now turn. 
 
                                                 
643 McGuckin, 1994:369-378 admits that the texts in this florilegium are unlikely to be over-
concerned with not distorting Nestorius’s context or meaning. 
644 Wickham, 1983:xx; McGuckin, 1994:31 - “a new Paul of Samosata”. 
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5:4 Claims upon Athanasius of Alexandria in the Christological 
Controversy 
Critical texts of Cyril are available,645 but without Syriac expertise, Nestorius is 
less accessible. The Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum [ACO] contains many of 
the texts collected by Cyril for the Council of Ephesus, but these amount to the 
prosecution’s case, reflecting aspects of Nestorius’ work which he felt to be most 
dangerous and most readily refuted: 
  
a collection which Nestorius complained was misleading in the way 
it took sentences out of context and interpreted them in the most 
damaging way possible (McGuckin, 1994:128). 
 
The fourteenth-century Nestorian bishop Ebed Jesus of Nisibis lists Nestorius’ 
complete works as a Liturgy; a Tragedy; the Book of Heracleides; Letter to 
Cosmas; a book of Letters and a collection of Sermons and Discourses 
(McGuckin, 1994:127). To this ancient bibliography McGuckin adds First 
Apology, the Hypomnemata;646 and fragments of Theopaschites.647 Loofs’s 1905 
compilation was overtaken by the discovery of a possible sixth-century Syriac 
translation of the book of Heracleides just months later. A mistranslation renders 
                                                 
645 Five of his works are produced in the CERF edition of «L’Institute des «Sources Chrétiennes»; 
i.e., the first books of Contre Julien [322]; Deux dialogues christologiques [97]; Dialogues sur la 
Trinité [231; 237 and 246 in the series]. McGuckin (2004) has translated many texts, Wickham 
(1983) has produced critical texts and translations of some of Cyril’s letters in the Oxford Early 
Christian Texts series. An important text of the UCT by Dragas (2004), with an introduction 
convincingly demonstrating Cyril’s authorship, has added to this.  T Hibert Bindley (1899) 
provides the texts of three epistles with translation, The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith, 
revised by F W Green, London, 1950: Second Epistle to Nestorius; Third Epistle to Nestorius, 
“The Twelve Articles”; To John of Antioch in an old but helpful compendium of documents. 
646 Preserved by the monophysite Severus of Antioch. 
647 Nestorius’s refutation of Cyril’s Anathemas. 
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the Syriac for tÒmoj648 or pragmate‹a649 as “Market place”, leading to the 
attractive - if misleading - translation of the title as the Bazaar of Heracleides.650 
Abramowski (1963) employed textual-critical methods that lead her to argue that 
many significant questions remain about work’s integrity. Scipioni (1956) has 
more regard for its integrity and is followed by Anastos (1962) and, with critical 
reservations, Grillmeier (1975). 
 
Until the emergence of Heracleides, fragments of Nestorius compared very 
unfavourably in volume and contextual integrity with preserved Cyrilline texts. An 
entirely negative view of Nestorius is moderated by Heracleides: he at least 
appears to prefer exile and notoriety to re-opening the controversy and risk the 
settlement of which he approved because of association with his name.651  
 
5.4.1: Athanasius in the polemical correspondence and Nestorian 
Fragments  
Nestorius does not appear to claim Athanasius in the fragments collected by his 
opponents (or followers) and arranged critically by Loofs (1905). This is either 
because Nestorius did not refer to Athanasius at this point for some reason, or – 
more likely – that the texts lack a contextual integrity, and it was not in the 
                                                 
648 McGuckin, 1994:126. 
649 Young, 1983:232; Nau, 1910:1, fn 1: “pragmate…a Ce mot signifié à la fois «étude ou traité», 
et «commerce»; le syriaque traduit ce dernier sens”. Cf. Loofs, 1905:65, 224.   
650 Driver and Hodgson, 1925:xii. The Syriac text was published ed. P Bedjan as Te  gurta de 
Heroclidus de  men Damsoq in Paris 15 years earlier, together with a French translation by Nau, 
1910.  
651 Young, 1983:279, quoting Nau (1910) in translation “but as for Nestorius, let him be 
anathema; only let men speak of God as I pray for them that they may speak.” Greer, 1975:320, 
finds Cyril the most sympathetic character without fawning hagiography: “The dour honesty and 
stubborn inflexibility of Nestorius command respect, particularly as he was willing to suffer for his 
principles and beliefs. Yet Nestorius, though a majestic figure, does not, finally, seem to me an 
attractive one.” 
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interest of Nestorius’s detractors to provide a patristic florilegium in his defence. 
This would seem the most reasonable explanation, and otherwise an account 
must be given of why, in the Liber Heracleides Athanasius is quite central to the 
text and Nestorius’s theological argument – though this may be a response to 
Cyril’s AUCT. It is this centrality, and not merely a superficial connection, that 
makes it most likely, on balance, that Nestorius’s Christology always claimed an 
Athanasian pedigree – though the period of exile may have enabled Nestorius to 
focus on the political sense of connecting his theological priorities to those of 
Athanasius. 
 
In the polemical correspondence, Cyril’s third Letter to Nestorius contains an 
equivalence to the notorious pseudo-Athanasian (Apollinarian) citation of m…a 
fÚsij toà lÒgou sesarkwmšnh.652 Cyril’s style is reflected in that he does not 
attribute it to Athanasius but authoritatively owns and promulges the faith with 
staggering confidence. He insists that Scripture is properly interpreted not by 
postulating two Sons, but by a single incarnate subject which is the Logos: 
 
 Øpost£sei mi´ tÍ toà lÒgou sesarkwmšnh (Wickham, 1983:24). 
 
The fact remains that there is no evidence that either party explicitly cited 
Athanasius textually at this point. This may be a dimension of Orthodox doctrinal 
methodology after Theodoret, but it would seem to help Cyril’s case to have cited 
Athanasius had he wished to depict his opponent as the new Arius (Wessel, 
2004). 
                                                 
652 Cf. Apollinarius, Ad Jovinianum 1. 
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5.4.2: Athanasius in Cyril’s De Incarnatione - De Recta Fide and Quod 
Unus Sit Christus  
In these two important Christological Dialogues, Cyril’s familiar method is again 
evident. He emphasizes the centrality of divine mystery as a brake to 
Christological arrogance and speculation (de Durand, 1964:81f). The redemptive 
action of God in Christ is effective because it is mediated in the assumed 
humanity’s flesh in the union (de Durand, 1964:85), echoing the soteriological 
ontology of Athanasius’s CG-DI. De Incarnatione – De Recta Fidei (DI/DRF) 
emphasizes the centrality of the incarnation, and seeks to protect its import by 
anti-Apollinarian polemic where he implicitly addresses the weakness inherent in 
miahypostatic Christology, that is a tendency to docetism (de Durand, 1964:101). 
Properly construed the incarnation is not divine ontological degradation. Cyril 
expounds Phil 2:5-17 in Quod Unus Sit Christus (=Quod Unus) 719b-720c (de 
Durand, 1964:318-323) – the Word appropriates a body with all its weakness and 
moribundity, but is not moderated by that action – thus skating on very thin ice in 
terms of a docetic humanity: 
 
“Wsper g¦r oÙk ¥n kekop…aken aÙtÕj ú ¹ p©sa dÚnamij, oÙd' ¥n 
e‡rhto peinÁsai, trof¾ kaˆ zw¾ tîn Ólwn Øp£rcwn aÙtÒj, m¾ oÙcˆ 
prooikeiws£menoj sîma tÕ peinÁn te kaˆ kopi©n pefukÒj.653 
 
The incarnation took place to divinize humanity not to enfeeble the divinity. This 
understanding of kšnwsij has much in common with Athanasius’s explication of 
the same issue of divine degradation in Vita Antonii 74 (MPG 26, 945B-C). He 
                                                 
653 Quod Unus 719e (de Durand 1964:320). 
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promotes Athanasius’s reading of 1 Pe.3:19 in DI/DRF 693b (de Durand, 
1964:234) where even death is not “suffered” by the Logos, but appropriated as a 
tool by which Christ can preach to the dead. Death is part of the continuum of the 
Logos’s embodiment, the divine union even in death allows the body to mediate 
divine life to humanity at its most hopeless. Flesh for Cyril in these Dialogues 
then is the mediatorial means of the real power of the Logos’s life which is divine.  
 
La divinité du Christ agirait alors directement sur nos âmes comme 
son corps sur nos corps (de Durand, 1964:112). 
 
De Durand notes other parallels and similarities between Cyril and Athanasius, 
but nowhere are there quotations or citations offered; but Ad Epictetum 2 (MPG 
26, 1052C-1053A) and Athanasius’s defence of the immutability of God in CA 
1.36 (MPG 26, 85B-88B) draws his comment. De Durand argues that Cyril raids 
CA 1-3 at many points “pour garnir son arsenal” (1964:16), but – as noted 
elsewhere – some  
expressions, que S. Cyrille croyait de S. Athanase, mais qui étaient 
en fait d’Apollinaire ou de son école (1964:24). 
 
There is a similar oscillation between the divine image residual in post-fall 
humanity, between an image destroyed and an image disfigured, that is found in 
Athanasius, representing the transmission of earlier readings rather than a 
synthesis (de Durand, 1964:89). But of greatest significance is the close rapport 
and claiming of Athanasian authority without there being examples in the texts of 
evidence of where there is continuity and identity of argument. No doubt Cyril 
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was convinced that he continued Athanasius’s Christological di£noia, but it is his 
generality of approach rather than detailed texual citation that is striking. 
 
5.4.3: Athanasius in Cyril’s Against those Unwilling to Confess that 
the Holy Virgin is Theotokos (AUCT) 
De Durand’s excursus (1964:522-524) quickly identified this as being located 
early in the Christological controversy, but dismissed Cyrilline authorship. 
Dragas’s recent text (2004) is prefaced by a line-by-line counter argument, urging 
its authenticity, but agreeing upon an early date. The brief text examines the 
Christological heresy (1-11, Dragas 2004:4-27), then explores Orthodox reading 
of Scripture – in particular four Christologically problematic texts654 - before 
asserting the validity of qeotÒkoj. 
 
Cyril’s method, particularly in the central section is interesting and compatible in 
general terms with that of Athanasius and the arguments in CA. He insists on 
contextual exegesis – looking at texts which on a surface level are incompatible 
with miahypostatic Christology in the context of the verses before and after them 
(chapters 12, 13, or in a broader authorial context, so 14). Cyril aims to 
undermine the humanizers, but has to manipulate each text with varied methods 
to establish a real meaning counter to its plain presentation. The result is an 
argument that clearly requires an ontologically divine foundation of the incarnate 
Christ – rejecting graceful participation as subordinationist (25, Dragas, 2004:62-
63). In the final part of the treatise, the infancy narratives and baptism narratives 
are cited to establish Mary as qeotÒkoj: why did John the Baptist object to 
                                                 
654 1 Tim. 2:5; Jn.8:40; 1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 2:22. 
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baptizing Christ, Cyril asks, if he were merely a man at that point? (28, Dragas, 
2004:68). 
 
Yet again, for all that is common between Cyril and Athanasius, there is no 
quotation or citation in the treatise. The treatise, if it is authentic, would appear to 
be an early précis of anti-Antiochene arguments which prompts Nestorius to 
respond by restating his case, echoing his condemnation as a heretic, but 
explicitly locating his argument in his reading of Athanasius in the Heracleides.  
5.4.4: Athanasius in the Nestorian Heracleides  
Attention has been drawn to critical questions about the authenticity of 
Heracleides. It is accepted in this chapter as probably authentic, but representing 
an articulate defence of Nestorian Christology whoever penned it: a deliberate 
defence of Nestorius using evidence from Patristic sources. In this sense it is 
aleady very different from Cyril’s work providing evidence of citations of 
Athanasius in its argument. 
 
Heracleides counters the arguments in Cyril’s AUCT pretty systematically, with 
Sophronius voicing Cyril’s accusations (chapter 51ff, Driver & Hodgson, 
1925:43f). Cyril had argued that the “latest” heresy divides Christ (AUCT 2, 
Dragas, 2004:5), who is really God and Man (AUCT 3, Dragas, 2004:7), he is not 
a mere man like the saints (AUCT 4-5, Dragas, 2004:9-11), but God become 
man (AUCT 6 & 13, Dragas, 2004:12-14; 32-33). Nestorius counters arguments 
that his Christology leaves ultimately an inspired man (Driver & Hodgson, 
1925:42-45), differentiating his language from that of Arians and other heretics 
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(ibid., 9f), and offering definitions of his Christological language to clarify his 
position (ibid.,13-28).  
 
Moreover, Heracleides paints Cyril as unethical in his depiction and motivation in 
the controversy, and the simplest way of showing that he is in error is to cite the 
great Christological authority, Athanasius, verbatim. 
 
Thus after book Two’s lengthy location of Nestorius as orthodox, and painful 
reflection of his circumstances, he identifies his plight with that of Athanasius at 
the calumny of his unjust deposition (Driver & Hodgson, 1925:130). It is not 
merely the plight that Nestorius can claim, however, but the Christological 
arguments. In his assertion that the incarnation is real, and that Christ is truly 
human and divine, he challenges his readers to obey Athanasius, citing Ad 
Epictetum 7 concluding with a phrase which he will turn in further discussion: 
 
Human therefore is that which issued from Mary, according to the 
Divine Scriptures and truly it belongs to our Saviour (Driver & 
Hodgson, 1925:192; 193; 205; 227; 256; 261; 262; 333). 
 
The author elegantly argues that his preferred Christological title, CristotÒkoj, is 
therefore Athanasian – and as far as can be discerned from Nau and Driver & 
Hodgson’s translations of the Syriac, it appears close to Athanasius’s text.  
 
The author reveals his “reading” of Athanasius as providing a foundation for the 
sense of dyohypostatic Christology. Another Athanasian gloss (Driver & 
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Hodgson, 1925:221) shows he shares the Athanasian insight that the incarnation 
works by the communion of different properties: 
 
God the Word and the body in which he was and whose 
[properties] he made his own in order that those of the one might 
become the other’s and those of the other the one’s. 
 
Nestorius has identified that Athanasius’s Christology works by both natures 
being different and maintaining their aspects after the union in order that 
salvation may be effected for all. 
 
The Heracleides therefore provides not only a legitimate reading of Athanasius’s 
theology, but citations and quotations which are missing in Cyril. 
 
5.5 oÙs…a, fÚsij and  ØpÒstasij   
The nature of God is acknowledged by both Cyril and Nestorius as impassible, 
mysterious, immutable655 even though a great deal of projecting of distorted 
theologies takes place in the polemics. Cyril accuses Nestorius of introducing a 
fourth member of the Trinity by his insistence on Christ having two natures - both 
of which are worthy of worship. This, for Cyril, is blasphemous idolatry of a 
creature. He sees the humanity of Jesus, in strict Nestorian terminology, as 
merely human and only associated with divinity. This changes the nature of God 
as revealed in Christian tradition. Nestorius does not allow God to be God in the 
second person of the Trinity because of his a priori assumption about divinity. 
                                                 
655 Notwithstanding Weindandy, 2003:52-53, et al. 
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There is no union in the Son and the significance of the incarnation is thus 
missed: 
 
For they followed up their single condemnation of one man for such 
profane nonsense [= Nestorius] with an attack not just on an 
individual but on the whole heretical chicanery (if I may so express 
it) which they have manufactured against the Church’s truly 
religious doctrines, by maintaining two Sons, by sundering the 
indivisible and indicting heaven and earth on a charge of man-
worship - heaven and earth, for the holy multitude of higher spirits 
joins us in worship of the Lord Jesus Christ.656 
 
Despite Weinandy’s arguments (2003:52-53), Cyril is clear that to preserve the 
transcendence of divine nature is central to the Antiochene concern. But this 
study has revealed the way in which humanity acts as a cipher in Cyril to mediate 
the divine power and reality of the Incarnate Son. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the immutability and impassibility of divine nature is Nestorius’s 
theological objection to Cyril’s Christology and anthropology. M…xij removed the 
reality of the Logos’ divinity and humanity, producing a hybrid as inappropriate of 
worship as Cyril’s creature: 
 
For you confess that Christ was constituted one nature [m…a fÚsij] 
from the incorporeal and the body, and was a single natural 
                                                 
656 On the Creed, Wickham, 1983:99-101. Cp. To Eulogius, ibid.:65-7. 
 305
hypostasis of the divine enfleshment [qeosarkèsewj]. But to say this 
is a confusion of the two natures, a confusion which deprives the 
natures of their own relative hypostases by confusing them with 
one another.657 
 
Nestorius, in the extract from Theopaschites, reveals that his objections against 
hypostatic union is rooted in a strictly physical, almost biological conceptuality: 
 
a single natural hypostasis of the divine enfleshment 
[qeosarkèsewj]...is a confusion of the two natures, a confusion 
which deprives the natures of their own relative hypostases by 
confusing them with one another.658  
 
Nestorius cannot but see Apollinarianism in Cyril’s phrase Øpost£sei mi´ tÍ toà 
lÒgou sesarkwmšnÍ,659 but Cyril understands the terms ØpÒstasij and oÙs…a as 
interchangeable: 
 
Thus there is only one nature [m…a fÚsij] of the Word - or 
ØpÒstasij if you like - and that is the Word himself.660 
 
Nestorius argues that if the ›nwsij results in one nature as Cyril maintains, then 
this creates a third entity: which smacks of Arianism, a mediating hybrid sharing 
elements of, but not the whole natures of, its progenitors and the core of the 
                                                 
657 Theopaschites, in Severus of Antioch, Contra. Gramm.2.32: McGuckin, 1994:150. 
658 Theopaschites, preserved in Severus of Antioch, Contra. Gramm. 2.32, translated by Lebon, 
CSCO 112, p192; McGuckin, 1994:150. 
659 Wickham 1983:24; 62 fn3; McGuckin, 1994:85, 207-8. 
660 Defence of the Anathemas against the Orientals, MPG 76.401 in McGuckin, 1994:209. 
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Apollinarian error. For Nestorius, this makes soteriological mediation impossible. 
Cyril’s Christology of a single natural hypostatic union, Nestorius believes, 
displaces humanity by divine enfleshment: 
   
a confusion which deprives the natures [fÚseij] of their own 
respective hypostases by confounding them with one another.661 
 
Greer expounds the conflict arguing that Ñus…a, fÚsij, and ØpÒstasij are all 
aspects of the concrete reality of a subject for Nestorius, in contrast to an illusion 
or notion. Unless all three cohere, then the subject is incomplete. An incomplete 
nature “needs” a natural union with another nature in order to exist. Hence talk of 
natural “hypostatic union” is alien to him because it conjures notions of 
symbiosis: 
 
given the axiomatic assumption of an absolute distinction between 
God and man, none of the terms discussed thus far are capable of 
being used of the union between God and man in Christ... since all 
three terms have a direct relationship to the entity itself, there is no 
way that God and man can be united (Greer, 1975:313f ). 
 
Nestorius’s attempt to find a language to do so – namely a prosopic unity – 
evokes a furious response in Cyril. For Cyril, ØpÒstasij, in the main, 
approximates with “individuality”. Hence, Nestorius’s objections provide all the 
                                                 
661  Heracleides, Driver and Hodgson, 1925:55-57; Nau, 1910:35-36. 
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evidence Cyril needs to convince him that his opponent holds a Christological 
position of two Sons. 
 
There is a significant theological difference between Cyril and the Antiochenes 
here, namely a reluctance on Cyril’s part, to overstep the bounds of human 
legitimacy in prying into the mechanics of the incarnation. Nestorius, however, 
exhibits an analytical attentiveness that Cyril views as inappropriate and impious. 
McGuckin explains it as Cyril’s preference for language that reflects and 
celebrates the mystery of the incarnation. Certainly, Cyril rejects theological 
terminology as unhelpful where it purports to probe the mechanics of how the 
natures are united. Nestorius, though, like Theodoret, is happier to explore 
theology proper and to pose metaphysical puzzles. Prosopic union is an attempt 
to describe how distinct natures can be united in the person of Christ. Nestorius 
is not explicit about how he understands and uses the terms Ñus…a, fÚsij, and 
ØpÒstasij.662 Cyril’s defenders claim that his language has a preference for 
paradox which acknowledges the fluidity of language, whilst Nestorius is plain 
inconsistent. 
 
Where the Christological disagreement focused on Cyril’s insistence on a single 
subject in Christ, the problem was to a large degree rooted in the limitations of 
human language when faced with a conundrum. Cyril preferred to expose the 
inadequacies of human language: the incarnation takes root in humanity, but 
merely human language cannot plumb its depth. From the human perspective, 
                                                 
662  Contrast Theodoret’s opening remarks in Eranistes, where he clearly defines his terms, and 
the distinctions made in his Expositio Recta Fidei. See Young, 1983:275ff. Theodoret was further 
on in the debate, by which time it had become clear that there was significant difficulty rooted in 
terminological confusion. Perhaps Theodoret was also the clearer and more subtle theologian.  
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God suffered by means of the incarnation and a sign of the power of qeopo…hsij 
which it affected. For Cyril the paradox of “God’s swaddling bands” was more 
wonderful than mere explanation, which had all the excitement and power of 
explaining a joke or a pun or a picture. Cyril prefers to state the truth in a supra-
logical way to remind the faithful of the penultimacy of all philosophical and 
linguistic constructs in the face of sublime Mystery. Nestorius’s explorations and 
indeed the solution of prosopic union effected disdain in Cyril because they were 
full of Ûbrij.663 However, it was vital to the reunion process that Cyril had to come 
to an agreement with the Antiochenes about what the terms oÙs…a, fÚsij and 
ØpÒstasij meant. Between them, McGuckin and Anastos draw up a schema of 
what each term meant to Cyril and Nestorius before the rapprochement which 
came with Nestorius’s deposition: 
 
McGuckin664 argues that Cyril’s usage was thus: 
 ousia    Essence, substance being, genus, nature 
 physis    Nature, “the make-up of a thing” 
 hypostasis   Concrete reality of a thing: its underlying  
     essence 
 
 prosopon   observable character, defining properties,  
     manifestation of reality, Superficial sense,  
     with its ancient meaning of a mask. 
Anastos665 claims that the terms were understood by Nestorius in this way: 
                                                 
663  “because of his theory of  the elements that made up the person of Jesus Christ”, Anastos op. 
cit. 123. 
664  McGuckin, 1994:138. 
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 Usia (sic)   Each existing thing’s indispensable underlying   
   factor from which it derives life. The invisible   
   inmost being in itself. 
physis & hypostasis  Totality of qualities which give it its individual   
    nature and character. 
Prosopon   [= Cyril’s hypostasis] reveals the usia and physis. 
Greer argues that Nestorius fuses the meanings of Ñus…a, fÚsij, and ØpÒstasij, 
overlapping them to the extent that they cohere around a central notion 
establishing the reality of a thing rather than its idea or an illusion. 
 
The ousia of a thing, while materially identical with its physis, has 
the formal meaning of the “substantial content or specific essence” 
of a nature. By the same token nature refers to a physical entity. 
Furthermore, Nestorius distinguishes between “complete” and 
“incomplete” natures. Incomplete natures cannot exist of 
themselves, but require a natural union with another nature before 
they are able to exist. For example, the human soul and the human 
body are incomplete natures; only when the natural union of body 
and soul has taken place may they exist. Complete natures, on the 
other hand, exist by themselves. A complete nature is materially 
identical with an hypostasis.666 
   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
665  Anastos, 1962:123. 
666  Greer, 1975:313, adopts Scipioni, 1956, slightly here. 
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OÙs…a and fÚsij have to be whole and distinct for Nestorius, hence his 
insistence upon the oÙs…a and fÚsij being “alien to one another”.667  
 
For Cyril, talk of prosopic union was superficial; for Nestorius, hypostatic union was 
a biological blending and thus distortion. To further complexify matters, language is 
also fluid and illusive in the way Nestorius used his key term prÒswpon and 
whether he spoke of one prÒswpon or two prÒswpa in Christ. Nestorius appeared 
to use the term in more than one way, which Cyril exposed triumphantly. There are 
two approximations of usage – a general sense of the external manifestation of 
distinctive qualities or natures of the Son – an adjectival usage, where prÒswpon 
means quality; and a more specific sense where PrÒswpon equates to “person” 
and is a noun. 668 
McGuckin notes that  
 
                                                 
667 Heracleides, Driver and Hodgson, 1925:298f.  
668  Anastos cites fifteen sections in Heracleides  where Nestorius maintains that the union of the 
two natures are one prÒswpon, Jesus Christ (Anastos, 1962:128) In three places Nestorius 
denies that there are two prÒswpa proper, so the incarnation should not be conceived of as a 
union of prÒswpa, that would be to hold that there are two Sons: “[the human Jesus] received his 
prÒswpon as something created, in such wise as not originally to be man but at the same time 
Man-God by the incarnation [™nanqrèphsij] of God (ibid). “Christ is a term that applies to both the 
impassible and the passible natures in a single prÒswpon. (Nestorius’s Reply to Cyril’s Second 
letter, translation of McGuckin, 1994:365). However, even in Heracleides, Nestorius writes of two 
prÒswpa, and in seven passages a “union of the prÒswpa”. Where he does use this phrase, 
Anastos points out that he immediately always modifies the meaning by saying that the two 
prÒswpa, or union of prÒswpa, “took the place of the prÒswpon.” (Anastos, 1962:129). Anastos 
helpfully posits a way out of the confusion by maintaining two usages of prÒswpon: sense A, 
where it means the visible manhood, the totality of Jesus’s nature, his human individuality and 
uniqueness; and sense B, where it is “an approximate equivalent of our word person.” (ibid.,131). 
Sense A is the more ancient sense of the word, following the Nicene period where the terms 
Ñus…a, fÚsij, and Øpost£sij were closer to each other than in Cyril’s use of them, in as much as 
they shared the undergirding concept of linkedness as fundamental to the identity of the whole 
“prÒswpon.” So for Nestorius, in the one PrÒswpon, Jesus Christ, [sense B, not two Sons] the 
divine and human prÒswpa are united [sense A, nearer the terms Ñus…a or fÚsij]. Anastos’s 
clarity in outlining these uses is helpful. He admits that his “analysis is a legitimate summary of 
Nestorius’ Christology, which he himself, however, never presents systematically (Anastos, ibid., 
132).  
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Nestorius’ christological argument is only supported by a highly 
complex hermeneutic that demands a sharp degree of precision in 
its usage. The question of how many ordinary bishops of the fifth 
century, let alone the common people, would ever be able to follow 
him was not something that seemed to have worried him greatly... 
This intellectual abstraction from the realities of the world (if not to 
say downright arrogance) was to prove his political downfall. 
(1994:158). 
 
But both patriarchs worked with Christological “umbrella constructs”, using 
language in different ways deliberately, and, as it suited neither Cyril nor 
Nestorius to commit themselves to open resolution, there was impasse. 
 
It is appropriate at this point to raise the question of how Athanasius used the 
three terms, and how, if at all, adherence to Athanasius’s usage may have 
coloured the discussion. Müller, 1952, provides exhaustive citations of the terms 
in the Athanasian corpus, and the scattering of usage is of serious interest.  
 
OÙs…a is used to represent “reality” in Epist. Afr. 4 (MPG 26.1036B) in a sense 
that Lampe (1968:980) suggests derives from Origen (de Oratione 27). In CG 9, 
27, (Müller, 1952:1049-1052) oÙs…a has a general meaning, namely “that which 
is,” whilst in CG2, 35, 39, 46; DI 18, & 20 it approximates more obviously to 
essence in a manner compatible with later usage. Most citations of this type are 
in CA (see Müller, 1952:1049). Athanasius’s usage is thus compatible with both 
Cyril and Nestorius. 
 312
 FÚsij mostly approximates to “nature”, and, again, is mostly a technical term in 
the CA, where it is used to emphasize the divine nature of the Son (Müller, 
1952:1553-1559). It stretches beyond the general term of oÙs…a because of a 
sense of the intimate qualities of a thing. Again Athanasius’s usage is consonant 
with that of both Cyril and Nestorius.  
 
`UpÒstasij is where Cyril and Nestorius disagree. Müller (1952:1509-1510) is 
particularly helpful here. In relation to the Trinity, Athanasius uses the term in the 
sense of “person” when writing to the Antiochenes (Tom. Ad Antioch. 5, MPG 
26:801) – there are three persons in this context. It is hardly surprising then, that 
the Antiochene Nestorius takes this as the primary meaning of ØpÒstasij – 
Athanasius, after all, uses it in this sense. Hence Nestorius believes that Cyril 
has abandoned Athanasius’s Christological and Trinitarian argument at this point. 
However, the case is more complex, because in the CA (especially CA 3), and 
De Decretis (25-7 MPG 25:461-465) it is used to emphasize the unity of natures 
of Father and Son in the singular. In an anti-Arian context it seems 
interchangeable with oÙs…a. It is indeed probable that Athanasius’s dual usage 
fuels later Christological controversy, when both feel back for Athanasius to 
undergird their argument, and should Cyril have been as attentive to texts as 
Nestorius, both would have found corroborating evidence. Athanasius here 
begets and reflects both miahypostatic and dyohypostatic conceptuality. 
 
PrÒswpon represents the presentation of the person, denoting identity, where 
the Son is the Father’s prÒswpon (CA 1:38; MPG 26:92). This term carries with it 
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something representational – hence, perhaps, Cyril’s suspicion of it when applied 
Christologically to the union. But in Anastos’s identification of the use of 
prÒswpon in Nestorius, he is nearer to Athanasius than Cyril will allow. Thus 
Athanasius has influenced not only the arguments but the vocabulary. Whether 
Cyril knows this or not it is not clear. He does not attempt the mammoth task 
which Athanasius undertook of arguing that to protect Athanasius’s argument, 
the di£noia of his thought, new vocabulary is necessary. This is partly because 
he preferred the path of caricatured attack (Wessel, 2004), and partly because 
admitting that Nestorius had a legitimate claim to Athanasian use of language 
would undermine his casting of himself as Athanasius and his opponent as the 
new Arius. There is also the fact that in his anti-Arian literature Athanasius uses 
ØpÒstasij in a way which Cyril will follow, whereas in the Tom. Ad Antioch. the 
usage is in line with Nestorius’s. This Athanasian inheritence may prove more 
useful a taxonomy and explanation of the conflict than conventional short-hand of 
lÒgoj-s£rx versus lÒgoj-¥nqrwpoj Christological emphasis.669 
 
For both patriarchs, Christology must be the meeting place of God and humanity, 
divine and human being or nature. Nestorius held as axiomatic and irreducible 
two natures in communion - sun£feia - held in eternal integrity, assenting a 
graceful commitment to the other, allowing only a derived communicatio 
idiomatum between the two natures because both in a single harmony were the 
subject of the incarnate Son. In this scheme there are two background prÒswpa 
                                                 
669  McGuckin goes too far when he refers to the traditional description as “a pseudo-category of 
patristic analysis which has been strictly avoided in this present study, as something that if 
artificially imposed on the subject in hand, quite anachronistically, and which distorts the context 
of the ancient debate more than it informs it.” 1994:206. Compare the number of times s£rx and 
¥nqrwpoj are juxtaposed in Theodoret’s dialogue Eranistes, and note who initiates each usage 
and defends the same. This would indicate at least that Theodoret understood this usage to 
reflect appropriately something of each tradition’s Christological usage. 
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but one PrÒswpon, Jesus Christ. Graceful assent is the basis for unity, called by 
Anastos prosopic union and by McGuckin “associative difference”. This means of 
union guarantees for Nestorius the central concern that the humanity and divinity 
meet, are mediated in the single PrÒswpon or Personality of Christ. Mediation, 
for Nestorius, would be prohibited if the natures mingled. 
 
Yet for Cyril, Nestorius’s model of graceful unity still requires two subjects at 
every stage and throughout the sun£feia. “Background essences” [prÒswpa in 
Nestorius’s language] will not do. If the union is based upon the free and loving 
wills of the divine and human natures, then there are two subjects in Christ in any 
willed sun£feia or Prosopic union. Cyril hears Nestorius to be saying that there 
are two centres of identity having to concur in the economy. But a real, human-
divine unity, for Cyril alone safeguards Christology as the arena where divinity 
and humanity meet and the natures of each are mediated to the other in Christ. 
Far from a “mere” graceful assent - which remains ultimately for Cyril merely 
external and voluntarist – a task-orientated alliance – hypostatic union is the 
model of Christian salvation, and perfects and mediates it: baptism and Eucharist 
are physical sacramental assurances of it.  
 
Cyril is unambiguous that the divine nature personally is the subject of the union. 
He sees this as marking the beginning of the process of qeopo…hsij for all who 
share human nature and are in Christ.670 The divinizing of the human condition is 
                                                 
670  Cf. the robust defence of Athanasius from an interpretation which sees salvation as in some 
way automatic through the mystery of the Incarnation by Petterson, 1990. His ethical emphasis 
begs questions, his anti-universalism and rejection of neo-Platonic models of participation goes 
too far, I think, for the evidence, especially in his argument with Bouyer. The most powerful 
contribution in this book is from p85ff, where Petterson looks at the body as mediator. 
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understood in a characteristically Alexandrian way. This is reinforced through the 
organic, direct communicatio idiomatum in hypostatic union: 
 
When he became like us, even though he always remained what he 
as, he did not deprecate our condition. No - for the sake of the 
economy he accepted, along with the limitations of the manhood, 
all those things which pertain to the human condition, and he 
regarded nothing therein as unworthy of his personal glory or 
nature: for yet, and even so, he is God and Lord of all.671 
 
Conflict around the appellation qeÒtokoj672 is described as the quintessential 
synopsis of the controversy: 
 
Nestorius seemed to be insisting, by such a rigid scheme of 
language rules... [a weakening of] the sense of paradox which 
language-crossing evoked, the paradox which enshrined the 
church’s sense of the single-subjectivity of Christ (McGuckin, 
1994:154). 
 
Nestorius’s “pastoral agenda” which led him to promote CristÒtokoj was 
immediately understood as an attack on qeÒtokoj terminology, which was a term 
in CA III to describe Mary. It may thus have an “Apollinarian” Sitz im Leben 
                                                 
671  Cyril, Explanation of the Twelve Anathemas, explanation 2, par. 9. Cp. Explanation 10 par. 
27. McGuckin, 1994:285. 
672  This was not only a cause for conflict with the Alexandrians; it was perhaps the chief 
stumbling block against Nestorius’s acceptance in Constantinople, and - significantly - in 
Ephesus. In Ephesus the cult of the Blessed Virgin Mother had displaced, both in terms of identity 
and economy, that of Diana.  
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though no-where in the Athanasian corpus does the term CristÒtokoj appear.673 
Nestorius does, however, attempt an Athanasian manoeuvre, claiming that its 
use ensures the proper mind of Scripture is protected. Nestorius allows 
¢nqrwpÒtokoj because that too, as part of the picture, has clear soteriological 
significance. CristÒtokoj, Nestorius’s preferred term is his attempt to preserve the 
union so important to the Alexandrians. 'AnqrwpÒtokoj as a title also allows the 
perspective that Mary is the bearer not only of Christ’s humanity but the one who 
was to renew all humanity: bearing all humanity. For Cyril this was secured by 
the paradox of God’s swaddling bands (McGuckin 1994:215). His miahypostatic 
vision smacked of - and indeed was built upon674 - Apollinarian texts as Nestorius 
heard it.675 
 
The phrase “one incarnate nature of God the Word” had been 
devised by Apollinarius, who had put it forward in the statement of 
faith he had sent to the Emperor Jovian in 363. (Russell, 2003: 240)  
 
An important factor remains Athanasius’s role in the creation of a miahypostatic 
Christological tradition. Apollinarius’s claims on Athanasius’s CG-DI are not 
distorting: Apollinarius appears to have believed himself to be promoting the 
Athanasian tradition, even Athanasius himself, in his apologia to the Emperor. 
Such a factor may account for Cyril’s conviction that Athanasius – in some of the 
expressions in DI, above (chapter 2) – indubitably implies a divine subject “taking 
                                                 
673 Cf., however, Nestorius’s claim on Ad Epictetum 7, above (5.4.4). 
674 Ad Jov. 1: Lietzmann, 1904:251. 
675  Cp. Young, 1983:259. McGuckin’s excuse of the text is not convincing 1994:85. Regardless 
of such orthodox defence, the fact remains that Apollinarian language was a very powerful 
motivation for Cyril’s thought. 
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for himself a body” in the incarnation. Cyril echoes this in AUCT 22 (Dragas, 
2004:54):  
 
 E„ to…nun Qeoà aŒma tÕ aŒma lšgetai, dÁlon æj QeÕj 
Ãn  s£rka perike…menoj. 
 
Nestorius’s objection to the unlettered use of qeÒtokoj is rooted in his concern 
that in a relentless single-subject Christology, divine nature is subjected to 
passibility, and salvation is endangered, and the pattern of divine exchange in 
the incarnation which Athanasius, for example in more nuanced expressions 
expounds, would be lost. 
 
Compare the dynamics in Athanasius’ dictum which are built upon two natures not 
being blended  
 “A g¦r tÕ ¢nqrèpinon œpace toà logou 
 †na ¹me‹j tÁj toà logoà qeÒthtoj metasce‹n dunhqèmen676 
 
with Nestorius:  
 
Christ undertook the person of the indebted nature; and through it 
as a son of Adam, He restored what was owed. It was proper that 
the one who should loose the debt should be taken from the race of 
the one who had once contracted it.677 
                                                 
676 MPG 292, Ettlinger, 1975:235 l.10-11 = Ep. Ad Epictetum 6, MPG  26.1060C. 
677  Loofs, 1905:255: Greer, 1975:311. 
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 Language that implied that Mary is the Mother of the Divine nature disturbs the 
soteriological / Christological resolution for Nestorius. He abhors the possible 
misconceptions that qeÒtokoj language can convey. His vivid rejection of it, and 
perceived ridicule of devotion, proved politically fatal, being, according to Marius 
Mercator, responsible for the defection of Theodotus of Ancyra and Acacius of 
Beroea when he said that he refused to acknowledge as God an infant of two or 
three months old. 
 
Cyril’s  furious hyperbole, rejoiced in the mystery of “the swaddling bands of 
God”678 – arguing that if the two-year old was not God incarnate then neither 
was, by oÙs…a, the one who died and rose again.  
 
Nestorius was happy to call Mary qeÒtokoj, but his overwhelming concern was to 
protect the two oÙs…ai of divine and human nature in tact. Hence his laboured 
point that the title was honorific. She bore the wonderful sunafe…a of natures in 
the one PrÒswpon. She did not nurture or bring God to birth.679 Cyril saw this 
refutation as unnecessary. Antiochene theology was a “purely mental 
consideration of the mind’s eye.”680 God was never conceived of as being 
brought to birth by Mary in the Christian tradition. The synodical deposition 
focused clearly on the question of qeÒtokoj, and leads from this into a caricature 
of Nestorius’s Christology as being at core one of Two Sons.  
                                                 
678  McGuckin, 1994:65. 
679  McGuckin sketches Nestorius’ puritanical morality as the driving force behind his resisting 
language that would lead the ignorant into pagan imagery, like Isis bearing Horus, or Hercules 
being a suffering, anthropomorphic God on Mount Aetna [1994:192] Cp. Wickham, 1983:xxxii 
“Whatever he is like, he is not like Aphrodite wounded with a hero’s spear and shrieking with pain 
(Iliad 5.335f). That was pagan myth”. 
680  I Succensus, 7, Wickham, op. cit., p 77. 
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 Nestorius was less able at communicating on a popular level than metaphysical 
speculation. Cyril failed to allow Nestorius’s preferred Christological title for Mary, 
CristÒtokoj, as celebrating the union of two natures in sunafe…a. Nestorius 
intended to proclaim, through this title, the mediation and integrity of both 
humanity and divinity in a prosopic unity – the very thing Cyril meant by 
hypostatic union. Cyril’s popularism drowns the subtlety of Nestorius’s argument 
from being heard.  
 
The analogies both parties use are also problematic. Cyril in several places uses 
an image of a material subject alight with fire as an analogy of the two natures in 
Christ. Wood alight, enflamed yet not destroyed, at the moment fire takes, 
remains both wooden and radiant with flames. Hence the material physical 
humanity of Jesus is enlivened, transformed by the divine nature which saves all 
who are in him by the process of divinization. “The image is itself a fragile one,” 
McGuckin admits (1994:197) “for fire actually does consume and changes even 
destroys, its original combustible material.” But Cyril avoids Nestorius’s preferred 
analogy of the burning bush, because 
  
the fire in this case did not touch the Bush, and can hardly be said 
to have provided the concept of dynamic inter-penetration he was 
looking for (McGuckin, 1994:197-8). 
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Transformative as Cyril’s imagery might be, it ultimately reduces the absolute 
essences of both divinity and humanity, hence Nestorius’s preference for the 
biblical image of the burning bush:  
 
But is there no distinction in the union when those which have been 
united therein remain without confusion, like the bush in the fire and 
the fire in the bush?... Dost thou understand “severance of natures” 
according to the meaning of “natures”, and as “without confusion”, 
yet without there being any “suspicion” of a limitation of the natures 
in thy mind, as when the fire was united with the bush and the bush 
with the fire, and they were not confused. Thus thou shewest them 
to be without limitation and without difference...The bush became 
fire and fire the bush; yet severally they were bush and fire, not two 
bushes nor yet two fires, for both were in the fire and both in the 
bush (Bethune-Baker, 1908:179,183). 
 
Nestorius veers to the opposite pole in maintaining two integrities, and echoes 
use of the burning bush in the Athanasian corpus, CA III:14: 
 
kaˆ Ð toà lÒgou ¢koÚwn o’den, Óti toà patrÕj ¢koÚei: æj kaˆ tù 
¢paug£smati Ð kataugazÒmenoj o„den, Óti kaˆ ØpÕ ¹l…ou 
fwt…zetai. (CA III.14.6, Tetz, Wyrwa, Metzler & Savvidis, 
2000:323). 
 
 321
God the Logos, and the man in whom he came to be, are not 
numerically two, for the prosopon [i.e., Prosopon, Persona] of both 
was one in dignity and honour, worshipped by all creation, and in 
no way and at no time ever divided by difference of purpose or will 
(Loofs, 1905:224; McGuckin, 1994: 164). 
 
Christ is indivisible in that he is Christ, but he is two-fold in that he 
is both God and man... We do not acknowledge two Christs... but 
one and the same who has been seen in created and uncreated 
nature (Loofs, 1905:280; McGuckin, 1994:165).    
 
For Cyril, this is idolatry, but it can claim an ideological heritage in Athanasius’s 
careful application of creatio ex nihilo to Christology: Nestorius can be read as 
preserving his assertion that the humanity of Jesus is created, real, and uses CA 
I & II to prove his point. Cyril prefers to allow Mariology to carry this truth, not 
least because it is thereby more “pious,” and reaches for CA III & IV (believing 
them to be Athanasian). Nestorius’s pleading that human nature is divinized in 
Jesus, by being held in eternal relationship with the fullness of divine nature in 
prosopic union or sunafe…a does not convince Cyril. Cyril will not allow the 
humanity of Jesus to be our end: after all, like Athanasius his predecessor, Cyril 
looked to salvation to be something more than the restoration of the image of 
God in humanity.681 
 
                                                 
681   Hence his rejection of tautologous views of salvation as the restoration in humanity not an 
image of an image [i.e., Adam restored, himself only the image of the Logos, who is the real 
image of the Father] in his Doctrinal Questions and Answers, 4, Wickham, 1983:196-197. “It is 
being said that we are not God’s image but an image of an image”.  
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Divine immutability, and the issue of the suffering of the divine Logos is also a 
source of conflict. The worry of passible divinity fuelled the Antiochene tradition’s 
exegetical hermeneutics, and the passible elements in the gospels - where Jesus 
hungers, thirsts, cries, sweats, experiences fear and pain are attributed by 
Nestorius and Theodoret not to the human Son [as if there are two Sons] but to 
the human aspect [quality or PrÒswpon] in the one Son Jesus Christ. Nestorius 
objects to the theopaschitism into which he believed to Cyril to have fallen. The 
options for assessing Cyril open to Nestorius were either theopaschitism - which 
destroyed divinity in his understanding - or that Jesus only appeared to suffer, 
docetically. Nestorius himself allowed  
 
the divinity [to] make[…] use of the prosopon of the humanity and 
the humanity that of the divinity (Driver & Hodgson, 1925:240). 
 
Cyril, however, emphasizes: 
  
He who alone was more worthy than all others laid down his life for 
the sake of all, and for a short time, in an economy, allowed death 
to pull down his flesh. But then, as life, he destroyed death, refusing 
to suffer anything contrary to his own nature, and he did this so that 
corruption should be weakened in the bodies of all, and so that the 
domination of death should be destroyed.682 
 
                                                 
682  Letter to the Monks of Egypt 25, McGuckin, 1994:260. 
 323
Whilst ontologically soteriological, Cyril finds himself having to respond to 
Nestorius’s (not unreasonable) accusations of Theopaschitism, His Letter to 
Acacius of Melitene identifies Cyril closely with this theology of a suffering divine 
nature - which caused alarm and consternation to, among others, the Emperor 
Theodosius. 
  
for the Godhead which assumed the slave’s form in no way 
shunned all these things which belonged to it, in order that through 
each... it might remove the barriers to salvation and bestow on us a 
benefit worthy of so great a self-limitation... I will not forbear telling 
what he endured for me! Impassable he did not cease from being, 
but he united himself to the passible and thus took on sufferings on 
my behalf (Wickham, 1983:34-35).  
 
Cyril rejects the possibility of only the body suffering - for as a human being is 
body and soul, so there is real, organic unity on an ontological level between 
divine and human natures in Christ:  
 
The objection is yet another attack upon those who say “one 
incarnate nature of the God the Son”, and trying to prove this 
affirmation idle, they pig-headedly argue for the existence of two 
natures... But take a normal human body, we recognize two natures 
[fÚseij] one that of the soul, a second that of the body. We divide 
them, though, merely in thought, accepting the difference as simply 
residing in intellectual differentiation or intuition...  The “two” are no 
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more, and the single living  being is constituted complete by the pair 
of them (Wickham, 1983:90-93).  
 
Sunafe…a is insufficient for Cyril. For him the reality of God experiencing 
suffering and humanity’s receiving divinization without postulating a prÒswpon on 
which the two natures exist together is core: 
  
We reject the term sunafe…a as being insufficient to signify the 
union... but the Word of God, hypostatically united to the flesh 
(Quod Unus 733b, de Durand, 1964:363, McGuckin, 1994:213). 
 
The incarnation is meaningless for Cyril unless the reality of humanity and the 
human condition is taken directly by God to himself in the act of kšnwsij. 
(Wickham, 1983: 106-109). In this regard, Nestorius can be properly said to hold 
an orthodox position – claiming Athanasius’s depictions of the state of humanity 
and its Christological resolution to undergird his ontological – soteriological 
concerns. 
 
5:6 “Enwsij and sun£feia 
In Athanasius’s schema in CG-DI primordial communion with God preserved 
human life. The incarnation ontologically prevents human being from falling back 
into chaos because there is a lasting union of humanity and the divine in Christ, 
which restores and even exceeds the stability of the beginning. Cyril’s insistence 
upon the significance of ›nwsij – because the union is rooted in this Christological 
foundation for salvation – is a consistent mark of his work. But Cyril has moved, 
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even before the crisis, from Athanasius’s depiction of salvation as divinization 
preferring instead to attribute participation in the divine sacramentally and by the 
work of the Holy Spirit in perfecting humanity still (Keating, 2000; Young, 2003). 
He thus avoids overemphasizing Christology as the setting for sanctification, and 
juxtaposes the Holy Spirit with human being in the life of the Christian through a 
more sacramental theology than Athanasius articulated. 
 
Cyril’s movement from an Athanasian position exposes him to Nestorius’s 
accusations that he has abandoned his predecessor in favour of Apollinarius, but 
Cyril succeeds in protecting himself throughout the conflict in a manner that 
Nestorius cannot achieve. His response is a refusal to justify himself from the text 
of Athanasius, but claiming authoritative continuity, castigating Nestorius as the 
new Arius. Cyril thus exhibits a significantly developed model from CG-DI, along 
the lines of the Serapion correspondence and the emerging view of the Spirit as 
ÐmooÚsioj with the Father and the Son. Whilst Cyril extends Athanasian thought 
into a more thorough trinitarian framework, it is also the case that he has laid 
aside aspects of Athanasian thought which were central to the young Athanasius 
as the dynamics of participation require both natures to participate in the 
incarnation for human deification (Kolp, 1982:1018-1023). 
 
A glance at Athanasius’s use of the terms sun£feia and ›nwsij may again account 
for each being convinced that their term was an appropriate Christological 
description. 
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Athanasius’s use of sun£feia (as coniunctio) is applied to marriage in the Contra 
Apollinarem,683 the harmony and peace of the Church in de Synodis684  and 
theologically to indicate the intimate communion between Father and Son in de 
Sententia Dionysii:685 
 
Oƒ d  oÙk ‡sasin, Óti m»te ¢phllotr…wtai pat¾r uƒoà Î pat»r, 
prokatarktikÕn g£r ™sti tÁj sunafe…aj tÕ Ônoma... 
 
In de Synodis 26.ix686 Athanasius asserts that there is no space, or distance 
allowed in the harmonic conjunction between Father and Son. Athanasius’s 
sense here echoes Cyril, but his language is that of Nestorius.  
 
The use of ›nwsij in the Athanasian corpus is a more directly Christological term, 
rather than proceding from the analogy of marriage and ecclesial harmony to 
unity of Father and Son. It is, however, problematic because it appears (Müller, 
1952:498) predominantly in CA IV, which is now identified as “Apollinarian”. So 
MPG 516C3 (where it is a term equated with ™nanqrèphsij), 517A12; B2; 
520C5; 524B10; 15; C14 (where the soteriological significance is drawn out) are 
all from a context which Cyril believed to be Athanasian, but which in fact are 
Apollinarian. That is not to say that Cyril was the new Apollinarius, he had moved 
on in a Trinitarian direction, but it accounts for Nestorius’s concern, and 
witnesses to the latter’s careful Christological attention, and his conservatism. 
 
                                                 
683 MPG 1097C11. 
684 MPG 720B4. 
685 MPG 504D1, Opitz, 1936:58. 
686 MPG 733B4; Opitz, 1941:253. 
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Thus not only do both reach back to the Athanasian corpus to justify language 
appropriate to God’s being and the nature of the union, they both find 
corroborating evidence in that corpus for their own positions. Athanasius may not 
have been responsible for their development of his ideas, but he was the figure 
to whom both reached and upon whom both had a legitimate claim. 
 
 
5:7 Conclusions: Athanasius and Apollinarius in the arguments of 
Cyril and Nestorius          
The early Young (1983:259) argued that, “surprisingly enough” it is Cyril’s 
conscientious conservatism to his Alexandrian tradition which “is the key to 
[his]... innovations.” It was, she argues, his dependency upon Apollinarian texts, 
all attributed to safe sources, especially Athanasius, but all of which were 
forgeries, that led Cyril to his Christological development. She maintained that 
Cyril’s rejection of Apollinarianism is superficial, and that there is no theological 
significance allowed to Christ’s humanity on these grounds. She backed Norris’s 
proposed solution as most insightful, in that Cyril is really searching for a 
theology which makes the Logos (rather than the Son) both divine and human. 
Despite her nuanced revision (2003), this chapter has demonstrated that whilst 
both reached for Athanasius to justify their Christological priorities and 
prejudices, and the Athanasian corpus can be seen to undergird both parties’ 
arguments. Cyril’s emphasis on ›nwsij for example, closely follows the 
Apollinarian CA IV. 
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In CA I & II, it has been observed above that Athanasius’s strategy for countering 
Arian claims that the Logos may not be essentially divine because of texts which 
apply suffering, change or lack to the incarnate Son as referring to the humanity, 
not to the divine Son in toto. Athanasius’s strategy is de facto to employ a 
hermeneutical device which divides the natures in the incarnate Son. Thus in 
these authentic Athanasian texts, he gives a model to Nestorius and other 
Antiochenes to differentiate texts which apply to the humanity, and those which 
apply to the divine nature. What was part of Athanasius’s strategy against Arian 
tendencies has been described in part 2 of this thesis as a differentiated 
application of creatio ex nihilo to Christology: not without good reason does 
Nestorius claim to be continuing this Athanasian application to Christology while 
Cyril obscures it. 
There is an irony in that Cyril’s major divergence from Athanasius comes from his 
following texts that he believed to be Athanasius’s (especially CA III & IV). But we 
can also see pneumatological developments as consistent with the later 
Athanasius. Living in the fluid Alexandrian theological tradition enables Cyril to 
move soteriology and Christian sanctification out of a strictly Christological 
context to a trinitarian one.   
A fully divine Spirit can communicate the divine nature in a more pastorally active 
way, refilling the Christian with divine grace through the Sacraments and 
communicating his own nature. The Spirit recapitulates Christ’s saving work in 
the temporal life of Christians. The humanity of Christians is thus cherished and 
preserved and brought into the stable participation with the divine in a different 
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way from Nestorius, who at once represents a model more faithful to the letter of 
Athanasius if less able to justice to his later works on the Spirit. 
Athanasius admits  
We are allowed to know the Son in the Father because the whole 
being of the Son [sÚmpan tÕ eŒnai] is proper to the Father’s 
whole being... they show the unity of the Godhead and the oneness 
of the being [t¾n tautÒthta tÁj QeÒthtoj t¾n d ˜nÒthta tÁj 
oÙs…aj de…xV]. [But] they are two, for the Father is Father and is 
not also Son, and the Son is Son and is not also Father; but the 
nature is one and all that is the Father’s is the Son’s... The Son and 
the Father are in propriety and peculiarity of nature and in the 
identity of the one Godhead... The fullness of the Father’s Godhead 
is the being of the Son, and the Son is whole God [tÕ pl»rwma tÁj 
toà PatrÕj QeÒthtÒj ™sti tÕ e nai toà Uƒoà, kaˆ Óloj QeÒj ™stin 
Ð UƒÒj.] (CA 3.4-5f, T F Torrance, 1997:304)  
 
This chapter has shown different ways in which both Cyril and Nestorius 
constructed aspects of Athanasius’s perceived Christological arguments and 
developed them in opposite directions. Cyril seeking to emulate his predecessor: 
Il a certainement desire passionnément toute sa vie de ressembler à 
St. Athanase (de Durand, 1964:32) 
whilst Nestorius shows signs of really wanting to pursue and explicate carefully the 
theological language and ideas of Athanasius. 
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Theodoret of Cyrus will provide a yet more inclusive and systematic reading of 
Athanasius, and to him we now turn. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THEODORET OF CYRUS: CLAIMING ATHANASIUS FOR ANTIOCH 
6.1: Introduction 
Theodoret of Cyrus’s 687 series of dialogues, Eranistes,688 enables a fifth-century 
evaluation of the impact of Athanasius’s Christology and the reception of his 
theological achievements from an Antiochene theological viewpoint. Written over 
a century after the beginning of the Nicene-Arian controversies, and providing an 
Antiochene apologia to the long and embittered Christological conflict between 
Alexandrian and Antiochene theological emphases, Eranistes provides valuable 
fifth century assessments of fourth century Christology. The way in which 
Athanasius and his opponents were viewed a century later, by an exponent of 
Alexandria’s “rival” theological tradition, indicates the extent to which 
Athanasius’s Christological foundations have become a universal foundation of 
orthodox thought. 
 
In this evaluation, an introduction to the purpose and genre of Eranistes 
precedes an exploration of Theodoret’s Christology with particular reference to 
the rôle of creatio ex nihilo in his understanding. An examination of Theodoret’s 
handling of the issue of mediation as a Christological function follows, before an 
assessment of Athanasius’s Christology (as Theodoret constructs it) in the 
dialogues. This demonstrates that the centre of Theodoret’s Christology depends 
                                                 
687 c393-457/466. 457/8 is the traditional one for Theodoret’s death - so NPNF ii.3. For a full 
review, see Ettlinger, 1975:3. 
688 The text used is that of Ettlinger (1975), and references are to his page and line numbers, 
preceded by the Migne [MPG] reference. 
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upon the theological achievements of Athanasius. Eranistes is a mid-fifth century 
witness to the reception of both the texts and the developing Christological 
trajectories which Athanasius engendered. 
6.2: The purpose and genre of Eranistes  
Theodoret’s Eranistes, provides his evaluation of the conflict in which he was 
engaged in the form of dramatic dialogues. Their style is a sustained 
Christological debate where profound differences are expressed. The characters 
in the dialogues are the hero, Orthodoxos, Theodoret’s spokesman for the 
Antiochene cause, and Eranistes, the “carpet bagger”, an apocrisiarius of the 
Alexandrian tradition.  
 
The first dialogue focuses upon the question of how the Alexandrian tradition has 
come to deal with divine immutability so lightly in its characteristic emphasis upon 
¢paqîj œpaqen (“he suffered without suffering”) in the so-called passionless 
passion Christology.689 Orthodoxos prefaces the debate by asking: 
 
How do you now bring forward these words of the gospel, that is, 
“the Word became flesh,” and attribute to them a turning point 
[trop≈n] to the unchangeable nature? [t⊇ ¢tršptJ ... fÚsei;]690 
 
This provides the basis for a discussion around John 1.14. The second dialogue 
builds upon these first arguments which establish that divine nature is 
                                                 
689 Young, 1983:283. 
690 MPG 36; Ettlinger, 1975:66, lines 14-15. 
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unconfounded, and that Christ necessarily has two natures without mingling or 
transformation as theological foundations: 
 
 God became incarnate not by being changed into flesh, but by taking 
 perfect human nature.691 
 
The third dialogue explores the significance of the function of divine impassability 
[¢paq»j], as proper justification for two continuing active natures in the 
incarnation. 
 
The dialogues are followed by a syllogistic epilogue, outlining the arguments 
establishing the immutability of the Logos.692 
 
Eranistes’s significance, however, is not merely as a commentary on the fifth 
century arguments in which Theodoret was embroiled, but illustrative of a 
process in theology which constructs arguments upon cited patristic texts, 
appended to each dialogue as florilegia of other theologians’ writings. This clarity 
answers definitively the accusation (common in Cyril) that the Antiochene 
tradition is impious inquisitiveness.693 This appeal to an authoritative apostolic 
tradition as well as Scripture, and, indeed, as the key to authentic interpretation 
of Scripture is evident from the outset of the first dialogue. Orthodoxos has to 
entice Eranistes to engage with him - he initially refuses to consider the 
incarnation theologically, convinced that investigation is unnecessary because he 
                                                 
691  oÙk e„j s£rka trape…j, ¢ll' ¢nqrwpe…an fÚsin tele…an labèn. MPG 220; Ettlinger, 1975:189 
lines 2-3. 
692  MPG 319-336; Ettlinger, 1975:254-265. 
693 See chapter 5, above. 
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(representing the Alexandrian tradition) “exactly holds the truth”.694 Orthodoxos 
prompts his opponent to consider the footsteps of apostles and saints,695 clearly 
indicating Theodoret’s answer to Alexandrian  charges of inquisitiveness, 
appealing to such as Athanasius as universal  authorities.   
 
In the florilegia696 of authorities after each dialogue, there are thirty citations from 
Athanasius697 and thirty-two from Apollinarius.698 In the dialogues, Theodoret 
distinguishes between viewpoints of Apollinarius and developments of 
subsequent Apollinarian writers,699 just as he discriminates between Athanasius 
and his Alexandrian successors700 Cyril and Dioscorus. This attentiveness, 
                                                 
694 ¢kribîj gar tÁj ¢lhqe…aj ™cÒmeqa. MPG 32, Ettlinger, 1975:63, lines 7-8. 
695 MPG 32, Ettlinger, 1975:63, lines 17-19. 
696 See M. Richard, in Grilleier and Bacht, 1962:721-48 for the background to the genre and its 
importance in doctrinal controversy. Ettlinger, 1975:23-35, discusses the Florilegia after each of 
the Dialogues. 
697 Ettlinger, 1975:9; 11; 14-15; 20-21, for each citation of Athanasius in Eranistes. Theodoret 
draws from the Epistula ad Epictetum; De Sententia Dionysii; Sermo maior de fide; Oratio II 
contra Arianos; Epistula ad Adelphium; De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos; De Incarnatione.  He 
regards all of these as authentic documents from Athanasius’s hand. Sermo maior de fide and De 
incarnatione contra Arianos are now generally judged to be spurious. Dragas, 1985, argues that 
Athanasius is the author of Contra Apollinarem. Theodoret omits any reference to this work. For 
an assessment of Dragas see Hanson 1988:645ff. 
698 Ettlinger, 1975:12-13; 18-19; 23 has full citations. Theodoret quotes from Apollinarius’ “chief 
work”, t∏ kat¦ kef¦laion b…blion, as well as kat¦ mšroj p…stij. These form the basis of the textual 
reconstructions of Leitzmann, 1904; de Riedmatten, 1962:203-212.  
699 Concerning the impassibility of the Logos’ divinity in Dialogue I, Theodoret argues that even 
Apollinarius did not promote such folly as his followers now appear to be holding. Eranistes, 
Dialogue I MPG 104, Ettlinger, 1975:110: 'IdoÝ to…nun mem£qhkaj, æj oÙ mÒnon oƒ profÁtai 
kaˆ ¢pÒstoloi, kaˆ oƒ met' aÙtoÝj ceirotonhqšntej tÁj o„koumšnhj did£skaloi, ¢ll¦ kaˆ Apolin£rioj, Ð 
toÝj aƒretikoÝj suggr£yaj, kaˆ ¥trepton Ðmologe‹ tÕn qeÕn lÒgon, kaˆ oÙk e„j s£rka aÙtÕn 
tetr£fqai fhs…n, ¢ll¦ s£rka ¢feilhfštai. See Dialogue III, florilegium 46f, MPG 300, Ettlinger, 
1975:46, where the followers of Apollinarius are said to surpassing the captain of their heresy in 
impiety. Though hardly a defence or promotion of  Apollinarius in any way, it echoes the 
contradictory work of Epiphanius of Salamis, who attempted to demonstrate that in heresy, error 
is multiplied as it fragments, making pure doctrine increasingly distant. 
700 Peter II succeeded Athanasius as Patriarch of Alexandria [373-381]. Peter’s successors were 
Timothy [Patriarch 381-385] and Theophilus [385-412]. Cyril was Theophilus’s nephew, and is 
often portrayed as managing his patriarchate with something of his uncle’s outrageous 
managerial style (though contrast Wessel, 2004:74-111). On Cyril’s death in 444, Dioscorus was 
appointed to the See, who continued the Alexandrian tradition of political interference across the 
East, but his was without the saving grace of Cyril’s theological erudition. It is perhaps in 
response to this “beggar” or “carpet bagger” that Eranistes was written. Frend, 1984:765. 
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together with generally accurate citations,701 reveal that Theodoret is an astute 
and careful scholar and fair witness of key issues. 
 
The form of Eranistes, recording as it does the engagement, conflict, and the 
rehearsal of the area of argument between the characters, illustrates the way in 
which the texts reproduced in the florilegia are being interpreted and appied in 
the fifth century, reflecting a method of citation and correlation and an exegetical 
struggle to establish Christological authenticity.  
 
Theodoret’s florilegia, besides being in the main accurate, reflect his desire to 
establish an agreed grammatical-linguistic process in Christological debate 
consistent with what he styles the “whole apostolic rule” (Ósoi tÕn ¢postolikÕn 
kanÒna).702 Rooting truth in ancient authorities and eschewing innovation or 
originality is, of course, well-known not only in Christian orthodoxy, but a familiar 
late-Antique convention. In Eranistes, though, this is not merely a somewhat 
dishonest device to avoid the impression of innovation. Theodoret, achieves 
something more ethically sophisticated than this, conveying that his model of 
doing Christology is a process of conversation in the light of authoritative 
traditions. The Antiochene hero, Orthodoxos, strives to keep consistent with them 
in his Christology. Theodoret’s drawing together of divergent strands of 
                                                 
701 Ettlinger, 1975:23-54 discusses errors and their significance. He regards Theodoret’s method 
and accuracy to be generally scholarly. Evidence includes attentiveness to detail in arguments of 
those with whom he disagrees, in order to engage fully with the truth. Note the encouragement in 
Orthodoxos’ farewell discourse to Eranistes to drink of all that is wholesome and sweet, even 
amid bitter herbs, but with care to avoid the poisonous. In the vast majority of the florilegia, there 
is a textual accuracy and a seeking on Theodoret’s part to view the quotation in context. 
702 MPG 154, Ettlinger, 1975:143. Cf. his attractive and humorous concluding exhortation, 
buzzing among the “fair flowers of these illustrious fathers” [kaˆ tîn paneuf»mwn patšrwn] MPG 
317; Ettlinger, 1975:253. Cp also, at the outset of the first dialogue, both characters agree that 
the quarrel is in order to agree upon and abide by “the apostolic doctrine in its purity.” MPG 32; 
Ettlinger, 1975:63 '/Ameinon mn Ân sumfwne‹n ¹m©j kaˆ t¾n ¢postolik¾n didaskal…an ful£ttein 
¢k»raton. 
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Christology is not simply cramming all sorts into an amalgam of texts. Rather, 
from these diverse examples, Theodoret attempts to plot a clear trajectory; 
emphasising particularly Athanasius’s authority. Athanasius’s presence is not 
mere convention or political astuteness: he is cited as a defender of, and 
protagonist for, orthodoxy. Apollinarius is exposed as a distorter of the truth both 
in an exploration of his Christology in Dialogue II, and subsequent textual 
evidence in the florilegia. Yet even here, Theodoret deals carefully with his 
sources, attempting to reconstruct and critically engage with Christological 
standpoints different from his own. Such reconstruction of an opponent’s ground 
without deliberate distortion is rare. Theodoret resists caricaturing all of the 
Alexandrian tradition’s subjection of the Logos’s divine nature to passibility as 
“Apollinarian”, even though he considers this to be the prime error of Cyril, 
Dioscorus, Eutyches and their supporters. Theodoret is clear that their treatment 
of divine nature mutates the Son and prohibits union by creating a third entity, 
instead of mediating two natures. Nonetheless, he does not caricature this as 
“Apollinarian,” instead portraying a discrete picture of Apollinarius’s theology 
distinguished from subsequent “decay” among his followers. Against them, even 
Apollinarius himself is used as a witness for orthodoxy.703  
 
Eranistes reflects Theodoret’s desire to analyse and connect Christology with a 
living developing tradition with Athanasius a significant authority. Eranistes, 
therefore, evidences the desire to establish authoritative methology in 
Christology. This fifth century development of a process which in earlier 
generations had provoked the formation of the New Testament Canon, became 
                                                 
703 Note, again though, his final exhortation as an indication and justification for this method in his 
theology.  
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focused in saintly authorities who stood in this Apostolic tradition.704 Ettlinger 
notes that ‘Eranistes represents the high point in Theodoret’s opposition to Cyril’ 
of Alexandria,705 yet there is an unavoidable sense of Athanasius’s personal 
authority in Eranistes. Athanasius is the brightest star of the Alexandrian Church 
(Ð fanÒtatoj tÁj 'Alexandršwn ™kklhs…aj fwst»r')706 with the exasperated 
implication that the current Alexandrian horizon was particularly benighted. 
Nonetheless, Theodoret’s appeal to Athanasius illustrates that his reception and 
authority, far from being restricted to the Alexandrian tradition, became a canon 
for Christology. 
 
Eranistes, written in the heady environment before Chalcedon, reflects the vital 
theological objections to some models of divine-human mediation in the fÚsij, 
ØpÒstasij and s≤rx of Christ. In opposing Cyril, Eranistes uses some 
consequences and implications of Athanasius’s and Apollinarius’s anti-Arian 
arguments a century before.  
 
Theodoret is thus a significant witness in illustrating and assessing the lasting 
impact and application of Athanasius’s theological achievement in connecting the 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to Christology.  
                                                 
704  Cf. Cameron, 1991, on totalizing discourses. Her inaugural address of the XIII International 
Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford 16-21 August 1999, “On Naming: the Trouble with 
Heresy” described the obsession of heresiologists to expose heresies not as eccentric errors but 
part of a wider scheme of distortion. This is why, for example, Epiphanius is anxious to make all 
manner of links between groups that did not accept an emerging authoritative discourse. She 
argued that full-blown persecution of heretics was restricted to very rare carefully controlled 
occasional outbursts. The arena of conflict was very much more the struggle for hearts and minds 
than an organized inquisition. Theodoret is interesting evidence representing the next stage of a 
claim on the truth by the Christian community. It is no longer just the canon of authoritative 
revelation in establishing which New Testament books were to be included; the claim is now 
made on the authority of Christian exegesis and theology in the Fathers. See Cameron, 
2003:471-492. 
705 Ettlinger, 1975:3. 
706 Preface to Florilegium 1, MPG 76; Ettlinger, 1975:91 line 19. 
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 6.3 Christology in Theodoret’s Eranistes 
Eranistes’s clarity and pertinency establishes Theodoret as a competent 
communicator of complex theological ideas and arguments.707 Eranistes’s 
strongly-worded arguments against Cyril of Alexandria and his successor 
Dioscorus708 provides a powerful didactic tool for adherents of the Antiochene 
School in the conflict.  
 
If Eranistes witnesses to Theodoret’s theological ability, it also explains the 
urgency of his opponents’ desire to condemn and silence him. By being confined 
in Cyrus, Theodoret could neither attend nor sway the second Council of 
Ephesus in 449, (the “robber synod”). His forthright response to Cyril’s 
Anathemas was, no doubt, politically disastrous in the short-term, resulting in a 
sojourn in the wilderness and a long-term polemical caricature of him as 
Nestorian.709 
 
                                                 
707 See, for example, the way he compares Øpostasij with oÙsia at the beginning of Dialogue I. 
MPG 33f; Ettlinger, 1975:64, line 6ff. 
708 The depiction of Dioscorus as “mad, bad and dangerous to know” is commonplace, e.g.,  
Cerbelaud 1989:13: “Si le prédécesseur de Cyrille apparaissait comme un personnage peu 
sympathique, son successeur a laissé le souvenir d’un véritable forban. Corrompu, violent, 
ambitieux, il indispose même ses éventuels sympathisants, tant par les scandales de sa vie 
privée que par son manque total de sens théologique”; Frend, 1984:763, argues that this 
reputation took some time to develop. Theodoret congratulated him on his reason and modesty, 
[Letter X] Domnus of Antioch and Pope Leo greeted him affectionately and looked forward to a 
different model of Patriarch from Cyril. Frend accounts Dioscorus reputation as Alexandrian 
ecclesiastical ambition. This certainly seems to be the common theme of his political allegiances 
at the various councils. Perhaps something of the vehemence of his rejection which lives on in 
anti-Dioscoran polemic can be understood as a cathartic means for the bishops who had gone 
along with the manoeuvres at the second council of Ephesus to distance themselves from events.  
709 There are parallels with Nestorius’ thought. Some scholarship is very near to acquitting 
Nestorius of grotesque heresy - see the summary and discussion in F M Young, op. cit., 1983, 
pp229-265, and above, chapter 5 – though Cyril is very much in the ascendancy in most recent 
scholarship. 
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Theodoret’s own Christology, outlined in Eranistes, is clear. Unsurprisingly, the 
Antiochene theologian wants to secure divine impassibility as foundational. This, 
he argues, is the key to orthodox Christology. To admit that the incarnation 
(™nanqrèphsij or o„konom…a) meant a modification or an essential 
accommodation of divine nature in the union (›nwsij), would belittle and distort 
both divine and human natures: 
 
If the divine Word took nothing of our nature, then the covenants 
which the God of all made with the patriarchs are not true, and the 
blessing of Judah is unprofitable, and the promise to David is a lie, 
and the Virgin is redundant because she contributed nothing of our 
nature to the Incarnate God. ... [But] he is proclaimed to have been 
made flesh, and teaching that he remained unchanged 
[¢nallo…wtoj], the evangelist also says “and we beheld his glory - 
the glory as of the only begotten of the Father”.710 
 
In changing both natures, God would no longer have been truly God and Christ 
never of “one substance with the Father” appertaining to his Godhead. If Christ 
was neither “of one substance” with the Father nor, appertaining to his humanity, 
“of one substance with us”, then not only would qeolog…a be distorted, but 
humanity, remaining untouched and unassumed without ontological mediation, 
would remain unredeemed.  
 
                                                 
710  MPG 72, 73. Ettlinger, 1975:88 line 27ff, 89 line 21ff. 
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Antiochene qeolog…a prompts Theodoret to urge the soteriological 
consequences of correct Christology, but he does so with characteristically 
Athanasian ontological emphasis. Athanasius achieved this synthesis, Theodoret 
shows. Even if Theodoret stands in the tradition of Theodore, objecting to 
Christologies where mediation is collapsed into mingling,711 he approves of 
Athanasius’s paradigm of the ontological gulf between divine and created natures 
and integrates it in his own method. Theodoret claims continuity with Athanasius 
after the first dialogue, rhetorically challenging Eranistes to judge whether this 
noteworthy star is an admissible witness.712 The passage from Ad Epictetum713 
prefigures the very wording of Orthodoxos in the dialogue: 
 
 Orthodoxos714     Athanasius715 
 oÙk e„j s£rka trape…j,  oÛtwj oÙc Óti trapeˆj e„j s£rka 
 ¢ll' ¢nqrwpe…an fÚsin   ¢ll' Óti s£rka Øpr ¹mîn 
 tele…an labèn   ¢nšlabe 
 
The change from Athanasius’s “flesh” to “complete human nature” is 
characteristically Antiochene. But the other characteristic theological preference 
(repugnance at divine passibility) is Athanasius almost verbatim.  
 
Ad Epictetum’s citation at the end of the first dialogue is also significant: it 
equates the Logos’s taking of humanity’s curse with his bearing the consequence 
of sin as a fall out of relationship with the divine nature and thus back into non-
                                                 
711 See the discussion of Dialogue II, below. 
712  MPG 76; Ettlinger, 1975:91, line 18. 
713  Ad Epictetum, 8: MPG 26.1061D - 1064A. 
714  MPG 220; Ettlinger, 1925, p189 line 2-3. 
715  In Eranistes Florilegium 1 after the first dialogue, MPG 76; Ettlinger 1975:91, lines 24-30. 
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being. Athanasius’s Christological anthropology is reiterated by his consistent 
application of creatio ex nihilo as to leave no ontological alternative to either 
remain (mene‹n) in the Logos or fall into non-Being.716 Devoid of divine power, 
the flesh is indeed the curse.  
 
Theodoret systematically presents theological objections against locating 
mediation in a part or element of the person of Christ: be that a divine pneàma or 
lÒgoj in human flesh. Neither is the assumption of part of human being - in the 
fÚsij or ØpÒstasij of the man Jesus adequate.717 Theodoret’s departure from the 
Athanasian text indicates the Antiochene’s emphasis that it is not merely the 
flesh which Christ assumes, but the taking of “complete human nature” that is 
significant. 
 
Theodoret outlines with ease and vitality the Christologies of those who have 
made these errors and draws clear sketches of their consequences, working 
through implications of victorious arguments of the past. The tradition of equating 
a heresy to a genealogy of dishonour, characteristic of heresiologists, finds 
sophisticated expression in Theodoret. An outline to his Prologue of Dialogue I, 
links Christologies which allow only divine nature with Simon, Cerdo and 
                                                 
716 On Johannine remaining in Athanasius cf. Anatolios, 1998:35-7;159. 
717 Athanasius’s Orationes Contra Arianos has parallels with Irenaeus of Lyons’s Adversus 
Omnes Haereses [Harnack, 1901, onwards]: Athanasius adapted Irenaeus’s biblical methodology 
in contrast to Origen, developing his theology along lines of Biblical themes of redemption rather 
than Platonic Cosmology. Irenaeus’s critique of Valentinian heresies are judged to be similar to 
the Arians by Athanasius, so he adapts Irenaeus’s attacks as his own rhetoric. Though 
Athanasius never cites Irenaeus, and, unlike him, Athanasius does not say that Christ had a 
human soul in Contra Arianos: Theodoret is silent about this omission. In his Tomus Ad 
Antiochonem, 7, Athanasius is explicit that unless a human soul is assumed then our souls have 
no opportunity of redemption. Greer, 1975:317 argues “It will be remembered that late in his 
career Athanasius was forced to take a stand with regard to the Apollinarian controversy, and that 
he argued that one must attribute a human soul to Christ. The human soul, however, never 
functioned theologically in Athanasius’s thought.” 
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Marcion. Those who derive from parqšnogenesij no organic connection with 
human being, viewing incarnation as only a passageway of divine being, without 
unity (parodik¾n d taÚthn genšsqai lšgein),718 are equated with Valentinus and 
Bardesanes. Those who call the union of divinity and humanity one nature derive 
from Apollinarius; whilst those who attribute suffering to the divinity of Christ are 
inheritors of Arius and Eunomius.719 
 
That suffering of the divine nature has Arian attribution requires examination. 
Arius’s refusal to reschedule divine and human natures in the light of the 
Athanasius’s radical distinction imposed by applying creatio ex nihilo 
Christologically confused distinct natures by retaining Platonic hermeneutic of 
overlap. Athanasius’s Christological application of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
is a powerful ally for Theodoret against Cyril’s attack upon the Antiochene 
tradition. 
 
In response to Alexandrian assertions of the unity of Christ, Theodoret delineates 
subtly the consequences of what he saw to be its damaging, uncritical piety. 
Frend suggested that: 
  
If the Cappadocians laid the foundation for the Christology of the 
fifth-century patriarchs of Constantinople, the real challenge to 
Apollinarianism was coming from a different quarter... Two Cilesian 
bishops, Diodore, bishop of Tarsus [flor. c. 375-90] and his disciple, 
Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia [d.428] maintained forcefully the 
                                                 
718 p£rodoj emphasises the revelatory rather than essential here, meaning “way, passage, a 
coming forward before an assembly to speak” without any significant union. 
719 Prologue to Dialogue I: MPG 28-29; Ettlinger 1975:61-62. 
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reality of the two natures in Christ. Jesus was a man and was part 
of the created order. God was by definition, Creator, and the gulf 
between the two was inseparable (Frend, 1988:641). 
 
But this is not the entire picture. Theodoret’s emphasis upon two natures is clear, 
but he constantly claims Athanasius as one who established the theological 
imperative for two natures: as a profoundly influential sequitur of his application 
of creatio ex nihilo. 
 
Theodoret’s model of differentiated union argues for the importance of the Logos 
not becoming flesh but taking (labèn) flesh. It is not enfleshment (s£rkwsij) that is 
the mechanics of salvation, as if it made a via media between the two natures of 
divinity and humanity, but the divine initiative of the Logos’s taking (labèn) flesh 
which is the great mystery. In terms of Christological principles, Theodoret is 
closer to Theodore in Alexandrian ears than he really was. The florilegia 
demonstrate that he is nearer Athanasius’s insistence on human and divine 
natures than he is to the exegetical practices of Diodore and Theodore. Although 
he defends Nestorius against Cyril’s political invasion of his See, Theodoret’s 
Eranistes is emphatic that free divine initiative be appreciated. This is in contrast 
both to Nestorius’s attempts to produce a system [prosopic union] which “allows” 
the presence of God to connect with human nature, and Cyril’s subsuming of the 
humanity of Christ. Theodoret steers a different path from those with whom he is 
most readily identified: witnessing to his independence of mind and his 
theological acumen.720   
                                                 
720 Cf. Young, 1983:285ff on his Preface to the Psalms. 
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 `O lÒgoj s¦rx ™gšneto does not therefore mean, for Theodoret, that divine nature 
was moulded or changed or that the incarnation is in any way a predictable 
process. After Dialogue I, the florilegia focus upon how John 1.14 has been 
understood by the fathers. Although Orthodoxos illustrates the Antiochene 
tradition’s unease with lÒgoj-s¦rx motifs721 and argues with clarity for a lÒgoj- 
¥nqrwpoj model, the florilegia are authentic quotations, which often use lÒgoj-
s¦rx shorthand.722 S¦rx for Theodoret means the “name” or style which 
appropriates to “humanity”. He argues: 
 
It appears to me that it is for the soul to lead in [the flesh’s 
transgression]... since it uses reasoning before the body acts.723  
 
Supporting his arguments with florilegia comparing biblical language concerning 
the body - or flesh - of Christ, as a sign for the whole, Theodoret argues that this 
refers to his whole person in the same way that people speak of the emperor 
being attacked if his statue or robe is defaced or destroyed.724 So the flesh of 
Christ is an icon for his whole being. 
 
This whole ¥nqrwpoj to which the divine Logos is united, is the reinstated, 
recreated e„kèn of God in humanity. This is possible only through the union of 
two unmutated and unchanged divine and human natures in the hypostatic 
                                                 
721 Cf.Gelasius of Caesarea’s maxim: oÙk aÙtoj metablhqe…j ¢ll' ™n ¹m‹n. 
722 Hanson, 1988:645. 
723 Dialogue III, MPG 225, also MPG 128-129 et al. 
724 Orthodoxos cites Eusebius of Emesa, omitting a citation [MPG 249.19-251.15 (=De Arbitrio, 
voluntate Pauli et Domini Passione) in Dialogue III, Florilegium 74, MPG 315; Ettlinger, 1975:250. 
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union. The basis of Theodoret’s appeal is again to the Athanasian application of 
the distinction which creatio ex nihilo brings when applied Christologically.  
 
In Eranistes, Theodoret sustains theological sophistication over Cyril’s rhetoric, 
demonstrating that sloganized theology is a reductio ad absurdum. Theodoret is 
aware that his style appears inimical to popular devotion. He is insistent, 
however, that a consistent theology of God’s nature, evolving from acute 
theological analysis, is necessary for authentic Christology and theological 
distinction between the persons of the Trinity.  
 
Theodoret’s energy is focused upon the theological discernment of the Mystery 
of God (qeolog…a) informing understanding of the nature of salvation 
(o„konom…a). Treating both aspects as parts of the whole Christian faith, he 
does not flee complexity.  Theodoret’s economic motivation is always balanced 
by this holistic theological focus. Theology occurs in context of fallen reason, 
confused language and divergent opinions. There is not, Orthodoxos voices, any 
formulaic panacea to complexity – Christology is forged in responding to 
problems requiring clear linguistic delineation.  He asks his opponent: 
 
 Answer me: would you... [apply] the same treatment [f£rmakon] to all, 
 or to each that which is appropriate?725  
 
Theology is to be worked at with fear and trembling, honed neither by pious 
platitudes nor bellicose rhetoric (both of which he judged to abound in Cyril and 
                                                 
725 MPG 116; Ettlinger, 1975:118, lines 13-15.          . 
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Dioscorus). Christian theology explicates orthodox truth by stating it afresh in 
new contexts where questions and language are constantly shifting. This 
accurate analysis of this period has a modern style about it. Attention to 
Christological problems is reverence, he urges: blanket piety is helpless in 
establishing truth if it remains undifferentiated quietism.  
 
To assert and speak of only Christ’s divinity then, as Eranistes insists contrary to 
Apostolic and Patristic testimony, states only part of the mystery of the 
incarnation. The assertion that between Christians only the divine nature should 
be spoken of is exposed as belittling the paradox of the divine o„konom…a,726 
distorting revelation and God’s purposes for humanity: 
 
Eranistes: What is hidden ought not to be delved into. 
Orthodoxos: Neither should what is plainly to be discerned be 
altogether ignored.727  
 
In refusing pious protectionism, Theodoret argues that processes of theological 
debate and disciplined honing that emerge from hard engagement alone brings 
true reconciliation of the two natures in one union. This commitment drives his 
appeal to the Fathers as sources in refining Christological understanding. 
Christian theology should be reverently rational in order to distinguish patterns of 
application of words to each nature in the union: 
  
                                                 
726 MPG 120ff; Ettlinger, 1975:120ff. 
727 MPG 39; Ettlinger, 1975:67 lines 13-14. 
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Let us, therefore, use this reason [tù de to…nun tù logikù] with 
regards to our Maker and Saviour, and apply what belongs to his 
divinity and what to his humanity.728 
 
Orthodoxos argues consistently for the immutable, unaffected and impassible 
divine nature in Christ through the argument’s turns. Contrasting his own 
Christology with Apollinarius’s in Dialogue II, he works through functions of the 
two natures of Christ in relation to pertinent texts and variant traditions. Dialogue 
III, for its familiarity of tone, faces in a poignant theological way the central 
question of the meaning of Christ’s passion.729 
 
Apollinarian anthropology and Christology, he argues,730 omits a reasonable soul 
in Christ, allowing merely the life-force common to all living creatures, without the 
will to make them real or distinct. He contrasts this with his own model, where the 
whole humanity is assumed by the truly divine nature of the Logos: Ólhn t¾n 
fÚsin analabîn.731 Irenaeus maintained that the Logos assumed a human soul, 
but Athanasius, despite Irenaeus’s influence,732 does not unequivocally follow 
Irenaeus here. In CG-DI, this would obscure his distinction between either 
created out-of-nothing or the eternal divinity of the Son, which he champions.733 
Elsewhere, notably the Tom. Ad. Antiochonem, Athanasius agrees that the 
Logos assumes a human soul. 
                                                 
728 MPG 236; Ettlinger, 1975:199, lines 33-35. 
729 Young, 1983:282-283. 
730 See Dialogue II, MPG 116; Ettlinger, 1975:118, line 1ff. 
731 MPG 108; Ettlinger, 1975:113, line 27. and MPG 75, Ettlinger, 1975:91 line 3. 
732  See above, chapter 1, and Anatolios, 2001. Papyrus evidence is that Irenaeus’s work was 
present in Egypt by 190, i.e., in his own lifetime. 
733 Athanasius gives priority to divine will and freedom, and to introduce in a semi-Origenist 
Alexandria the human soul of Jesus would, no doubt throw the discussion back to Origen’s 
explorations of the perfect, unfallen pre-existent human soul of Jesus, obscuring what Athanasius 
wanted to focus upon: creatio ex nihilo.   
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 Theodoret accepts the union, but fusion, change or influence is completely 
unacceptable because that undermines God’s ontological stability. He defines 
›nwsij: 
We preach so close a union of Godhead and of manhood as to 
understand one person [prÒswpon] undivided.734   
 
By this, Theodoret leaves not the slightest wedge for his opponent Eranistes to 
drive arguments against him. 
 
Theodoret reproduces different patterns of Christological vocabulary to justify his 
choice of Christological language. In the Dialogues, Eranistes emphasises - and 
his arguments naturally employ - the phraseology s£rkwsij and ›nwsij; 
Orthodoxos prefers ™nanqrèphsij and o„konom…a.735 Orthodoxos however, 
unashamedly uses his opponent’s terminology expertly. His commitment to 
finding authentic grammar in Christology evidences Theodoret’s belief that 
Christological language and terminology has a central role in forming the 
theological logic of Christology. The skilful use of his opponent’s vocabulary 
conforms Theodoret’s skill in using others’ preferred theologoumena to his own 
                                                 
734 MPG 252; Ettlinger, 1975:209, lines 26-30. Theodoret is careful in using prÒswpon that he 
does so primarily in quotations from Scripture. He does not, however, echo Arius’s cry for a 
biblicism in terminology.  
735 Theodoret uses the term ™nanqrèphsij 17 times on the lips of Orthodoxos, 10 times in the 
Florilegia and only 4 times on the lips of Eranistes. S£rkwsij appears 8 times on Orthodoxos’ lips, 
7 times in the florilegia and 6 on Eranistes’. More telling than the number in the cases both of 
these terms and especially in the cases of o„konom…a and ›nwsij is the fact of who introduces 
the term and who stands by it. O„konom…a is a term Orthodoxos espouses, and although in the 
debate Othodoxos cites - just in Dialogue II - ›nwsij 32 times to Eranistes’s 13, this is because 
Eranistes keeps trying to hide under the term and Orthodoxos expounds fully what the union 
means. For a full list of citations see Ettlinger, 1975:282; 290; 294. Although he properly quotes it 
in his citation of Athanasius, Orthodoxos changes Athanasius’s reference of sarx in Ad Epictetum, 
[= Florilegium 1] to “taking a complete human nature”. 
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advantage in his theological method, exposing opponents’ inadequacy in the 
process.  
 
6.4 Mediation and Christology 
Theodoret devotes time to debating the question of the means of mediation if in 
the union humanity and divinity are unmixable, defining his position in relation to 
the attempts of others before and around him, especially Athanasius and 
Apollinarius. We need to explore this understanding of mediation in order to 
assess his use of Athanasius, which will illustrate the enduring significance of 
Athanasius’s categories forged in the Arian crisis. 
 
A key passage on the subject of the unconfounded nature of the divinity of Christ 
is in Dialogue II. After a direct clash between Orthodoxos and Eranistes 
concerning the names (= natures) of ‘God’ and ‘Man’ in Jesus, the argument 
maintains that both are necessary to bear witness to the whole truth of the nature 
of Christ [qeolog…a] and for the viability of salvation [o„konom…a]: 
  
The name ‘man’ is the name of a nature [fÚsewj]. Not to speak the 
name is to deny the nature. Denial of [Christ’s human] nature is a 
denial of the sufferings, and a denial of the sufferings is to utterly 
ruin [froàdein] salvation.736 
 
In this enormously significant passage, Theodoret, in Orthodoxos’s words, sets 
out the basis for the case he is to argue. It is Jesus’ true humanity which allows 
                                                 
736 MPG 120; Ettlinger, 1975:120, line 23ff. 
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communication idiomatum with the rest of the race.737 Eranistes’ fear is that 
baldly to call Jesus ‘man’ veers to gross heresy and belittles the glory of the true 
person of Christ: 
 
It is profitable to acknowledge the assumed nature but to call the 
Saviour... of the world ‘man’ is to cheapen his glory.738 
 
Orthodoxos explores this glory of Christ in the debate through a series of biblical 
references to Jesus as a man739 and then rhetorically asks Eranistes if he 
considers himself wiser than the Apostles or even the Lord. 
 
Eranistes’s response is the familiar contemporary Alexandrian argument, 
expressed clearly and powerfully, without undue polemical distortion. He argues 
that, especially in apologetic or missionary settings, it is unnecessary first to call 
Christ human: 
 
To call Christ a man is I think unnecessary - all the more when 
believer is in dialogue with unbeliever.740 
 
The reasoning behind this statement - neither explicitly announced nor ridiculed - 
is that it is clearly obvious that Jesus was a man. That is not at issue to the 
orthodox, but the point of who this man is - by nature - is central. 
 
                                                 
737 Theodoret expounds clearly what oÙs…a means in Dialogue I, [MPG 33, Ettlinger, 1975:64] 
Cf. Young, 1983: 275f., on the clarity of this point in the Expositio recta fidei.  
738 MPG 120; Ettlinger, 1975: 120 lines 27ff. 
739 I.e., Jn 8:40 - a loose citation, but the key term, ¥nqrwpoj, is there; Ac 2:22; Ac 17:30-31. 
740 MPG 120; Ettlinger, 1975:121 lines 27ff. 
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Orthodoxos’s response is that this indeed is the very point at issue. Just as the 
Alexandrians begin with Christ’s divine nature, so Orthodoxos, as a good 
Antiochene, begins with what can be perceived. The significance of the divine 
nature is that it is mediated through the true humanity of Christ. Citing I Tim. 2: 5-
6 to prove his case: Orthodoxos argues that mes thj indicates both Godhead 
and manhood:  
 
 EŒj qeÒj     One God, 
 eŒj kaˆ mes thj    and one mediator  
 qeoà kaˆ ¢nqrèpwn,   of God and humanity 
 ¥nqrwpoj CristÕj  Ihsoàj  the man Christ Jesus. 741 
 
Qeoà kaˆ ¢nqrèpwn is interpreted as epexegetical explication of the mediator’s 
nature, including both parties for whom he mediates.  
 
He is called ‘mediator’ because he does not exist as God alone; for 
how, if he had nothing of our nature could he have mediated 
between us and God?742 
 
“Having our nature” is vital – not mingling, but a relationship with integrity in the 
union. Instead of postulating a third entity (as Nestorius does in aspects of 
prosopic union),743 humanity focuses the mediatorial motif in Theodoret’s 
Christology. Thus it may not be relinquished in the process of coming to a full 
                                                 
741 MPG 121; Ettlinger, 1975:122 line 1ff: EŒj qeÒj eŒj kaˆ mes thj qeoà kaˆ ¢nqrèpwn, 
¥nqrwpoj CristÕj  ‘Ihsoàj. 
742 MPG 121f; Ettlinger, 1975:122 line 5ff. 
743 See above, chapter 6. 
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understanding of the person of Christ. The motivation to protect divine nature is 
less obsessive in Theodoret than in other examples of Antiochene Christology. 
Central for Theodoret is that Christ’s true humanity is allowed its mediatorial 
function. Athanasius’s model of a Christology moderated by creatio ex nihilo is 
developed into the tenet of necessary humanity in Theodoret’s Christology. 
Theodoret’s argument presents a prelude to the Chalcedonian couplet of dual 
correlation of human and divine nature: 
 
as God, he is joined with the Father - having the same substance 
[æj qeÕj sunÁptai tù patrˆ t¾n aÙt⎯n œcwn oÙs…an]; and as man 
he is joined with us, because from us he took the form of a 
servant.744 
 
The act of mediation consists of Christ uniting in himself the distinct qualities of 
the nature of divinity and manhood.745 
 
The discussion unfolds in Eranistes, with mediation emerging to engage with, 
and develop, traditional Antiochene exegetical practice of attributing aspects of 
texts to one or other of Christ’s two natures. Applying texts in this manner is 
redeemed from a crude “two Sons” Christology in Nestorius by his insistence 
upon communicatio idiomatum: the Prosopic Union facilitates communication of 
different characteristics of the two natures. Theodoret’s exploration of Christ’s 
humanity mediating the divine nature is far from merely an exegetical device 
                                                 
744 MPG 122; Ettlinger, 1975:122, line 7ff. 
745 So: e„kÒtwj mes…thj çnÒmastai, sun£ptwn ™n ˜autù t¦ diestîta tÍ ˜nèsei tîn fÚsewn, qeot»toj 
lšgw kaˆ ¢nqrwpÒthtoj. MPG 122; Ettlinger, 1975:122 lines 9-10. 
 353
protective of divine nature, but, emphasizes the reality of divine and human 
natures coinhering in the person of the Mediator.746 Eranistes cites Moses as an 
example of one who successfully mediates, through reason, piety and 
beseeching. Orthodoxos responds that Moses was a type of the truth that was to 
come;747 arguing that types do not need to correspond at every juncture with that 
which they signify. This is consistent with Athanasius’s understanding that lives 
correspond to scriptural archetypes.748 An example is  that  Moses, though not of 
divine nature, is called by the Lord “a god” to Pharaoh.749 That to which this type 
refers, i.e. Christ, is by nature, not by analogy, divine and human.  
 
Eranistes’s obstinacy is the stylistic device in the dialogue allowing Orthodoxos to 
demonstrate that the Scriptures use the incomplete as a symbolic precursor to 
that which is perfectly completed in Christ.  
 
Hebrews 6.20 and 7.1-3 assume at this point a significant rôle in the exegetical 
justification of Christology. The texts are applied in the argument specifically to 
Godhead in respect of the lack of genealogy of Melchizedek, and to the humanity 
of Christ according to his priestly function - hence the nature of Christ’s 
priesthood “after the order of Melchizedek”. The humanity is the priestly thing: the 
holy offering of salvation for humanity is made under this human function.750 
                                                 
746 The notion of a real coinherence is closely analogous to Trinitarian formulation. Young 
defends Nestorius’s use of communicatio idiomatum, 1983:238, though her position is revised in 
2003:55-74. 
747 tÚpoj ºn ™ke‹noj tÁj alhqe…aj. MPG 122; Ettlinger, 1975:122, line 12. 
748 Ernest, 2004, identifies a pattern that shows part of Athanasius’s use of Scripture is as a place 
where lives are measured against archetypal characters. For Athanasius the thrust of the meta-
narrative is central, rather than the complex exegesis. Participation in the life of faith is expressed 
concretely and mundanely by the imitation of biblical characters. 
749 Orthodoxos quotes Exodus 7.1. LXX = 'IdoÝ dšdwk£ se qeÕn Faraù; MPG 122; Ettlinger, 
1975:122 line 15ff: 'IdoÝ [g£r f»si] tšqeik£ se qeÕn tù Faraù. 
750 MPG 129; Ettlinger, 1975:127 line 5ff. 
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Melchizedek was dissimilar in many ways from Christ, human but not divine, 
begotten in time not eternally begotten, despite Scripture’s paradoxical witness 
that he was “without father, without mother and without descent”.751 
 
This text has familiar Nestorian parallels with Theodoret’s Christology. Hebrews 
7.3 is used, analogically, to refer to the two natures respectively and not to the 
union (›nwsij). Christ did not have a father according to the flesh, being “born of 
the Holy Virgin alone.”752 Only according to this human aspect is Christ “without 
father.” Then comes the shift, which Theodoret’s thorough two-natures 
Christology requires. The second part of the verse “without mother” clearly does 
not apply to Jesus according to the flesh. Theodoret makes the point on the lips 
of Orthodoxos that it is absurd to propose that the divine nature had a mother. 
Eranistes agrees. Mary is not qeÒtokoj in that she nurtured divinity, even after 
the union - at conception for Eranistes - because that would distort the 
immutable, unconfounded and impassible nature of the divine Logos, thereby 
annulling salvation. The parallel with Nestorius here is unavoidable. Mary is 
CristÒtokoj, and truly Mother through the union of the whole Christ, but not k¦ta 
t¾n qe…an fÚsin mhtšra.753 Orthodoxos explores the image of Melchizedek, 
battling against Eranistes’s pious denial that man can be an image of God.754 
Eranistes argues from a lÒgoj-s¦rx perspective that humanity is not an image 
[e„kën] of God, but made in the image of God, kat' e„kÒna qeoà ™gšneto.755 
Orthodoxos insists that the ›nwsij is the mediatorial facilitator, but that it is human 
nature which possesses the mediatorial function. A single proof text, 1 Cor. 11.7 - 
                                                 
751 Hebrews 7.3. 
752 ™k mÒnhj g¦r ¡g…aj ™genn»qh parqšnou. MPG 125; Ettlinger, 1975:124 line 23. 
753 MPG 125; Ettlinger, 1975:124 line 26. 
754 MPG 127; Ettlinger, 1975:124-5. 
755 MPG 127; Ettlinger, 1975:124-5. 
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“man is the image and glory (e„kèn kaˆ dÒxa) of God”756 - is introduced to gain 
his opponent’s approval. This part of the argument appears to be a 
predominantly Alexandrian – rather than an Antiochene defensiveness of the 
“divinity” of God. Orthodoxos insists upon the presence of God to real human 
nature in Christ. 
 
The force providing dynamism in this debate is that proper discrimination is 
necessary in theology. Theodoret labours the text here because the issue is 
imperative: Orthodoxos is carving into Eranistes’s naïve simplicity an awareness 
that theology works by analogy and approximation.757 Orthodoxos’s 
sophistication ultimately leads Eranistes to admit that “the image has not all the 
qualities of the archetype”758 yet is properly a type, but it is a tedious process and 
a near thing! “Enwsij, though recognized as a theological necessity and truth, is a 
motif to caricature Cyril’s insistence upon it in pietistically indiscriminate ways, 
veiling that which should be uncovered.  
 
Another text, Col. 1.15, provides grounds for exploration of Christ as the one 
“who is the image of the invisible God.”759 This leads into debate about divine 
and human natures of Christ, demonstrating again the necessity of a precise 
theology of two-natures Christology. Eranistes veers to reverential generalities 
asserting only that the Son has all the qualities of the Father. Orthodoxos, as 
                                                 
756 MPG 127; Ettlinger, 1975:125. 
757 Eranistes’ admission that the image works as a type even though the details are not parallel in 
every respect - oÙ kat¦ p£nta, MPG 128; Ettlinger, 1975:126, line 7. Eranistes is depicted as a 
nervous (rather than careful) theologian, wanting, for example, clear and unambiguous 
correspondence in every detail between Moses and Jesus before he would accept Moses as an 
archetype of Christ. 
758 MPG 128; Ettlinger, 1975:126. 
759 “Oj ™stin e„kën toà qeoà toà ¢ort£tou. MPG 128; Ettlinger, 1975:126 lines 12-13. 
 356
Athanasius had done both by applying creatio ex nihilo between the Godhead 
and creation, and establishing two natures in the Son, maintains distinction in the 
Godhead: Pat¾r oÙk œstin uƒÒj.760  
 
Theodoret insists upon differentiation of the persons of the Trinity whilst rejecting 
the assumption common to other dyohypostatic theologians who, desiring to 
maintain ontological distinction, insisted that differentiation meant degrees of 
subordination. Theodoret argues that theological descriptions ‘uncaused’ and 
‘unbegotten’ do not and cannot apply to the union. But contemporary Alexandrian 
emphasis on the transforming power of the divine nature of Christ must not 
distort the differentiated natures of Father, Son and Spirit.  
 
Eranistes maintains that the o„konom…a allows Christians to call Jesus ‘man’: 
the incarnation was real; but it is not appropriate to the divine glory of the Son 
after the passion.761 Orthodoxos counters this reticence, citing New Testament 
references to Christ as ‘man’762 after the resurrection. Inevitably, another lengthy 
rhetorical deviation ensues,763 throughout which Orthodoxos argues that the 
direction of Scripture is vital in understanding its genre.764  
 
                                                 
760 MPG 128; Ettlinger, 1975:126 line 15. 
761 MPG 131; Ettlinger, 1975:128, lines 4ff. 
762 MPG 132; Ettlinger, 1975:128, lines 9-22. 
763 MPG 132; Ettlinger, 1975: 128-9. 
764 The Jews, he argues, did not doubt that Jesus was a man, nor even a good man, but 
according to Jn. 10:32, they sought to stone him for blasphemy - seeking to make himself God. 
[=MPG 133; Ettlinger, 1975:130, line 8]. Eranistes delights in the course of the argument as he 
believes that this clearly demonstrated that Jesus wished to be called God and not man, MPG 
134; Ettlinger, 1975:130. 
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Eranistes’ delight in the example from John’s gospel,765 where Jesus “revealed 
himself to the Jews as God and not man”,766 proves fleeting. The text provides 
clear evidence of Theodoret’s powerful, sophisticated theology in his exegesis of 
Matthew 22:42-44.767  
 
Theodoret argues that Christ “did not deny... but he added...”. Both passages 
explicate both divine and human natures.768 Orthodoxos cites instances where 
Jesus does not reprove people for the appellation “Son of David”. To Eranistes 
these human Christological titles are accepted by Christ because of the incarnate 
Lord’s holy condescension and indulgence to the weakness of the ignorant. They 
are not proper descriptors after Ascension. The argument thus has to focus on 
the nature of the risen Christ.  
 
Theodoret exposes an improper theological duality undergirding his opponents’ 
approach, applying some epithets in the story but disapplying them afterwards. 
Orthodoxos shows Christ’s human body, his scarred hands and pierced feet, 
proves his reality in the appearance narratives. The transformed human body, 
scars and all, is proof of resurrection, not merely the experience of a miraculous 
spiritual encounter. The eating of fish and preparing breakfast are human 
activities, whereby the disciples know Christ’s divine presence. Risen humanity 
mediates divine glory. The risen body has supernatural power to come and go, 
but is no ghost.769 Christ’s real humanity is transfigured with divine nature in a 
distinctive manner after the resurrection, but each episode in the narrative of the 
                                                 
765 John 10:32-33 in MPG 133; Ettlinger, 1975:129. 
766 MPG 133; Ettlinger, 1975:129. 
767 MPG 134; Ettlinger, 1975:130. 
768 MPG 134; Ettlinger, 1975:130. 
769 MPG 137; Ettlinger, 1975:132 line 15. 
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incarnation, from annunciation to ascension and the giving of the Spirit, reveals 
to Orthodoxos, an aspect of the whole truth. Discernment is required in 
understanding how the whole coheres in the union, but the meta-narrative of 
redemption, focused in the life and ministry of the Incarnate Son, is central to 
Theodoret’s theological and scriptural hermeneutics. To the disbelieving Jews 
who think Jesus guilty of blasphemy, Jesus demonstrates his divine nature. To 
the disciples after the resurrection who think they are encountering a 
disembodied soul or divine apparition, Christ demonstrates his humanity.  
 
For Theodoret, the resurrection body is Christ, truly man and truly God. The 
resurrection body reveals the wonder of the o„konom…a: in the face of the 
destructive powers of death, the union remains intact: united with divine nature, 
human nature is secure. The persistence of two natures in the union is 
imperative, and clearly demonstrated in Christ’s resurrection body. There is an 
aesthetic consistency in the o„konom…a through the life, death and resurrection 
of Christ here. The distinctions between natures, and the relation of human and 
divine natures together in the drama of salvation, are consistently evident since 
the union, and remain in his eternal, resurrection life.  
 
The soteriological dimension is that humanity is united with Christ’s humanity for 
ever: in him, without being submerged by an alien (albeit divine) nature, human 
destiny and salvation is assured.770 Christ’s humanity has undergone pain and 
                                                 
770 This is an early stage of a significant soteriological trajectory in Christology. Cf. the 
distinguished persons of the Trinity providing a fuller understanding of human nature and 
salvation in the work of Karl Rahner: “This abbreviation, this code-word for God is man, that is, 
the Son of Man and men, who exist ultimately because the Son of Man was to exist. If God wills 
to be become non-God, man comes to be, that and nothing else, we might say. This of course 
does not mean that man is to be explained in terms of his ordinary everyday life. It means that 
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death. Theodoret’s theological anthropology, in contrast to Cyril’s, does not 
remove humanity from the insecurities of ontological instability, affected by 
context and environment, in life or theological investigation. Yet in the union of 
natures in Christ, a persisting divinity remains immutable, without confusion and 
impassible. Death has not destroyed the union nor achieved confusion. This 
means for Theodoret whereby that is a dynamism is shown in his insistence upon 
¢sugcÚtoj. It does not  
look like a sort of external counterbalance to the unity, always 
threatening to dissolve it again, but shows precisely how it enters 
into the constitution of the united unity as an intrinsic factor, in such 
a way that unity and distinction become mutually conditioning and 
intensifying characteristics, not competing ones.771 
 
For Theodoret, the union is the o„konom…a or ™nanqrèphsij of the Logos taking 
(labèn) flesh.772 Eranistes balks at this, maintaining that there is a very great 
distinction between ¹ s£rkwsij and ¹ ›nwsij. S£rkwsij is the taking of the flesh, 
›nwsij the combination or holding together of two distinct things. This is a turning 
point in the drama of the debate, building to the climax when Theodoret places 
the resolving concept, sun£feia, on Eranistes’ lips.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
man is brought back home to the region of the ever incomprehensible mystery. But he is such a 
mystery. And if God himself is man and remains so for ever, if all theology is therefore eternally 
an anthropology, if man is forbidden to belittle himself, because to do so would belittle God; and if 
this God remains the insoluble mystery, man is for ever the articulate mystery of God.”1966:119-
120. Clearly, union would have to be liberally scattered in Rahner’s work to be completely 
acceptable to Theodoret, but the constant soteriological concern also resonates with Theodoret. 
771  Karl Rahner, “Christ the Mediator: One Person and Two Natures” in McCool, 1975:159. 
772  S£rka gar proslabèn ™sakèqh, MPG 138; Ettlinger, 1975:133, line 7. 
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Sun£feia directly links to argument about the hypostatic union and is a term 
commonly used by Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius. It is criticized by Cyril 
of Alexandria as innovative and he advises that the term should never be 
used,773 though used by Leo the Great similarly to Theodoret’s usage.774 
Although the connotation of “combination” is one which Theodoret would clearly 
resist if that suggested a third reality,775 sun£feia emphasises conjunction here.  
Derivatively it refers to harmony, is a euphemism for sexual union and clearly 
even in its most spiritualized sense emphasises the notion of relationship or 
communion.776  
 
Ironically, sun£feia, rejected by Cyril as weak and leading into error, is introduced 
on the lips of Eranistes. This device allows Orthodoxos to re-examine the 
paradox of how to speak of Christ’s two natures after incarnation, but just one 
pre-existent divine Logos before. 
 
At this central point, Eranistes has admitted that Christ was of two natures, but 
he now backtracks fearfully.777 Orthodoxos asks Eranistes whether ‘of two 
natures’ is a mingling comparable to gilded silver or the blending of silver and 
gold - being purely neither - in electron.778 Should Christ be understood to be 
“blended,” as a toy soldier is made out of tin and lead? Theodoret’s imagery is 
                                                 
773  Paratoàntai mšn t¾n ›nwsin, sun£feia de Ñnom£zousin, ¿n ¨n œcoi tucÕn kaˆ ›teroj tij prÕj 
qšon, æj ™x ¢retÁj kaˆ ¡giasmoà mononoucˆ sundoÚmenoj... sun£ptoito d'¥n kaˆ maqht¾j 
didask£lw. Quod Unus sit Christus. Pusey, VII:334, MPG 75:1253.  
774  In 1 Joh.5:4-8, Ep. 28 MPL 54: 778A.  
775  Cf. Nestorius’s schema in Heracleides where he writes of a prosopic plane or topos, chapter 
5, above. 
776 Lampe, 1961:1308-1310. 
777 MPG 140; Ettlinger, 1975:134 line 5. 
778 Electron is a compound or mixed residue after the smelting of Gold, see the NPNF 3:192, 
where Blomfield Jackson cites Pliny HN xxxiii.23 where electron is a compound of one part silver 
to four of gold. MPG 140; Ettlinger, 1975:134 lines 6-7. 
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deliberately provocative, leaving no alternative but a judgment that mingling is a 
deviation to be rejected. Two pure things blend into impurity. Theodoret claims 
that this solution to the problem of mediation has more in common with Arian and 
Apollinarian resolutions than Athanasius’s. Unless the properties of each nature 
are held undiminished after the union, there can be no mediation. Orthodoxos’s 
earlier term is worth recalling: Christ does not repudiate, but adds to. The term 
rejected by Cyril, but placed innocently on Eranistes’s lips is an important one, 
and for all its casual appearance, it is a structurally significant move in the drama 
of the text.  
 
Sun£feia is a term of relationship and communion. These are concepts 
paramount to Theodoret’s understanding of mediation in Christology. Sun£feia 
avoids mutation or change. The taking of flesh by that which is divine was free 
from change (tropÁj).779  
 
Christ’s divinity is true, remaining immutable, unconfounded and impassible. To 
be otherwise would run counter to the theological and cosmological foundation 
that Athanasius had laid in his application of creatio ex nihilo to Christology. True 
humanity is not sacrificed or distorted but co-exists sacramentally with the divine 
nature in perfect communion. The perfect humanity of Jesus is the renewed 
e„kèn of God in human being – the means of divine mediation, human salvation 
as it is the locus of Christ’s priestly function. The conjunction of each nature 
without confusion or mutation (trop») ensures that both are preserved, held with 
integrity, free from danger of distortion in the union.  
                                                 
779 MPG 144; Ettlinger, 1975:136 lines 32-33. 
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 Theodoret’s Christology does not postulate a prosopic plane of union as a locus 
for the union as Nestorius does. Theodoret’s is an attractive expression of 
Antichene Christology, exhibiting powerful logic and attempting to apply the 
distinctions of created and divine natures to the incarnate Christ in a manner 
consistent with Athanasius’s method. Theodoret conceives of mediation in a 
fundamentally different sense from the Apollinarian tradition which requires 
blending, and the contemporary Alexandrian tradition which, in Cyril and 
Dioscorus, identified salvation as divinizing participation. All of these traditions 
laid claim to Athanasius. It is now appropriate to evaluate the degree of 
Athanasius’s influence upon Theodoret. 
6.5: The Influence Of Athanasius In Theodoret’s Christology 
Athanasius’s influence is claimed by Apollinarius, Cyril and Theodoret. 
Theodoret’s Eranistes builds almost on patristic citation, establishing twin poles 
of distinction between natures at all times in the union, and their koinwn…a within 
that union. Theodoret upholds his Christology as Athanasian against what he 
considers to be inadequate Christological models. This conclusion evaluates how 
Theodoret saw Athanasius’s position, and claimed to be an expositor of it. The 
question of how far Athanasius would have recognized himself in Theodoret’s 
Christological construct, is reserved until the exploration of these Christological 
trajectories is complete.780 
 
Theodoret depicts Apollinarius’s followers’ work to be as dangerous a heresy as 
that of Arius. Thus Theodoret connects them because although their 
                                                 
780 See the conclusion to this thesis, below.  
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Christological starting point is from different sides of the ontological divide of 
human and divine natures, he considers that they distort both natures in Christ 
into a third entity, a hybrid, with devastating soteriological consequences. 
Theodoret reacts against the notion of blended natures as theologically 
irresponsible because a blended nature, the product of divinity and humanity, is a 
third, distinct and deviant (trop») nature. Apollinarius-inspired theological models’ 
improper insistence that the ›nwsij blends the natures actually prevents 
mediation in Theodoret’s estimate, because the mediatorial function is Christ’s 
humanity. The union effects salvation because it is, for Theodoret, the perfect 
communion of humanity and divinity.  
 
Apollinarius’s (and his followers’) sublimation of the distinctly human element of 
Jesus’ being are dismissed as creating a deviation. The irreverent image of a die-
cast toy soldier of smelted tin and lead781 is poignant and is applied equally to 
Arianism as Apollinarianism. Hanson782 outlines some ‘neo-Arian’ solutions to the 
Christological issue of in, for example, Aetius of Coele-Syria, which echo some of 
the arguments used in Eranistes. Aetius is called (probably metaphorically) a 
bronze-smith, (kamineut»j) who - according to Epiphanius’ Syntagmation - 
argued that God could not have taken flesh in the womb of a woman. Aetius’s 
solution is not that natures co-existed but that there was another, lesser, derived 
divinity. Homoian Arianism emphasized the particular nature of the creature of 
the Son. These developments are not, in Theodoret’s estimate, far from the 
consequences of Apollinarian Christology. Indeed Theodoret identified a link 
between Apollinarius’s theology and homoian Arianism: a common failure to 
                                                 
781 MPG 140; Ettlinger, 1975:134 lines 6-7. 
782 1988: 599ff. 
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grasp the significance of the ultimate distinction between divine and human 
natures - established by Athanasius in his consistent application of creatio ex 
nihilo to Christology. 
 
It is also clear, amid all the distancing from Apollinarianism in its contemporary 
forms, that Theodoret is unpolemical enough to refrain from equating Apollinarius 
with his followers. At the end of the each of the florilegia in the dialogues, 
Theodoret shows that even Apollinarius really knew that the divine nature of the 
Logos was immutable, unconfounded and impassible.  
 
The relationship with Athanasius is complex. Though there is a conventional 
hagiography which makes claiming him politically astute, there is a good deal of 
Christological continuity between them. For example, in the discussion above on 
the rejection of trop» in the incarnation, there is clear continuity with Athanasius. 
In CA III,783 Athanasius corresponds to the universal patristic rejection of trop» as 
alien to divine nature. The incarnation did not bring mutation to divine nature: 
oÙk ™peid¾ gšgonen ¥nqrwpoj... ™tr£ph.  
 
But if changes to divine nature are rejected by both Athanasius and Theodoret, 
there is dissonance over the place of human nature in divine mediation. 
Athanasius emphasises the divine power of the Logos sovereign in the body of 
Jesus. He does not postulate the replacement of any part of humanity;784 it is the 
divine power that preserves the body. Athanasius’s connection of essential and 
                                                 
783 I am attributing this to Athanasius here – even though Kannengiesser has made a strong case 
for Apollinarian authorship – because this is Theodoret’s attribution. I.48 = MPG 26.112C. 
784 Athanasius does not specify - in contrast to Irenaeus - that there is a human soul of Christ. 
This would undermine the unity of Christ’s person, and be more than likely be misconstrued by 
his Arian opponents. 
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economic Christology understands salvation for the Christian to be a similar 
renewal of human nature by the divine Logos in Christ.785 Christian life is an 
extension of the incarnation: for Theodoret,   
salvation did not mean the transformation of man into God 
[qeopo…hsij], nor the realization of a natural kinship between the 
human and the divine, but rather the union of man with God by 
participation, neither God nor man sacrificing their integrity, but 
man becoming the image of God by being made by him.786  
  
“Participation” here is a term which correctly explicates Theodoret’s stretching 
beyond simple co-existence or juxtaposition in his term sun£feia to describe 
Christ’s two natures. Communion, koinwn…a, is interchangeable with sun£feia in 
Theodoret’s conceptuality. Quoting Athanasius, he maintains that this emphasis 
is of Athanasian origin: 
 
Life does not die but gives life to the dead: the Godhead of the 
Word is immutable and unvarying.787 
 
The familiar abbreviation of Athanasius’ ontological soteriology is “he became 
man in order that we might become divine”.788 Consequently, this soteriology of 
the transformation of human nature appears to fit with Cyril’s Christological 
priority, focusing upon one divinizing nature of the Son. It seems far from 
                                                 
785 Roldanus, 1968:98-124, ‘La recréation de l’homme à l’image de Dieu’. 
786 Young, 1983:275. 
787 Florilegium 28 of Erasnistes Dialogue III, citing Athanasius’ Sermo Maior de Fide  [Schwarz, 
p22.6-19, no 62]. 
788 aÙtÕj g¦r ™nhnqrèphsen †na ¹me‹j qeopoihqîmen. De Incarnatione I. 54. 
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Theodoret’s stress on both natures in communion in Christ as a model of 
humanity’s eternal relationship to God in Christ.  
 
However, we are helped by Theodoret’s astuteness in choosing a less 
problematic ambiguous logion to illustrate something of the dynamic subtlety in 
Athanasius’s thought. Florilegium 25 of Dialogue III cites a theologically explicit 
and sophisticated couplet to describe the scheme of Athanasius’s Christological 
soteriology:   
 
 For the humanity of the Logos suffered 
 so that we might be empowered to participate in the divinity of the   
 Logos. 
 
 “A g¦r tÕ ¢nqrèpinon œpace toà l®gou 
 †na ¹me‹j tÁj toà l®gou qeÒthtoj metasce‹n dunhqèmen.789 
 
The suffering humanity of the Logos is the mediator of humanity’s being 
gracefully given the possibility of participating in the divine nature of the Logos.  
 
There is, therefore, a common theological coherence between Athanasius and 
Theodoret, as well as differences of emphasis. Both understand qeopo…hsij as 
something other than assumption into the uncreated divine nature. It is being 
united with, and remaining in, the Son. Christians participate in Christ’s true 
divine nature, but do not possess it as he does. Christians participate in the true 
                                                 
789 MPG 292; Ettlinger, 1975:235 lines 10-11 = Ep. Ad Epictetum 6, MPG  26.1060C. 
 367
divine nature in Christ because of the shared human nature. For both Athanasius 
and Theodoret, this participation is different from “owning” as a right. To be ‘in 
Christ’ means humanity’s being is placed in Christ so that his humanity may act 
in a priestly function, and be the mediator of divine nature. Participation thus 
depends upon distinctions remaining within the union. Neither Athanasius nor 
Theodoret dilute divine nature but both re-establish the created e„kèn into its 
proper place and nature. Neither envisages salvation as being sublimated into a 
pool of divinity. Athanasius does stress, though, the active, transforming and 
preserving power of qeopo…hsij, displacing everything that is human but which 
is not found in Christ. This is partly in consequence of the particular emphasis 
and dynamic that comes from his application of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in 
soteriology and eschatology.  
 
The transforming power of the incarnation and its extension through baptism, 
Eucharist and the pneumatic indwelling in Christians, is clearly an emphasis of 
Cyril and Theodoret’s theological and ecclesiastical opponents. But the function 
of human nature as the mediator of true divine presence, thus essential to the 
salvation that divine nature endows, is achieved in Theodoret by both natures 
being held in an eternal integrity, communion or sun£feia. Theodoret’s questions 
remain an important Christological and soteriological critique of the Christology 
argued by Cyril and his successors, and are perhaps the fullest and most 
persuasive statement of Antiochene Christology. 
 
The significance of Theodoret’s claims upon Athanasius, and the use of texts in 
his Florilegia, establish that Theodoret’s Christology is a trajectory with its roots 
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in Athanasius’s own concerns. Most especially, it is the emphasis that 
Athanasius placed upon creatio ex nihilo in the Christological enterprise against 
the Arians that explains this dependence by Theodoret upon the Alexandrian 
hero. Athanasius’s emphasis on basic ontological incompatibility between 
created and uncreated being gives dynamism to Theodoret’s concern to maintain 
the two natures distinctly. Athanasius’s application of creatio ex nihilo in the 
different context of the refutation of Arius’s assertion that the Son is a creature, is 
used theologically to explicate and justify the Antiochene tradition’s concerns. 
Like Cyril against Nestorius, Theodoret claims identification with Athanasius, not 
merely as a rhetorical strategy (Wessel, 2004), but ideologically. 
 
Most significantly, the Christological discussion illustrates that there is a 
sophisticated shift into focusing on the Christian’s participation in the divine life of 
the Son as salvation, however that participation is described. In the Son, 
humanity is related to the Father and receives the Holy Spirit. Soteriology is no 
longer restricted in its concern to portraying the Logos as a stage in the hierarchy 
of being, a connection with the beyond-being-God, but is explicitly driven by a 
more thoroughgoing Trinitarian concern.  
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7: CONCLUSIONS 
TRACING THE GOD-MAN 
 
Whence did the wondrous mystic art arise, 
Of painting speech and speaking to the eyes, 
That we by tracing magic lines are taught 
How to embody and to colour thought? (Massey, 1763). 
 
This dissertation has traced these “lines” of the development of Christological 
description, viewing the discussion through the prisms of mediation and creatio 
ex nihilo. The analogy of tracing is a helpful one in recapitulating the nature of 
this enquiry, and evaluating and justifying its methodology. OED (1989:2090 sub 
pages 332-335) offers a selection of meanings for trace, and it is appropriate at 
this point to review in which senses this dissertation “traces” the development 
and impact of religious ideas and their expression. A trace is a way or path by 
which anything develops: a progression or itinerary. The analysis of how 
theologians before Athanasius constructed Christological models, showing how 
mediation and creation provided a movement in these models has been 
considered. Trace meaning “a line, file or train of persons” adds the dimension of 
the input both of different personalities and of localized and changing contexts in 
this tracery. Trace also comes to mean a series of steps (in dancing), a distance 
or measure (as in Athanasius’s assertion that there is not a trace between Father 
and Son in the latter’s eternal procession). This dissertation shows the 
development of a series of steps in ideas, and explores emergent ground rules in 
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the Christological pericèrhsij by critically evaluating key footprints (another 
meaning of trace) left in the struggle between miahypostatic and dyohypostatic 
Christological models. A trace is also a vestige of evidence indicating a former 
presence, existence or action – an indication of a former context. This thesis sets 
Athanasius’s achievement in the context of earlier thinkers – especially Origen – 
who viewed the Logos in terms of a Platonic “One-Many” mediator. Mediation in 
this intellectual environment worked by a trace (or path) of overlapping 
hierarchical relationships. The dissertation has responded to a serious critique of 
the over-Platonizing of Origen (Edwards, 2002), but shows that even if the 
material creation is ex nihilo for Origen, he views the Spiritual creation as eternal 
– responding to Celsus’s critique by asserting that because God is Creator, he 
must always have been Creator, and not begun a process alien to his being at a 
certain, temporal point. I am aware of a danger in reading Origen in too 
anticipatory a role in this dissertation by exploring the transformation of his 
thought: but I have attempted to respond to modern readings of Origen rather 
than construct too Platonic a caricature. The result is a picture of Origen which is 
nearer Athanasian and Cappadocian thought than might be the case – but the 
abandonment of his hierarchical hermeneutical framework is nevertheless 
provocative in Christological developments in this dissertation. A real sense of a 
shift from Origen’s hierarchy should not be, and is not, obscured for all Edwards’s 
(2002) achievement.  
 
A trace is also a mark or impression made upon the mind – and the provocation 
through Arius that this hierarchy is incompatible with a biblical cosmology 
establishes a gulf between God and all else. This is such an indelible mark in the 
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development of Christology, as this dissertation traces responses to the 
challenge to Christian theology of alienating God and establishing him in such 
monadically-construed terms. It is a ground plan of emergent responses to this 
assimilated feature through an analysis of what such an environmental change 
does to the concept of mediation in Christological formulation. It has identified 
and reinforced the significance of Athanasius as a figure who (with others) not 
only recognized changed Christological conditions, but established fundamental 
methods for Christian theology and was reckoned by successive generations (of 
both Alexandrian and Antiochene pedigrees) as pivotal in this development. His 
agenda establishes the divine identity of the Logos (“above” an ontological gulf, 
as it were), creating a new method of articulating mediation both ontologically 
and soteriologically. It has been shown how Athanasius develops Irenaean 
insights so as to enable a means of speaking of God’s immanence and ultimate 
transcendence in Trinitarian vocabulary. This makes Athanasius structurally 
centrally significant in Christianity – as is witnessed in a variety of ways which 
require there to be communion between divine and created natures in 
Christology: this finds expression in doctrinal articulation, Scriptural exegesis, 
emerging sacramental theology and Christian Spirituality.  
 
The major contribution of this thesis is that this particular reading highlights the 
dynamic which mediation played in this development – or prefiguring what will 
become essential in Christianity – and it has evidenced Athanasius’s 
achievement as understood to be absolutely fundamental to and ultimately 
characteristic of orthodox Christianity. It traces this huge shift, diverse responses 
to it, and the enormous and sustained impact of Athanasius upon Christian 
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thought. In terms of particular contributions of this study, it has shown that 
Athanasius’s impact is core to both miahypostatic and dyohypostatic 
Christologies that come after him. It demonstates the convergence and 
correlation of Athanasius with Apollinarius, and recognizes the mutual influence 
of each other’s thought, and offers something of a newly nuanced reading of 
Apollinarius as rehabilitating ÐmooÚsioj in a non-Marcellan manner. The 
dissertation has also shed new Athanasian light upon the terminological 
confusion between Cyril and Nestorius by providing evidence that both reached 
to (and found) usages of technical terms in different pockets of the Athanasian 
corpus. In particular, Nestorius finds examples of double application of Scripture 
in CA I and II, where Athanasius accounts for passages of Scripture referring to 
Jesus’s suffering, hunger or ignorance as referring to the humanity of the 
Incarnate Son. This falls foul of Cyril’s insistence upon communicatio idiomatum 
in Orthodox theology – which he justifies by a reliance upon CA III & IV. 
Nestorius does thus cast himself as Athanasius, whilst Cyril depicts him as the 
new Arius. Nestorius has identified Athanasius’s nuanced application of creatio 
ex nihilo: the gulf or cwrismÒj is held together and bridged in the person of Christ 
rather than lying between Father and Son (or in earlier language God and 
Logos). This dissertation has shown that the Antiochenes are those who continue 
this Christological application of creatio ex nihilo while Cyril obscures it. 
 
A trace is a line or figure drawn or copied often through opaque paper to provide 
a copy, and, from this, an investigation into the origins, of, for example, a 
telephone call or electronic communication. This thesis has attempted to trace 
the development of ideas, using as lanterns the ideas of creatio ex nihilo and 
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mediation. They have provided enough light to penetrate the opaque 
environment and show new detail which establishes Athanasius’s significance in 
both Orthodox and Western Christian traditions.790 My style is not that, however, 
of Enlightenment confidence, identifying strict cause and effect. The methodology 
is necessarily more artistic, requiring imagination and, at times, conjecture. The 
result is, however, a significant refinement to understanding the sources and 
significance of Athanasius’s thought. If there is a major weakness with the 
method, it is that there is perhaps a danger of seeing Athanasius everywhere. 
The evidence produced and analysed here identifies a greater danger, however, 
that of not seeing him everywhere. 
 
Tracing has highlighted Athanasius’s signficance in the radical restructuring of 
Christology and Christian vocabulary after the collapse of the influence of 
Platonic hierarchy in Christological expression after Arius: 
 
If the renewal of philosophical research… needs to be undertaken 
in a radical fashion, it is not enough to “patch up” or complete an 
already existent philosophy by integrating certain current 
problems... it is first necessary to rediscover the starting point for 
philosophical research beyond this rupture (Philippe, 1999:6). 
 
The two initial responses, of Arius and Alexander differed toto caelo. Arius’s 
direct application of the doctrine to the Logos, whether or not it was “driven” by 
                                                 
790 It is my intention to respond to this research by engaging upon further tracing of the 
Christological themes in Oriental Churches, particularly Nestorian and Armenian traditions. I am 
grateful to Robert Thomson for suggesting this and for his pointing to characteristics of the 
transformation of Athanasius in catenae in the Armenian tradition (1965:47-69). 
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soteriological concern (Gregg & Groh, 1981) or a conservative biblicist 
monotheistic protectionism (Young, 1983) is naïve, and his Christological 
application of the argument undifferentiated and awkward. Alexander’s response, 
that of ignoring this application, reveals a discomfort with the argument. His 
rebuttals of Arius avoided the pertinent discussion, but his forthright successor 
accepted the ontological premises of Arius, that there is an impenetrable gulf 
between created and divine natures, and constructions of the idea of salvation or 
participation in Christ upon the basis of some a priori ontological connection with 
divine being was groundless. Athanasius’s development of this idea and its use 
against the soteriological Christological solutions of Arius and other dyophysite 
Christians is the significant thing. He does not achieve a balanced integration of 
traditional Alexandrian and Irenaean concerns in a smooth synthesis, but his 
method reflects a serious integration of ontological concerns viewed through a 
framework dominated by what is now understood to be Scripture’s prime 
differentiation of all things and emphasis upon divine transcendence including a 
free presence to the world (Young, 1991; Anatolios, 1998; 2001). Athanasius’s 
labours resolve what he considered to be the centre of Christological confusion 
by establishing a single overarching theological description, which attempted to 
describe closely the relation of the Father to the Son, and of divine nature’s 
relation to created nature in the Son. This nuanced, “contrapuntal” application of 
creatio ex nihilo brought the concept of participation in and mediation of both 
ontological realities into the foreground. Singularity of hypostasis at this juncture 
refers primarily to the uniqueness of divine nature, which Father and Logos (and 
– ultimately – the Spirit) partake. Nicaea’s use of a tainted term ÐmooÚsioj, is 
pragmatically chiefly avoided by Athanasius until the mid-fourth century, because 
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of its controversial status after Nicaea (and possibly because of previous 
arguments over the meaning of the term791), and its association with Gnosticism 
(Hanson, 1988:191; Ricken, 1969:335-6) and its identification with Marcellus. In 
Athanasius’s eventful career, two dimensions are of particular significance in this 
reading of the period: firstly the clarity of his ontological-soteriological reworking 
of Eusebius’s apologetic in CG-DI; and his more complex and detailed exegetical 
engagement with dyohypostatic arguments in his anti-Arian literature.  
 
Athanasius’s achievement begets enormous conflict, however, as Part Three 
evaluated in detail. The linguistic conflict reflects a profound reaction to this major 
shift in conceiving God’s relation to humanity and the nature of the soul. The 
concept of participating in ontologically polar opposite realms (divine and 
created) prompts concern and discussion about the Son’s nature and argument 
about where to locate his personality and identity. Athanasius does not reflect 
upon the theological significance of the Son’s whole humanity – its significance is 
that it is assumed. Apollinarius and Cyril, in subtly different styles, attempted to 
                                                 
791 Athanasius’s de Sent. Dion and Letter to the African Bishops disentangle local devotion to 
Dionysius of Alexandria from markedly “Arian” patterns of Christology: “it was indeed to remove 
this slur on his predecessor in the see of Alexandria that Athanasius wrote” de Sent. Dion., 
Hanson, 1988:72. In Ad Afros, Athanasius reduces the complex dialectic of the Dionysian 
correspondence to a “somewhat disingenuous” endorsement of ÐmooÚsioj. (Hanson, 1988:192). 
Confusion is compounded because ÐmooÚsioj was explicitly refuted in the Council of Antioch 
when Paul of Samosata was deposed and condemned. “Athanasius is embarrassed by this 
argument. He… cannot deny that they damned the epithet ÐmooÚsioj as applied to the Son. His 
way of resolving the difficulty is to argue that Paul and the upholders of the Nicene formula in 
Athanasius’ day used the word in different senses. The almost insoluble difficulty is to determine 
in what sense Paul used ÐmooÚsioj. Athanasius represents him as describing the word as 
unsuitable in a kind of reductio ad absurdum; he quotes one sentence from Paul himself: ‘If Christ 
did not derive from man, he is therefore homoousios with the Father and there must be three 
ousiai; one chief and the other two deriving from it.’ [De Synodis 45.4] A few years later Hilary 
attempts to meet the same argument against the use of ÐmooÚsioj, that ‘our fathers, when Paul 
of Samosata was declared a heretic, even repudiated homoousion’, but the reason which he 
gives for this repudiation is that the word to them spelt Sabellianism. He clearly believes that Paul 
himself approved of ÐmooÚsioj [Hilary, de Synodis 81, 86, 87, 88: his reason is quia per hanc 
unius essentiae nuncupationem solitarium et unicum sibi esse patrem et filium praedicabat, 
which, presumably, means ‘because through this epithet of “of one substance” he was teaching 
that the Father and the Son were a single and sole individual’.(81)]” Hanson, 1988:193-4; Ayres 
2004a. 
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explicate issues from Athanasius’s silence, the latter by claims upon the 
Athanasian corpus – especially the third and fourth CA – now viewed as probably 
Apollinarian in origin. Apollinarius and Cyril accept mediation as imperative, and 
their miahypostatic resolutions provoke sustained reflection, opposition and 
clarification from representatives of dyohypostatic Christological traditions – in 
Nestorius and Theodoret. This has guided the selection of the characters for this 
thesis. I intend to revisit Marcellus – whose motivation and method I believe are 
less radically influenced by Athanasius – for Athanasian influence and claim, but 
that important endeavour properly belongs outside this thesis. 
 
Apollinarius’s theological creativity in KMP, and his variations on the double 
homoousion in De Unione significantly rehabilitate the centrality of ÐmooÚsioj in 
Christological discussion (contra Marcellan usage), at the cost of his reputation. 
Apollinarius draws hostile fury from dyohypostatic theologians at Nicaea’s 
perceived innovations, even though he argues for a single Øpost£sij of the Son, 
but, (unlike Marcellus) a triple hypostasis in the Trinity.792 Athanasius’s 
reputation, however, benefits from this casualty for the miahypostatic cause, 
establishing an “Athanasian” miahypostatic model which holds in tension a view 
of salvation and Christian life which is redemptive in its emphasis, but which 
holds ontological Christological mediation as foundational. Far from being 
                                                 
792 Contra the Egyptian tropici against whom Athanasius wrote Ad Serapionem, in the 350s-360s, 
and conservatives who persisted in opposing miahypostatic language, led by Eusebius, asserting 
that the Spirit is brought into being by the Son, ›n dš ti tîn di¦ toà Øioà genomšnon tugc£nei 
Eccles Theol iii.6.3, Klostermann & Hansen, 1972:164. Kelly Spoerl (1994:545-568) notes that in 
this section (Eccles Theol iii.4-6), Eusebius additionally asserts that the Spirit is superior to every 
intellectual being, and thus (because there is no neutral place) a fully divine member of the 
Trinity. The consensus of scholarship is more reticent about attributing a tri-hypostatic Trinity to 
Apollinarius than has been argued here, significantly cf. André de Halleux, 1984, for a distinction 
in Apollinarius’s language between hypostasis and tÕ Øfest£nai, (subsistent). Though 
Apollinarius describes a single hypostasis of the Son, he applies this term also to the Father and 
the Holy Spirit to urge their distinctness and the eternity of the divine persons (against the quasi-
Sabellianism of Marcellus), de Halleux, 1984:329, 345.  
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replaced by the notion of union as a central motif, mediation provides a 
distinctively Christian dynamic in the notion of union with the divine: Athanasius’s 
emphasis upon union with the divine for ontological stability is thoroughly 
dependent upon the Incarnation. This study has shown that, despite the import of 
Cyril of Alexandria in the development of this Christological method, Wickham 
goes too far in his claim that 
 
The patristic understanding of the Incarnation owes more to Cyril of 
Alexandria than to any other individual theologian. The classic 
picture of Christ the God-man, as it is delineated in the formulae of 
the Church from the Council of Chalcedon onwards… is the picture 
Cyril persuaded Christians was the true, the only credible, Christ 
[1983:xi]. 
 
Cyril represents one means of expounding the Christological significance of the 
paradigm shift achieved by Athanasius.  
 
The persistence of the idea of mediation in Athanasius is pressed home by his 
application of creatio ex nihilo: the incarnation is not simply as a device for the 
relation - or reversion - of the One and the Many, but the foundation for his 
theological anthropology, Christology and ecclesiology.793 Mediation functions in 
this argument to emphasize the Son’s ontological participation in the Father’s 
                                                 
793 Cf. Young, 1991:139-151, makes a case for the primacy of Jewish and Christian emphasis on 
the transcendence of God rather than Platonic philosophy: “God was not subject to necessity but 
free, and that was a better and more biblical grounding for his transcendence and impassibility 
than a mere adoption of Platonic axioms. He was conceived as containing all things while not 
being himself contained: thus even before Plotinus, indeed in Irenaeus, the concept of his infinity 
began to be grasped” (1991:151). 
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nature. Redemption is constructed as the Son giving to Christians his own divine 
life. Athanasius’s use of creatio ex nihilo attempts to establish the Son’s 
necessary divinity. Sustained attacks upon Apollinarius, by Eusebius and others, 
were thinly veiled attacks upon Athanasius, who was careful to distinguish 
between Apollinarius and Apollinarians when distancing himself from 
formulations not explicitly expressed in Apollinarius’s writings. 
 
In the fifth century, though, Nestorius’s approach is significantly different from the 
dyohypostatic reaction to Athanasius and his achievement in the previous 
generation. The Antiochene perspective was rhetorically depicted by Cyril as a 
continuation of the Arian impiety, with Nestorius especially as the new Arius, but 
it sought the theological significance of Christ’s humanity, using this as a cipher 
to discuss mediation and soteriology. Theodoret of Cyrus especially clarifies the 
Antiochene tradition; and we have observed how all claimed Athanasius as core 
to their Christological concerns.  
 
This trajectory has illustrated the inter-relation of ontological and soteriological 
concerns, their Christological focus, and the way in which Christology is the locus 
for reflections upon theological anthropology with the notion of mediation 
moderating the debate – a control which is central to the construction of 
acceptable Christological vocabulary and grammar in this formative period. It is 
Athanasius, rather than Cyril, who must have central place: 
 
Only Augustine, if the Reformation may be allowed to count as a 
consequence of following to their conclusions his leading thoughts 
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about divine grace and human freedom, has had a comparable 
significance, at once religious and political, unitive and unwittingly 
divisive (Wickham (of Cyril), 1983:xi).  
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Post script on the parallel to the Thalia in Ep. Ad Aeg. 12 
 
In the above discussions around the texts attributed to Arius, this thesis follows 
the models offered by Stead (1978) and Williams (2001), not least because these 
attempt to steer away from the conventional antagonistic depiction of Arius and 
Arianism (Wiles, 2001:5). Bardy’s reconstruction of fragments 17 and 18, 
however, from Ad Ep. Aeg. 12 and Marcellus’s Epistle to Julius respectively is 
rejected by Stead (1978:23) because of the clearly polemical nature of these 
texts. Yet it is significant to note that Ep. Ad Aeg. offers a parallel to the text in 
CA 1.5 up until çnom£sqai mÒnon sof…an ka… lÒgon. In Ep. Ad Aeg. the 
accusation follows that the Logos was made for the sake of humanity, not 
humanity for the sake of and by the Logos, as an example of archetypal Arian 
impiety:  
 
 P£lin tš fasin, Óti OÙc ¹m©j œktise di' ™ke‹non, ¢ll' ™ke‹non di' ¹m©j 
 
Newman (1833) refers to this as an authentic unpacking of the dynamics of 
Arius’s thought driven by Athanasius’s specific arguments against Arian 
opponents. But Lyman (1993b) rightly is reserved about the construction of 
Athanasius’s opponents in such terms. Stead therefore rejects this reading as 
prejudicial on Bardy’s part, and urges that this is Athanasius’s own deduction 
which he is presenting to his opponents (1978:31). The worship of a work as God 
(Ad Ep. Aeg. 13) is reminiscent of CA  1.8; 2.43; 3.16 (Wiles, 2001:8), but I am 
following the argument that Athanasius is interjecting his detracting thesis into his 
retelling of Arian heresy at this point and therefore omitting it from the discussion, 
 411
 412
though it may yet be shown to have a Sitz-im-Leben which does have an 
authentic Arian echo, and illustrative of soteriological priorities in dyohypostatic 
Christology. 
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